.
It's been 40 years since the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, considered the denouement of the Space Race between the United States and the USSR, but the latent tensions from that era are still being resolved in the 21st century. Last week the United Nations hosted a series of multilateral negotiations on the European Union’s proposed International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (ICoC), the leading set of principles and guidelines for operations in space.
The EU’s ICoC is nearing a decade of development, since it was first sparked by UN General Assembly Resolution 61/75 in 2006. Progress has been slow, but the ICoC has evolved significantly over the several years of its incubation. Three open-ended consultations on the draft proposal were held in Kiev (May 2013), Bangkok (November 2013), and Luxembourg (May 2014), transforming the document into a much more inclusive work.
The recent conference is a cornerstone step in the finalization of the preliminary regulations, and movement towards a comprehensive international framework for spacefaring countries. While it seems that space is the place for scientists and academics, as Jacek Bylica of the European External Action Service explained in the welcoming remarks of the multilateral negotiations, space has more of an effect on our modern society than it seems on the surface.
“Space plays an increasingly pivotal role in the efficient, every-day functioning of modern societies and their economic development. The use of satellite communications, earth observation, and navigation generates a growing number of applications and services. There include weather forecasting, environmental and climate change monitoring, disaster management, transport, natural resource management, agriculture, and others. As a result, space is increasingly seen worldwide as an important source of economic growth, social well-being, and sustainable development,” he said.
The history of outer space norm development is long and convoluted. The initial concerns with the rise of the Space Race and the two major space powers were the militarization and weaponization of space. Through the activity of the UN General Assembly First Committee, each year the international community has passed resolutions on the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS). The PAROS has relied heavily on the keystone 1967 Outer Space Treaty, and is still limited by its resolution status - PAROS is not a comprehensive treaty that could prevent any nation from gaining a further military advantage in outer space or reduce current military uses of outer space.
One of the major opponents of PAROS has been the United States, which has abstained each time the resolution comes to vote. In order to court the US, there was an attempt to circumvent the problematic language of "prevention of an arms race" with the "prevention of the placement of weapons." The Russia-China draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT) was introduced in 2008. However, China's shocking tests of a ground-based, kinetic energy anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon in 2007, breaking a de-facto moratorium on ASAT testing, rekindled fears of a new arms race in space and effectively blocked the passage of PPWT.
China's test of their newly developed ASAT also renewed attention to another pressing aspect of space-development: space debris. The Chinese tests were conducted on an ageing Chinese weather satellite, Fenguyn-1 C, and while the tests were successful, they created a massive amount of debris in the few useful orbital bands. The threat of any debris in space is severe. Michael Krepon of The Stimson Center explained at the multilateral negotiations this Wednesday,
"There are already 20,000 or so weapons in space. They are pieces of debris the size of a marble, or larger. A piece of debris the size of a marble travels through space with the energy of a one-ton safe dropped from a five-story building. Anything in the path of that marble will be blown to pieces, creating far more lethal debris."
As space has moved from the playground of two superpowers to a frontier with a diversity of institutional and private actors and over 60 governments, the world will have to start treating space as a fragile ecosystem, like that of the oceans and atmosphere.
With an ever-increasing litany of factors affecting sustainable development in outer space, it's become more and more clear that a comprehensive treaty has to be formed. The EU's ICoC is the leading vehicle for this kind of regulation.
The code will not function as a legally binding treaty, but is intended to exist as a set of principles and guidelines agreed to on a voluntary basis amongst states. It is not intended to have any formal enforcement mechanisms. With these concessions, the EU hopes to make the ICoC more palatable than any of the earlier attempts at an outer space treaty.
There are three central principles to the ICoC: All countries’ inheritable right to use space for peaceful purposes; protection of security and reliability of space objects in orbit; and consideration for states’ legitimate defense interests. It's an overarching and ambitious set of guidelines designed to "strengthening the safety, security, and sustainability of outer space activities," said Bylica.
However, with the large scope of the ICoC, many of the participants of the multilateral negotiations felt that the EU has overextended the goals of the treaty.
On the most fundamental level, there was a significant thread of ire surrounding the initial creation of the ICoC. The EU had written the treaty without consultation of the other major spacefaring powers or their space agencies. While these primary concerns were somewhat alleviated by the later years of consultation, the sentiment remained during the course of the negotiations this July, with many delegates from smaller or developing nations protesting that the treaty has not been inclusive enough.
