n May 2023, the Arab League—an organization of 22 Arab countries formed in 1945—welcomed Syria back after its exclusion in 2011 for its crackdown on the regime's opposition. Since that moment, Syria has been subjected to economic sanctions and the closure of embassies, isolating it from the rest of the Arab world. It was readmitted to the League thanks to 13 anonymous votes out of 21.
There were no moral considerations behind this choice, especially given the crimes of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad against his population. As argued in the Diplomatic Courier last year, many Middle Eastern countries have a massive problem with Captagon, a highly addictive amphetamine widespread among the region's youth. Captagon production and smuggling have been an essential source of financing for the al-Assad Regime and Hezbollah, an Iran-backed militia stationing in the Levant.
Caroline Rose, leader of a project on the Captagon trade at Washington-based think tank New Lines Institute, speaking to France24, said, "Captagon has been seen as somewhat as an easy win for many states pushing for normalization. [They] believe that with enough incentives, they could convince the Syrian regime to give up the trade."
A realpolitik approach explains the decision to welcome Damascus back to the League. In addition to the Captagon issue, Syria's Arab neighbors are concerned by other security problems involving Damascus, such as the regional refugee instability, with 5.7 million Syrians scattered throughout the neighboring countries (as of late 2021).
Saudi Arabia and Jordan have pushed the hardest for a rapprochement with Syria, hosting two meetings in April and early May. Conversely, Qatar and Kuwait were the most prominent hold-out. Qatari Prime Minister, Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani, was keen to affirm that each country has its own decision about relations with the Syrian regime, and its readmission does not imply full bilateral normalization. Arab League secretary-general Ahmed Aboul Gheit later confirmed this statement.
Britain and the United States are skeptical about readmitting Syria to the Arab League without a political solution that includes regime opposition. U.S. officials asked the Syrian government to grant something in return for this engagement, like a genuine effort to stop the smuggling of Captagon. There is a sense that Western countries are gradually accepting this new geopolitical situation in the Middle East.
Syria's readmission will have long-term implications for the Middle East and the Arab world. First, civil and military opposition will feel abandoned by regional leaders. It is worth remembering that in 2013, the Syrian opposition, under leader Moaz al-Khatib, obtained a seat in the Arab League, replacing the al-Assad regime. This event gave hope for a new, democratic Syria admitted into the international community—a dream later shattered.
In addition, the U.S. and EU sanctions are still effective, limiting the chances for the promised waves of investments or the growth of bilateral trade with the Arab League members. A Jordanian official added that a political solution in Syria is a precondition to lobbying for any decrease of Western sanctions, which will allow funding for Syria's reconstruction.
Finally, the Arab League members will face an "Iran's dilemma." After the uprising of 2011, Teheran expanded its military presence in some parts of Syria, maintaining its influence to this day. Thus, dealing with al-Assad means dealing with Iran and Russia—another country with many geopolitical interests in the country. At the same time, however, if the Arab League does not improve cooperation with Syria, there is a real risk that Iran's influence in the country will grow further.
Syria is still divided between different centers of power controlled by several actors, and the regime has regained complete control only of some of them. This fact means that the international community is not negotiating with a Westphalian state—i.e., a state where power is centralized and exercised by sovereign control over a clearly defined territory. This fact raises vast security issues and uncertainty in the Syrian policy-making process.
This year, two political breakthroughs favored Syria's readmission to the Arab League. The first is the two earthquakes that hit Turkey and Syria in February and the flow of foreign aid broke the al-Assad regime's international isolation. The other is the diplomatic rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran after years of profound political and military confrontations. In March, both agreed to reopen their embassies, starting a process to normalize bilateral ties with significant consequences for all the Middle Eastern crisis scenarios spanning from the Levant to the Arab peninsula.
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Syria's Arab League Readmission and the Future of the Middle East
The Umayyad Mosque of Damascus. Image by Loyloy Thal from Pixabay.
