isinformation about COVID-19 and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been rampant for the past year, but, according to a new study by DisinfoLab, different narratives have gained traction with different groups. The findings of the report highlight the important role of history and politics in determining which disinformation narratives will likely impact a country’s population. Therefore, when crafting solutions to combat mis/disinformation, a “one-size-fits-all” approach is bound to leave some countries more vulnerable than others.
The study, which analyzed disinformation resilience in Eastern Europe through Facebook comments, found that Poles combatted disinformation 1.7 times more often than Hungarians, despite both countries experiencing comparable democratic backsliding. However, Polish and Hungarian commenters exhibited near opposite reactions to the two types of disinformation. Poles were deeply vulnerable to COVID-19 disinformation, but showed resilience to Russia-Ukraine disinformation. Hungarians were the inverse, frequently supporting Russia-Ukraine disinformation, but calling out COVID-19 disinformation.
DisinfoLab observed that 80% of Polish comments agreed with posts containing COVID-19 disinformation compared to 31% among Hungarians. “Only fools with no opinion of their own were vaccinated,” read one Polish comment responding to an article falsely claiming that the World Health Organization’s authority would supersede Poland’s constitution. Just 12% of Polish comments disagreed with posts about COVID-19, such as one commenter who responded with a GIF of Stephen Colbert with “Fake News” in bold text. This same user shared a link to a Polish fact-checking website that corrected the narrative.
Although Hungarians outperformed Poles in resisting COVID-19 disinformation, they were far more vulnerable when presented with Russia-Ukraine disinformation. Nearly 60% of Hungarian comments showed support for these false narratives—compared to 37% in Poland.
DisinfoLab identified a Hungarian Facebook post containing what is likely a deepfake (a fake AI-generated video) of Ukrainian representative Ilya Kiva claiming that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky crossed the Poland-Ukraine border in early March, hiding in the U.S. embassy and sending thousands of Ukrainian soldiers to be killed in order to inherit their money. As of early August, the video had 1.2 million views and over 16,000 comments. Facebook has yet to flag it as false content.
“Wow. It is very interesting when a Ukrainian says this about his own country!” said one Hungarian commenter upon seeing the deepfake. Another commenter, however, called out the post: “This is a Russian disinformation channel. A Russian propaganda page.”
What accounts for these differences? DisinfoLab points to two main factors that may explain Poles’ accentuated vulnerability towards COVID-19 disinformation and Hungarians’ towards Russia-Ukraine disinformation.
First, government regulation may explain the disparity between Hungary and Poland with respect to COVID-19 disinformation. Roughly two weeks after the WHO declared COVID-19 a pandemic in March 2020, the Hungarian parliament passed a set of coronavirus measures. Among other powers, the legislation authorized President Viktor Orbán to rule by decree and introduced up to five years of jail time for citizens deliberately spreading misinformation that hindered the government’s pandemic response.
Orbán’s critics and international watchdogs feared that the legislation was not an earnest effort to combat COVID-19 disinformation, but rather a pretext for expanding state control of the press. Since entering office in 2010, Orbán has enacted a series of amendments that modified Hungarian media laws to grant the government more control. And media outlets friendly to Fidesz, Orbán’s political party, have empirically spread disinformation without consequence in Hungary. Regardless of the purported intentions of Hungary’s coronavirus legislation, DisinfoLab’s data suggests that the laws may have contributed to the population’s relative resilience to COVID-19 compared to their Polish counterparts.
Second, a country’s political relationship with Russia may impact its citizens’ susceptibility to Russian disinformation. On one hand, the Hungarian government has friendly relations with the Kremlin through the Eastern Open Policy, an effort to deepen bilateral economic and political ties. In late 2021, the Kremlin awarded a Hungarian official the Russian Order of Friendship—the highest Russian honor a foreign citizen can receive for promoting mutual cooperation. This positive relationship may explain why Hungarians were more likely to believe disinformation portraying Ukrainians as the aggressor in the ongoing conflict.
On the other hand, Poland has long had a negative relationship with Russia. One prominent source of historical trauma is the USSR’s 1939 invasion of Poland and the subsequent massacre of over 20,000 Polish military officers and prisoners of war. More recently, a Polish government commission implicated Russia in the 2010 Smolensk air disaster, where a plane carrying Poland’s president and other officials crashed in Russia, killing everyone aboard. Given this tension, it is likely that Polish citizens are primed to reject pro-Russian narratives.
These findings highlight the need for media literacy campaigns tailored to local contexts. Understanding a population’s unique vulnerabilities based on historical memory, foreign policy, and existing mis- and disinformation responses will enable more effective strategies to combat misleading narratives. Specifically, media literacy campaigns can prioritize certain narratives to pre-bunk and debunk, ensuring resources are directed where they are needed most.
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Political and Historical Factors of Disinformation Resilience
Image via Adobe Stock.
