.

Turkey was presented with the rare opportunity to re-write its modern history when the country became a Republic in 1929. However, Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoglu is still harnessing the country’s previous identity as the multi-ethnic, multi-cultural Ottoman Empire to shape a new foreign affairs policy. Because the former geographic boundaries stretched from Egypt to Jordan, from Saudi-Arabia to Macedonia and included Europe as well as Asia, the affairs that once were internal suddenly became public dirty laundry when the empire dissolved. This had obvious detrimental implications on Turkey’s relationship with all of its neighbors, necessitating a new foreign relations strategy that focused on quickly ironing over these problems.

A Break from the Old Routine

At Turkey’s outset as a republic there was an assumption that the country would function as a bridge between East and West. However, while Turkey is undeniably a part of both worlds, it is at the same time an entirely unique nation. This is the multidimensional perspective from which Turkey sees itself, and is more in line with Turkey’s global aspirations and ambitions.

This also applies to its attitude regarding security and stability. Turkey is convinced that maintaining its own stability and security can only be successful if it is in conjunction with the neighboring countries. It is a break from the old routine and part of the strategic shift. Instead of having a defensive attitude, Turkey has acquired a more proactive role towards its neighbors.

Strategic Shift

During the Cold War, Turkey was labeled a “frontier country”. The post-Cold War period demanded from countries of the ex-Soviet Union a change in attitude and a reorientation of their roles. Since the bipolar world had disappeared in favor of a more unipolar world, most countries were searching for a new role to play in this altered atmosphere—Turkey being no exception. It had to assess its foreign policy and think about its possible new role on the world stage that had changed considerably. It transformed and profiled itself as a bridge country between East and West. While most other countries in the region fell into some kind of conflict (i.e. conflict in the Balkan and the first Gulf War) Turkey seemed able to isolate itself from these confrontations.

However, at the outset of this paradigm shift Turkey’s relations with its adjacent neighbors were far from perfect. Ismail Cem, who became minister of Foreign Affairs in 1997, began implementing a prominent shift in Turkey’s foreign policy approach. A principle was adopted that for every positive rapprochement towards Turkey, Turkey would reciprocate with two positive ones.

Cem’s new strategy was as ambitious and positive as it was naive and suspicious. At the end of the last millennium a start had been made with a strong rapprochement with Greece. The earthquakes in 1999 that first hit Turkey and later Greece marked this beginning of rapprochement between Greece and Turkey where both countries genuinely held out a helping hand to each other. Some called this form of rapprochement “earthquake diplomacy”. But it was the election of the AKP (the Justice and Development Party) in 2002 that can be seen as the most striking and visible shift in Turkey’s foreign affairs.

The Grand Architect of Turkey’s Strategic Shift

While Cem laid the foundation for a shift in the strategy of Turkey’s foreign affairs, it is minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoglu who is the grand architect of Turkey’s current foreign policy strategy. He is able to appeal to Turkey’s disparate demographics as a religious and scholarly man from the conservative Anatolian part of Konya. As an advisor to the mercurial president Erdogan in 2002, Davutoglu, who taught at the Marmara University and was associated with Beykent University set out his philosophy of international relations and chalked out foreign policies.

When he became minister of Foreign Affairs himself in 2009, Davutoglu had the chance to put these philosophies and theories into practice. All these principles are focused on creating a new and more powerful role and identity for Turkey. The main tenet of his international relations philosophy is “zero problem policy toward Turkey’s neighbors”.

Zero Problems?

In order to successfully adhere to the philosophy of “zero problems with neighbors”, Turkey had to take up a few different and unexpected roles, such as a mediator and as a peacemaker.   Forging this territory without previous experience was not easy, but since implementation this strategy can be deemed successful—even in the political and diplomatic quagmire that is the Middle East.

In the past, Turkey’s foreign policy has been strongly influenced by its problematic, crisis-prone relationship and traditional rivalry with Greece. Even though rapprochement took place at the end of the nineties, it was only after the election of the AKP that the relationship between Greece and Turkey became profoundly altered. In 2010 Turkey removed its former archenemy Greece from its list of national threats—a move that would have been unthinkable not so long ago. Furthermore, both countries began talks on disputes that were bothering both countries for some time, such as the Aegean Sea dilemma. While only incremental progress, it is progress nonetheless.

On the other hand, Turkey’s relations with neighbor Syria have never been as good as they are currently. Davutoglu made his interest in the relationship clear when he visited the country three times in 2009 alone, the year he became the minister of Foreign Affairs. But relations have also been strengthened on an economic level as well, which is essential for two countries that are so dependent upon each other for trade. Since Dayutoglu took office this dependence has only intensified, with the signing of free trade agreements generating even more income for both parties.

Turkey’s relationship with Armenia may not have been at the top of any foreign relations priority list before, but upon taking office Davutoglu immediately signed two protocols to normalize bonds and cultivate relations with the country. Previously, both countries had been intermittently contentious, and these protocols laid the groundwork for a more peaceful and understanding relationship.

