.
If one looks at a map of the 22 Arabic-speaking countries in the Middle East and North Africa—stretching from Morocco and Western Sahara in the west to Oman and the United Arab Emirates in the east—one country sits at the epicenter:  the Arab Republic of Egypt.  Egypt, the most populous Arab nation, is home to almost a quarter of the Arab world’s people.  The country has long been center of both Arab culture and the teaching of Islam, and its geographic position puts it at the crossroads of Africa, the Mediterranean, the Levant, and the Arabian Peninsula. Putting all this together leads to the critically important conclusion: Egypt is among the most strategically important countries in the world.  For that reason, a long-term pillar of American foreign policy has been to maintain the stability of Egypt and set the conditions for its growth and development as a society, economy, and regional player. Egypt's signing of the Camp David Accords with Israel and the United States in 1978 ushered in a long era of cooperation between Washington and Cairo.  But the ouster of President Mubarak in 2011 set off a wave of changes to the Egyptian body politic, and President Sisi's "counterrevolution" in 2013, to take power from Muslim Brotherhood-backed Mohamed Morsi (who was tragically taking the country to ruin), triggered a reassessment in Washington about the relationship. As a result of this reassessment, in October 2013, the United States placed a hold on sending weapons to Egypt in an attempt to convince Egypt to improve its record on democracy and human rights.  But the rise of an emboldened Iran and the threat of ISIS spreading from Iraq and Syria into Egypt and the rest of Northern Africa triggered a "reassessment of the reassessment" within the Obama Administration. As a result—an in recognition of the idea that Egypt’s stability has never been more important—Washington earlier this year lifted the hold on arms sales. This development allowed the delivery of U.S.-made F-16s and Harpoon missiles, as well as the upgrading of Egypt’s M-1 Abrams tanks. The Administration also assured President Sisi that it would continue to request $1.3 billion a year from Congress in foreign military financing for Egypt. This decision, however, came with important caveats and conditions that will change the dynamics in the security relationship. The Obama Administration made clear that the change in policy was a reflection of U.S. national security needs, rather than as a certification of Egypt’s progress in democracy or human rights. Washington also ended cash flow financing for Egypt, which allowed Egypt to buy weapons on credit such that it obligated the United States to appropriate future funds for its defense. In addition, the United States will now evaluate Egyptian arms purchases based on their ability to secure four security goals: maritime security, security in Sinai, border security, and counterterrorism. This retooling of U.S. assistance may have been the right long-term play, though it must be managed carefully given the importance of reassuring Egyptians about the U.S. commitment to the bilateral relationship. Rather than encouraging Egypt to rethink its domestic policies, the 2013 weapons ban caused Egypt to question Washington’s commitment. Moreover, Sisi responded by displaying a willingness to reach out to other nations as an alternative to the United States. For example, Egypt signed a preliminary weapons deal with Russia worth up to $3.5 billion. The way the United States handles Egypt in the months ahead will also be important to the rest of the region—because it will be seen by Saudi Arabia and the UAE as a harbinger of the extent to which Washington will stick by other long-time Sunni allies. As Melissa Dalton, a fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, recently pointed out there is a “trust deficit” between the United States and many of its Sunni Gulf partners. The deficit stems largely from Washington’s approach to Iran, but also from past U.S. support for the Shiite-led Maliki government in Iraq as well as U.S. reluctance to more aggressively push President Assad from power in Syria. Fortunately, there is bipartisan agreement within the United States as to the importance of our ties with Egypt. With such support, there is much that we can and should do to repair and ramp up the relationship. Restarting defense deliveries was a first step, but the United States and Egypt should examine new ways to support Egypt’s counterterrorism efforts. New initiatives can help restore trust. U.S. counterterrorism assistance is more important than ever, as Egypt is dealing with considerable security challenges. The Muslim Brotherhood is openly calling for President Sisi’s assassination. There is a newly emergent and strikingly violent ISIS-affiliated terrorist group, “Sinai Province” (also known as Ansar Beit al-Maqdi) that is conducting significant attacks in the Sinai, including a July missile attack on an Egyptian frigate. As Sinai Province increases ISIS’s reach into North Africa, the U.S. has a greater interest in Egypt’s counterterror successes than at any time in recent years. The Sisi regime is taking major steps to combat terrorism throughout Egypt and North Africa. In November 2013, for example, Egyptian groups killed Mohammed Hussein Muhareb, the leader of an al-Qaeda inspired jihadist group in the Sinai. Muhareb was suspected of having orchestrated an August 2013 attack that killed 25 police conscripts. More recently, the Egyptian military stepped up activities in the Sinai after jihadists assassinated the nation’s prosecutor-general and attacked military checkpoints. President Sisi has also taken significant action to fight the Islamic State outside of Egypt. In February 2015, Egypt bombed Islamic State targets in Libya after the group released a video showing the beheading of 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians. President Sisi is also one of the only Arab leaders taking on the bigger CT challenge—how to prevent the creation of terrorists, rather than just dealing with them after that they have been created.  Sisi has started a dialogue with his own people about the future of Islam.  In a January 2015 speech, President Sisi told his people that a revolution was needed within Islam to eliminate elements of their religious discourse that could inspire violence.  This alone could be a major legacy for the President and an important contribution to the region and the world. Since the Camp David Accords nearly 40 years ago, the relationship between the United States and Egypt has been based on shared interests in regional stability. Despite differences between the two nations, Egypt’s role in ensuring stability in the Middle East is as essential as ever as the region adjusts to the ISIS threat and as Iran continues to try to spread its influence. The United States must continue working with Egypt and the Sisi government to strengthen a bilateral relationship based on decades of cooperation in addressing shared challenges. In this time of turmoil for Egypt, it needs a friend in the United States. And in this time of strife across the region, the United States needs friends like Egypt in the Middle East.   Michael J. Morell served as Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and twice as its Acting Director.  He is currently a Senior Counselor at Beacon Global Strategies and a Senior Advisor to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.

