espite fears, recent tensions in northern Kosovo have not lead to the destabilization of the Balkans. Since Kosovo’s 2008 declaration of independence, concerns over conflict in the region have reemerged. Tensions in the region soared in July when the Albanian-dominated authorities in Pristina declared that Serbian-issued identity documents and vehicle license plates would no longer be valid in northern Kosovo where the Serbs make up the majority of the population. Many of them still continue to use Serbian-issued documents, as they refuse to integrate into Kosovo’s legal system. While Belgrade and Pristina have managed to reach a deal over identification documents—preserving peace in the region—what comes next, both for Serbia and Kosovo as well as for the Balkans?
According to the European Union Foreign Policy Chief Josep Borrell, under the EU-facilitated dialogue, Serbia has agreed to abolish entry/exit documents for Kosovo ID holders and Kosovo agreed not to introduce them for Serbian ID holders. In other words, Serbia has implicitly recognized Kosovo-issued IDs even though Belgrade does not recognize Kosovo’s 2008 unilaterally declared independence. In exchange, Pristina will allow the Serbs living in northern Kosovo to freely travel across the administrative boundary with Serbia using their Serbian-issued ID cards.
Sooner or later, however, Belgrade and Pristina will have to resolve another dispute—how to handle license plates. Under the current geopolitical circumstances, it is not probable that Kosovo will stop striving for “mutual recognition,” meaning that Serbia may be pressured not only to recognize Kosovo-issued car plates, but also to convince the Serbs living in northern Kosovo to re-register their vehicles and replace their Serbian-issued car plates with Kosovan ones. Once that occurs, the West is expected to push Belgrade and Pristina to resolve the passport issue. If Serbia agrees to recognize Kosovo-issued passports, it will be another step in Belgrade’s gradual implicit recognition of Kosovo’s independence. However, that will not be the end of the Kosovo saga given that the West will almost certainly insist that the two sides sign a legally binding agreement on full normalization of relations—meaning that Belgrade would have to explicitly recognize secession of its own territory.
Five EU members—Spain, Romania, Greece, Slovakia, and Cyprus—support Serbia’s territorial integrity and do not recognize Kosovo’s unilaterally declared independence. However, given that the United States backs Kosovo and insists that Belgrade and Pristina reach an agreement that includes mutual recognition, Serbia’s room for political maneuvers is rather limited. As a result, Belgrade had to make a significant concession to Pristina by recognizing Kosovo-issued IDs. Kosovo, for its parts, agreed to preserve the status quo in the north where neither Belgrade nor Pristina have full sovereignty.
As Milica Andric Rakic, project manager of the New Social Initiative based in ethnically divided town of Kosovska Mitrovica told Diplomatic Courier, the Serbian community in northern Kosovo does not support any integration processes into Kosovo’s legal system and is unlikely to accept any ultimatums that may come from Pristina. Therefore, it remains to be seen if Kosovo’s authorities will eventually decide to force the Serbs to re-register their vehicles—a move that could lead to new tensions in northern Kosovo.
Although most Serbs support a lasting peace with the Kosovo Albanians, recent polls suggest that the vast majority of them would never support Belgrade’s recognition of Kosovo. Thus, if the West continues pressuring Belgrade to make concessions to Pristina, it is entirely possible that the number of Serbs against joining the European Union will continue to grow. In order to preserve stability in the region, the United States will likely pressure all actors in the region to join the Open Balkan Initiative.
Even though Kurti is refusing to allow for Kosovo to become a part of the Open Balkan Initiative until Serbia recognizes its breakaway province as an independent state, there are growing demands in Pristina for Kosovo’s joining Serbia, Albania, and North Macedonia in the regional initiative that is strongly backed by Washington. However, from Serbia’s perspective, Kosovo’s potential membership in the Open Balkan Initiative would mean that Belgrade would have to yet again implicitly recognize its independence, a move which would unlikely be welcomed by most Serbs.
For all of these reasons, Serbia, at least for now, is expected to continue insisting on maintaining its territorial integrity despite pressures that may come from the West. Such a position of Belgrade is unlikely to have an impact on regional stability, given that it will almost certainly continue holding regular talks with Kosovo’s authorities in Brussels. For the EU, dialogue on normalization of relations has no alternative, so the West will continue to push both sides to refrain from any actions that may renew tensions in restive northern Kosovo. One thing is for sure: Belgrade and Pristina may not resolve their disputes any time soon, but chances for another large-scale conflict in the region will remain minimal. Stabilocracy in the Balkans will prevail.
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Serbia and Kosovo’s Long Road to Normalization
Pristina, Kosovo. Photo by Mario Heller via Unsplash.
