ussia’s invasion of Ukraine has provoked a profound rethinking of Europe’s foreign policy. Germany is undertaking a particularly major shift, including rearmament and questioning the policy of “engagement through trade” with authoritarian states. On the other side of the world, Russia’s neighbor Japan seems unlikely to radically change its foreign policy, but Russia’s invasion has given a sense of urgency to several pre-existing trends.
The first alteration is the abandonment of diplomatic engagement with Russia, the failure of which has been evident for several years. Former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo devoted significant energy to trying to seduce Vladimir Putin with promises of cooperation for the economic development of the Russian Far East. His goal was to negotiate the return of at least some of the Kuril Islands (“Northern Territories” in Japan). These islands were occupied by the Soviet Union at the end of World War II and have been a bone of contention between the two countries ever since. It's mostly because of this that Japan and Russia have never signed a formal peace treaty.
Long before the invasion of Ukraine, however, it had become clear that the Russian president had no intention of making concessions on this issue. Abe had not given up hope, however, and because of his great influence in Japanese politics, his successors felt obliged to show their support for his approach to Russia even after his resignation. This situation has now radically changed. In 2014, after the annexation of Crimea, Abe reluctantly followed his Western partners in applying sanctions against Russia. This time, after a brief moment of hesitation, the Fumio Kishida administration has completely aligned itself with the rest of the G7. Any prospect of renewed engagement with Russia is, for the moment, dead and buried, and Japanese elites are united in their condemnation of the threat posed by Vladimir Putin. No one fears that he will try to invade Hokkaido (which faces Siberia), but Japan’s defense planners probably expect more tension in the north.
Tokyo’s main concern remains the defense of the southern archipelago against China’s maritime advance. It is in this context that one must understand remarks made by several Japanese leaders that the crisis in Ukraine does not only concern Europe, but risks undermining the foundations of the international order in Asia as well. This is a reference to the universal importance of the principle of non-aggression and respect for established borders. It is also an echo of Japan’s concerns about Chinese actions in the East China Sea. China and Russia have conducted several joint naval and air patrols in the region in the last few years.
In response, Japan’s defense budget is growing—albeit at a slow pace—and is beginning to exceed Japan’s informal self-imposed limit of 1% of GDP. In the long run, the crisis in Ukraine will not change this direction. If anything, this crisis will make Japan's government even more convinced that the country needs to improve its military resources and capabilities.
The most immediate concern of the Japanese authorities is the uncertain fate of Taiwan. Over the past two or three years, various Japanese politicians and senior officials have become very outspoken in their expressions of great concern about the growing pressure imposed by China on the island. Japanese strategists see Taiwan’s continued autonomy as an existential issue since "reunification" with China would allow China to easily threaten the archipelago’s sea lines of communication and even the Okinawa islands in the event of a Sino-Japanese conflict. Tokyo's biggest fear, then, is that China will be encouraged by Russia's actions and decide to invade Taiwan, which would be bad for Japan.
There is nothing to suggest that Beijing is tempted to attack Taiwan, although Chinese leaders are closely monitoring the development of the crisis in Europe and will draw lessons from it for their plans for reunification by force. This did not stop Abe Shinzo from calling on the United States to formally pledge to defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack. He also suggested that Japan should seriously discuss hosting U.S. nuclear weapons on its territory—a taboo in Japanese politics until now, even though it is an open secret that such weapons have already been deployed on U.S. bases in the archipelago.
The current Prime Minister, Fumio Kishida, has been quick to point out that these are not the official positions of the Japanese government. Nevertheless, Abe’s views reflect the sense of urgency among Japanese elites in the face of the challenge posed by an "authoritarian axis" between Moscow and Beijing. This idea of a global clash between democratic countries and increasingly bold authoritarian states is not new. The invasion of Ukraine, however, has given it great urgency, both in Japan and in Europe.
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Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Adds Sense Of Urgency to Japan’s Foreign Policy
Photo via Unsplash.