The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.

a global affairs media network

www.diplomaticourier.com

Our Important Ties to Egypt

The stone pillar colonnade with row of hanging lanterns in Sultan ibn Tulun mosque in old Cairo, Egypt, in soft warm evening light, strong shadows
September 7, 2015

If one looks at a map of the 22 Arabic-speaking countries in the Middle East and North Africa—stretching from Morocco and Western Sahara in the west to Oman and the United Arab Emirates in the east—one country sits at the epicenter:  the Arab Republic of Egypt.  Egypt, the most populous Arab nation, is home to almost a quarter of the Arab world’s people.  The country has long been center of both Arab culture and the teaching of Islam, and its geographic position puts it at the crossroads of Africa, the Mediterranean, the Levant, and the Arabian Peninsula. Putting all this together leads to the critically important conclusion: Egypt is among the most strategically important countries in the world.  For that reason, a long-term pillar of American foreign policy has been to maintain the stability of Egypt and set the conditions for its growth and development as a society, economy, and regional player. Egypt's signing of the Camp David Accords with Israel and the United States in 1978 ushered in a long era of cooperation between Washington and Cairo.  But the ouster of President Mubarak in 2011 set off a wave of changes to the Egyptian body politic, and President Sisi's "counterrevolution" in 2013, to take power from Muslim Brotherhood-backed Mohamed Morsi (who was tragically taking the country to ruin), triggered a reassessment in Washington about the relationship. As a result of this reassessment, in October 2013, the United States placed a hold on sending weapons to Egypt in an attempt to convince Egypt to improve its record on democracy and human rights.  But the rise of an emboldened Iran and the threat of ISIS spreading from Iraq and Syria into Egypt and the rest of Northern Africa triggered a "reassessment of the reassessment" within the Obama Administration. As a result—an in recognition of the idea that Egypt’s stability has never been more important—Washington earlier this year lifted the hold on arms sales. This development allowed the delivery of U.S.-made F-16s and Harpoon missiles, as well as the upgrading of Egypt’s M-1 Abrams tanks. The Administration also assured President Sisi that it would continue to request $1.3 billion a year from Congress in foreign military financing for Egypt. This decision, however, came with important caveats and conditions that will change the dynamics in the security relationship. The Obama Administration made clear that the change in policy was a reflection of U.S. national security needs, rather than as a certification of Egypt’s progress in democracy or human rights. Washington also ended cash flow financing for Egypt, which allowed Egypt to buy weapons on credit such that it obligated the United States to appropriate future funds for its defense. In addition, the United States will now evaluate Egyptian arms purchases based on their ability to secure four security goals: maritime security, security in Sinai, border security, and counterterrorism. This retooling of U.S. assistance may have been the right long-term play, though it must be managed carefully given the importance of reassuring Egyptians about the U.S. commitment to the bilateral relationship. Rather than encouraging Egypt to rethink its domestic policies, the 2013 weapons ban caused Egypt to question Washington’s commitment. Moreover, Sisi responded by displaying a willingness to reach out to other nations as an alternative to the United States. For example, Egypt signed a preliminary weapons deal with Russia worth up to $3.5 billion. The way the United States handles Egypt in the months ahead will also be important to the rest of the region—because it will be seen