n August 2022, I was fortunate enough to sit down with Keir Giles at a fine steak restaurant in St. James’s Park (although to my great shame I chose the fish and chips). Six months after Russia’s expanded invasion of Ukraine, it was an exciting opportunity to meet someone whose work I regularly read—I am, if nothing else, a literary and policy nerd. What struck me most about meeting Giles was his intensity and passion, touched with a hint of combativeness, which is certainly reflected in his writing and his puckishness on Twitter.
His earnestness about what the West needed to do to respond to Russia’s aggression stood in stark contrast with the civil servants of the Ministry of Defence and Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office, with whom I had spent the bulk of the week meeting. Exceedingly well informed and generous with their time, they were far more reserved and circumspect. That the mandarins of Whitehall were far more staid is not surprising, but Giles’ passion sets him apart from many of the long-time Russian watchers. Indeed, this passion is reflected in his new book “Russia’s War on Everybody,” a copy of which was kindly dispatched by the publisher for review.
Being such an impassioned analyst comes with risks. Opponents can accuse one of being a zealot, or dismiss the commentator as merely anti-Russian. Audiences that may be sympathetic or simply on the fence, may equally find themselves put off by that same intensity (no one quite likes being shouted at…) In “Russia’s War on Everybody,” Giles finds a nuanced balance, providing clear analysis and criticism, without becoming a demagogue and alienating the very audience who needs to hear his message. Indeed, Giles may have inadvertently crafted and filled a role that has been missing in the Russia discourse—that of an expert, measured firebrand.
Giles dispenses with the traditional focus on elite pundits and policymakers, looking at how Russia’s behavior is seen from the frontlines and from those it affects. He shows how it really is Russia’s war on everybody and how Moscow’s malign behavior affects more than just high politics. This is a clever way of illustrating his thesis. Too many books on Russia focus on the strategic or abstract effects of the Kremlin’s activities, making it distant and something “over there” even when it hits home (Russia’s interference in the 2016 American election, for example).
Where other books treat elements of Russia’s behavior in isolation, focusing on one piece of a complex puzzle such as military activities, political or information warfare, or cyber operations, Giles does a superb job in blending all into one coherent and eminently readable volume. He shows how Russia is and has been at war with the West, even if the West did not appreciate it or understand it as such. Moscow clearly, as Giles demonstrates, sought to exploit schisms within Western societies, sow additional discord, undermine politics, and split alliances to advance its position relative to the West, and maintain what it views as its rightful place in geopolitics—that of a great power.
Giles’ moral clarity is most vividly on display in his frustration with the policymaking status quo. He has plenty of criticism for policymakers, particularly in Germany, that have willingly and knowingly made deals with the metaphorical devil. Equally, he criticizes those he sees as Russia apologists and enablers who have advanced the Kremlin’s narrative out of for profit or simply by being misguided and ill-informed. Indeed, it is at times unclear if Giles is more frustrated with Russia or the West’s policy makers, but perhaps both in equal measures.
This intensity and clarity are an attraction for the general reader. By eschewing the quiet recitation of Russia’s long-list of malfeasance in favor of more focused invective, Giles brings home the causes and consequences of Moscow’s actions to the average reader. There are innumerable experts on Russia. Indeed, many of the books written by those experts were reviewed in these digital pages. Each provides expert, dispassionate insights, but most have largely avoided writing with any moral outrage or intensity. This measured expertise has been and will continue to be absolutely invaluable to better understand Russia, its policies, and its politics. Yet, that dispassionate approach has its drawbacks, particularly when attempting to mobilize popular sentiment against Moscow’s behaviors. Measured analysis, legal indictments, and considered reflection is necessary, but not sufficient to mobilize popular sentiment and understanding.
That mobilization and awareness is critical to responding to Russia’s behaviors. If the West is to come out of the Ukraine war better than it went in, it needs to see the panoply of tools the Kremlin uses to manipulate and attack the West, as well as understand why Russia acts the way it does. Here, “Russia’s War on Everybody” is an invaluable piece of a growing mosaic of renewed expertise on, and interest in, Russia, joining recent popular works such as Catherine Belton’s “Putin’s People” to Mark Galeotti’s “A Short History of Russia” and Timothy Frye’s “Weak Strongman,” and Giles’ own “Moscow Rules.”
There is a risk in assuming that the Moscow that exits the war in Ukraine will be better than the Moscow that invaded Ukraine. Indeed, there is an increasing strain of vocal triumphalism that Russia will somehow be changed irrevocably for the better in the wake of a battlefield defeat. Equally, there is a risk that the poor performance of Russia’s armed forces on the battlefield, the severing of 30 years of economic connectivity, and the international pariah status (at least in the West) of Russia could lead many in the West to assume that Russia is not a challenge or a threat, and can be dismissed as a hollow power.