September 7, 2022
Despite fears, recent tensions in northern Kosovo have not lead to the destabilization of the Balkans. While Serbia and Kosovo reached a deal over identification documents—preserving peace in the region—Nikola Mikovic delves into what comes next for both countries as well as for the Balkans.
D
espite fears, recent tensions in northern Kosovo have not lead to the destabilization of the Balkans. Since Kosovo’s 2008 declaration of independence, concerns over conflict in the region have reemerged. Tensions in the region soared in July when the Albanian-dominated authorities in Pristina declared that Serbian-issued identity documents and vehicle license plates would no longer be valid in northern Kosovo where the Serbs make up the majority of the population. Many of them still continue to use Serbian-issued documents, as they refuse to integrate into Kosovo’s legal system. While Belgrade and Pristina have managed to reach a deal over identification documents—preserving peace in the region—what comes next, both for Serbia and Kosovo as well as for the Balkans?
According to the European Union Foreign Policy Chief Josep Borrell, under the EU-facilitated dialogue, Serbia has agreed to abolish entry/exit documents for Kosovo ID holders and Kosovo agreed not to introduce them for Serbian ID holders. In other words, Serbia has implicitly recognized Kosovo-issued IDs even though Belgrade does not recognize Kosovo’s 2008 unilaterally declared independence. In exchange, Pristina will allow the Serbs living in northern Kosovo to freely travel across the administrative boundary with Serbia using their Serbian-issued ID cards.
Sooner or later, however, Belgrade and Pristina will have to resolve another dispute—how to handle license plates. Under the current geopolitical circumstances, it is not probable that Kosovo will stop striving for “mutual recognition,” meaning that Serbia may be pressured not only to recognize Kosovo-issued car plates, but also to convince the Serbs living in northern Kosovo to re-register their vehicles and replace their Serbian-issued car plates with Kosovan ones. Once that occurs, the West is expected to push Belgrade and Pristina to resolve the passport issue. If Serbia agrees to recognize Kosovo-issued passports, it will be another step in Belgrade’s gradual implicit recognition of Kosovo’s independence. However, that will not be the end of the Kosovo saga given that the West will almost certainly insist that the two sides sign a legally binding agreement on full normalization of relations—meaning that Belgrade would have to explicitly recognize secession of its own territory.
Five EU members—Spain, Romania, Greece, Slovakia, and Cyprus—support Serbia’s territorial integrity and do not recognize Kosovo’s unilaterally declared independence. However, given that the United States backs Kosovo and insists that Belgrade and Pristina reach an agreement that includes mutual recognition, Serbia’s room for political maneuvers is rather limited. As a result, Belgrade had to make a significant concession to Pristina by recognizing Kosovo-issued IDs. Kosovo, for its parts, agreed to preserve the status quo in the north where neither Belgrade nor Pristina have full sovereignty.
As Milica Andric Rakic, project manager of the New Social Initiative based in ethnically divided town of Kosovska Mitrovica told Diplomatic Courier, the Serbian community in northern Kosovo does not support any integration processes into Kosovo’s legal system and is unlikely to accept any ultimatums that may come from Pristina. Therefore, it remains to be seen if Kosovo’s authorities will eventually decide to force the Serbs to re-register their vehicles—a move that could lead to new tensions in northern Kosovo.
Although most Serbs support a lasting peace with the Kosovo Albanians, recent polls suggest that the vast majority of them would never support Belgrade’s recognition of Kosovo. Thus, if the West continues pressuring Belgrade to make concessions to Pristina, it is entirely possible that the number of Serbs against joining the European Union will continue to grow. In order to preserve stability in the region, the United States will likely pressure all actors in the region to join the Open Balkan Initiative.
Even though Kurti is refusing to allow for Kosovo to become a part of the Open Balkan Initiative until Serbia recognizes its breakaway province as an independent state, there are growing demands in Pristina for Kosovo’s joining Serbia, Albania, and North Macedonia in the regional initiative that is strongly backed by Washington. However, from Serbia’s perspective, Kosovo’s potential membership in the Open Balkan Initiative would mean that Belgrade would have to yet again implicitly recognize its independence, a move which would unlikely be welcomed by most Serbs.
For all of these reasons, Serbia, at least for now, is expected to continue insisting on maintaining its territorial integrity despite pressures that may come from the West. Such a position of Belgrade is unlikely to have an impact on regional stability, given that it will almost certainly continue holding regular talks with Kosovo’s authorities in Brussels. For the EU, dialogue on normalization of relations has no alternative, so the West will continue to push both sides to refrain from any actions that may renew tensions in restive northern Kosovo. One thing is for sure: Belgrade and Pristina may not resolve their disputes any time soon, but chances for another large-scale conflict in the region will remain minimal. Stabilocracy in the Balkans will prevail.