June 14, 2023
The decision to readmit Syria to the Arab League was driven by practical considerations such as Captagon smuggling and the refugee crisis. The decision has serious implications both within the region, and for the region's relations with the U.S. and EU, writes DC Correspondent Elia Preto Martini.
I
n May 2023, the Arab League—an organization of 22 Arab countries formed in 1945—welcomed Syria back after its exclusion in 2011 for its crackdown on the regime's opposition. Since that moment, Syria has been subjected to economic sanctions and the closure of embassies, isolating it from the rest of the Arab world. It was readmitted to the League thanks to 13 anonymous votes out of 21.
There were no moral considerations behind this choice, especially given the crimes of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad against his population. As argued in the Diplomatic Courier last year, many Middle Eastern countries have a massive problem with Captagon, a highly addictive amphetamine widespread among the region's youth. Captagon production and smuggling have been an essential source of financing for the al-Assad Regime and Hezbollah, an Iran-backed militia stationing in the Levant.
Caroline Rose, leader of a project on the Captagon trade at Washington-based think tank New Lines Institute, speaking to France24, said, "Captagon has been seen as somewhat as an easy win for many states pushing for normalization. [They] believe that with enough incentives, they could convince the Syrian regime to give up the trade."
A realpolitik approach explains the decision to welcome Damascus back to the League. In addition to the Captagon issue, Syria's Arab neighbors are concerned by other security problems involving Damascus, such as the regional refugee instability, with 5.7 million Syrians scattered throughout the neighboring countries (as of late 2021).
Saudi Arabia and Jordan have pushed the hardest for a rapprochement with Syria, hosting two meetings in April and early May. Conversely, Qatar and Kuwait were the most prominent hold-out. Qatari Prime Minister, Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani, was keen to affirm that each country has its own decision about relations with the Syrian regime, and its readmission does not imply full bilateral normalization. Arab League secretary-general Ahmed Aboul Gheit later confirmed this statement.
Britain and the United States are skeptical about readmitting Syria to the Arab League without a political solution that includes regime opposition. U.S. officials asked the Syrian government to grant something in return for this engagement, like a genuine effort to stop the smuggling of Captagon. There is a sense that Western countries are gradually accepting this new geopolitical situation in the Middle East.
Syria's readmission will have long-term implications for the Middle East and the Arab world. First, civil and military opposition will feel abandoned by regional leaders. It is worth remembering that in 2013, the Syrian opposition, under leader Moaz al-Khatib, obtained a seat in the Arab League, replacing the al-Assad regime. This event gave hope for a new, democratic Syria admitted into the international community—a dream later shattered.
In addition, the U.S. and EU sanctions are still effective, limiting the chances for the promised waves of investments or the growth of bilateral trade with the Arab League members. A Jordanian official added that a political solution in Syria is a precondition to lobbying for any decrease of Western sanctions, which will allow funding for Syria's reconstruction.
Finally, the Arab League members will face an "Iran's dilemma." After the uprising of 2011, Teheran expanded its military presence in some parts of Syria, maintaining its influence to this day. Thus, dealing with al-Assad means dealing with Iran and Russia—another country with many geopolitical interests in the country. At the same time, however, if the Arab League does not improve cooperation with Syria, there is a real risk that Iran's influence in the country will grow further.
Syria is still divided between different centers of power controlled by several actors, and the regime has regained complete control only of some of them. This fact means that the international community is not negotiating with a Westphalian state—i.e., a state where power is centralized and exercised by sovereign control over a clearly defined territory. This fact raises vast security issues and uncertainty in the Syrian policy-making process.
This year, two political breakthroughs favored Syria's readmission to the Arab League. The first is the two earthquakes that hit Turkey and Syria in February and the flow of foreign aid broke the al-Assad regime's international isolation. The other is the diplomatic rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran after years of profound political and military confrontations. In March, both agreed to reopen their embassies, starting a process to normalize bilateral ties with significant consequences for all the Middle Eastern crisis scenarios spanning from the Levant to the Arab peninsula.