"Such an instrument should be held in the format of inclusive and consensus-based multilateral negotiations within the framework of the UN...and taking into account the interests of all States, irrespective of their level of development, in order to reach a balanced outcome that addresses the needs and reflects the concerns of all participants," said the BRICS nations in a joint-statement at the multilateral negotiations.
Many of these developing nations also expressed a suspicion that the ICoC could be used to bottleneck their expansion into space. Many nations in Africa and Latin America are yet to fully develop their space capabilities, so some perceive any regulatory instrument by the West as an effort to limit their future capabilities. They draw up the nonproliferation regime, which has restricted access to nuclear technologies, despite playing an important role in international security.
Another concern has been the security aspect of the code. One of the pillars of the code is the right of self-defense of states, even in outer space. Nations still developing their space-capabilities believe that overt references to the right of self-defense in the code would accelerate the trend toward space weaponization. While the right to self-defense is enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter, many feel referencing self-defense is an unnecessary and potentially hazardous addition to the code.
A final major objection relates to the nature of the code itself. Several countries, including Russia, China, Ukraine, Mexico, Thailand, Brazil and Ethiopia believe the code should focus only on the peaceful uses of outer space and should accordingly be retooled. However, there is a thin line between peaceful and military uses of outer space and the dual-use nature of the space technology makes a compelling case for initiating a comprehensive instrument. Many countries including the US, UK, Italy, Germany and Canada have reiterated the need for including military- and security-oriented uses of outer space.
Some countries are still conflicted on whether the treaty should be politically or legally binding. India has objected to the ICoC because it believes that the code needs to be legally binding in order to have an impact. Another set of critical aspects of the treaty that must be addressed are the code's investigation and consultative mechanisms - in the case of a politically binding treaty without proper enforcement mechanisms, the provisions of investigation and consultation must be made stronger.
Not all is lost with the ICoC. As Frank A. Rose US Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance explained in the multilateral negotiations: "We must look closely at the proposed Code and appreciate the effort that the European Union and others in the international community have put into crafting a document that provide us with an opportunity to reach agreement in the near term on a series of voluntary, non-legally binding, pragmatic, and timely measures that are essential to the long-term sustainability, safety, stability, and security of the outer space environment. And I would urge colleagues to recognize that many of these cooperative mechanisms do not exist anywhere else. That is why the Code is such an important step forward in increasing our shared efforts to preserve the outer space environment for all nations."
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.
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New Tensions on How to Regulate Outer Space
Planet earth with sunrise and moon in space
August 10, 2015
It's been 40 years since the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, considered the denouement of the Space Race between the United States and the USSR, but the latent tensions from that era are still being resolved in the 21st century. Last week the United Nations hosted a series of multilateral negotiations on the European Union’s proposed International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (ICoC), the leading set of principles and guidelines for operations in space.
The EU’s ICoC is nearing a decade of development, since it was first sparked by UN General Assembly Resolution 61/75 in 2006. Progress has been slow, but the ICoC has evolved significantly over the several years of its incubation. Three open-ended consultations on the draft proposal were held in Kiev (May 2013), Bangkok (November 2013), and Luxembourg (May 2014), transforming the document into a much more inclusive work.
The recent conference is a cornerstone step in the finalization of the preliminary regulations, and movement towards a comprehensive international framework for spacefaring countries. While it seems that space is the place for scientists and academics, as Jacek Bylica of the European External Action Service explained in the welcoming remarks of the multilateral negotiations, space has more of an effect on our modern society than it seems on the surface.
“Space plays an increasingly pivotal role in the efficient, every-day functioning of modern societies and their economic development. The use of satellite communications, earth observation, and navigation generates a growing number of applications and services. There include weather forecasting, environmental and climate change monitoring, disaster management, transport, natural resource management, agriculture, and others. As a result, space is increasingly seen worldwide as an important source of economic growth, social well-being, and sustainable development,” he said.
The history of outer space norm development is long and convoluted. The initial concerns with the rise of the Space Race and the two major space powers were the militarization and weaponization of space. Through the activity of the UN General Assembly First Committee, each year the international community has passed resolutions on the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS). The PAROS has relied heavily on the keystone 1967 Outer Space Treaty, and is still limited by its resolution status - PAROS is not a comprehensive treaty that could prevent any nation from gaining a further military advantage in outer space or reduce current military uses of outer space.
