.

Washington and Brussels continue to push those Balkan countries that remain outside of the European Union to speed-up internal economic integration processes within the Balkans. Launched in 2019, the Open Balkan Initiative is slowly resulting in a single market that will allow the free movement of people, goods, and services in southeastern Europe—mirroring what the EU does in western Europe.

Brussels has made it clear on several occasions that none of the Balkan countries will be able join the EU until at least 2025. Quite aware that their EU membership is not inevitable, in 2019 Serbia, North Macedonia, and Albania decided to advance regional cooperation by forming the so-called “mini-Schengen”—named after the Schengen Agreement allowing for passport-free movement within 26 European countries. The goal of the initiative was to “to improve life and the economy in the region” until the EU opens its doors to these western Balkan countries.

In July 2021, mini-Schengen was rebranded as the Open Balkan Initiative. A new name, however, did not resolve the economic problems facing the region. For instance, the Balkan countries continue to see the outward immigration of highly-skilled and educated workers—a phenomenon known as the brain drain. There are also political issues that remain to be resolved. To this day, it is still unclear how many countries are part of the Western Balkans. For the EU and the United States, the Western Balkan countries are Serbia, North Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. In reality, all of them are located in the central and southern parts of the Balkan Peninsula, rather than in the West. More importantly, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina do not recognize the unilaterally declared independence of Kosovo and see it as an integral part of Serbia.

The United States, however, insists that the Open Balkan Initiative should include “all six Western Balkan countries at the same level.” According to Gabriel Escobar, the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary overseeing Western Balkans policy, in order to succeed “the initiative will have to incorporate all six Western Balkan countries and would have to align its agenda with all other regional initiatives like the EU’s Berlin Process.”

In other words, Serbia will be forced to recognize the independence of Kosovo by allowing it to eventually join the Open Balkan Initiative. Presently, the authorities in Pristina refuse any participation in the group, claiming that it “only serves to further strengthen Serbia.” However, given that the Executive Director of the American Chamber of Commerce in Kosovo, Arian Zeka, openly supports Kosovo’s membership in the initiative, it is very likely that the self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo—recognized as an independent state by most Western countries, but not by Greece, Cyprus, Romania, Spain and Slovakia—will soon join the bloc.

It is worth remembering that Montenegro also initially opposed joining the Open Balkan Initiative, but recently the country’s Prime Minister, Dritan Abazovic, said that his cabinet would consider joining Serbia, North Macedonia, and Albania in the project. In the past, Bosnia and Herzegovina was also skeptical about the initiative. However, on June 8 in North Macedonia’s town of Ohrid, Zoran Tegeltija, the head of Bosnia’s Council of Ministers, attended the Open Balkan summit as an observer—just like Abazovic.

“Bosnian business community and public generally support the initiative, although the country still lacks a consensus about it for political reasons,” Tegeltija said, pointing out that he asked the Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) Presidency to consider and approve BiH's accession to the regional initiative.

During the summit in June, leaders of Albania, North Macedonia, and Serbia signed an agreement on cooperation on the mutual recognition of diplomas and academic qualifications. Previously, in December 2021, they signed the Agreement on conditions for free access to the labor market in the Western Balkans. The document grants the right to the citizens of the three countries to move, stay, and work within the three nations. In July 2021, Belgrade, Skopje and Tirana agreed to abolish border controls between the three Balkan states beginning January 1, 2023— a move which is expected to strengthen their economic ties and increase mobility.

At this point, it is too early to say who will benefit the most from the Open Balkan Initiative. The very fact that the European Union backs the project could mean that Brussels, weary of further enlargement, sees the process as a substitute for the region’s EU membership. Still, European Commissioner for Neighborhood and Enlargement Oliver Varhelyi—who also attended the Ohrid Summit—claims that “the initiative can represent the possibility of accelerating the path towards the EU.” That, however, does not necessarily mean that the Balkan countries will join the EU anytime soon, if at all.

“In the EU, there is no desire for enlargement,” said Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic in July 2021.

It remains to be seen if the war in Ukraine will change the EU’s enlargement strategy. If the conflict in the Eastern European nation does not lead to a faster EU integration of the so-called Western Balkan nations, all of them will likely remain stuck in the “EU’s eternal waiting room.” While waiting for a “bright European future” that may never come, they will almost certainly continue to integrate into the Open Balkan Initiative. Although it may not formally be part of the EU, the Balkan region will undoubtedly remain deeply in Brussels’ and Washington’s geopolitical orbit—at least for the foreseeable future.

About
Nikola Mikovic
:
Nikola Mikovic is a correspondent for Diplomatic Courier. He is a freelance journalist, researcher and analyst based in Serbia covering foreign policy in Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.

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www.diplomaticourier.com

The “Eternal Waiting Room” of the EU’s Open Balkan Initiative

Photo by Sara Kurfess via Unsplash.

