The beat of the drums of war is growing steadily once again, and this time the public and private debates are swirling about Iran and its uranium enrichment program. So when an article appeared in The Daily Telegraph, titled “The deal the West could strike with Iran", advocating for allowing Iran to enrich uranium, albeit with the toughest safeguards, it set off a flurry of international attention. Is it wise to trust Iran? How would such negotiations play out? What are Iran’s motives? The Diplomatic Courier sat down with the article’s author, Ambassador Peter Jenkins, to find out.
Peter Jenkins CMG is former British Permanent Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency (2001-06) and is now a partner at ADRg Ambasasdors LLP, an international partnership of former Ambassadors who provide representation and strategic advice to businesses and governments.
***
[Diplomatic Courier]: What are Iran’s motivations for pushing forward on its uranium enrichment plan?
[Ambassador Peter Jenkins]: American intelligence experts believe Iran wants the means to make nuclear weapons (a nuclear weapons capability) but not nuclear weapons. A uranium enrichment capability would be a vital component of a nuclear weapons capability.
I sense that Iran’s main motive is security-related. Iran’s leaders want to feel confident that, if ever there were a threat to Iran’s “supreme interests”, they could withdraw, legally, from the NPT and manufacture nuclear devices. They may also want the enrichment program to bear witness to the intellectual caliber and organizational skills of the Iranian people and to show that Iran, an ancient Asian civilization, is –- like China and Turkey -– back in business.
[DC]: What are a country’s rights to uranium enrichment under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)?
[PJ]: NPT parties may develop an enrichment capability provided they respect all other provisions of the NPT, especially the obligations to refrain from manufacturing nuclear devices and to place all fissile nuclear material under IAEA safeguards.
For at least 12 years prior to 2003 Iran failed to respect its safeguards obligation. The NPT does not call for a non-compliant state to forfeit its rights. It requires only that the non-compliance be corrected; this Iran has done.
Following the discovery of its non-compliance Iran suspended a range of enrichment-related activities. It did so voluntarily, as a confidence-building measure, since the NPT does not require suspension in such circumstances.
[DC]: In your article in The Daily Telegraph, you state that Western powers should work toward an agreement – similar to the 2005 offer Iran made to the UK, France, and Germany – that would allow Iran to continue to enrich uranium if they agree to the strictest of IAEA standards. How would such a deal benefit western powers?
[PJ]: My experience leads me to doubt that the current Western policy – essentially to coerce Iran into giving up its enrichment capability – will work, and to fear that it will lead to a third Gulf War, which would cost the West lives and economic growth. So in my article I argued for a change of tactics and a change of objectives.
Tactically, what I suggest is the abandonment of coercion and a return to persuasion – diplomacy instead of sanctions, in essence. Being heirs to an ancient civilization, Iranians feel insulted by coercive measures and saloon-bar language; they react better to good manners, mutual respect, and a rational search for shared interests.
As for objectives, it seems to me that Western security interests do not require the West to insist on Iran surrendering its enrichment plants and work-shops provided all these are subject to intrusive international monitoring. So I favor the West negotiating for an agreement that is based on the balance of rights and obligations enshrined in the NPT, and on Iran volunteering measures to reassure neighbors who have been alarmed by Iran’s past “policy of concealment”.
The ultimate aim would be to minimize the risk of Iran deciding to use its nuclear capabilities for military purposes, by influencing Iranian motives and perceptions, especially perceptions of the costs and benefits of becoming nuclear-armed. Specifically the aim would be to:
- Increase the probability that any move towards being nuclear-armed will be detected by IAEA inspectors.
- Increase the probability that the UN will react as one, and forcefully, to any such detection, inflicting real harm on Iranian economic and political interests.
- Reduce Iran's sense of isolation, insecurity, resentment and anger over Western handling of the nuclear problem since 2005.
- Increase the value to Iran of international trade and investment so that Iran would have more to lose if it were to become nuclear-armed.
- Strengthen the reformist tendency in Iran by denying the more conservative tendencies a cause around which to rally Iranian nationalists.
There is no perfect policy response to the Iranian enrichment program. That’s why the debate still rages nine years after Dr. El Baradei first visited the enrichment site at Natanz. But some policies may be better adapted to the realities of a complex, multi-dimensional problem than others, and more likely to ensure the non-occurrence of potentially catastrophic conflict in a region vital to global prosperity.
[DC]: Aren’t you overlooking the “international obligations” that the Security Council has created for Iran, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, especially the obligations to suspend all enrichment, apply the IAEA Additional Protocol, and resolve all nuclear questions on the IAEA file? Iran has failed to comply, surely?
