.
In 2012, the European Union received the Nobel Peace Prize for its role in the post Second World War Franco-German reconciliation and the peaceful transition of formerly Communist Eastern European countries in the 1990s. For its most ardent supporters, the European Union is a global peace model, transcending nationalism and making war unthinkable in Western Europe. In the recent debates over British EU membership, politicians have warned of future violent conflicts in Europe should the Union fail.
Lost in this praise is recognition of the harm the Union’s limited expansion has caused for the larger European community. Through its singular focus on Western and Central Europe, the European Union has prioritized its inward consolidation, at the expense of its excluded neighbors. Rather than realizing its founding mission of bringing peace to Europe, it has hidden behind a subjective interpretation of what it means to be “European.”
EU membership is formally open to any European country that respects “democratic values”, which has been interpreted liberally by the Union throughout its history, allowing it to absorb still-transitioning members in Southern and Eastern Europe. On the other hand, the “Europeanness” criterion has been used to deny members who do not fit comfortably into the Western perception of Europe. Morocco’s 1987 membership bid was immediately rejected because Morocco was not “European,” despite a thousand year historical connection to Europe. Politicians can cling to the fact that Morocco is “African” because it is south of the Mediterranean by seven miles, but then how can they rationalize the inclusion of Cyprus and Malta when both are even farther away from other EU Members?
Despite having territory in the traditional geographic notion of “Europe,” Turkey also had its membership opposed due to a lack of “Europeanness.” These concerns have not prohibited Turkish participation from other European institutions such as NATO and the Council of Europe. Russia and other post-Soviet states, except for the Baltic republics and recently Ukraine, have similarly not been given any signs of potential membership, despite their undeniable European locations and cultural identities.
European politicians may cite economic or geopolitical concerns in withholding membership, but what was the difference between Romania and Ukraine in the mid-2000s? Why did formerly Communist Eastern Bloc countries get membership offers but not Russia? Why does Croatia, whose war crime record is controversial at best, get a fast track to membership while Albania continues to wait? Why is Morocco too risky geopolitically, but not Cyprus, currently divided by two hostile factions and less than a hundred miles from Syria?
There is a real price of exclusion for those left outside the European family, illustrated clearly by Russia and Ukraine. Despite being a major European power for the last 400 years, there has never been serious discussion of Russian EU membership. For all the praise the Union receives for reconciliation after World War Two, it has utterly failed to heal the wounds of the Cold War. A Union founded on the idea of rehabilitating former enemy Germany has refused to consider extending the same offer to Russia. Should there be any wonder why Russia reacted so aggressively when the European Union made overtures to Georgia and Ukraine? Russian revanchism is not a result of ingrained cultural militarism, but a logical reaction to the belief that Europe and the West will always view Russia as an enemy. For Ukraine, the pursuit of closer European ties, indeed of eventual membership, has brought the nation to war, despite no firm commitment that membership will be accepted.
For outsiders, crushed dreams of European membership can threaten progress made towards democratization, as witnessed in Turkey. What would be the effect on countries such as Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, should the Union balk at further enlargement no matter the reforms or reconciliation achieved? Tunisia has become an international darling for its democratic progress, but will most likely have to survive on its own in a crisis-ridden region, as the doors to Europe remain closed.
It is fashionable in European foreign policy circles to talk of an “arc of instability” surrounding the Union’s eastern and southern flanks, as if it is some random misfortune. While the conflicts in the post-Soviet space, the Middle East, and North Africa have numerous causes, the creation of “Ins” and “Outs” has prevented the Union from engaging these regions in meaningful ways. Although the EU connects with its neighbors through the Neighborhood Policy and Association Agreements, these programs offer miniscule benefits compared to EU membership. For all of the rhetoric of transnationalism and reconciliation, the European Union has largely become an insiders club, detached from its troubled neighbors. For all the national borders the EU claims to have erased, it has thrown up just as many artificial ones, separating its valued European core from those doomed to the outside.
David Wemer received an MA in European Union Politics from the London School of Economics and is the Washington D.C. Program Coordinator for the Eisenhower Institute at Gettysburg College. David is also a Europe Fellow at Young Professionals in Foreign Policy.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.