Another neighboring country with which Turkey invigorated relationships is Iran. Turkey sought rapprochement and maximum cooperation with the country, as it saw itself as an ideal mediator for the nuclear issue—evidence that Turkey felt more than ready to claim its role as a leader in the region.

In 2009 Turkey intermediated between Bosnia and Serbia when their relations suddenly became hostile again, despite the fact that neither country is at Turkey’s border. The aim was to expand the definition of “neighbor” to encompass more of the region and to make the boundaries of Turkey’s diplomacy more fluid. An anecdote illustrates Davutoglu’s diplomatic approach: Davutoglu, a non-smoker out of religious principle, made an exception to smoke with the Bosnian politician Haris Silajdzic so he would accept Serbia’s apology. He was quoted saying that his diplomatic method was “smoking like a Bosnian”.

Views from the Rest

Turkey’s new approach to foreign policy has received much criticism internally as well as internationally. The United States, a longtime ally, was distressed with Turkey’s actions and diplomatic endeavors in Iran. It is imaginable that an amicable relationship between Iran and Turkey is not favored by the U.S., as Iran’s ambitions to enrich uranium are considered threatening to world peace. These rapprochements left Washington wondering what Turkey’s motives were and whose friend it actually was. In addition, the deteriorated relations between Israel and Turkey after the flotilla-incident is also of great concern to the U.S. because it is seen as endangering Israel’s position in the region.

Opinion-makers in the West claimed Turkey’s new stance was equal to having turned its back on the EU and the rest of the world in favor of the Arab region. The argument goes that Turkey got too impatient waiting for the invitation to join the EU and that it felt rejected. Turkey also received criticism that it is not big or strong enough to be a serious power in the region. This criticism however is seen from the perspective of balance-of-power politics, which does not fully explain the essence of the new foreign policy. On the other hand, other critics find the shift neo-Ottoman aiming at for instance, a commonwealth. The implementation of the visa-free zones and the initiation of free trade between Syria, Lebanon and Jordan are considered a restoration of “the old Ottoman space”.

Turkey hardly reacts to these criticisms. Davutoglu claims that Turkey’s foreign policy does not aim to choose sides for one or the other—he wants to have a good relationship with all neighbors, even if that means befriending a neighbor’s ally. The question that surfaces: is a good relationship with everybody even possible in a multidimensional, multicultural and an increasingly more multipolar world? Whatever the answer to this, Turkey is riding on a wave of self-confidence and economic dynamism that fuels its attitude and ambitions. Its ambition to become a regional leader is intertwined with its role to become a global player, and it intends to make its stepping-stones out of regional diplomacy.

The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.

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www.diplomaticourier.com

Turkey’s Foreign Policy Strategy

April 9, 2011

Turkey was presented with the rare opportunity to re-write its modern history when the country became a Republic in 1929. However, Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoglu is still harnessing the country’s previous identity as the multi-ethnic, multi-cultural Ottoman Empire to shape a new foreign affairs policy. Because the former geographic boundaries stretched from Egypt to Jordan, from Saudi-Arabia to Macedonia and included Europe as well as Asia, the affairs that once were internal suddenly became public dirty laundry when the empire dissolved. This had obvious detrimental implications on Turkey’s relationship with all of its neighbors, necessitating a new foreign relations strategy that focused on quickly ironing over these problems.

A Break from the Old Routine

At Turkey’s outset as a republic there was an assumption that the country would function as a bridge between East and West. However, while Turkey is undeniably a part of both worlds, it is at the same time an entirely unique nation. This is the multidimensional perspective from which Turkey sees itself, and is more in line with Turkey’s global aspirations and ambitions.

This also applies to its attitude regarding security and stability. Turkey is convinced that maintaining its own stability and security can only be successful if it is in conjunction with the neighboring countries. It is a break from the old routine and part of the strategic shift. Instead of having a defensive attitude, Turkey has acquired a more proactive role towards its neighbors.

Strategic Shift

During the Cold War, Turkey was labeled a “frontier country”. The post-Cold War period demanded from countries of the ex-Soviet Union a change in attitude and a reorientation of their roles. Since the bipolar world had disappeared in favor of a more unipolar world, most countries were searching for a new role to play in this altered atmosphere—Turkey being no exception. It had to assess its foreign policy and think about its possible new role on the world stage that had changed considerably. It transformed and profiled itself as a bridge country between East and West. While most other countries in the region fell into some kind of conflict (i.e. conflict in the Balkan and the first Gulf War) Turkey seemed able to isolate itself from these confrontations.

However, at the outset of this paradigm shift Turkey’s relations with its adjacent neighbors were far from perfect. Ismail Cem, who became minister of Foreign Affairs in 1997, began implementing a prominent shift in Turkey’s foreign policy approach. A principle was adopted that for every positive rapprochement towards Turkey, Turkey would reciprocate with two positive ones.

Cem’s new strategy was as ambitious and positive as it was naive and suspicious. At the end of the last millennium a start had been made with a strong rapprochement with Greece. The earthquakes in 1999 that first hit Turkey and later Greece marked this beginning of rapprochement between Greece and Turkey where both countries genuinely held out a helping hand to each other. Some called this form of rapprochement “earthquake diplomacy”. But it was the election of the AKP (the Justice and Development Party) in 2002 that can be seen as the most striking and visible shift in Turkey’s foreign affairs.

