s this review is posted, the United States will have played England in the first round of the World Cup. Whether America’s footballers were able to overcome Harry Kane and the Three Lions will have been decided by the time readers (hopefully) enjoy this take over their morning coffee. That football match (soccer for Americans) is an opportune time to reflect on the relationship between Washington and London. For most it is a superficial relationship, one based on history, culture, language, and other less tangible elements. The often cited but rarely truly appreciated “special relationship” ebbs and flows with the politicians of the day. Yet, as Michael W. Smith shows in his superb new book, “The Real Special Relationship,” the ties between Washington and London go far deeper than football and State Dinner speeches. Indeed, the titular real special relationship is the story of America and Britain’s deep and lasting intelligence partnership.
Smith, thrillingly and with a keen eye for personalities, charts the emergence of cooperation between the two countries. From the early days of World War II, when wary intelligence professionals met to exchange information on cryptography and ciphers from Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, through to the height of the Cold War and onto the War on Terror, Afghanistan, and Iraq, Smith charts the growth, maturation, and deepening of this vital partnership. As Smith shows, this relationship is robust, rich, and has survived political turmoil in both capitals, leveraging the strength of each, and paying incalculable dividends for both.
Smith’s story is also about the transformation of the power relationship between the two countries. The 20century was as much about the United States’ emergence as a global power, eclipsing the United Kingdom, especially after World War II. This transition was reflected in the intelligence cooperation between London and Washington. The former very much saw itself as the apex predator of intelligence operations, viewing the latter as well-meaning but bumbling neophytes in the fight against Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. Yet Washington brought to bear resources of which their British counterparts could only dream, and its intelligence officers were quick learners.
What is most fascinating about the relationship is its sustainability and resilience, even in the face of political pressures. President Dwight Eisenhower’s unwillingness to support the United Kingdom in the Suez Crisis in 1956 was juxtaposed against the operational planning for the coup in Iran occurring at the same time. In the wake of the Suez Crisis, he and his counterpart in Anthony Eden, held a conference to reaffirm the importance of the special relationship, deepening intelligence cooperation in an unreleased annex to the publicly signed agreements. Even as President Nixon and, in particular, Henry Kissinger, railed against the United Kingdom (with the latter going so far as to order the suspension of cooperation) as it sought membership in the European Economic Community in 1973, the day-to-day working relationship continued.
After Argentina invaded the Falklands, in 1982 many within the Reagan administration were disinclined to support London, favoring relations with Buenos Aires as a counterweight to communist expansion in Latin and South America—sensibly, Reagan’s relationship with Thatcher won out. Indeed, then-Sen. Joe Biden remarked to the British ambassador, “Do you think that if the Falkland Islands had belonged to Brazil rather than you, and Argentina had invaded them, the U.S. would have reacted in the way they have done?” He continued, “It is because you are British, with all that means in this country, that we have supported you.”
Relations between then-Prime Minister John Major and President Bill Clinton were not particularly warm—a recent FT review noted that the term “special relationship” was even banned by Major—yet the actual working and operational relationship remained strong throughout Clinton’s presidency in the 1990s as Smith shows. Even more recently, despite the significant strains brought about by President Donald Trump’s tenure (about which Smith has little to say), the actual working relationship between U.S. and British intelligence agencies continued largely unaffected. Equally, Britain’s recent political turmoil is unlikely to have even registered on a practical level within SIS or the CIA.
Here, Smith lands on a key truth about the intelligence relationship between Washington and London, that it is and remains largely apolitical. To be sure, the relationship experiences ups and downs, ebbs and flows, but the consequences of high politics remain largely divorced from the collection, sharing, and coordination of intelligence. That speaks to a level of trust and mutual interest that transcends the machinations of 10 Downing Street or the White House. The strength of the intelligence relationship, and indeed its military analogue, is often lost on American politicians, and certainly the American public. The United Kingdom suffered the second highest number of combat fatalities in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, a sacrifice for which Americans should be forever grateful.
The emphasis each country puts on the relationship, at least in public, is by no means equal. The United Kingdom often places greater importance on the relationship, even before Brexit, while Washington does indeed seem to take it for granted. There is risk in that for both parties. The United States’ expectation of the relationship undoubtedly creates friction when it appears to ignore the United Kingdom’s interests or perspectives, or even fails to solicit their advice. Conversely, London’s expectations of benefits from the relationship may be found wanting if Washington fails to deliver. This is, of course, a political risk. Smith successfully demonstrates that throughout the political turmoil, the working intelligence relationship remained highly productive, and one suspects this will continue into the future.
