On 21 January, P5+1 and Iranian officials are to meet in Istanbul in yet another round of nuclear talks in order to reach an agreement on the substance and extent of Iran's nuclear activities. Although expectations are deliberately kept low, prospect of reaching an agreement with Iran is unusually high this time.
U.S. and its allies are now going to have to deal with an Iranian government that, on the one hand, has both the power to deliver on its promises and incentives to make compromises in return for lifting of some sanctions, while, on the other hand, is fearful of its future because it is engaged in a tough, uncertain internal political wrestling. As a result, Ahmadinejad and his superiors at the IRGC have gradually come to believe that striking an agreement with the West in Istanbul can bring them the much needed domestic and international recognition to successfully put an end to Tehran's political dysfunction and consolidate their power.
Utilising the support of IRGC, Mr. Ahmadinejad is trying to increase the powers of the presidency to the detriment of those of Parliament and Supreme Leader. He has imposed the lifting of subsidies in spite of the objection of many parliamentarians. Simultaneously, and in despite of strong criticisms from conservative clerics and politicians, he has also been trying to construct a new Persian-Islamic discourse in order to justify his call for a strong, centralised government and discredit his opponents as disinterested in Iran and its glorious past.
Add to this Mr. Mottaki's dismissal, who was given the post at the insistence of Mr. Khamenei in 2005, Ahmadinejad's consistent support for Mashaei, and the unsuccessful attempts by the Judiciary and the Parliament to prosecute Mohammad Reza Rahimi—the First Vice President—and it then becomes clear that a new chapter in Iranian politics has begun where old comrades, including the Supreme Leader, are set to lose power and influence.
It is in light of these considerations, and in-line with the recent comments of Hossein Ali Shariatmadari that the contestation of the Supreme Leader on certain political developments is due to his concerns with regime survival, that it could be found that Khamenei no longer ‘calls the shots’ but is called upon to play his part in an orchestrated effort by the IRGC to keep the society calm and prevent another large-scale uprising. Khamenei's recent comment on an Iranian-Islamic model for economic development of the country is a case in point.
Provided that foreign policy in Iran has traditionally been used to bolster domestic positions and/or weaken factional rivals, if Mr Mottaki’s replacement, Ali Akbar Salehi, reaches agreement with the West, it will be a major victory for Ahmadinejad's block, which it can benefit from in 2013. And given the current economic situation, it seems highly unlikely that Mr. Khamenei and Mr. Larijani will attempt to prevent a major victory for the President as they did prior to the 2009 election. Even if they do, the Ahmadinejad faction can still be a winner by blaming them for continuation of sanctions and people suffering, thereby criticising them for jeopardising Iran's national interests.
Therefore, the U.S. stands a good chance to pen an agreement with Iran especially if it is willing to make some compromises. Alternatively, the Obama Administration can deny Ahamdinejad faction a major political victory in Turkey and hence further exacerbate internal political rivalries in Tehran in the anticipation of dealing with a much weaker and more desperate Iranian side at another meeting in the not too distant future. This is a more attractive option since Iran is still four to five years away from acquiring the know-how knowledge to assemble a bomb.
Any possible deal, however, will require the Obama Administration to forgo its concerns about democracy and human rights in Iran for the sake of its strategic interests. This will not be the first episode, and certainly not the last one, in which normative aspects of the U.S. foreign policy are sacrificed for realpolitik gains, and thus the main issue of concern for the Administration will be twofold: how the Republicans could manipulate any deal, or lack of it, with Iran in the 2012 presidential campaign and whether or not agreement with Iran will encourage more regional actors to defect to the Iranian camp.
a global affairs media network
There Could be a Breakthrough in Istanbul
January 23, 2011
On 21 January, P5+1 and Iranian officials are to meet in Istanbul in yet another round of nuclear talks in order to reach an agreement on the substance and extent of Iran's nuclear activities. Although expectations are deliberately kept low, prospect of reaching an agreement with Iran is unusually high this time.
U.S. and its allies are now going to have to deal with an Iranian government that, on the one hand, has both the power to deliver on its promises and incentives to make compromises in return for lifting of some sanctions, while, on the other hand, is fearful of its future because it is engaged in a tough, uncertain internal political wrestling. As a result, Ahmadinejad and his superiors at the IRGC have gradually come to believe that striking an agreement with the West in Istanbul can bring them the much needed domestic and international recognition to successfully put an end to Tehran's political dysfunction and consolidate their power.
Utilising the support of IRGC, Mr. Ahmadinejad is trying to increase the powers of the presidency to the detriment of those of Parliament and Supreme Leader. He has imposed the lifting of subsidies in spite of the objection of many parliamentarians. Simultaneously, and in despite of strong criticisms from conservative clerics and politicians, he has also been trying to construct a new Persian-Islamic discourse in order to justify his call for a strong, centralised government and discredit his opponents as disinterested in Iran and its glorious past.
Add to this Mr. Mottaki's dismissal, who was given the post at the insistence of Mr. Khamenei in 2005, Ahmadinejad's consistent support for Mashaei, and the unsuccessful attempts by the Judiciary and the Parliament to prosecute Mohammad Reza Rahimi—the First Vice President—and it then becomes clear that a new chapter in Iranian politics has begun where old comrades, including the Supreme Leader, are set to lose power and influence.
It is in light of these considerations, and in-line with the recent comments of Hossein Ali Shariatmadari that the contestation of the Supreme Leader on certain political developments is due to his concerns with regime survival, that it could be found that Khamenei no longer ‘calls the shots’ but is called upon to play his part in an orchestrated effort by the IRGC to keep the society calm and prevent another large-scale uprising. Khamenei's recent comment on an Iranian-Islamic model for economic development of the country is a case in point.
Provided that foreign policy in Iran has traditionally been used to bolster domestic positions and/or weaken factional rivals, if Mr Mottaki’s replacement, Ali Akbar Salehi, reaches agreement with the West, it will be a major victory for Ahmadinejad's block, which it can benefit from in 2013. And given the current economic situation, it seems highly unlikely that Mr. Khamenei and Mr. Larijani will attempt to prevent a major victory for the President as they did prior to the 2009 election. Even if they do, the Ahmadinejad faction can still be a winner by blaming them for continuation of sanctions and people suffering, thereby criticising them for jeopardising Iran's national interests.
Therefore, the U.S. stands a good chance to pen an agreement with Iran especially if it is willing to make some compromises. Alternatively, the Obama Administration can deny Ahamdinejad faction a major political victory in Turkey and hence further exacerbate internal political rivalries in Tehran in the anticipation of dealing with a much weaker and more desperate Iranian side at another meeting in the not too distant future. This is a more attractive option since Iran is still four to five years away from acquiring the know-how knowledge to assemble a bomb.
Any possible deal, however, will require the Obama Administration to forgo its concerns about democracy and human rights in Iran for the sake of its strategic interests. This will not be the first episode, and certainly not the last one, in which normative aspects of the U.S. foreign policy are sacrificed for realpolitik gains, and thus the main issue of concern for the Administration will be twofold: how the Republicans could manipulate any deal, or lack of it, with Iran in the 2012 presidential campaign and whether or not agreement with Iran will encourage more regional actors to defect to the Iranian camp.
