he NATO summit in the Hague at the end of June represents the beginning of the next iteration of the defensive alliance. Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 began a process that the full–scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the (re)election of President Donald Trump accelerated, creating a foundation for NATO 4.0 (common parlance among NATO officials and observers referring to what’s next after the Cold War, post–Cold War, and current post–9/11 iterations), or indeed NATO 5.0.
In this iteration, the alliance and its members face three concurrent challenges: a changing relationship with its anchor partner—the United States, the return of hard power as a tool of statecraft, and geoeconomic competition from the People’s Republic of China. In isolation, each challenge is daunting enough, but all three concurrently are straining Brussels’ political capacity. What NATO 4.0 looks like will result from how the alliance manages these concurrent pressures.
Most immediately, the relationship with the U.S. has definitively changed. Even if a more trans–Atlantically oriented president returns to office in the next four years little is likely to change. The underlying factors will remain: European doubts about the future reliability of the U.S., but also Washington’s reorientation toward the Indo–Pacific and expectation that member states pay their fair share. The fantasy that America’s support for NATO was unconditional has ended.
Member states have belatedly recognized that hard power has returned to the continent as a tool of statecraft. At the Hague summit, member states are expected to commit to 5% of GDP spending—3.5% for core defence and 1.5% for other expenditures. Over time this will see a more capable NATO better able to achieve its Deterrence and Defence of the Euro–Atlantic Area (DDA) mission.
The answer to the People’s Republic of China is just as complex and inextricably tied to member state economic interests. Beijing’s tacit (and explicit) support for Moscow’s ‘special military operation,’ and a conflict at the heart of the Alliance—is it European only, or does it have a greater mission–set beyond the continent—make this a much more definitively political question.
The near–term objective of the Hague summit is getting America’s continued buy–in—the so–called 5% for Article Five—but the longer–term trends are already in motion in response to Russia’s full–scale invasion and President Trump’s ‘America First’ orientation. Whilst there will be disruption now, the long–term prospects for NATO could well see a stronger alliance with a more European identity, both of which will be welcomed by Washington and concerning for Moscow.
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The next iteration of NATO and the forthcoming Hague summit
Image courtesy of Adobe Stock.
June 23, 2025
This year’s NATO Summit will likely represent the beginning of NATO’s next iteration in response to internal and external pressures. While we can expect disruption, the future of NATO could be a stronger alliance, with a more European identity, writes Joshua Huminski.
T
he NATO summit in the Hague at the end of June represents the beginning of the next iteration of the defensive alliance. Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 began a process that the full–scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the (re)election of President Donald Trump accelerated, creating a foundation for NATO 4.0 (common parlance among NATO officials and observers referring to what’s next after the Cold War, post–Cold War, and current post–9/11 iterations), or indeed NATO 5.0.
In this iteration, the alliance and its members face three concurrent challenges: a changing relationship with its anchor partner—the United States, the return of hard power as a tool of statecraft, and geoeconomic competition from the People’s Republic of China. In isolation, each challenge is daunting enough, but all three concurrently are straining Brussels’ political capacity. What NATO 4.0 looks like will result from how the alliance manages these concurrent pressures.
Most immediately, the relationship with the U.S. has definitively changed. Even if a more trans–Atlantically oriented president returns to office in the next four years little is likely to change. The underlying factors will remain: European doubts about the future reliability of the U.S., but also Washington’s reorientation toward the Indo–Pacific and expectation that member states pay their fair share. The fantasy that America’s support for NATO was unconditional has ended.
Member states have belatedly recognized that hard power has returned to the continent as a tool of statecraft. At the Hague summit, member states are expected to commit to 5% of GDP spending—3.5% for core defence and 1.5% for other expenditures. Over time this will see a more capable NATO better able to achieve its Deterrence and Defence of the Euro–Atlantic Area (DDA) mission.
The answer to the People’s Republic of China is just as complex and inextricably tied to member state economic interests. Beijing’s tacit (and explicit) support for Moscow’s ‘special military operation,’ and a conflict at the heart of the Alliance—is it European only, or does it have a greater mission–set beyond the continent—make this a much more definitively political question.
The near–term objective of the Hague summit is getting America’s continued buy–in—the so–called 5% for Article Five—but the longer–term trends are already in motion in response to Russia’s full–scale invasion and President Trump’s ‘America First’ orientation. Whilst there will be disruption now, the long–term prospects for NATO could well see a stronger alliance with a more European identity, both of which will be welcomed by Washington and concerning for Moscow.