It is, nonetheless, important for both capitals to remember the value and importance of the relationship. Shared culture, history, and language are all important—necessary, but not sufficient. The relationship is as much about shared strategic interests and mutual benefits. In the case of the former, both Washington and London want to and need to sustain the liberal western order, an order that has provided for stability and growth since the end of World War II. Both want and need to uphold international law and norms of behavior, illustrated most recently by the joint aid to Ukraine against Russia’s war of aggression. Washington gains access to bases and capabilities that it would not otherwise have; London gains access to resources and technology, and influence that it particularly needed during the course of the Cold War, and continues to need today.
Not surprisingly, Smith’s narrative pace increases and the details become scarce as he approaches today, breezily covering 9/11, the war in Afghanistan, intelligence in Iraq, the Snowden breaches, and the pivot to the Indo-Pacific in much less detail than the 20century. The era of strategic competition will likely find Washington and London confronting new challenges in the relationship. The former is clearly driving the pivot to the Indo-Pacific at a time when the latter is facing considerable political and fiscal turmoil at home, but also only belatedly sharing the concerns about Beijing (at least publicly—successive governments largely ignored the warnings of the intelligence establishment). Indeed, London’s acceptance of China’s Huawei into its 5G network sparked serious concerns about the viability of the intelligence-sharing relationship. In another 80 years, Smith’s successor will undoubtedly write the story of how the second century of Anglo-American cooperation compares to the first.
Smith crafts a riveting history from the opening days of the relationship and the attendance skepticism from both the American and British partners, through to the near inseparable connections today. That relationship saw both the United States and United Kingdom through the Cold War and into the muddled world that followed, and will undoubtedly see both through this new era of strategic competition—an era in which the cooperative relationship will be just as important.
In his 1952 address to a joint session of Congress, cited by Smith, Prime Minister Winston Churchill remarked, “There is one thing that is exactly the same as when I was here last—Britain and the United States are working for the same high cause. Let us make sure that the supreme fact of the 20th century is that they tread the same path.” Indeed, let us make sure that that supreme fact carries on into the 21century.
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The Enduring Shadow Special Relationship
Photo by Marco Bianchetti via Unsplash.
November 26, 2022
In his book, “The Real Special Relationship,” Michael W. Smith shows that the ties between Washington and London go far deeper than commonly known. Indeed, the titular real special relationship is the story of America and Britain’s deep and lasting intelligence partnership, writes Joshua Huminski.
A
s this review is posted, the United States will have played England in the first round of the World Cup. Whether America’s footballers were able to overcome Harry Kane and the Three Lions will have been decided by the time readers (hopefully) enjoy this take over their morning coffee. That football match (soccer for Americans) is an opportune time to reflect on the relationship between Washington and London. For most it is a superficial relationship, one based on history, culture, language, and other less tangible elements. The often cited but rarely truly appreciated “special relationship” ebbs and flows with the politicians of the day. Yet, as Michael W. Smith shows in his superb new book, “The Real Special Relationship,” the ties between Washington and London go far deeper than football and State Dinner speeches. Indeed, the titular real special relationship is the story of America and Britain’s deep and lasting intelligence partnership.
Smith, thrillingly and with a keen eye for personalities, charts the emergence of cooperation between the two countries. From the early days of World War II, when wary intelligence professionals met to exchange information on cryptography and ciphers from Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, through to the height of the Cold War and onto the War on Terror, Afghanistan, and Iraq, Smith charts the growth, maturation, and deepening of this vital partnership. As Smith shows, this relationship is robust, rich, and has survived political turmoil in both capitals, leveraging the strength of each, and paying incalculable dividends for both.
Smith’s story is also about the transformation of the power relationship between the two countries. The 20century was as much about the United States’ emergence as a global power, eclipsing the United Kingdom, especially after World War II. This transition was reflected in the intelligence cooperation between London and Washington. The former very much saw itself as the apex predator of intelligence operations, viewing the latter as well-meaning but bumbling neophytes in the fight against Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. Yet Washington brought to bear resources of which their British counterparts could only dream, and its intelligence officers were quick learners.
What is most fascinating about the relationship is its sustainability and resilience, even in the face of political pressures. President Dwight Eisenhower’s unwillingness to support the United Kingdom in the Suez Crisis in 1956 was juxtaposed against the operational planning for the coup in Iran occurring at the same time. In the wake of the Suez Crisis, he and his counterpart in Anthony Eden, held a conference to reaffirm the importance of the special relationship, deepening intelligence cooperation in an unreleased annex to the publicly signed agreements. Even as President Nixon and, in particular, Henry Kissinger, railed against the United Kingdom (with the latter going so far as to order the suspension of cooperation) as it sought membership in the European Economic Community in 1973, the day-to-day working relationship continued.