The Grand Architect of Turkey’s Strategic Shift

While Cem laid the foundation for a shift in the strategy of Turkey’s foreign affairs, it is minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoglu who is the grand architect of Turkey’s current foreign policy strategy. He is able to appeal to Turkey’s disparate demographics as a religious and scholarly man from the conservative Anatolian part of Konya. As an advisor to the mercurial president Erdogan in 2002, Davutoglu, who taught at the Marmara University and was associated with Beykent University set out his philosophy of international relations and chalked out foreign policies.

When he became minister of Foreign Affairs himself in 2009, Davutoglu had the chance to put these philosophies and theories into practice. All these principles are focused on creating a new and more powerful role and identity for Turkey. The main tenet of his international relations philosophy is “zero problem policy toward Turkey’s neighbors”.

Zero Problems?

In order to successfully adhere to the philosophy of “zero problems with neighbors”, Turkey had to take up a few different and unexpected roles, such as a mediator and as a peacemaker.   Forging this territory without previous experience was not easy, but since implementation this strategy can be deemed successful—even in the political and diplomatic quagmire that is the Middle East.

In the past, Turkey’s foreign policy has been strongly influenced by its problematic, crisis-prone relationship and traditional rivalry with Greece. Even though rapprochement took place at the end of the nineties, it was only after the election of the AKP that the relationship between Greece and Turkey became profoundly altered. In 2010 Turkey removed its former archenemy Greece from its list of national threats—a move that would have been unthinkable not so long ago. Furthermore, both countries began talks on disputes that were bothering both countries for some time, such as the Aegean Sea dilemma. While only incremental progress, it is progress nonetheless.

On the other hand, Turkey’s relations with neighbor Syria have never been as good as they are currently. Davutoglu made his interest in the relationship clear when he visited the country three times in 2009 alone, the year he became the minister of Foreign Affairs. But relations have also been strengthened on an economic level as well, which is essential for two countries that are so dependent upon each other for trade. Since Dayutoglu took office this dependence has only intensified, with the signing of free trade agreements generating even more income for both parties.

Turkey’s relationship with Armenia may not have been at the top of any foreign relations priority list before, but upon taking office Davutoglu immediately signed two protocols to normalize bonds and cultivate relations with the country. Previously, both countries had been intermittently contentious, and these protocols laid the groundwork for a more peaceful and understanding relationship.

Another neighboring country with which Turkey invigorated relationships is Iran. Turkey sought rapprochement and maximum cooperation with the country, as it saw itself as an ideal mediator for the nuclear issue—evidence that Turkey felt more than ready to claim its role as a leader in the region.

In 2009 Turkey intermediated between Bosnia and Serbia when their relations suddenly became hostile again, despite the fact that neither country is at Turkey’s border. The aim was to expand the definition of “neighbor” to encompass more of the region and to make the boundaries of Turkey’s diplomacy more fluid. An anecdote illustrates Davutoglu’s diplomatic approach: Davutoglu, a non-smoker out of religious principle, made an exception to smoke with the Bosnian politician Haris Silajdzic so he would accept Serbia’s apology. He was quoted saying that his diplomatic method was “smoking like a Bosnian”.

Views from the Rest

Turkey’s new approach to foreign policy has received much criticism internally as well as internationally. The United States, a longtime ally, was distressed with Turkey’s actions and diplomatic endeavors in Iran. It is imaginable that an amicable relationship between Iran and Turkey is not favored by the U.S., as Iran’s ambitions to enrich uranium are considered threatening to world peace. These rapprochements left Washington wondering what Turkey’s motives were and whose friend it actually was. In addition, the deteriorated relations between Israel and Turkey after the flotilla-incident is also of great concern to the U.S. because it is seen as endangering Israel’s position in the region.

Opinion-makers in the West claimed Turkey’s new stance was equal to having turned its back on the EU and the rest of the world in favor of the Arab region. The argument goes that Turkey got too impatient waiting for the invitation to join the EU and that it felt rejected. Turkey also received criticism that it is not big or strong enough to be a serious power in the region. This criticism however is seen from the perspective of balance-of-power politics, which does not fully explain the essence of the new foreign policy. On the other hand, other critics find the shift neo-Ottoman aiming at for instance, a commonwealth. The implementation of the visa-free zones and the initiation of free trade between Syria, Lebanon and Jordan are considered a restoration of “the old Ottoman space”.

Turkey hardly reacts to these criticisms. Davutoglu claims that Turkey’s foreign policy does not aim to choose sides for one or the other—he wants to have a good relationship with all neighbors, even if that means befriending a neighbor’s ally. The question that surfaces: is a good relationship with everybody even possible in a multidimensional, multicultural and an increasingly more multipolar world? Whatever the answer to this, Turkey is riding on a wave of self-confidence and economic dynamism that fuels its attitude and ambitions. Its ambition to become a regional leader is intertwined with its role to become a global player, and it intends to make its stepping-stones out of regional diplomacy.

The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.