On July 9, 2011, six years after signing a 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended Africa’s longest and bloodiest civil war, south Sudan will declare independence from President Omar al-Bashir’s Sunni Muslim government in the north. Contrary to its peaceful aims, however, the Sudanese split may be precipitating a slide back to conflict, as recent clashes along the contested border indicate.
Sudan’s short but chaotic history puts into relief the upcoming declaration of independence: from its founding in 1956 until 1972, the country was embroiled in the first of two civil wars. The second raged from 1983 to 2005, claiming over 2 million lives and displacing upwards of 4 million people. Stemming from northern social, economic and political domination of the Christian and animist south, the disputes ultimately led north and south to contemplate phased divorce as a solution to irreparable relations.
A Realpolitik Separation
The 2005 Agreement granted South Sudan six years of autonomy in the run up to a January 9, 2011 referendum at which southerners voted overwhelmingly to secede from the country; the secession will be formalized on July 9. Southerners are then scheduled to undertake the Herculean task of nation-building, to which rising border tensions are adding another dimension of complexity.
The clashes began on May 21 when Khartoum’s army, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), began bombing the resource-rich region of Abyei, triggering instability throughout the state of South Kordofan, Reactions to the violence by southern forces, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), have complicated peacekeeping efforts of the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), and forced a host of other UN agencies to flee the area. The fighting has already displaced nearly 200,000, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).
Abyei is a linchpin. Aside from its oil, pasture and water reserves, the small region situated along the southern half of Sudan’s north-south border is home to large populations of Muslims, Christians and animists. Securing a toehold in this strategic center, often called the Kashmir of Sudan, is a top priority for both sides: for Khartoum, control over Abyei would provide a means not only to keep tabs on its newly independent foe but monitor the southern border of Darfur, through which the north has long accused southerners of smuggling weapons and other forms of Darfurian aid. The south, for its part, seeks control over Abyeia to keep such meddling at bay.
The May 21 invasion was no fluke. Abyei, too, was scheduled for a January referendum to decide which side to join in the event of secession. Facing the likely prospect that Abyeians would vote in favor of southern membership, however, Khartoum balked at the last moment and cancelled the plebiscite. Analysts thus interpret the Abyeian incursion as a backdoor attempt to grab the coveted land using Bashir’s preferred method of diplomacy: realpolitik.
Add to the fact Khartoum lost control over a quarter of its territory and four-fifths of its oil reserves in the January referendum, and the contested region of Abyei contains vast oil fields, the May invasion comes as no surprise. Indeed, Bashir signed the CPA only after the Obama Administration offered to remove his country from a state-sponsored terrorist list, which would undoubtedly brighten the embattled regime’s gloomy trade prospects. Another consideration to sign was that all the country’s oil pipelines run through the north, affording Bashir leverage (at least for the time being) over where, when or whether oil from the south is sold.
Lucky Break
On Monday, June 20, just before the Secretary General was to update the Security Council on the crisis, African officials struck a deal in the capital of Ethiopia “that provides for temporary administrative arrangements for Abyei and the withdrawal of troops from both sides.” Ethiopian peacekeeping forces are scheduled to deploy to Abyei immediately. Meanwhile, South Sudan is gearing up for independence day, to be followed by an broadly supported application for statehood in the UN General Assembly this fall.
So where does that leave Khartoum? Thanks to the diplomatic support of its African neighbors, the north dodged what could have been a Security Council crackdown. With its negotiating position still largely intact, the embattled government would do well to accept the U.S. carrot while it is still on the table, and let the south go on its way. Even if the north ultimately wins Abyei, it will still need to face an economic future in which oil plays a dwindling role--all the more reason to normalize relations with the world’s largest economy. But such considerations appear lost on Bashir, who made clear his position at the start of May’s bombing campaign: “We do not want the U.S. carrot and we are not afraid of its stick.”
