ountries across the Americas are grappling with a challenging question: Should presidents be held accountable for actions taken while they were in office? Views on the question are diverging between the U.S. and Latin America, illustrated by the indictment of former Colombian President Alvaro Uribe and the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision to uphold broad presidential immunity. This schism extends to how they respond to actions to hold presidents accountable abroad has emerged—one that has important implications for both democracy and inter–American affairs.
Alternating Between Rule of Law and Impunity
There is a delicate balance between the rule of law and its application to those that enforce the law. There are some actions or powers that are, and should, be banned for members of the general public, but that may be considered legitimate when performed by a leader. However, while there are cases where special rights are needed, it is important to recognize that most actions do not fall into this realm—particularly as they relate to human rights abuses and corruption. Despite this distinction, it has historically been difficult to try leaders for crimes. While there are reasons to be concerned about the potential weaponization of the judiciary, an overly broad immunity incentivizes politicians to abuse their positions to enrich themselves and their allies as well as to violate democratic norms and human rights.
Since the turn of the 21st century, Latin American nations have taken important steps to combat corruption and regularly held former executives accountable for their actions. These included large scale corruption probes (ie: the Lava Jato in Brazil) as well as leveraging regional and international organizations to support anti–corruption efforts (ie: the United Nations’ International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) and the Organization of American States’ Mission to Support the Fight against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras) (MACCIH)). Today, many countries across Latin America have presidents either in prison, house arrest, or in exile to avoid arrest. Conversely, the U.S. has seen the erosion of norms surrounding presidential impunity. Rather than combating presidential impunity, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 2024 that the president was immune in cases that were conducted in the pursuit of “official acts” of the presidency. Critics have raised concerns this broad definition could usher in de facto complete presidential impunity.
Responding to Accountability Abroad
The shift in how Latin America and the U.S. have sought to address presidential impunity not only impacts democracy at home, but shapes relations across the region. Historically the U.S. has prided itself on promoting democracy in the Americas. While the “Colossus of the North” has not always had the best track record, since the end of the Cold War, the United States has advocated for stronger tools to defend democracy and supported anti–corruption efforts.
This has included supporting Latin American efforts to hold former presidents accountable, both by supporting Latin American legal cases as well as by trying former leaders in the U.S. when there are concerns about domestic courts. In just the past few years, the U.S. arrested and extradited Former Peruvian President Alejandro Toledo and tried former Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández (who was extradited to United States in 2022).
The Trump administration has shifted away from these efforts. During its first term, the Trump administration withdrew U.S. support for global and regional efforts to combat crime and corruption including CICIG and MACCIH—both of which took actions to hold former presidents accountable. The second Trump administration has been more confrontational on this front. Perhaps fueled by the parallels to his own experience, U.S. President Trump has lashed out at Brazil’s government, including high tariffs, in response to ongoing charges against former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro. At the same time, Congressional Republicans have voiced opposition to the trial of former Colombian President Uribe. Meanwhile, the Washington Post reported that the administration will not criticize El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele for human rights abuses in his country.
Implications for Democracy and Regional Affairs
The shift in how nations address executive accountability will reverberate in both domestic politics and in regional relations. Domestically, the shift toward holding executives more accountable in Latin America is positive and can help deter future leaders from overreach, corruption, and excess. However, norms and institutions in the U.S. which historically constrained the worst excesses of U.S. presidents may be eroded by the shift away from formal accountability. At the same time, the change in U.S. foreign policy from arguing in favor of rule of law toward supporting executive privilege undermines U.S. credibility and emboldens bad actors. Rather than improving regional relations, the shift in U.S. priorities may draw a further wedge between the Americas.
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The fine line between presidential impunity and rule of law
Image via Adobe Stock.
September 2, 2025
Across the Americas, approaches to executive accountability are diverging between the U.S. and Latin America. This split could threaten democratic norms and strain inter–American relations, writes Adam Ratzlaff.
C
ountries across the Americas are grappling with a challenging question: Should presidents be held accountable for actions taken while they were in office? Views on the question are diverging between the U.S. and Latin America, illustrated by the indictment of former Colombian President Alvaro Uribe and the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision to uphold broad presidential immunity. This schism extends to how they respond to actions to hold presidents accountable abroad has emerged—one that has important implications for both democracy and inter–American affairs.
Alternating Between Rule of Law and Impunity
There is a delicate balance between the rule of law and its application to those that enforce the law. There are some actions or powers that are, and should, be banned for members of the general public, but that may be considered legitimate when performed by a leader. However, while there are cases where special rights are needed, it is important to recognize that most actions do not fall into this realm—particularly as they relate to human rights abuses and corruption. Despite this distinction, it has historically been difficult to try leaders for crimes. While there are reasons to be concerned about the potential weaponization of the judiciary, an overly broad immunity incentivizes politicians to abuse their positions to enrich themselves and their allies as well as to violate democratic norms and human rights.
Since the turn of the 21st century, Latin American nations have taken important steps to combat corruption and regularly held former executives accountable for their actions. These included large scale corruption probes (ie: the Lava Jato in Brazil) as well as leveraging regional and international organizations to support anti–corruption efforts (ie: the United Nations’ International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) and the Organization of American States’ Mission to Support the Fight against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras) (MACCIH)). Today, many countries across Latin America have presidents either in prison, house arrest, or in exile to avoid arrest. Conversely, the U.S. has seen the erosion of norms surrounding presidential impunity. Rather than combating presidential impunity, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 2024 that the president was immune in cases that were conducted in the pursuit of “official acts” of the presidency. Critics have raised concerns this broad definition could usher in de facto complete presidential impunity.
Responding to Accountability Abroad
The shift in how Latin America and the U.S. have sought to address presidential impunity not only impacts democracy at home, but shapes relations across the region. Historically the U.S. has prided itself on promoting democracy in the Americas. While the “Colossus of the North” has not always had the best track record, since the end of the Cold War, the United States has advocated for stronger tools to defend democracy and supported anti–corruption efforts.
This has included supporting Latin American efforts to hold former presidents accountable, both by supporting Latin American legal cases as well as by trying former leaders in the U.S. when there are concerns about domestic courts. In just the past few years, the U.S. arrested and extradited Former Peruvian President Alejandro Toledo and tried former Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández (who was extradited to United States in 2022).
The Trump administration has shifted away from these efforts. During its first term, the Trump administration withdrew U.S. support for global and regional efforts to combat crime and corruption including CICIG and MACCIH—both of which took actions to hold former presidents accountable. The second Trump administration has been more confrontational on this front. Perhaps fueled by the parallels to his own experience, U.S. President Trump has lashed out at Brazil’s government, including high tariffs, in response to ongoing charges against former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro. At the same time, Congressional Republicans have voiced opposition to the trial of former Colombian President Uribe. Meanwhile, the Washington Post reported that the administration will not criticize El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele for human rights abuses in his country.
Implications for Democracy and Regional Affairs
The shift in how nations address executive accountability will reverberate in both domestic politics and in regional relations. Domestically, the shift toward holding executives more accountable in Latin America is positive and can help deter future leaders from overreach, corruption, and excess. However, norms and institutions in the U.S. which historically constrained the worst excesses of U.S. presidents may be eroded by the shift away from formal accountability. At the same time, the change in U.S. foreign policy from arguing in favor of rule of law toward supporting executive privilege undermines U.S. credibility and emboldens bad actors. Rather than improving regional relations, the shift in U.S. priorities may draw a further wedge between the Americas.