Extrapolating from Giles’ argument, both are wrong and naïve. Giles demonstrates a pattern of behavior that goes well beyond Putin. Russia’s tactics and behaviors are remarkably consistent from before the Cold War, throughout that 70-year conflict, and today. While the notes may change, the beat remains the same. If anything, Russia has proven remarkably adept at adapting to the changing times and technologies, updating their information warfare playbook for the internet era.
Moreover, it is wholly possible and indeed likely that things will get worse. A militarily degraded Russia will find the tactics and behaviors Giles outlines more even attractive than prior to the war. The intelligence and security services will be keen to reassert themselves and demonstrate their utility after poor performances in Ukraine. Russia itself will certainly be changed, but the West’s—rightful and morally justified—response to the invasion will have only served to validate the Kremlin’s propaganda narratives. Those who did not leave Russia prior to the war or thereafter may find themselves at the hands of an even more aggressive anti-Western campaign.
Ignoring Russia and assuming it will be the aforementioned hollow power is just as foolish. To paraphrase Leon Trotsky, “You may not be interested in Russia, but Russia is interested in you.” It will certainly continue to be so after Ukraine.
There is, however, disappointingly little expectation that the West will be any better at making policy towards Russia until the assumptions that underpin the West’s understanding of Moscow are substantively changed. Giles’ pair of books on the subject are invaluable, impassioned efforts to correct these assumptions, but the realities of “presentism”—the sense that what is happening now and today is unique and novel—almost certainly overpower the longer-term historical view. Perhaps Giles’ bolder approach will eat away at those flawed policy foundations. A starting point is certainly in the public’s understanding.
In “Russia’s War on Everybody” Giles rises to the pulpit and delivers a homily filled with measured hellfire and damnation warning the congregation of everyday citizens of Moscow’s ill intentions towards them. This intensity is useful in mobilizing public opinion, and that is at whom this book is directed. It is a needed accompaniment to the more academic reflections on the Kremlin’s behavior—it is not enough to say what Russia is doing, or why it is doing it, but to connect it with very real-world, and indeed deadly, consequences. Making smart policy requires an understanding of what Russia is doing and why, and clarity of the consequences thereof. It also takes a measure of both strategic empathy and moral clarity, and Giles is a welcome guide for readers along this path.
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On Russia, Moral Clarity and Strategic Empathy
Moscow, Russia. Photo by Ivan Lapyrin via Unsplash.
January 28, 2023
In his book, "Russia's War on Everybody," Keir Giles looks at how Russia’s behavior is seen from the frontlines and from those it affects. He shows how it really is Russia’s war on everybody and how Moscow’s malign behavior affects more than just high politics, writes Joshua Huminski in his review.
I
n August 2022, I was fortunate enough to sit down with Keir Giles at a fine steak restaurant in St. James’s Park (although to my great shame I chose the fish and chips). Six months after Russia’s expanded invasion of Ukraine, it was an exciting opportunity to meet someone whose work I regularly read—I am, if nothing else, a literary and policy nerd. What struck me most about meeting Giles was his intensity and passion, touched with a hint of combativeness, which is certainly reflected in his writing and his puckishness on Twitter.
His earnestness about what the West needed to do to respond to Russia’s aggression stood in stark contrast with the civil servants of the Ministry of Defence and Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office, with whom I had spent the bulk of the week meeting. Exceedingly well informed and generous with their time, they were far more reserved and circumspect. That the mandarins of Whitehall were far more staid is not surprising, but Giles’ passion sets him apart from many of the long-time Russian watchers. Indeed, this passion is reflected in his new book “Russia’s War on Everybody,” a copy of which was kindly dispatched by the publisher for review.
Being such an impassioned analyst comes with risks. Opponents can accuse one of being a zealot, or dismiss the commentator as merely anti-Russian. Audiences that may be sympathetic or simply on the fence, may equally find themselves put off by that same intensity (no one quite likes being shouted at…) In “Russia’s War on Everybody,” Giles finds a nuanced balance, providing clear analysis and criticism, without becoming a demagogue and alienating the very audience who needs to hear his message. Indeed, Giles may have inadvertently crafted and filled a role that has been missing in the Russia discourse—that of an expert, measured firebrand.
Giles dispenses with the traditional focus on elite pundits and policymakers, looking at how Russia’s behavior is seen from the frontlines and from those it affects. He shows how it really is Russia’s war on everybody and how Moscow’s malign behavior affects more than just high politics. This is a clever way of illustrating his thesis. Too many books on Russia focus on the strategic or abstract effects of the Kremlin’s activities, making it distant and something “over there” even when it hits home (Russia’s interference in the 2016 American election, for example).