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The Price of Exclusion: Enlargement and the European Union’s Troubled Neighbors
June 20, 2016
In 2012, the European Union received the Nobel Peace Prize for its role in the post Second World War Franco-German reconciliation and the peaceful transition of formerly Communist Eastern European countries in the 1990s. For its most ardent supporters, the European Union is a global peace model, transcending nationalism and making war unthinkable in Western Europe. In the recent debates over British EU membership, politicians have warned of future violent conflicts in Europe should the Union fail.
Lost in this praise is recognition of the harm the Union’s limited expansion has caused for the larger European community. Through its singular focus on Western and Central Europe, the European Union has prioritized its inward consolidation, at the expense of its excluded neighbors. Rather than realizing its founding mission of bringing peace to Europe, it has hidden behind a subjective interpretation of what it means to be “European.”
EU membership is formally open to any European country that respects “democratic values”, which has been interpreted liberally by the Union throughout its history, allowing it to absorb still-transitioning members in Southern and Eastern Europe. On the other hand, the “Europeanness” criterion has been used to deny members who do not fit comfortably into the Western perception of Europe. Morocco’s 1987 membership bid was immediately rejected because Morocco was not “European,” despite a thousand year historical connection to Europe. Politicians can cling to the fact that Morocco is “African” because it is south of the Mediterranean by seven miles, but then how can they rationalize the inclusion of Cyprus and Malta when both are even farther away from other EU Members?
Despite having territory in the traditional geographic notion of “Europe,” Turkey also had its membership opposed due to a lack of “Europeanness.” These concerns have not prohibited Turkish participation from other European institutions such as NATO and the Council of Europe. Russia and other post-Soviet states, except for the Baltic republics and recently Ukraine, have similarly not been given any signs of potential membership, despite their undeniable European locations and cultural identities.
European politicians may cite economic or geopolitical concerns in withholding membership, but what was the difference between Romania and Ukraine in the mid-2000s? Why did formerly Communist Eastern Bloc countries get membership offers but not Russia? Why does Croatia, whose war crime record is controversial at best, get a fast track to membership while Albania continues to wait? Why is Morocco too risky geopolitically, but not Cyprus, currently divided by two hostile factions and less than a hundred miles from Syria?
There is a real price of exclusion for those left outside the European family, illustrated clearly by Russia and Ukraine. Despite being a major European power for the last 400 years, there has never been serious discussion of Russian EU membership. For all the praise the Union receives for reconciliation after World War Two, it has utterly failed to heal the wounds of the Cold War. A Union founded on the idea of rehabilitating former enemy Germany has refused to consider extending the same offer to Russia. Should there be any wonder why Russia reacted so aggressively when the European Union made overtures to Georgia and Ukraine? Russian revanchism is not a result of ingrained cultural militarism, but a logical reaction to the belief that Europe and the West will always view Russia as an enemy. For Ukraine, the pursuit of closer European ties, indeed of eventual membership, has brought the nation to war, despite no firm commitment that membership will be accepted.
For outsiders, crushed dreams of European membership can threaten progress made towards democratization, as witnessed in Turkey. What would be the effect on countries such as Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, should the Union balk at further enlargement no matter the reforms or reconciliation achieved? Tunisia has become an international darling for its democratic progress, but will most likely have to survive on its own in a crisis-ridden region, as the doors to Europe remain closed.
It is fashionable in European foreign policy circles to talk of an “arc of instability” surrounding the Union’s eastern and southern flanks, as if it is some random misfortune. While the conflicts in the post-Soviet space, the Middle East, and North Africa have numerous causes, the creation of “Ins” and “Outs” has prevented the Union from engaging these regions in meaningful ways. Although the EU connects with its neighbors through the Neighborhood Policy and Association Agreements, these programs offer miniscule benefits compared to EU membership. For all of the rhetoric of transnationalism and reconciliation, the European Union has largely become an insiders club, detached from its troubled neighbors. For all the national borders the EU claims to have erased, it has thrown up just as many artificial ones, separating its valued European core from those doomed to the outside.
David Wemer received an MA in European Union Politics from the London School of Economics and is the Washington D.C. Program Coordinator for the Eisenhower Institute at Gettysburg College. David is also a Europe Fellow at Young Professionals in Foreign Policy.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.
