urkey is, so far, one of the biggest winners of the Ukraine war. Ankara is carefully balancing its economic ties with Russia with the political and military support it continues providing to Kyiv. As a result, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is among the top five most popular foreign leaders in Ukraine, while his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin reportedly aims to turn Turkey into a new European natural gas hub. But can the Russian leader achieve such an ambitious geopolitical goal?
Prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Germany was Europe's biggest gas consumer and importer. It used to get Russian natural gas from the Nord Stream 1 pipeline, as well as from JAGAL (Jamal-Gas-Anbindungsleitung)—a German section of the Yamal-Europe pipeline. Berlin was also hoping to start receiving gas flows through the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, but the Ukraine war has ended German energy ambitions.
Now that the Nord Stream 1 pipeline is no longer operational as a result of the recent explosion, and Russia often closes the Yamal pipeline for maintenance, the only stabile gas supply routes to Europe remain those that are passing through Ukraine, and the TurkStream pipeline. Being quite aware of such a favorable geopolitical position, Turkey seeks to become a gas hub to redirect Russian natural gas flows to other markets.
"We will create a hub here with Turkish gas coming from Russia,” said Erdoğan on 20 October 2022, emphasizing that Putin, in his own words, announced to the world that “Europe can get its natural gas from Turkey.”
Given that Turkey is not a gas producer itself, gas coming from Russia cannot be Turkish. Even if Turkey becomes a gas hub, it will still be Russian natural gas that Ankara will try to re-export to the European Union. But Turkey can do that only if the EU agrees to purchase the de facto Russian gas from Turkey. At this point, the Turkish government has no information on whether Europe, amid its energy divorce from Russia, is willing to import Russian gas from the Turkish hub.
But why is the Kremlin interested in such a risky geopolitical and geoeconomic project that would involve Turkey—a country that has historically been Russia’s enemy, and that openly supports Moscow’s opponent in Ukraine?
"It is easier for us to work with Turkey. President Erdoğan is a man of his word... and it is easier for us to control the Black Sea," said Putin on 31 October 2022.
Still, it remains unclear why the Russian leader, who was in the past seen by some Western authors as “a geopolitical genius,” was not aware of all the risks that the construction of the Nord Stream pipelines could bring. Now that it has become obvious that Moscow can no longer use the Baltic Sea as the primary transportation route for gas supplies to Europe, the Kremlin started looking for alternatives.
There is no doubt that turning Turkey into a new gas hub would additionally increase energy ties between the two frenemies. More importantly, given that Russian gas supplies to Europe have significantly decreased, and it remains highly uncertain when and if at all the Nord Stream pipeline will be repaired, a new hub could potentially bring additional income for Russia’s state-owned gas corporation Gazprom.
The problem, however, is that in southern Europe there is no such energy infrastructure as in northern parts of the continent, which means that southeastern European nations are unlikely to start immediately receiving large volumes of Russian gas. But in the mid-term, Turkey could develop a powerful gas infrastructure on its territory, which means Ankara could eventually become an intermediary in gas sales, especially given that it already imports natural gas from other producers, namely Azerbaijan and Iran. Thus, Turkey could turn into a very important player in the gas market, which is why some Turkish experts insist Ankara should additionally diversify its gas imports and become a regional price benchmark. Such a policy would allow the Turkish government to at least partially stabilize its inflation-hit economy.
It is, therefore, not surprising that Turkey, following the Nord Stream pipelines explosions, has strengthened the protection of the TurkStream pipeline, and that Erdoğan actively supports Putin’s gas policy vis-à-vis Turkey. The Russian president, for his part, hopes that European countries, despite the EU’s decision to end its dependence on Russian energy, will continue purchasing Russian gas. But Alexey Belogoryev, deputy principal director on energy studies at the Russian independent Institute for Energy and Finance Foundation, is skeptical about such an idea. In his view, in order to turn Turkey into a gas hub, it is necessary not only to build TurkStream 2 pipeline—initially proposed by Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller in 2019—but also a new pipeline that would pass through EU members Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary. Under the current geopolitical circumstances, Brussels is unlikely to give the green light for such a project.
The Russian expert argues that Turkey as a new gas hub is a project that depends on both the EU’s de facto approval, as well as on the political fate of President Erdoğan. In other words, if he does not stay in power after 2023, chances for Putin and Erdoğan to implement their ambitious goal will remain rather slim.
But even if the two leaders eventually reach a final deal on a gas hub in Turkey, it remains highly uncertain which companies would build the infrastructure. The construction contractor for both strings of the TurkStream gas pipeline’s offshore section was a Swiss-Dutch enterprise Allseas Group. As long as anti-Russian sanctions—imposed on Moscow by the EU following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—remain in place, European firms will almost certainly not participate in any projects where Russia is involved.
Finally, it would take years to build a gas hub in Turkey. Meanwhile, Europe will almost certainly learn to live without Russian gas, which means that it may never be interested in another Putin’s geopolitical project.
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Will Turkey Really Become a Natural Gas Hub?
Istanbul, Turkey. Photo by Meg Jerrard via Unsplash.
