round three months have passed since the fall of Kabul, and the extent to which efforts to evacuate Afghan refugees since has been a success is still very much in question. The coupling of a government-led evacuation effort with private endeavors to fill the gaps through charter aircraft and coordination to identify at-risk Afghans could be a model for future public-private partnerships. However, the fact that the results are still unclear is, in itself, highly problematic. Along with questions over the efficacy of the experiment, there are further questions over the value of funding models and the legality of operations. This continued uncertainty will likely be the coda for America’s experiment in building a democracy in Afghanistan – a final, solitary nail in the coffin.
While the public-private partnership enjoyed meaningful successes, we should all be worried about what it means for government control over inherently governmental functions.
What defines success when upwards of 130,000 people were evacuated from Afghanistan? As a single data point, the number alone signifies some success. However, dig into the specifics and one will find that most combat translators (also known as ‘SIVs’) who served with American forces were left behind. An official with the Biden Administration admitted as much in September. While the public-private partnership did save lives, the unofficial numbers for the most at-risk population of Afghans - combat translators - are disheartening. The Department of Homeland Security revealed that just 3% of Afghan evacuees had Special Immigrant Visas. There were an estimated 18,000 primary legal recipients of the SIV visa in Afghanistan in August and with family members that number was closer to 32,000. Including those in various stages of the application process, the number was around 65,000 total. Of this total, around 7,000 Special Immigrant Visa applicants made it to the U.S. That number would sound great if not for the fact that 58,000 were left behind.A more troubling question is whether the public-private partnership to evacuate at-risk Afghans passes scrutiny with the American public. The conglomeration of various task forces with both active and retired military and regular citizens combined with millions of dollars in donations should lead anyone to pause and take stock. Who did what, where, when, and why? How will the American public react in learning that private citizens influenced the government at every level to get people out of Afghanistan? What if the public were to find that these private rescue operations used their contacts to arrange for temporary holding stations in third countries without U.S. Government approval? Americans should question who is in charge and making decisions. The recent Congressional hearings with the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are just the beginning. More specifically, donors – and the charitable status of the supporting cast of 501(c)(3) organizations – will require an accounting of their actions.
No One Left Behind (NOLB) supported many of these efforts through building comprehensive lists of at-risk Afghans. Yet even these noble efforts included troubling associations. NOLB received multiple notices from the UAE Red Crescent regarding its responsibility for the care and feeding of 5,000 refugees in the UAE. Clearly, we made no agreement for such a thing and yet, we were implicated in something that was beyond our capabilities – who made such a promise and why NOLB was named is still uncertain. Despite these complications, NOLB remains committed to spending $2 million to legally and officially fly-out combat translators with the Special Immigrant Visa on commercial flights and has already commenced that process after a pause since Kabul fell.
If evacuations are inherently a government function, what role should the private sector play? Over the past 40 years, there were upwards of 20 non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) with the most recent likely the most trying in terms of numbers and time. Every Combatant Command possesses a plan for a NEO, so processes are in place to move quickly when approval is granted. What is not clear is the role private evacuation efforts should perform. As a case-in-point, armed private citizens tried to enter Afghanistan but were thankfully stopped by immigration officials; what does that level of unbridled commitment mean for the future of these efforts? Equally troubling are admissions that donor funds were burned-through at an alarming rate and likely with minimal scrutiny. Many well-meaning Americans gave money towards evacuating Afghans with the understanding that the efforts would meet with success, that flight clearances would be approved and that the safety of the Afghans would be paramount. In such a complex landscape, nothing is guaranteed. However it is clear that many groups moving Afghans across the country were unable to complete the final stages of evacuation, to include embarkation and takeoff. Interestingly, the State Department was blamed for obstruction in this regard.
In reality, the situation on the ground was intensely more fluid and complex than the State Department could predict, let alone any single private organization. Extricating at-risk Afghans is a noble aim, but the reality is that the support required once they leave Afghanistan is a part of a much larger problem, particularly because these many private endeavors attempted to move Afghans without United States visas. Unless the State Department approved third countries for processing, these private organizations should rightly be held responsible for the continued support of these refugees once they arrive in third countries. Furthermore, the difference between Afghans rushing onto government flights to be screened later and private entities doing the same without appropriate screening processes is the difference between the inherently government function of providing immigration services and everyone else.
Americans need to understand that good people did what they thought was right for the right reasons. However, these actions were often taken at the cost of subverting inherently governmental processes likely, unnecessarily complicating the matter and potentially leading to criminal investigations. There is a role for the private sector when it comes to evacuations, but it must be assiduously scoped so that efforts are neither duplicated nor undermining to government control. Donors and the American public expect as much.
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What Defines Success in Afghanistan? A Coda and a Warning.
Photo via Pixabay.