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Sudan Borders on War, Again
June 21, 2011
On July 9, 2011, six years after signing a 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended Africa’s longest and bloodiest civil war, south Sudan will declare independence from President Omar al-Bashir’s Sunni Muslim government in the north. Contrary to its peaceful aims, however, the Sudanese split may be precipitating a slide back to conflict, as recent clashes along the contested border indicate.
Sudan’s short but chaotic history puts into relief the upcoming declaration of independence: from its founding in 1956 until 1972, the country was embroiled in the first of two civil wars. The second raged from 1983 to 2005, claiming over 2 million lives and displacing upwards of 4 million people. Stemming from northern social, economic and political domination of the Christian and animist south, the disputes ultimately led north and south to contemplate phased divorce as a solution to irreparable relations.
A Realpolitik Separation
The 2005 Agreement granted South Sudan six years of autonomy in the run up to a January 9, 2011 referendum at which southerners voted overwhelmingly to secede from the country; the secession will be formalized on July 9. Southerners are then scheduled to undertake the Herculean task of nation-building, to which rising border tensions are adding another dimension of complexity.
The clashes began on May 21 when Khartoum’s army, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), began bombing the resource-rich region of Abyei, triggering instability throughout the state of South Kordofan, Reactions to the violence by southern forces, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), have complicated peacekeeping efforts of the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), and forced a host of other UN agencies to flee the area. The fighting has already displaced nearly 200,000, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).
Abyei is a linchpin. Aside from its oil, pasture and water reserves, the small region situated along the southern half of Sudan’s north-south border is home to large populations of Muslims, Christians and animists. Securing a toehold in this strategic center, often called the Kashmir of Sudan, is a top priority for both sides: for Khartoum, control over Abyei would provide a means not only to keep tabs on its newly independent foe but monitor the southern border of Darfur, through which the north has long accused southerners of smuggling weapons and other forms of Darfurian aid. The south, for its part, seeks control over Abyeia to keep such meddling at bay.
The May 21 invasion was no fluke. Abyei, too, was scheduled for a January referendum to decide which side to join in the event of secession. Facing the likely prospect that Abyeians would vote in favor of southern membership, however, Khartoum balked at the last moment and cancelled the plebiscite. Analysts thus interpret the Abyeian incursion as a backdoor attempt to grab the coveted land using Bashir’s preferred method of diplomacy: realpolitik.
Add to the fact Khartoum lost control over a quarter of its territory and four-fifths of its oil reserves in the January referendum, and the contested region of Abyei contains vast oil fields, the May invasion comes as no surprise. Indeed, Bashir signed the CPA only after the Obama Administration offered to remove his country from a state-sponsored terrorist list, which would undoubtedly brighten the embattled regime’s gloomy trade prospects. Another consideration to sign was that all the country’s oil pipelines run through the north, affording Bashir leverage (at least for the time being) over where, when or whether oil from the south is sold.
Lucky Break
On Monday, June 20, just before the Secretary General was to update the Security Council on the crisis, African officials struck a deal in the capital of Ethiopia “that provides for temporary administrative arrangements for Abyei and the withdrawal of troops from both sides.” Ethiopian peacekeeping forces are scheduled to deploy to Abyei immediately. Meanwhile, South Sudan is gearing up for independence day, to be followed by an broadly supported application for statehood in the UN General Assembly this fall.
So where does that leave Khartoum? Thanks to the diplomatic support of its African neighbors, the north dodged what could have been a Security Council crackdown. With its negotiating position still largely intact, the embattled government would do well to accept the U.S. carrot while it is still on the table, and let the south go on its way. Even if the north ultimately wins Abyei, it will still need to face an economic future in which oil plays a dwindling role--all the more reason to normalize relations with the world’s largest economy. But such considerations appear lost on Bashir, who made clear his position at the start of May’s bombing campaign: “We do not want the U.S. carrot and we are not afraid of its stick.”