[PJ]: Yes, Iran has failed to comply. It’s deplorable that a UN member should ignore demands made by the Security Council. But there is something troubling about these demands. As you say, they are “international obligations” thanks to the use of the powers Chapter VII confers on the Security Council.
What is often overlooked, however, is that the drafters of Chapter VII, no doubt wanting to guard against the Security Council abusing this extraordinary power to make international law, ensured that the chapter opens with the following sentence: “The...Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall…decide what measures shall be taken… to maintain or restore international peace and security.”
No such determination has been made in respect of Iran’s enrichment activities, and it is not obvious that these do constitute a threat to the peace. So it could be said that the use of Chapter VII has been disproportionate and therefore unjust.
I suppose it could be argued that Iran must abandon enrichment to maintain the peace, since Israel has repeatedly threatened to breach the peace by committing an act of aggression to destroy Iran’s enrichment plants. But the logic of that argument is questionable. It would be more rational to remind Israel that, as a UN member, it is obliged to refrain from threatening other members with aggression, and may only use force defensively in the event of “an armed attack” on Israel.
I am confident Iran would agree to most of the UN's demands – but not suspension – in the course of the balanced negotiation for which I am arguing.
[DC]: If Iran were to use a deal to cheat, and ultimately produce enough high-grade uranium for a weapon, what recourse would the international community have?
[PJ]: There would be time for UN-backed diplomacy to persuade Iran to step back. If that failed, there would be time for the UN to approve measures to raise high the political and economic costs of becoming nuclear-armed. There would also be time for the UN to approve military action, though the costs and benefits of this would have to be weighed very carefully.
[DC]: Tensions have been escalating between Iran and Saudi Arabia as they both vie to become regional leaders of their respective Islamic sect. Do you see an opportunity to ease these tensions between the countries through the enrichment negotiations?
[PJ]: Saudi fears of Iran represent a significant political obstacle to a peaceful settlement (though these fears are not shared by other neighbors of Iran such as Turkey, Qatar, and Oman). It ought to be possible, though, to devise "confidence-building measures" which Iran would be ready to volunteer and which would reduce Saudi fears over time. Personally I see attractions in a nuclear-weapon-free zone covering the states that abut the Gulf.
Such zones elsewhere have proved their worth. No state in Latin America, Africa, Central Asia, South East Asia or the Pacific is suspected of working to violate its nuclear non-proliferation commitments. Perhaps promises made to neighbors weigh more heavily in the considerations of policy-makers than commitments made to distant powers.
[DC]: Relations between Iran and the United Kingdom have also worsened since the student attack on the UK Embassy in Tehran, and recently since Iranian intelligence agents interrogated a BBC Persian staff member in London. Relations between the U.S. and the Islamic Republic have never been good. Who is in the best position to lead negotiations?
[PJ]: Iran would have no confidence in an agreement to which the US was not a party. So the US must be at the negotiating table. The UK could be represented by the European Union but would probably prefer to speak for itself.
[DC]: Iran’s government is currently undergoing a seeming leadership crisis, as supporters of President Ahmadinejad and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei escalate the rhetoric against each other. Do you believe this political situation could affect negotiations?
[PJ]: Yes. The outlook for the next few months is unpromising. It could improve, though, after the convening of a new Iranian parliament in June.
[DC]: What is your opinion on why the West is accepting of some countries’ (such as Brazil) uranium enrichment programs, but sees Iran’s program as an inherent threat?
[PJ]: A good question. It brings us back to motives. Brazil has no discernible reason to use its enrichment plants to produce material for weapons. The West needs to work towards feeling equally confident about Iran. Working to affect motives can deliver durable solutions to problems; imposing constraints and restrictions to deny capacity cannot.
[DC]: The sanctions the U.S. and EU are currently levying on Iran are creating a rough economic situation for the Iranian people, dramatically devaluing the rial and making access to everyday goods difficult. Are such sanctions useful and effective? Or could they create an environment that could prevent a diplomatic solution?
[PJ]: Yes, the West seems to have become indifferent to the suffering of ordinary Iranians. It used to boast that its sanctions were so carefully targeted that only members of the elite would suffer. No longer. It also seems indifferent to the harm it is doing to its own economic interests.
These prices could be worth paying if sanctions were likely to bring about peacefully a lasting settlement. They are not, however, as I have already explained. Not only do Iranians bridle when subjected to pressure; in the majority of cases since 1945 sanctions have been ineffective.
This article was originally published in the Diplomatic Courier's March/April edition.