August 18, 2022
Disinformation about COVID-19 and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been rampant for the past year, but, according to a new study by DisinfoLab, different narratives have gained traction with different groups.
D
isinformation about COVID-19 and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been rampant for the past year, but, according to a new study by DisinfoLab, different narratives have gained traction with different groups. The findings of the report highlight the important role of history and politics in determining which disinformation narratives will likely impact a country’s population. Therefore, when crafting solutions to combat mis/disinformation, a “one-size-fits-all” approach is bound to leave some countries more vulnerable than others.
The study, which analyzed disinformation resilience in Eastern Europe through Facebook comments, found that Poles combatted disinformation 1.7 times more often than Hungarians, despite both countries experiencing comparable democratic backsliding. However, Polish and Hungarian commenters exhibited near opposite reactions to the two types of disinformation. Poles were deeply vulnerable to COVID-19 disinformation, but showed resilience to Russia-Ukraine disinformation. Hungarians were the inverse, frequently supporting Russia-Ukraine disinformation, but calling out COVID-19 disinformation.
DisinfoLab observed that 80% of Polish comments agreed with posts containing COVID-19 disinformation compared to 31% among Hungarians. “Only fools with no opinion of their own were vaccinated,” read one Polish comment responding to an article falsely claiming that the World Health Organization’s authority would supersede Poland’s constitution. Just 12% of Polish comments disagreed with posts about COVID-19, such as one commenter who responded with a GIF of Stephen Colbert with “Fake News” in bold text. This same user shared a link to a Polish fact-checking website that corrected the narrative.
Although Hungarians outperformed Poles in resisting COVID-19 disinformation, they were far more vulnerable when presented with Russia-Ukraine disinformation. Nearly 60% of Hungarian comments showed support for these false narratives—compared to 37% in Poland.
DisinfoLab identified a Hungarian Facebook post containing what is likely a deepfake (a fake AI-generated video) of Ukrainian representative Ilya Kiva claiming that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky crossed the Poland-Ukraine border in early March, hiding in the U.S. embassy and sending thousands of Ukrainian soldiers to be killed in order to inherit their money. As of early August, the video had 1.2 million views and over 16,000 comments. Facebook has yet to flag it as false content.
“Wow. It is very interesting when a Ukrainian says this about his own country!” said one Hungarian commenter upon seeing the deepfake. Another commenter, however, called out the post: “This is a Russian disinformation channel. A Russian propaganda page.”
What accounts for these differences? DisinfoLab points to two main factors that may explain Poles’ accentuated vulnerability towards COVID-19 disinformation and Hungarians’ towards Russia-Ukraine disinformation.
First, government regulation may explain the disparity between Hungary and Poland with respect to COVID-19 disinformation. Roughly two weeks after the WHO declared COVID-19 a pandemic in March 2020, the Hungarian parliament passed a set of coronavirus measures. Among other powers, the legislation authorized President Viktor Orbán to rule by decree and introduced up to five years of jail time for citizens deliberately spreading misinformation that hindered the government’s pandemic response.
Orbán’s critics and international watchdogs feared that the legislation was not an earnest effort to combat COVID-19 disinformation, but rather a pretext for expanding state control of the press. Since entering office in 2010, Orbán has enacted a series of amendments that modified Hungarian media laws to grant the government more control. And media outlets friendly to Fidesz, Orbán’s political party, have empirically spread disinformation without consequence in Hungary. Regardless of the purported intentions of Hungary’s coronavirus legislation, DisinfoLab’s data suggests that the laws may have contributed to the population’s relative resilience to COVID-19 compared to their Polish counterparts.
Second, a country’s political relationship with Russia may impact its citizens’ susceptibility to Russian disinformation. On one hand, the Hungarian government has friendly relations with the Kremlin through the Eastern Open Policy, an effort to deepen bilateral economic and political ties. In late 2021, the Kremlin awarded a Hungarian official the Russian Order of Friendship—the highest Russian honor a foreign citizen can receive for promoting mutual cooperation. This positive relationship may explain why Hungarians were more likely to believe disinformation portraying Ukrainians as the aggressor in the ongoing conflict.
On the other hand, Poland has long had a negative relationship with Russia. One prominent source of historical trauma is the USSR’s 1939 invasion of Poland and the subsequent massacre of over 20,000 Polish military officers and prisoners of war. More recently, a Polish government commission implicated Russia in the 2010 Smolensk air disaster, where a plane carrying Poland’s president and other officials crashed in Russia, killing everyone aboard. Given this tension, it is likely that Polish citizens are primed to reject pro-Russian narratives.
These findings highlight the need for media literacy campaigns tailored to local contexts. Understanding a population’s unique vulnerabilities based on historical memory, foreign policy, and existing mis- and disinformation responses will enable more effective strategies to combat misleading narratives. Specifically, media literacy campaigns can prioritize certain narratives to pre-bunk and debunk, ensuring resources are directed where they are needed most.