June 16, 2022

The EU is in no hurry to expand membership, they have supported the Open Balkan Initiative’s efforts to integrate the economies of several Balkan nations. Although the process has been contentious, the Balkans remain within the EU sphere of influence, writes DC’s Nikola Mikovic.

Washington and Brussels continue to push those Balkan countries that remain outside of the European Union to speed-up internal economic integration processes within the Balkans. Launched in 2019, the Open Balkan Initiative is slowly resulting in a single market that will allow the free movement of people, goods, and services in southeastern Europe—mirroring what the EU does in western Europe.

Brussels has made it clear on several occasions that none of the Balkan countries will be able join the EU until at least 2025. Quite aware that their EU membership is not inevitable, in 2019 Serbia, North Macedonia, and Albania decided to advance regional cooperation by forming the so-called “mini-Schengen”—named after the Schengen Agreement allowing for passport-free movement within 26 European countries. The goal of the initiative was to “to improve life and the economy in the region” until the EU opens its doors to these western Balkan countries.

In July 2021, mini-Schengen was rebranded as the Open Balkan Initiative. A new name, however, did not resolve the economic problems facing the region. For instance, the Balkan countries continue to see the outward immigration of highly-skilled and educated workers—a phenomenon known as the brain drain. There are also political issues that remain to be resolved. To this day, it is still unclear how many countries are part of the Western Balkans. For the EU and the United States, the Western Balkan countries are Serbia, North Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. In reality, all of them are located in the central and southern parts of the Balkan Peninsula, rather than in the West. More importantly, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina do not recognize the unilaterally declared independence of Kosovo and see it as an integral part of Serbia.

The United States, however, insists that the Open Balkan Initiative should include “all six Western Balkan countries at the same level.” According to Gabriel Escobar, the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary overseeing Western Balkans policy, in order to succeed “the initiative will have to incorporate all six Western Balkan countries and would have to align its agenda with all other regional initiatives like the EU’s Berlin Process.”

In other words, Serbia will be forced to recognize the independence of Kosovo by allowing it to eventually join the Open Balkan Initiative. Presently, the authorities in Pristina refuse any participation in the group, claiming that it “only serves to further strengthen Serbia.” However, given that the Executive Director of the American Chamber of Commerce in Kosovo, Arian Zeka, openly supports Kosovo’s membership in the initiative, it is very likely that the self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo—recognized as an independent state by most Western countries, but not by Greece, Cyprus, Romania, Spain and Slovakia—will soon join the bloc.

It is worth remembering that Montenegro also initially opposed joining the Open Balkan Initiative, but recently the country’s Prime Minister, Dritan Abazovic, said that his cabinet would consider joining Serbia, North Macedonia, and Albania in the project. In the past, Bosnia and Herzegovina was also skeptical about the initiative. However, on June 8 in North Macedonia’s town of Ohrid, Zoran Tegeltija, the head of Bosnia’s Council of Ministers, attended the Open Balkan summit as an observer—just like Abazovic.

“Bosnian business community and public generally support the initiative, although the country still lacks a consensus about it for political reasons,” Tegeltija said, pointing out that he asked the Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) Presidency to consider and approve BiH's accession to the regional initiative.

During the summit in June, leaders of Albania, North Macedonia, and Serbia signed an agreement on cooperation on the mutual recognition of diplomas and academic qualifications. Previously, in December 2021, they signed the Agreement on conditions for free access to the labor market in the Western Balkans. The document grants the right to the citizens of the three countries to move, stay, and work within the three nations. In July 2021, Belgrade, Skopje and Tirana agreed to abolish border controls between the three Balkan states beginning January 1, 2023— a move which is expected to strengthen their economic ties and increase mobility.

At this point, it is too early to say who will benefit the most from the Open Balkan Initiative. The very fact that the European Union backs the project could mean that Brussels, weary of further enlargement, sees the process as a substitute for the region’s EU membership. Still, European Commissioner for Neighborhood and Enlargement Oliver Varhelyi—who also attended the Ohrid Summit—claims that “the initiative can represent the possibility of accelerating the path towards the EU.” That, however, does not necessarily mean that the Balkan countries will join the EU anytime soon, if at all.

“In the EU, there is no desire for enlargement,” said Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic in July 2021.

It remains to be seen if the war in Ukraine will change the EU’s enlargement strategy. If the conflict in the Eastern European nation does not lead to a faster EU integration of the so-called Western Balkan nations, all of them will likely remain stuck in the “EU’s eternal waiting room.” While waiting for a “bright European future” that may never come, they will almost certainly continue to integrate into the Open Balkan Initiative. Although it may not formally be part of the EU, the Balkan region will undoubtedly remain deeply in Brussels’ and Washington’s geopolitical orbit—at least for the foreseeable future.

About
Nikola Mikovic
:
Nikola Mikovic is a correspondent for Diplomatic Courier. He is a freelance journalist, researcher and analyst based in Serbia covering foreign policy in Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.