November 11, 2022
Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly wants to use Turkey as a new hub for getting Russian natural gas to Europe, given Turkey’s favorable geopolitical position. This ambition hinges on EU approval as well as the political fate of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, writes Nikola Mikovic.
T
urkey is, so far, one of the biggest winners of the Ukraine war. Ankara is carefully balancing its economic ties with Russia with the political and military support it continues providing to Kyiv. As a result, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is among the top five most popular foreign leaders in Ukraine, while his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin reportedly aims to turn Turkey into a new European natural gas hub. But can the Russian leader achieve such an ambitious geopolitical goal?
Prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Germany was Europe's biggest gas consumer and importer. It used to get Russian natural gas from the Nord Stream 1 pipeline, as well as from JAGAL (Jamal-Gas-Anbindungsleitung)—a German section of the Yamal-Europe pipeline. Berlin was also hoping to start receiving gas flows through the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, but the Ukraine war has ended German energy ambitions.
Now that the Nord Stream 1 pipeline is no longer operational as a result of the recent explosion, and Russia often closes the Yamal pipeline for maintenance, the only stabile gas supply routes to Europe remain those that are passing through Ukraine, and the TurkStream pipeline. Being quite aware of such a favorable geopolitical position, Turkey seeks to become a gas hub to redirect Russian natural gas flows to other markets.
"We will create a hub here with Turkish gas coming from Russia,” said Erdoğan on 20 October 2022, emphasizing that Putin, in his own words, announced to the world that “Europe can get its natural gas from Turkey.”
Given that Turkey is not a gas producer itself, gas coming from Russia cannot be Turkish. Even if Turkey becomes a gas hub, it will still be Russian natural gas that Ankara will try to re-export to the European Union. But Turkey can do that only if the EU agrees to purchase the de facto Russian gas from Turkey. At this point, the Turkish government has no information on whether Europe, amid its energy divorce from Russia, is willing to import Russian gas from the Turkish hub.
But why is the Kremlin interested in such a risky geopolitical and geoeconomic project that would involve Turkey—a country that has historically been Russia’s enemy, and that openly supports Moscow’s opponent in Ukraine?
"It is easier for us to work with Turkey. President Erdoğan is a man of his word... and it is easier for us to control the Black Sea," said Putin on 31 October 2022.
Still, it remains unclear why the Russian leader, who was in the past seen by some Western authors as “a geopolitical genius,” was not aware of all the risks that the construction of the Nord Stream pipelines could bring. Now that it has become obvious that Moscow can no longer use the Baltic Sea as the primary transportation route for gas supplies to Europe, the Kremlin started looking for alternatives.
There is no doubt that turning Turkey into a new gas hub would additionally increase energy ties between the two frenemies. More importantly, given that Russian gas supplies to Europe have significantly decreased, and it remains highly uncertain when and if at all the Nord Stream pipeline will be repaired, a new hub could potentially bring additional income for Russia’s state-owned gas corporation Gazprom.
The problem, however, is that in southern Europe there is no such energy infrastructure as in northern parts of the continent, which means that southeastern European nations are unlikely to start immediately receiving large volumes of Russian gas. But in the mid-term, Turkey could develop a powerful gas infrastructure on its territory, which means Ankara could eventually become an intermediary in gas sales, especially given that it already imports natural gas from other producers, namely Azerbaijan and Iran. Thus, Turkey could turn into a very important player in the gas market, which is why some Turkish experts insist Ankara should additionally diversify its gas imports and become a regional price benchmark. Such a policy would allow the Turkish government to at least partially stabilize its inflation-hit economy.
It is, therefore, not surprising that Turkey, following the Nord Stream pipelines explosions, has strengthened the protection of the TurkStream pipeline, and that Erdoğan actively supports Putin’s gas policy vis-à-vis Turkey. The Russian president, for his part, hopes that European countries, despite the EU’s decision to end its dependence on Russian energy, will continue purchasing Russian gas. But Alexey Belogoryev, deputy principal director on energy studies at the Russian independent Institute for Energy and Finance Foundation, is skeptical about such an idea. In his view, in order to turn Turkey into a gas hub, it is necessary not only to build TurkStream 2 pipeline—initially proposed by Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller in 2019—but also a new pipeline that would pass through EU members Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary. Under the current geopolitical circumstances, Brussels is unlikely to give the green light for such a project.
The Russian expert argues that Turkey as a new gas hub is a project that depends on both the EU’s de facto approval, as well as on the political fate of President Erdoğan. In other words, if he does not stay in power after 2023, chances for Putin and Erdoğan to implement their ambitious goal will remain rather slim.
But even if the two leaders eventually reach a final deal on a gas hub in Turkey, it remains highly uncertain which companies would build the infrastructure. The construction contractor for both strings of the TurkStream gas pipeline’s offshore section was a Swiss-Dutch enterprise Allseas Group. As long as anti-Russian sanctions—imposed on Moscow by the EU following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—remain in place, European firms will almost certainly not participate in any projects where Russia is involved.
Finally, it would take years to build a gas hub in Turkey. Meanwhile, Europe will almost certainly learn to live without Russian gas, which means that it may never be interested in another Putin’s geopolitical project.