by Saudi Arabia and the UAE as a harbinger of the extent to which Washington will stick by other long-time Sunni allies. As Melissa Dalton, a fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, recently pointed out there is a “trust deficit” between the United States and many of its Sunni Gulf partners. The deficit stems largely from Washington’s approach to Iran, but also from past U.S. support for the Shiite-led Maliki government in Iraq as well as U.S. reluctance to more aggressively push President Assad from power in Syria. Fortunately, there is bipartisan agreement within the United States as to the importance of our ties with Egypt. With such support, there is much that we can and should do to repair and ramp up the relationship. Restarting defense deliveries was a first step, but the United States and Egypt should examine new ways to support Egypt’s counterterrorism efforts. New initiatives can help restore trust. U.S. counterterrorism assistance is more important than ever, as Egypt is dealing with considerable security challenges. The Muslim Brotherhood is openly calling for President Sisi’s assassination. There is a newly emergent and strikingly violent ISIS-affiliated terrorist group, “Sinai Province” (also known as Ansar Beit al-Maqdi) that is conducting significant attacks in the Sinai, including a July missile attack on an Egyptian frigate. As Sinai Province increases ISIS’s reach into North Africa, the U.S. has a greater interest in Egypt’s counterterror successes than at any time in recent years. The Sisi regime is taking major steps to combat terrorism throughout Egypt and North Africa. In November 2013, for example, Egyptian groups killed Mohammed Hussein Muhareb, the leader of an al-Qaeda inspired jihadist group in the Sinai. Muhareb was suspected of having orchestrated an August 2013 attack that killed 25 police conscripts. More recently, the Egyptian military stepped up activities in the Sinai after jihadists assassinated the nation’s prosecutor-general and attacked military checkpoints. President Sisi has also taken significant action to fight the Islamic State outside of Egypt. In February 2015, Egypt bombed Islamic State targets in Libya after the group released a video showing the beheading of 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians. President Sisi is also one of the only Arab leaders taking on the bigger CT challenge—how to prevent the creation of terrorists, rather than just dealing with them after that they have been created.  Sisi has started a dialogue with his own people about the future of Islam.  In a January 2015 speech, President Sisi told his people that a revolution was needed within Islam to eliminate elements of their religious discourse that could inspire violence.  This alone could be a major legacy for the President and an important contribution to the region and the world. Since the Camp David Accords nearly 40 years ago, the relationship between the United States and Egypt has been based on shared interests in regional stability. Despite differences between the two nations, Egypt’s role in ensuring stability in the Middle East is as essential as ever as the region adjusts to the ISIS threat and as Iran continues to try to spread its influence. The United States must continue working with Egypt and the Sisi government to strengthen a bilateral relationship based on decades of cooperation in addressing shared challenges. In this time of turmoil for Egypt, it needs a friend in the United States. And in this time of strife across the region, the United States needs friends like Egypt in the Middle East.   Michael J. Morell served as Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and twice as its Acting Director.  He is currently a Senior Counselor at Beacon Global Strategies and a Senior Advisor to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.

The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.