espite being broadly anticipated and widely discussed, China’s rise still seems to offer up new surprises. In the summer of 2021, reports emerged about mysterious “bouncy castles of death” in Yumen, China. These inflatable domes masked China’s installation of intercontinental ballistic missile silos, part of Beijing’s nuclear development. In November, China allegedly tested a hypersonic glide vehicle that caught analysts by surprise, given its sophistication and reported deployment of a secondary payload in flight. How much of a surprise these reports were to U.S. and allied intelligence remains unclear, but both indicate an acceleration in China’s military modernization efforts, a program that aims to bring China on par with the United States in the near-term – and possibly even surpassing it in the future.
Beijing’s military efforts are, of course, only one part of a multi-faceted, dynamic rise. As this rise progresses, China’s Communist Party is increasingly confident in its regional and global position, and accordingly is keen to assert its interests. The story of this rise and its practical application in politics, diplomacy, economics, and culture is one that is increasingly being told from nearly every angle. Books on China’s surveillance state, the global reach of the CCP, Beijing’s efforts within the United States and further afield – and the Party’s grand strategy are more common than even five years ago. This situation helps the public be better informed about shifting geopolitical norms, but it also makes it more difficult for a book to stand out.
“The World According to China” by Elizabeth Economy, a senior fellow with Stanford’s Hoover Institution and current senior adviser on China to the Department of Commerce, is an excellent contribution to the field of China geopolitical studies. Unfortunately, it also misses a step that could have made it stand-out even more from this increasingly crowded field.
From the outset, it is important to note that Economy’s book (a copy of which was kindly provided by the publisher) is superb. It is well-written, well-researched, and notably balanced in its presentation of China’s policies and the effects of these policies’ implementation. Economy looks at the dynamic and multifaceted nature of China’s rise, the application of its power, its attempts to manipulate global norms and institutions, the “One Belt, One Road Initiative,” and more – each of which is presented in a very even-keeled and balanced manner. She discusses China’s aims such as presenting China’s model as an alternative to the Western democratic-capitalist system and the reunification of China without hyperbole, making this one of the more balanced books on China available today. It is neither a Party apologist’s tome nor a breathless book of doom.
Economy’s exploration of China’s relationship with Greece and the Port of Piraeus is particularly insightful, weaving together not only the political and financial interests of Athens and Beijing in the broader context of how Greece’s relations with northern European states during the 2008 financial crisis affected the Aegean state. Here, Economy discusses how Beijing managed to secure a financial stake in the port, expand this interest, and the resulting effects of this investment (to include Chinese organized crime). She explores the One Belt and One Road initiative, noting the initiative often requires investments and loans be made prior to the program’s initial launch. Her exploration illustrates the strings that come with Chinese backing, strings that are prompting a considerable backlash. It is also interesting to note that this investment does not necessarily equate to full backing of China’s interests and positions.
Economy could have gone into greater depth about China’s use of the Thousand Talents Program, state-sanctioned/supported corporate espionage, and Beijing’s use of state intelligence apparatuses to support Chinese industry. To be sure she does cover this, but the insidiousness of this threat and the West’s uneven acknowledgement of these threats (both overt and covert) is a significant obstacle to addressing the challenge. Here too the attractiveness of China’s lucre often overpowers domestic interests, save for those few countries willing to stand up to the Chinese Communist Party—look at what Lithuania is doing today in pushing back against Beijing’s coercive tactics.
All of this superb content comes after one of the most riveting chapters I’ve yet read on China and one that could (and perhaps should) have been a book in and of itself. Economy opens her book with a fascinating look at how China’s response to Covid encapsulates nearly every element of Beijing’s playbook, save for the military component, which one almost certainly could find a connection if this were a feature-length book.
From the knee-jerk reaction to suppress any information about the virus, obfuscating its origins, and stonewalling the international community, through to Beijing’s use of wolf warrior diplomacy to spread mis- and dis-information, China’s response to the pandemic illustrates much about the Party’s interests and its pursuit of those interests. Economy’s exploration of this as an opening is inspired. It is likely one of the few places where the totality of China’s response has been analyzed and it is fascinating. How China managed to flip the narrative to become an internationally benevolent country and economic success in the face of a bungled and chaotic initial response says much about Beijing’s application of its power and pursuit of its interests.