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Nuclear Security and Iran: An Interview with Ambassador Peter Jenkins
March 30, 2012
The beat of the drums of war is growing steadily once again, and this time the public and private debates are swirling about Iran and its uranium enrichment program. So when an article appeared in The Daily Telegraph, titled “The deal the West could strike with Iran", advocating for allowing Iran to enrich uranium, albeit with the toughest safeguards, it set off a flurry of international attention. Is it wise to trust Iran? How would such negotiations play out? What are Iran’s motives? The Diplomatic Courier sat down with the article’s author, Ambassador Peter Jenkins, to find out.
Peter Jenkins CMG is former British Permanent Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency (2001-06) and is now a partner at ADRg Ambasasdors LLP, an international partnership of former Ambassadors who provide representation and strategic advice to businesses and governments.
***
[Diplomatic Courier]: What are Iran’s motivations for pushing forward on its uranium enrichment plan?
[Ambassador Peter Jenkins]: American intelligence experts believe Iran wants the means to make nuclear weapons (a nuclear weapons capability) but not nuclear weapons. A uranium enrichment capability would be a vital component of a nuclear weapons capability.
I sense that Iran’s main motive is security-related. Iran’s leaders want to feel confident that, if ever there were a threat to Iran’s “supreme interests”, they could withdraw, legally, from the NPT and manufacture nuclear devices. They may also want the enrichment program to bear witness to the intellectual caliber and organizational skills of the Iranian people and to show that Iran, an ancient Asian civilization, is –- like China and Turkey -– back in business.
[DC]: What are a country’s rights to uranium enrichment under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)?
[PJ]: NPT parties may develop an enrichment capability provided they respect all other provisions of the NPT, especially the obligations to refrain from manufacturing nuclear devices and to place all fissile nuclear material under IAEA safeguards.
For at least 12 years prior to 2003 Iran failed to respect its safeguards obligation. The NPT does not call for a non-compliant state to forfeit its rights. It requires only that the non-compliance be corrected; this Iran has done.
Following the discovery of its non-compliance Iran suspended a range of enrichment-related activities. It did so voluntarily, as a confidence-building measure, since the NPT does not require suspension in such circumstances.
[DC]: In your article in The Daily Telegraph, you state that Western powers should work toward an agreement – similar to the 2005 offer Iran made to the UK, France, and Germany – that would allow Iran to continue to enrich uranium if they agree to the strictest of IAEA standards. How would such a deal benefit western powers?
[PJ]: My experience leads me to doubt that the current Western policy – essentially to coerce Iran into giving up its enrichment capability – will work, and to fear that it will lead to a third Gulf War, which would cost the West lives and economic growth. So in my article I argued for a change of tactics and a change of objectives.
Tactically, what I suggest is the abandonment of coercion and a return to persuasion – diplomacy instead of sanctions, in essence. Being heirs to an ancient civilization, Iranians feel insulted by coercive measures and saloon-bar language; they react better to good manners, mutual respect, and a rational search for shared interests.
As for objectives, it seems to me that Western security interests do not require the West to insist on Iran surrendering its enrichment plants and work-shops provided all these are subject to intrusive international monitoring. So I favor the West negotiating for an agreement that is based on the balance of rights and obligations enshrined in the NPT, and on Iran volunteering measures to reassure neighbors who have been alarmed by Iran’s past “policy of concealment”.
The ultimate aim would be to minimize the risk of Iran deciding to use its nuclear capabilities for military purposes, by influencing Iranian motives and perceptions, especially perceptions of the costs and benefits of becoming nuclear-armed. Specifically the aim would be to:
- Increase the probability that any move towards being nuclear-armed will be detected by IAEA inspectors.
- Increase the probability that the UN will react as one, and forcefully, to any such detection, inflicting real harm on Iranian economic and political interests.
- Reduce Iran's sense of isolation, insecurity, resentment and anger over Western handling of the nuclear problem since 2005.
- Increase the value to Iran of international trade and investment so that Iran would have more to lose if it were to become nuclear-armed.
- Strengthen the reformist tendency in Iran by denying the more conservative tendencies a cause around which to rally Iranian nationalists.
There is no perfect policy response to the Iranian enrichment program. That’s why the debate still rages nine years after Dr. El Baradei first visited the enrichment site at Natanz. But some policies may be better adapted to the realities of a complex, multi-dimensional problem than others, and more likely to ensure the non-occurrence of potentially catastrophic conflict in a region vital to global prosperity.
[DC]: Aren’t you overlooking the “international obligations” that the Security Council has created for Iran, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, especially the obligations to suspend all enrichment, apply the IAEA Additional Protocol, and resolve all nuclear questions on the IAEA file? Iran has failed to comply, surely?