Where other books treat elements of Russia’s behavior in isolation, focusing on one piece of a complex puzzle such as military activities, political or information warfare, or cyber operations, Giles does a superb job in blending all into one coherent and eminently readable volume. He shows how Russia is and has been at war with the West, even if the West did not appreciate it or understand it as such. Moscow clearly, as Giles demonstrates, sought to exploit schisms within Western societies, sow additional discord, undermine politics, and split alliances to advance its position relative to the West, and maintain what it views as its rightful place in geopolitics—that of a great power.
Giles’ moral clarity is most vividly on display in his frustration with the policymaking status quo. He has plenty of criticism for policymakers, particularly in Germany, that have willingly and knowingly made deals with the metaphorical devil. Equally, he criticizes those he sees as Russia apologists and enablers who have advanced the Kremlin’s narrative out of for profit or simply by being misguided and ill-informed. Indeed, it is at times unclear if Giles is more frustrated with Russia or the West’s policy makers, but perhaps both in equal measures.
This intensity and clarity are an attraction for the general reader. By eschewing the quiet recitation of Russia’s long-list of malfeasance in favor of more focused invective, Giles brings home the causes and consequences of Moscow’s actions to the average reader. There are innumerable experts on Russia. Indeed, many of the books written by those experts were reviewed in these digital pages. Each provides expert, dispassionate insights, but most have largely avoided writing with any moral outrage or intensity. This measured expertise has been and will continue to be absolutely invaluable to better understand Russia, its policies, and its politics. Yet, that dispassionate approach has its drawbacks, particularly when attempting to mobilize popular sentiment against Moscow’s behaviors. Measured analysis, legal indictments, and considered reflection is necessary, but not sufficient to mobilize popular sentiment and understanding.
That mobilization and awareness is critical to responding to Russia’s behaviors. If the West is to come out of the Ukraine war better than it went in, it needs to see the panoply of tools the Kremlin uses to manipulate and attack the West, as well as understand why Russia acts the way it does. Here, “Russia’s War on Everybody” is an invaluable piece of a growing mosaic of renewed expertise on, and interest in, Russia, joining recent popular works such as Catherine Belton’s “Putin’s People” to Mark Galeotti’s “A Short History of Russia” and Timothy Frye’s “Weak Strongman,” and Giles’ own “Moscow Rules.”
There is a risk in assuming that the Moscow that exits the war in Ukraine will be better than the Moscow that invaded Ukraine. Indeed, there is an increasing strain of vocal triumphalism that Russia will somehow be changed irrevocably for the better in the wake of a battlefield defeat. Equally, there is a risk that the poor performance of Russia’s armed forces on the battlefield, the severing of 30 years of economic connectivity, and the international pariah status (at least in the West) of Russia could lead many in the West to assume that Russia is not a challenge or a threat, and can be dismissed as a hollow power.
Extrapolating from Giles’ argument, both are wrong and naïve. Giles demonstrates a pattern of behavior that goes well beyond Putin. Russia’s tactics and behaviors are remarkably consistent from before the Cold War, throughout that 70-year conflict, and today. While the notes may change, the beat remains the same. If anything, Russia has proven remarkably adept at adapting to the changing times and technologies, updating their information warfare playbook for the internet era.
Moreover, it is wholly possible and indeed likely that things will get worse. A militarily degraded Russia will find the tactics and behaviors Giles outlines more even attractive than prior to the war. The intelligence and security services will be keen to reassert themselves and demonstrate their utility after poor performances in Ukraine. Russia itself will certainly be changed, but the West’s—rightful and morally justified—response to the invasion will have only served to validate the Kremlin’s propaganda narratives. Those who did not leave Russia prior to the war or thereafter may find themselves at the hands of an even more aggressive anti-Western campaign.
Ignoring Russia and assuming it will be the aforementioned hollow power is just as foolish. To paraphrase Leon Trotsky, “You may not be interested in Russia, but Russia is interested in you.” It will certainly continue to be so after Ukraine.
There is, however, disappointingly little expectation that the West will be any better at making policy towards Russia until the assumptions that underpin the West’s understanding of Moscow are substantively changed. Giles’ pair of books on the subject are invaluable, impassioned efforts to correct these assumptions, but the realities of “presentism”—the sense that what is happening now and today is unique and novel—almost certainly overpower the longer-term historical view. Perhaps Giles’ bolder approach will eat away at those flawed policy foundations. A starting point is certainly in the public’s understanding.
In “Russia’s War on Everybody” Giles rises to the pulpit and delivers a homily filled with measured hellfire and damnation warning the congregation of everyday citizens of Moscow’s ill intentions towards them. This intensity is useful in mobilizing public opinion, and that is at whom this book is directed. It is a needed accompaniment to the more academic reflections on the Kremlin’s behavior—it is not enough to say what Russia is doing, or why it is doing it, but to connect it with very real-world, and indeed deadly, consequences. Making smart policy requires an understanding of what Russia is doing and why, and clarity of the consequences thereof. It also takes a measure of both strategic empathy and moral clarity, and Giles is a welcome guide for readers along this path.