Economy dismantles some of the popular conceptions, exposing how much of the “aid” was really commercial in nature and how Beijing made the allocation of this support contingent on signing contracts or political concessions such as supporting Beijing’s policies or avoiding sensitive topics. China’s mobilization of overseas Chinese through its United Works Front Department to provide PPE and critical supplies at the outset is also a story that is largely forgotten at this point. Ironically, so too are the rather ham-fisted efforts by Beijing to cast doubts on the origin of the virus, even suggesting that the U.S. military brought COVID-19 to Wuhan. While many of the Tweets were laughable, to look at their apparent silliness is to miss the fact that China is playing on the dis- and misinformation field, and will only get improve its efforts. Within China, the Party’s narrative is the only narrative, yet, as Economy shows, Beijing is working on the global stage to spread not only favorable news stories, but the whole Party line. The response to COVID-19 also illustrated China’s misuse of international organizations to quash unfavorable stories and narratives, but also to isolate Taiwan from the global community.
The strength of this chapter is an absolute stand-out. It merits its own book and I do hope Economy takes this task on as I will be amongst the first to pre-order it when and if it goes live. This chapter’s strength sets it apart from the remainder of the book which, again, is superb.
Ultimately, in the crowded field of China-policy books, it comes down to the policy recommendations on what the United States and the West should do with China’s rise. Economy smartly writes that the strategy of “engage, but hedge” seen in previous administrations and President Donald Trump’s “compete, counter, and contain” approach are largely two sides of the same coin. Here, if nothing else, Trump’s presidency and COVID-19 may have caused the scales to fall from the eyes of all by the most ardent China cheerleaders. China’s entry into the WTO did not achieve a fraction of the openness and democratization President Clinton suggested it would, nor did it lead to a more even economic playing field and benefits for American companies. Quite the opposite, in fact.
The balanced narrative Economy offers up, is perhaps too bullish on the prospects for stability and the absence of a new Cold War, or maybe the reviewer is too cynical and bearish. Perhaps both are true. While Economy is undoubtedly right that alliances matter, that the tent of traditional partners must be enlarged, and values are a currency of the realm, the reality is that hard power and financial interests matter more. Soft power can only achieve so much in the absence of conventional economic and military strength, especially in this new era of strategic geo-technological competition, where marshaling national power is much more multifaceted.
So long as there are leverages to be exploited, financial interests to be manipulated, and the absence of a full appreciation of the 21st century challenge that the Chinese Communist Party represents, Quad diplomacy and multilateral democratic summits will only achieve so much, and right now, that isn’t very much at all.
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China's Ambitions for a New International Order
Photo by Murphy Li via Unsplash.
January 29, 2022
Elizabeth Economy's latest book, "The World According to China," is well-written, well-researched, and notably balanced in its presentation of China’s policies and the effects of these policies’ implementation, writes Joshua C. Huminski in his latest book review.
D
espite being broadly anticipated and widely discussed, China’s rise still seems to offer up new surprises. In the summer of 2021, reports emerged about mysterious “bouncy castles of death” in Yumen, China. These inflatable domes masked China’s installation of intercontinental ballistic missile silos, part of Beijing’s nuclear development. In November, China allegedly tested a hypersonic glide vehicle that caught analysts by surprise, given its sophistication and reported deployment of a secondary payload in flight. How much of a surprise these reports were to U.S. and allied intelligence remains unclear, but both indicate an acceleration in China’s military modernization efforts, a program that aims to bring China on par with the United States in the near-term – and possibly even surpassing it in the future.
Beijing’s military efforts are, of course, only one part of a multi-faceted, dynamic rise. As this rise progresses, China’s Communist Party is increasingly confident in its regional and global position, and accordingly is keen to assert its interests. The story of this rise and its practical application in politics, diplomacy, economics, and culture is one that is increasingly being told from nearly every angle. Books on China’s surveillance state, the global reach of the CCP, Beijing’s efforts within the United States and further afield – and the Party’s grand strategy are more common than even five years ago. This situation helps the public be better informed about shifting geopolitical norms, but it also makes it more difficult for a book to stand out.
“The World According to China” by Elizabeth Economy, a senior fellow with Stanford’s Hoover Institution and current senior adviser on China to the Department of Commerce, is an excellent contribution to the field of China geopolitical studies. Unfortunately, it also misses a step that could have made it stand-out even more from this increasingly crowded field.
From the outset, it is important to note that Economy’s book (a copy of which was kindly provided by the publisher) is superb. It is well-written, well-researched, and notably balanced in its presentation of China’s policies and the effects of these policies’ implementation. Economy looks at the dynamic and multifaceted nature of China’s rise, the application of its power, its attempts to manipulate global norms and institutions, the “One Belt, One Road Initiative,” and more – each of which is presented in a very even-keeled and balanced manner. She discusses China’s aims such as presenting China’s model as an alternative to the Western democratic-capitalist system and the reunification of China without hyperbole, making this one of the more balanced books on China available today. It is neither a Party apologist’s tome nor a breathless book of doom.