March 15, 2022
Russia's invasion of Ukraine is causing a rethink of foreign policy models for governments around the world and Japan is no exception. While Japan is unlikely to radically alter its foreign policy approach, existing shifts will likely be pursued more urgently, writes Richard Rousseau.
R
ussia’s invasion of Ukraine has provoked a profound rethinking of Europe’s foreign policy. Germany is undertaking a particularly major shift, including rearmament and questioning the policy of “engagement through trade” with authoritarian states. On the other side of the world, Russia’s neighbor Japan seems unlikely to radically change its foreign policy, but Russia’s invasion has given a sense of urgency to several pre-existing trends.
The first alteration is the abandonment of diplomatic engagement with Russia, the failure of which has been evident for several years. Former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo devoted significant energy to trying to seduce Vladimir Putin with promises of cooperation for the economic development of the Russian Far East. His goal was to negotiate the return of at least some of the Kuril Islands (“Northern Territories” in Japan). These islands were occupied by the Soviet Union at the end of World War II and have been a bone of contention between the two countries ever since. It's mostly because of this that Japan and Russia have never signed a formal peace treaty.
Long before the invasion of Ukraine, however, it had become clear that the Russian president had no intention of making concessions on this issue. Abe had not given up hope, however, and because of his great influence in Japanese politics, his successors felt obliged to show their support for his approach to Russia even after his resignation. This situation has now radically changed. In 2014, after the annexation of Crimea, Abe reluctantly followed his Western partners in applying sanctions against Russia. This time, after a brief moment of hesitation, the Fumio Kishida administration has completely aligned itself with the rest of the G7. Any prospect of renewed engagement with Russia is, for the moment, dead and buried, and Japanese elites are united in their condemnation of the threat posed by Vladimir Putin. No one fears that he will try to invade Hokkaido (which faces Siberia), but Japan’s defense planners probably expect more tension in the north.
Tokyo’s main concern remains the defense of the southern archipelago against China’s maritime advance. It is in this context that one must understand remarks made by several Japanese leaders that the crisis in Ukraine does not only concern Europe, but risks undermining the foundations of the international order in Asia as well. This is a reference to the universal importance of the principle of non-aggression and respect for established borders. It is also an echo of Japan’s concerns about Chinese actions in the East China Sea. China and Russia have conducted several joint naval and air patrols in the region in the last few years.
In response, Japan’s defense budget is growing—albeit at a slow pace—and is beginning to exceed Japan’s informal self-imposed limit of 1% of GDP. In the long run, the crisis in Ukraine will not change this direction. If anything, this crisis will make Japan's government even more convinced that the country needs to improve its military resources and capabilities.
The most immediate concern of the Japanese authorities is the uncertain fate of Taiwan. Over the past two or three years, various Japanese politicians and senior officials have become very outspoken in their expressions of great concern about the growing pressure imposed by China on the island. Japanese strategists see Taiwan’s continued autonomy as an existential issue since "reunification" with China would allow China to easily threaten the archipelago’s sea lines of communication and even the Okinawa islands in the event of a Sino-Japanese conflict. Tokyo's biggest fear, then, is that China will be encouraged by Russia's actions and decide to invade Taiwan, which would be bad for Japan.
There is nothing to suggest that Beijing is tempted to attack Taiwan, although Chinese leaders are closely monitoring the development of the crisis in Europe and will draw lessons from it for their plans for reunification by force. This did not stop Abe Shinzo from calling on the United States to formally pledge to defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack. He also suggested that Japan should seriously discuss hosting U.S. nuclear weapons on its territory—a taboo in Japanese politics until now, even though it is an open secret that such weapons have already been deployed on U.S. bases in the archipelago.
The current Prime Minister, Fumio Kishida, has been quick to point out that these are not the official positions of the Japanese government. Nevertheless, Abe’s views reflect the sense of urgency among Japanese elites in the face of the challenge posed by an "authoritarian axis" between Moscow and Beijing. This idea of a global clash between democratic countries and increasingly bold authoritarian states is not new. The invasion of Ukraine, however, has given it great urgency, both in Japan and in Europe.
