ater has become the new gold due to droughts, flooding, desertification, the effect of climate change on these natural disasters, population growth, and water mismanagement. Accordingly, water sharing among countries is a sensitive topic. In Central Asia, for example, water resources are divided between the upstream and downstream nations. Kazakhstan’s focus on water management—and its history of mulitvector foreign policy—should give rise to a new approach to diplomacy.
Kazakhstan’s multivector foreign policy strategy pursues cordial and friendly relations with all countries: neutrality and a pro–peace and pro–dialogue attitude help the country burnish its international image and create partnerships with global actors without appearing threatening. Kazakhstan should evolve their foreign policy approach to also address water security: a “blue” foreign policy.
Kazakhstan’s major water bodies are shared with neighboring states. Hence, Astana actively engages its neighbors to protect these resources and ensure proper and adequate sharing. The Ministers of Energy and Water Resources of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, which border each other, recently met to discuss water and energy management for the upcoming Summer.
A look at Kazakhstan’s map and main water bodies helps illustrate the situation. First, Kazakhstan is a downstream country; water comes from Kyrgyzstan. Southeastern Kazakhstan’s main water body Lake Balkhash, similarly, is fed by the Ili River, which flows from China. Moreover, the Aral Sea is shared with Uzbekistan, while the Caspian is shared with Azerbaijan, Iran, Russia, and Turkmenistan. Finally, the Ural River originates in Russia.
Unfortunately, the governments of Iran and Turkmenistan have shown little care about efficient water management and protecting the Caspian’s environment. The Ural remains polluted, and Uzbekistan continues to drain the Aral—which more closely resembles a group of lakes than a unified water body—for its cotton industry. Meanwhile, Beijing sees water as a domestic issue and is not concerned about sharing it responsibly with its neighbors.
There is some good news. In recent years, Central Asian governments have increased cooperation. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan recently signed an agreement on the junction point of state borders, which follows a Bishkek–Dushanbe peace agreement. In 2018, the Caspian States signed the convention of Aktau, seemingly ending border disputes between the five Caspian countries—though the Caspian continues to dry, including Russia’s and Kazakhstan’s shores.
The recent meeting between Astana, Bishkek, and Tashkent highlights the willingness of regional governments to continue talking and cooperating. There are also two regional organizations dedicated to water: the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS) and the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination of Central Asia (ICWC). Moreover, Tajikistan hosts the Dushanbe Water Process, a unique initiative to bring global attention to water issues and promote discussion and negotiations.
These efforts alone are not enough for the region. The region is under acute pressure to address its natural water issues—including multiple droughts and a severe dust storm. While dust storms are natural, unplanned construction, loss of green areas, and desertification worsen these natural phenomena. To make the situation worse, the Taliban in Afghanistan is constructing the Qosh Tepa Canal, which will divert up to 20% of the Amur Darya River, which flows into Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.
Astana’s foreign policy toward water
In recent years, the Kazakhstani government has raised awareness about water security. In a 2023 speech, President Kassym–Jomart Tokayev warned of drought in the country by 2030 and a lack of water resources by 2050 if the situation does not change. More recently, in late 2024, the country co–organized the One Water Summit in Saudi Arabia with France.
Given the current situation domestically and regionally, Kazakhstan must continue engaging its neighbors to secure new agreements and consensus on the responsible sharing of water resources that affect Kazakhstan directly, and raising awareness about the perils of further regional water mismanagement. Beyond simply carrying these projects out, Kazakhstan should codify them within a single document—the codification of a “blue foreign policy” that is an extension of the country’s already well–known diplomatic strategy.
State realignment to focus on water issues is not unprecedented. Astana in 2023 created a Ministry for Water Resources and Irrigation to address domestic water management. The next step is to cement the nexus between water security and foreign policy by developing a new strategy, which would have realistic objectives and goals about what Astana can achieve by engaging its numerous neighbors about sharing water (with Kyrgyzstan and Russia) and protecting water bodies (e.g., the Aral, Caspian, and Lake Balkhash).
Developing a blue foreign policy, or blue multivector foreign policy, must not simply involve drafting a document that will eventually be forgotten. It must become a vital component of Astana’s foreign policy for the short, medium, and long term. Ideally, this model would be copied by other regional states.
A Kazakhstani blue foreign policy will involve promoting water diplomacy, carrying out negotiations to address water sharing, keeping water security as a high–profile issue during inter–state meetings, and becoming the region’s spokesperson to engage the international community to address water issues in Central Asia. Astana will host a Regional Climate Summit in 2026, an ideal occasion to announce a blue foreign policy strategy.
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The evolution of Kazakhstan’s new “blue” foreign policy
The Aral Sea, historically a massive freshwater lake bordering Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, has shrunk drastically due to mismanagement, and is increasingly unusable due to rising salinity. Image by Arian Zwegers via Flickr. CC BY 2.0
June 9, 2025
Climate change, population growth, and water mismanagement make water resources a very sensitive topic in Central Asia. Kazakhstan should apply its multivector foreign policy to a new “blue” approach, writes Wilder Alejandro Sánchez.
