n the wake of the 7 Oct. 2023 attacks, a new Middle East has emerged. There is a volatile escalation in the Persian Gulf, as the new round of war between Hamas and Israeli Defense Forces spreads from Gaza to Syria and Jordan, all the way to the Red Sea. This growing regional chaos follows the post–9/11 U.S. military involvement in the region, the collapse of dictatorships during the Arab Spring, and the rise and then collapse of ISIS, all punctuated by violent competition between rival Islamist factions.
Regional powers took various measures to prevent escalation. Saudi Arabia prioritized its economic development plan based on its Vision 2030, Turkey recalibrated engagement with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, Qatar put a formal end to its blockade culminating in the al–Ula Declaration of January 2021, Tel Aviv normalized relations with Riyadh and Tehran resumed diplomatic engagement with Riyadh. This led to speculation that the region would see peace, only for this to be ended by the 7 Oct. attacks. Iranians, the backers of Hamas and seen in the West as the funders of the attacks, claim that the Israel–Palestinian conflict is what is driving regional instability. Iran also claims that it aims to keep all options open, maneuvering between regional trade partners and their efforts to de–escalate the conflict while pursuing its vision for the new Middle East.
Tehran’s response to de–escalation
As Qatar, Israel, and the U.S. discuss potential de–escalation, Tehran sees its role in–region as finally legitimized, forcing regional economies to re–calibrate their policy options while providing necessary grounds for them to collectively engage in reconciliation. According to former official of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (speaking on the promise of anonymity), the remarks made by President Raisi’s deputy chief of staff for political affairs, Mohammad Jamshidi, are a reflection of how Tehran perceives regional de–escalation initiatives, considering them a testament to Iran’s successful regional policy.
To achieve peace, Iran might open its doors for greater economic cooperation through diplomatic engagement, revising political ties with key regional allies (both bilaterally or through multilateral engagement) with an intent to bring regional stability on its terms. Though it is difficult to predict (or control) the future of friendship or enmity, Tehran may choose to de–escalate if this benefits its larger regional ambitions. In any de–escalation effort that involves the United States, the European Union, Russia or China, Iran may be willing to sit at the table, as long as peaceful negotiations do not disrupt its broader regional ambitions. If this situation does arise, Tehran may include non–interference in its nuclear program, perhaps proposing to hold an Iran–GCC summit to achieve regional stability. Keeping such an engagement in mind, it is highly likely Tehran will invite Russia or China as neutral allies in its efforts to host multilateral engagements between Iran and the greater Middle East, as it seeks to garner confidence and support from regional allies.
The fate of Gaza remains unclear. Although confirmed by some western media outlets, IRGC officials interviewed by the authors reiterated Tehran’s decision to not engage in the conflict on the behalf of Hamas, as according to one former IRGC official, Tehran was not informed nor involved in the discussions prior to 7 Oct. That said, while Tehran continues to provide Hamas unprecedented moral support, any chance of formal engagement/involvement would only occur if Washington or Tel Aviv declare an open war on Iran. That said, the war in Gaza provides a valuable opportunity for Tehran. If it chooses to, it can call for an immediate ceasefire or exchange of prisoners, as it did before with Thai hostages in November 2023, resulting in a successful release.
Iran, which before the 7 Oct. attack perceived itself ignored and perpetually exiled from the U.S.–led regional order for the Greater Middle East since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, has mastered the art of securing its regional interest in times of mayhem, chaos and regional instability. The war in Gaza gives Tehran a valuable opportunity to propose a revised regional security apparatus, but it has yet to face the reality of Washington remaining loyal to its allies in the times of crisis in the Middle East, and continuing to demonstrate its presence in the region. Iran also needs to accept the fact that regional economies may expand their security ties with Washington in the face of its growing assertiveness in the region. Will Tehran alter its policy for the Middle East? It is too soon to tell.
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Will Tehran alter its Middle East policy?
Azadi Square, Tehran, Iran. Photo by fatemeh momtaz on Unsplash.
