.
I

n October 2019, the United States Mission to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) celebrated a milestone in international arms control and co-operative monitoring. Representatives from the U.S. joined delegates from other countries to celebrate the 1,500th flight under the auspices of the Open Skies Treaty, or OST. The treaty remains a landmark conventional arms control achievement of the post-Cold War era, allowing its 34 signatories to conduct unarmed reconnaissance flights over territory stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok. Since 2002, the agreement has provided unparalleled opportunities to promote shared military dialogue and transparency. Despite this record, in May of 2020, U.S. President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that the U.S. would soon be leaving the accord.

Amid backlash from Congressional leaders and European allies alike, the Administration justified its action by citing concerns over Russia’s compliance with key treaty provisions. Nevertheless, President Trump appeared to suggest the U.S. could return to the treaty should the existing agreement be reformed. The door to potentially saving one of the few remaining European security guardrails looks to be open, but is the OST worth saving? From a deterrence and strategic stability perspective, the answer to both questions should be an unequivocal yes.      

Although the OST may appear to invite legal spying, the terms of the agreement are strict and closely defined. OST flights can be monitored by personnel from all treaty member-states and host-country monitors can shut down image collection should an aircraft deviate off a pre-approved flight path. Moreover, while the treaty does not ban any specific type of aircraft sensor, it does limit sensor resolution to around 30 centimeters of resolution, approximately enough to distinguish a tank from a truck. Sensors must also be approved by all participating countries.

That being said, implementation of the OST has been imperfect and the agreement has its detractors. Russia, in particular, has drawn ire for restricting flights over its Baltic Sea exclave of Kaliningrad, Moscow, and the occupied Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia has also attempted to use the treaty to legitimize its occupation of Crimea, designating an airfield on the Ukrainian peninsula for aircraft refueling.  U.S. officials have also raised concerns that OST flights could be used by Russia to surveil U.S. critical infrastructure, but Russia already possesses the cyber capabilities to surveil American critical infrastructure outside of the OST.

With these new challenges to deterrence in mind, the OST is worth saving. The OST provides a potent signaling tool to deter aggression. U.S. and European allies effectively used the treaty in this regard in late 2018 in Ukraine. Following the seizure of Ukrainian naval vessels and personnel by Russia near the Kerch Strait and Sea of Azov, the U.S. and its European allies conducted an OST flight to reassure partners and deter future breaches of international law. Should the United States leave Open Skies, it would lose the ability to perform similar operations to support embattled allies like Ukraine and Georgia. A U.S. exit from the treaty would also not stop Russia from overflying U.S. military installations and exercises in Europe.

With its deterrent value in mind, can measures be implemented to allow U.S. participation to continue? While Russia did allow flights to resume over Kaliningrad earlier this year, restrictions over the Russo-Georgian border remain in place. These compliance concerns aside, Open Skies can be reformed to improve its ability to counter the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) through the addition of sensors for atmospheric gas and particulate sampling. The treaty does not restrict the type of sensors that can be added to OST aircraft, should all treaty parties agree, making such an addition feasible. The addition of such capabilities should be a welcome addition for the Trump Administration, especially amid recent assertions that Russia may be resuming non-zero yield nuclear testing. Sensors better adapted to counter WMD should also be welcomed by Russia, which has denied U.S. assertions that it is conducting nuclear-yield producing tests, and has touted its adherence to nuclear treaties like the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

Despite its faults, the Open Skies Treaty remains a critical instrument of arms control and deterrence. By improving the ability of treaty aircraft to counter a potentially emerging WMD threat, policymakers can reaffirm its deterrent value and provide an incentive for continued U.S. participation. Such an arrangement would not only benefit U.S. allies and partners in Europe but would also provide much needed strategic stability.

Amid strained relations with Russia, the collapse of the INF Treaty, the coming expiration of the New START agreement, and the Trump Administration’s stated intention to remove up to 9,500 US troops from Germany without consulting Berlin, reforming the Open Skies Treaty is ultimately essential to prevent the European security system from dying a death by a thousand cuts.

About
Andrew Carroll
:
Andrew Carroll is an officer in the U.S. Air Force and a graduate student at Columbia University.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.

a global affairs media network

www.diplomaticourier.com

Not Too Late to Save the Open Skies Treaty

Photo by Ryan Stone via Unsplash.