[PJ]: Yes, Iran has failed to comply. It’s deplorable that a UN member should ignore demands made by the Security Council. But there is something troubling about these demands. As you say, they are “international obligations” thanks to the use of the powers Chapter VII confers on the Security Council.
What is often overlooked, however, is that the drafters of Chapter VII, no doubt wanting to guard against the Security Council abusing this extraordinary power to make international law, ensured that the chapter opens with the following sentence: “The...Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall…decide what measures shall be taken… to maintain or restore international peace and security.”
No such determination has been made in respect of Iran’s enrichment activities, and it is not obvious that these do constitute a threat to the peace. So it could be said that the use of Chapter VII has been disproportionate and therefore unjust.
I suppose it could be argued that Iran must abandon enrichment to maintain the peace, since Israel has repeatedly threatened to breach the peace by committing an act of aggression to destroy Iran’s enrichment plants. But the logic of that argument is questionable. It would be more rational to remind Israel that, as a UN member, it is obliged to refrain from threatening other members with aggression, and may only use force defensively in the event of “an armed attack” on Israel.
I am confident Iran would agree to most of the UN's demands – but not suspension – in the course of the balanced negotiation for which I am arguing.
[DC]: If Iran were to use a deal to cheat, and ultimately produce enough high-grade uranium for a weapon, what recourse would the international community have?
[PJ]: There would be time for UN-backed diplomacy to persuade Iran to step back. If that failed, there would be time for the UN to approve measures to raise high the political and economic costs of becoming nuclear-armed. There would also be time for the UN to approve military action, though the costs and benefits of this would have to be weighed very carefully.
[DC]: Tensions have been escalating between Iran and Saudi Arabia as they both vie to become regional leaders of their respective Islamic sect. Do you see an opportunity to ease these tensions between the countries through the enrichment negotiations?
[PJ]: Saudi fears of Iran represent a significant political obstacle to a peaceful settlement (though these fears are not shared by other neighbors of Iran such as Turkey, Qatar, and Oman). It ought to be possible, though, to devise "confidence-building measures" which Iran would be ready to volunteer and which would reduce Saudi fears over time. Personally I see attractions in a nuclear-weapon-free zone covering the states that abut the Gulf.
Such zones elsewhere have proved their worth. No state in Latin America, Africa, Central Asia, South East Asia or the Pacific is suspected of working to violate its nuclear non-proliferation commitments. Perhaps promises made to neighbors weigh more heavily in the considerations of policy-makers than commitments made to distant powers.
[DC]: Relations between Iran and the United Kingdom have also worsened since the student attack on the UK Embassy in Tehran, and recently since Iranian intelligence agents interrogated a BBC Persian staff member in London. Relations between the U.S. and the Islamic Republic have never been good. Who is in the best position to lead negotiations?
[PJ]: Iran would have no confidence in an agreement to which the US was not a party. So the US must be at the negotiating table. The UK could be represented by the European Union but would probably prefer to speak for itself.
[DC]: Iran’s government is currently undergoing a seeming leadership crisis, as supporters of President Ahmadinejad and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei escalate the rhetoric against each other. Do you believe this political situation could affect negotiations?
[PJ]: Yes. The outlook for the next few months is unpromising. It could improve, though, after the convening of a new Iranian parliament in June.
[DC]: What is your opinion on why the West is accepting of some countries’ (such as Brazil) uranium enrichment programs, but sees Iran’s program as an inherent threat?
[PJ]: A good question. It brings us back to motives. Brazil has no discernible reason to use its enrichment plants to produce material for weapons. The West needs to work towards feeling equally confident about Iran. Working to affect motives can deliver durable solutions to problems; imposing constraints and restrictions to deny capacity cannot.
[DC]: The sanctions the U.S. and EU are currently levying on Iran are creating a rough economic situation for the Iranian people, dramatically devaluing the rial and making access to everyday goods difficult. Are such sanctions useful and effective? Or could they create an environment that could prevent a diplomatic solution?
[PJ]: Yes, the West seems to have become indifferent to the suffering of ordinary Iranians. It used to boast that its sanctions were so carefully targeted that only members of the elite would suffer. No longer. It also seems indifferent to the harm it is doing to its own economic interests.
These prices could be worth paying if sanctions were likely to bring about peacefully a lasting settlement. They are not, however, as I have already explained. Not only do Iranians bridle when subjected to pressure; in the majority of cases since 1945 sanctions have been ineffective.
This article was originally published in the Diplomatic Courier's March/April edition.