January 31, 2024
As Qatar, Israel, and the U.S. discuss potential de–escalation in Gaza, Iran feels that its role in the region is being legitimized. Now, the Iranian government has options for helping to de–escalate and bring regional stability on its own terms, write Anant Mishra and Jay Heisler.
I
n the wake of the 7 Oct. 2023 attacks, a new Middle East has emerged. There is a volatile escalation in the Persian Gulf, as the new round of war between Hamas and Israeli Defense Forces spreads from Gaza to Syria and Jordan, all the way to the Red Sea. This growing regional chaos follows the post–9/11 U.S. military involvement in the region, the collapse of dictatorships during the Arab Spring, and the rise and then collapse of ISIS, all punctuated by violent competition between rival Islamist factions.
Regional powers took various measures to prevent escalation. Saudi Arabia prioritized its economic development plan based on its Vision 2030, Turkey recalibrated engagement with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, Qatar put a formal end to its blockade culminating in the al–Ula Declaration of January 2021, Tel Aviv normalized relations with Riyadh and Tehran resumed diplomatic engagement with Riyadh. This led to speculation that the region would see peace, only for this to be ended by the 7 Oct. attacks. Iranians, the backers of Hamas and seen in the West as the funders of the attacks, claim that the Israel–Palestinian conflict is what is driving regional instability. Iran also claims that it aims to keep all options open, maneuvering between regional trade partners and their efforts to de–escalate the conflict while pursuing its vision for the new Middle East.
Tehran’s response to de–escalation
As Qatar, Israel, and the U.S. discuss potential de–escalation, Tehran sees its role in–region as finally legitimized, forcing regional economies to re–calibrate their policy options while providing necessary grounds for them to collectively engage in reconciliation. According to former official of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (speaking on the promise of anonymity), the remarks made by President Raisi’s deputy chief of staff for political affairs, Mohammad Jamshidi, are a reflection of how Tehran perceives regional de–escalation initiatives, considering them a testament to Iran’s successful regional policy.
To achieve peace, Iran might open its doors for greater economic cooperation through diplomatic engagement, revising political ties with key regional allies (both bilaterally or through multilateral engagement) with an intent to bring regional stability on its terms. Though it is difficult to predict (or control) the future of friendship or enmity, Tehran may choose to de–escalate if this benefits its larger regional ambitions. In any de–escalation effort that involves the United States, the European Union, Russia or China, Iran may be willing to sit at the table, as long as peaceful negotiations do not disrupt its broader regional ambitions. If this situation does arise, Tehran may include non–interference in its nuclear program, perhaps proposing to hold an Iran–GCC summit to achieve regional stability. Keeping such an engagement in mind, it is highly likely Tehran will invite Russia or China as neutral allies in its efforts to host multilateral engagements between Iran and the greater Middle East, as it seeks to garner confidence and support from regional allies.
The fate of Gaza remains unclear. Although confirmed by some western media outlets, IRGC officials interviewed by the authors reiterated Tehran’s decision to not engage in the conflict on the behalf of Hamas, as according to one former IRGC official, Tehran was not informed nor involved in the discussions prior to 7 Oct. That said, while Tehran continues to provide Hamas unprecedented moral support, any chance of formal engagement/involvement would only occur if Washington or Tel Aviv declare an open war on Iran. That said, the war in Gaza provides a valuable opportunity for Tehran. If it chooses to, it can call for an immediate ceasefire or exchange of prisoners, as it did before with Thai hostages in November 2023, resulting in a successful release.
Iran, which before the 7 Oct. attack perceived itself ignored and perpetually exiled from the U.S.–led regional order for the Greater Middle East since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, has mastered the art of securing its regional interest in times of mayhem, chaos and regional instability. The war in Gaza gives Tehran a valuable opportunity to propose a revised regional security apparatus, but it has yet to face the reality of Washington remaining loyal to its allies in the times of crisis in the Middle East, and continuing to demonstrate its presence in the region. Iran also needs to accept the fact that regional economies may expand their security ties with Washington in the face of its growing assertiveness in the region. Will Tehran alter its policy for the Middle East? It is too soon to tell.