After Argentina invaded the Falklands, in 1982 many within the Reagan administration were disinclined to support London, favoring relations with Buenos Aires as a counterweight to communist expansion in Latin and South America—sensibly, Reagan’s relationship with Thatcher won out. Indeed, then-Sen. Joe Biden remarked to the British ambassador, “Do you think that if the Falkland Islands had belonged to Brazil rather than you, and Argentina had invaded them, the U.S. would have reacted in the way they have done?” He continued, “It is because you are British, with all that means in this country, that we have supported you.”
Relations between then-Prime Minister John Major and President Bill Clinton were not particularly warm—a recent FT review noted that the term “special relationship” was even banned by Major—yet the actual working and operational relationship remained strong throughout Clinton’s presidency in the 1990s as Smith shows. Even more recently, despite the significant strains brought about by President Donald Trump’s tenure (about which Smith has little to say), the actual working relationship between U.S. and British intelligence agencies continued largely unaffected. Equally, Britain’s recent political turmoil is unlikely to have even registered on a practical level within SIS or the CIA.
Here, Smith lands on a key truth about the intelligence relationship between Washington and London, that it is and remains largely apolitical. To be sure, the relationship experiences ups and downs, ebbs and flows, but the consequences of high politics remain largely divorced from the collection, sharing, and coordination of intelligence. That speaks to a level of trust and mutual interest that transcends the machinations of 10 Downing Street or the White House. The strength of the intelligence relationship, and indeed its military analogue, is often lost on American politicians, and certainly the American public. The United Kingdom suffered the second highest number of combat fatalities in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, a sacrifice for which Americans should be forever grateful.
The emphasis each country puts on the relationship, at least in public, is by no means equal. The United Kingdom often places greater importance on the relationship, even before Brexit, while Washington does indeed seem to take it for granted. There is risk in that for both parties. The United States’ expectation of the relationship undoubtedly creates friction when it appears to ignore the United Kingdom’s interests or perspectives, or even fails to solicit their advice. Conversely, London’s expectations of benefits from the relationship may be found wanting if Washington fails to deliver. This is, of course, a political risk. Smith successfully demonstrates that throughout the political turmoil, the working intelligence relationship remained highly productive, and one suspects this will continue into the future.
It is, nonetheless, important for both capitals to remember the value and importance of the relationship. Shared culture, history, and language are all important—necessary, but not sufficient. The relationship is as much about shared strategic interests and mutual benefits. In the case of the former, both Washington and London want to and need to sustain the liberal western order, an order that has provided for stability and growth since the end of World War II. Both want and need to uphold international law and norms of behavior, illustrated most recently by the joint aid to Ukraine against Russia’s war of aggression. Washington gains access to bases and capabilities that it would not otherwise have; London gains access to resources and technology, and influence that it particularly needed during the course of the Cold War, and continues to need today.
Not surprisingly, Smith’s narrative pace increases and the details become scarce as he approaches today, breezily covering 9/11, the war in Afghanistan, intelligence in Iraq, the Snowden breaches, and the pivot to the Indo-Pacific in much less detail than the 20century. The era of strategic competition will likely find Washington and London confronting new challenges in the relationship. The former is clearly driving the pivot to the Indo-Pacific at a time when the latter is facing considerable political and fiscal turmoil at home, but also only belatedly sharing the concerns about Beijing (at least publicly—successive governments largely ignored the warnings of the intelligence establishment). Indeed, London’s acceptance of China’s Huawei into its 5G network sparked serious concerns about the viability of the intelligence-sharing relationship. In another 80 years, Smith’s successor will undoubtedly write the story of how the second century of Anglo-American cooperation compares to the first.
Smith crafts a riveting history from the opening days of the relationship and the attendance skepticism from both the American and British partners, through to the near inseparable connections today. That relationship saw both the United States and United Kingdom through the Cold War and into the muddled world that followed, and will undoubtedly see both through this new era of strategic competition—an era in which the cooperative relationship will be just as important.
In his 1952 address to a joint session of Congress, cited by Smith, Prime Minister Winston Churchill remarked, “There is one thing that is exactly the same as when I was here last—Britain and the United States are working for the same high cause. Let us make sure that the supreme fact of the 20th century is that they tread the same path.” Indeed, let us make sure that that supreme fact carries on into the 21century.