November 15, 2021
The public-private hybrid approach to evacuating Afghan refugees has had some impressive successes but remains intensely problematic, with questions around not only the approach's efficacy but also its legality, writes former No One Left Behind Board Member Christopher Karwacki.
A
round three months have passed since the fall of Kabul, and the extent to which efforts to evacuate Afghan refugees since has been a success is still very much in question. The coupling of a government-led evacuation effort with private endeavors to fill the gaps through charter aircraft and coordination to identify at-risk Afghans could be a model for future public-private partnerships. However, the fact that the results are still unclear is, in itself, highly problematic. Along with questions over the efficacy of the experiment, there are further questions over the value of funding models and the legality of operations. This continued uncertainty will likely be the coda for America’s experiment in building a democracy in Afghanistan – a final, solitary nail in the coffin.
While the public-private partnership enjoyed meaningful successes, we should all be worried about what it means for government control over inherently governmental functions.
What defines success when upwards of 130,000 people were evacuated from Afghanistan? As a single data point, the number alone signifies some success. However, dig into the specifics and one will find that most combat translators (also known as ‘SIVs’) who served with American forces were left behind. An official with the Biden Administration admitted as much in September. While the public-private partnership did save lives, the unofficial numbers for the most at-risk population of Afghans - combat translators - are disheartening. The Department of Homeland Security revealed that just 3% of Afghan evacuees had Special Immigrant Visas. There were an estimated 18,000 primary legal recipients of the SIV visa in Afghanistan in August and with family members that number was closer to 32,000. Including those in various stages of the application process, the number was around 65,000 total. Of this total, around 7,000 Special Immigrant Visa applicants made it to the U.S. That number would sound great if not for the fact that 58,000 were left behind.A more troubling question is whether the public-private partnership to evacuate at-risk Afghans passes scrutiny with the American public. The conglomeration of various task forces with both active and retired military and regular citizens combined with millions of dollars in donations should lead anyone to pause and take stock. Who did what, where, when, and why? How will the American public react in learning that private citizens influenced the government at every level to get people out of Afghanistan? What if the public were to find that these private rescue operations used their contacts to arrange for temporary holding stations in third countries without U.S. Government approval? Americans should question who is in charge and making decisions. The recent Congressional hearings with the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are just the beginning. More specifically, donors – and the charitable status of the supporting cast of 501(c)(3) organizations – will require an accounting of their actions.
No One Left Behind (NOLB) supported many of these efforts through building comprehensive lists of at-risk Afghans. Yet even these noble efforts included troubling associations. NOLB received multiple notices from the UAE Red Crescent regarding its responsibility for the care and feeding of 5,000 refugees in the UAE. Clearly, we made no agreement for such a thing and yet, we were implicated in something that was beyond our capabilities – who made such a promise and why NOLB was named is still uncertain. Despite these complications, NOLB remains committed to spending $2 million to legally and officially fly-out combat translators with the Special Immigrant Visa on commercial flights and has already commenced that process after a pause since Kabul fell.
If evacuations are inherently a government function, what role should the private sector play? Over the past 40 years, there were upwards of 20 non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) with the most recent likely the most trying in terms of numbers and time. Every Combatant Command possesses a plan for a NEO, so processes are in place to move quickly when approval is granted. What is not clear is the role private evacuation efforts should perform. As a case-in-point, armed private citizens tried to enter Afghanistan but were thankfully stopped by immigration officials; what does that level of unbridled commitment mean for the future of these efforts? Equally troubling are admissions that donor funds were burned-through at an alarming rate and likely with minimal scrutiny. Many well-meaning Americans gave money towards evacuating Afghans with the understanding that the efforts would meet with success, that flight clearances would be approved and that the safety of the Afghans would be paramount. In such a complex landscape, nothing is guaranteed. However it is clear that many groups moving Afghans across the country were unable to complete the final stages of evacuation, to include embarkation and takeoff. Interestingly, the State Department was blamed for obstruction in this regard.
In reality, the situation on the ground was intensely more fluid and complex than the State Department could predict, let alone any single private organization. Extricating at-risk Afghans is a noble aim, but the reality is that the support required once they leave Afghanistan is a part of a much larger problem, particularly because these many private endeavors attempted to move Afghans without United States visas. Unless the State Department approved third countries for processing, these private organizations should rightly be held responsible for the continued support of these refugees once they arrive in third countries. Furthermore, the difference between Afghans rushing onto government flights to be screened later and private entities doing the same without appropriate screening processes is the difference between the inherently government function of providing immigration services and everyone else.
Americans need to understand that good people did what they thought was right for the right reasons. However, these actions were often taken at the cost of subverting inherently governmental processes likely, unnecessarily complicating the matter and potentially leading to criminal investigations. There is a role for the private sector when it comes to evacuations, but it must be assiduously scoped so that efforts are neither duplicated nor undermining to government control. Donors and the American public expect as much.