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ater has become the new gold due to droughts, flooding, desertification, the effect of climate change on these natural disasters, population growth, and water mismanagement. Accordingly, water sharing among countries is a sensitive topic. In Central Asia, for example, water resources are divided between the upstream and downstream nations. Kazakhstan’s focus on water management—and its history of mulitvector foreign policy—should give rise to a new approach to diplomacy.
Kazakhstan’s multivector foreign policy strategy pursues cordial and friendly relations with all countries: neutrality and a pro–peace and pro–dialogue attitude help the country burnish its international image and create partnerships with global actors without appearing threatening. Kazakhstan should evolve their foreign policy approach to also address water security: a “blue” foreign policy.
Kazakhstan’s major water bodies are shared with neighboring states. Hence, Astana actively engages its neighbors to protect these resources and ensure proper and adequate sharing. The Ministers of Energy and Water Resources of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, which border each other, recently met to discuss water and energy management for the upcoming Summer.
A look at Kazakhstan’s map and main water bodies helps illustrate the situation. First, Kazakhstan is a downstream country; water comes from Kyrgyzstan. Southeastern Kazakhstan’s main water body Lake Balkhash, similarly, is fed by the Ili River, which flows from China. Moreover, the Aral Sea is shared with Uzbekistan, while the Caspian is shared with Azerbaijan, Iran, Russia, and Turkmenistan. Finally, the Ural River originates in Russia.
Unfortunately, the governments of Iran and Turkmenistan have shown little care about efficient water management and protecting the Caspian’s environment. The Ural remains polluted, and Uzbekistan continues to drain the Aral—which more closely resembles a group of lakes than a unified water body—for its cotton industry. Meanwhile, Beijing sees water as a domestic issue and is not concerned about sharing it responsibly with its neighbors.
There is some good news. In recent years, Central Asian governments have increased cooperation. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan recently signed an agreement on the junction point of state borders, which follows a Bishkek–Dushanbe peace agreement. In 2018, the Caspian States signed the convention of Aktau, seemingly ending border disputes between the five Caspian countries—though the Caspian continues to dry, including Russia’s and Kazakhstan’s shores.
The recent meeting between Astana, Bishkek, and Tashkent highlights the willingness of regional governments to continue talking and cooperating. There are also two regional organizations dedicated to water: the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS) and the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination of Central Asia (ICWC). Moreover, Tajikistan hosts the Dushanbe Water Process, a unique initiative to bring global attention to water issues and promote discussion and negotiations.
These efforts alone are not enough for the region. The region is under acute pressure to address its natural water issues—including multiple droughts and a severe dust storm. While dust storms are natural, unplanned construction, loss of green areas, and desertification worsen these natural phenomena. To make the situation worse, the Taliban in Afghanistan is constructing the Qosh Tepa Canal, which will divert up to 20% of the Amur Darya River, which flows into Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.
Astana’s foreign policy toward water
In recent years, the Kazakhstani government has raised awareness about water security. In a 2023 speech, President Kassym–Jomart Tokayev warned of drought in the country by 2030 and a lack of water resources by 2050 if the situation does not change. More recently, in late 2024, the country co–organized the One Water Summit in Saudi Arabia with France.
Given the current situation domestically and regionally, Kazakhstan must continue engaging its neighbors to secure new agreements and consensus on the responsible sharing of water resources that affect Kazakhstan directly, and raising awareness about the perils of further regional water mismanagement. Beyond simply carrying these projects out, Kazakhstan should codify them within a single document—the codification of a “blue foreign policy” that is an extension of the country’s already well–known diplomatic strategy.
State realignment to focus on water issues is not unprecedented. Astana in 2023 created a Ministry for Water Resources and Irrigation to address domestic water management. The next step is to cement the nexus between water security and foreign policy by developing a new strategy, which would have realistic objectives and goals about what Astana can achieve by engaging its numerous neighbors about sharing water (with Kyrgyzstan and Russia) and protecting water bodies (e.g., the Aral, Caspian, and Lake Balkhash).
Developing a blue foreign policy, or blue multivector foreign policy, must not simply involve drafting a document that will eventually be forgotten. It must become a vital component of Astana’s foreign policy for the short, medium, and long term. Ideally, this model would be copied by other regional states.
A Kazakhstani blue foreign policy will involve promoting water diplomacy, carrying out negotiations to address water sharing, keeping water security as a high–profile issue during inter–state meetings, and becoming the region’s spokesperson to engage the international community to address water issues in Central Asia. Astana will host a Regional Climate Summit in 2026, an ideal occasion to announce a blue foreign policy strategy.