Economy’s exploration of China’s relationship with Greece and the Port of Piraeus is particularly insightful, weaving together not only the political and financial interests of Athens and Beijing in the broader context of how Greece’s relations with northern European states during the 2008 financial crisis affected the Aegean state. Here, Economy discusses how Beijing managed to secure a financial stake in the port, expand this interest, and the resulting effects of this investment (to include Chinese organized crime). She explores the One Belt and One Road initiative, noting the initiative often requires investments and loans be made prior to the program’s initial launch. Her exploration illustrates the strings that come with Chinese backing, strings that are prompting a considerable backlash. It is also interesting to note that this investment does not necessarily equate to full backing of China’s interests and positions.
Economy could have gone into greater depth about China’s use of the Thousand Talents Program, state-sanctioned/supported corporate espionage, and Beijing’s use of state intelligence apparatuses to support Chinese industry. To be sure she does cover this, but the insidiousness of this threat and the West’s uneven acknowledgement of these threats (both overt and covert) is a significant obstacle to addressing the challenge. Here too the attractiveness of China’s lucre often overpowers domestic interests, save for those few countries willing to stand up to the Chinese Communist Party—look at what Lithuania is doing today in pushing back against Beijing’s coercive tactics.
All of this superb content comes after one of the most riveting chapters I’ve yet read on China and one that could (and perhaps should) have been a book in and of itself. Economy opens her book with a fascinating look at how China’s response to Covid encapsulates nearly every element of Beijing’s playbook, save for the military component, which one almost certainly could find a connection if this were a feature-length book.
From the knee-jerk reaction to suppress any information about the virus, obfuscating its origins, and stonewalling the international community, through to Beijing’s use of wolf warrior diplomacy to spread mis- and dis-information, China’s response to the pandemic illustrates much about the Party’s interests and its pursuit of those interests. Economy’s exploration of this as an opening is inspired. It is likely one of the few places where the totality of China’s response has been analyzed and it is fascinating. How China managed to flip the narrative to become an internationally benevolent country and economic success in the face of a bungled and chaotic initial response says much about Beijing’s application of its power and pursuit of its interests.
Economy dismantles some of the popular conceptions, exposing how much of the “aid” was really commercial in nature and how Beijing made the allocation of this support contingent on signing contracts or political concessions such as supporting Beijing’s policies or avoiding sensitive topics. China’s mobilization of overseas Chinese through its United Works Front Department to provide PPE and critical supplies at the outset is also a story that is largely forgotten at this point. Ironically, so too are the rather ham-fisted efforts by Beijing to cast doubts on the origin of the virus, even suggesting that the U.S. military brought COVID-19 to Wuhan. While many of the Tweets were laughable, to look at their apparent silliness is to miss the fact that China is playing on the dis- and misinformation field, and will only get improve its efforts. Within China, the Party’s narrative is the only narrative, yet, as Economy shows, Beijing is working on the global stage to spread not only favorable news stories, but the whole Party line. The response to COVID-19 also illustrated China’s misuse of international organizations to quash unfavorable stories and narratives, but also to isolate Taiwan from the global community.
The strength of this chapter is an absolute stand-out. It merits its own book and I do hope Economy takes this task on as I will be amongst the first to pre-order it when and if it goes live. This chapter’s strength sets it apart from the remainder of the book which, again, is superb.
Ultimately, in the crowded field of China-policy books, it comes down to the policy recommendations on what the United States and the West should do with China’s rise. Economy smartly writes that the strategy of “engage, but hedge” seen in previous administrations and President Donald Trump’s “compete, counter, and contain” approach are largely two sides of the same coin. Here, if nothing else, Trump’s presidency and COVID-19 may have caused the scales to fall from the eyes of all by the most ardent China cheerleaders. China’s entry into the WTO did not achieve a fraction of the openness and democratization President Clinton suggested it would, nor did it lead to a more even economic playing field and benefits for American companies. Quite the opposite, in fact.
The balanced narrative Economy offers up, is perhaps too bullish on the prospects for stability and the absence of a new Cold War, or maybe the reviewer is too cynical and bearish. Perhaps both are true. While Economy is undoubtedly right that alliances matter, that the tent of traditional partners must be enlarged, and values are a currency of the realm, the reality is that hard power and financial interests matter more. Soft power can only achieve so much in the absence of conventional economic and military strength, especially in this new era of strategic geo-technological competition, where marshaling national power is much more multifaceted.
So long as there are leverages to be exploited, financial interests to be manipulated, and the absence of a full appreciation of the 21st century challenge that the Chinese Communist Party represents, Quad diplomacy and multilateral democratic summits will only achieve so much, and right now, that isn’t very much at all.