September 30, 2020

I

n October 2019, the United States Mission to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) celebrated a milestone in international arms control and co-operative monitoring. Representatives from the U.S. joined delegates from other countries to celebrate the 1,500th flight under the auspices of the Open Skies Treaty, or OST. The treaty remains a landmark conventional arms control achievement of the post-Cold War era, allowing its 34 signatories to conduct unarmed reconnaissance flights over territory stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok. Since 2002, the agreement has provided unparalleled opportunities to promote shared military dialogue and transparency. Despite this record, in May of 2020, U.S. President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that the U.S. would soon be leaving the accord.

Amid backlash from Congressional leaders and European allies alike, the Administration justified its action by citing concerns over Russia’s compliance with key treaty provisions. Nevertheless, President Trump appeared to suggest the U.S. could return to the treaty should the existing agreement be reformed. The door to potentially saving one of the few remaining European security guardrails looks to be open, but is the OST worth saving? From a deterrence and strategic stability perspective, the answer to both questions should be an unequivocal yes.      

Although the OST may appear to invite legal spying, the terms of the agreement are strict and closely defined. OST flights can be monitored by personnel from all treaty member-states and host-country monitors can shut down image collection should an aircraft deviate off a pre-approved flight path. Moreover, while the treaty does not ban any specific type of aircraft sensor, it does limit sensor resolution to around 30 centimeters of resolution, approximately enough to distinguish a tank from a truck. Sensors must also be approved by all participating countries.

That being said, implementation of the OST has been imperfect and the agreement has its detractors. Russia, in particular, has drawn ire for restricting flights over its Baltic Sea exclave of Kaliningrad, Moscow, and the occupied Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia has also attempted to use the treaty to legitimize its occupation of Crimea, designating an airfield on the Ukrainian peninsula for aircraft refueling.  U.S. officials have also raised concerns that OST flights could be used by Russia to surveil U.S. critical infrastructure, but Russia already possesses the cyber capabilities to surveil American critical infrastructure outside of the OST.

With these new challenges to deterrence in mind, the OST is worth saving. The OST provides a potent signaling tool to deter aggression. U.S. and European allies effectively used the treaty in this regard in late 2018 in Ukraine. Following the seizure of Ukrainian naval vessels and personnel by Russia near the Kerch Strait and Sea of Azov, the U.S. and its European allies conducted an OST flight to reassure partners and deter future breaches of international law. Should the United States leave Open Skies, it would lose the ability to perform similar operations to support embattled allies like Ukraine and Georgia. A U.S. exit from the treaty would also not stop Russia from overflying U.S. military installations and exercises in Europe.

With its deterrent value in mind, can measures be implemented to allow U.S. participation to continue? While Russia did allow flights to resume over Kaliningrad earlier this year, restrictions over the Russo-Georgian border remain in place. These compliance concerns aside, Open Skies can be reformed to improve its ability to counter the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) through the addition of sensors for atmospheric gas and particulate sampling. The treaty does not restrict the type of sensors that can be added to OST aircraft, should all treaty parties agree, making such an addition feasible. The addition of such capabilities should be a welcome addition for the Trump Administration, especially amid recent assertions that Russia may be resuming non-zero yield nuclear testing. Sensors better adapted to counter WMD should also be welcomed by Russia, which has denied U.S. assertions that it is conducting nuclear-yield producing tests, and has touted its adherence to nuclear treaties like the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

Despite its faults, the Open Skies Treaty remains a critical instrument of arms control and deterrence. By improving the ability of treaty aircraft to counter a potentially emerging WMD threat, policymakers can reaffirm its deterrent value and provide an incentive for continued U.S. participation. Such an arrangement would not only benefit U.S. allies and partners in Europe but would also provide much needed strategic stability.

Amid strained relations with Russia, the collapse of the INF Treaty, the coming expiration of the New START agreement, and the Trump Administration’s stated intention to remove up to 9,500 US troops from Germany without consulting Berlin, reforming the Open Skies Treaty is ultimately essential to prevent the European security system from dying a death by a thousand cuts.

About
Andrew Carroll
:
Andrew Carroll is an officer in the U.S. Air Force and a graduate student at Columbia University.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.