One of the major opponents of PAROS has been the United States, which has abstained each time the resolution comes to vote. In order to court the US, there was an attempt to circumvent the problematic language of "prevention of an arms race" with the "prevention of the placement of weapons." The Russia-China draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT) was introduced in 2008. However, China's shocking tests of a ground-based, kinetic energy anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon in 2007, breaking a de-facto moratorium on ASAT testing, rekindled fears of a new arms race in space and effectively blocked the passage of PPWT.
China's test of their newly developed ASAT also renewed attention to another pressing aspect of space-development: space debris. The Chinese tests were conducted on an ageing Chinese weather satellite, Fenguyn-1 C, and while the tests were successful, they created a massive amount of debris in the few useful orbital bands. The threat of any debris in space is severe. Michael Krepon of The Stimson Center explained at the multilateral negotiations this Wednesday,
"There are already 20,000 or so weapons in space. They are pieces of debris the size of a marble, or larger. A piece of debris the size of a marble travels through space with the energy of a one-ton safe dropped from a five-story building. Anything in the path of that marble will be blown to pieces, creating far more lethal debris."
As space has moved from the playground of two superpowers to a frontier with a diversity of institutional and private actors and over 60 governments, the world will have to start treating space as a fragile ecosystem, like that of the oceans and atmosphere.
With an ever-increasing litany of factors affecting sustainable development in outer space, it's become more and more clear that a comprehensive treaty has to be formed. The EU's ICoC is the leading vehicle for this kind of regulation.
The code will not function as a legally binding treaty, but is intended to exist as a set of principles and guidelines agreed to on a voluntary basis amongst states. It is not intended to have any formal enforcement mechanisms. With these concessions, the EU hopes to make the ICoC more palatable than any of the earlier attempts at an outer space treaty.
There are three central principles to the ICoC: All countries’ inheritable right to use space for peaceful purposes; protection of security and reliability of space objects in orbit; and consideration for states’ legitimate defense interests. It's an overarching and ambitious set of guidelines designed to "strengthening the safety, security, and sustainability of outer space activities," said Bylica.
However, with the large scope of the ICoC, many of the participants of the multilateral negotiations felt that the EU has overextended the goals of the treaty.
On the most fundamental level, there was a significant thread of ire surrounding the initial creation of the ICoC. The EU had written the treaty without consultation of the other major spacefaring powers or their space agencies. While these primary concerns were somewhat alleviated by the later years of consultation, the sentiment remained during the course of the negotiations this July, with many delegates from smaller or developing nations protesting that the treaty has not been inclusive enough.
"Such an instrument should be held in the format of inclusive and consensus-based multilateral negotiations within the framework of the UN...and taking into account the interests of all States, irrespective of their level of development, in order to reach a balanced outcome that addresses the needs and reflects the concerns of all participants," said the BRICS nations in a joint-statement at the multilateral negotiations.
Many of these developing nations also expressed a suspicion that the ICoC could be used to bottleneck their expansion into space. Many nations in Africa and Latin America are yet to fully develop their space capabilities, so some perceive any regulatory instrument by the West as an effort to limit their future capabilities. They draw up the nonproliferation regime, which has restricted access to nuclear technologies, despite playing an important role in international security.
Another concern has been the security aspect of the code. One of the pillars of the code is the right of self-defense of states, even in outer space. Nations still developing their space-capabilities believe that overt references to the right of self-defense in the code would accelerate the trend toward space weaponization. While the right to self-defense is enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter, many feel referencing self-defense is an unnecessary and potentially hazardous addition to the code.
A final major objection relates to the nature of the code itself. Several countries, including Russia, China, Ukraine, Mexico, Thailand, Brazil and Ethiopia believe the code should focus only on the peaceful uses of outer space and should accordingly be retooled. However, there is a thin line between peaceful and military uses of outer space and the dual-use nature of the space technology makes a compelling case for initiating a comprehensive instrument. Many countries including the US, UK, Italy, Germany and Canada have reiterated the need for including military- and security-oriented uses of outer space.
Some countries are still conflicted on whether the treaty should be politically or legally binding. India has objected to the ICoC because it believes that the code needs to be legally binding in order to have an impact. Another set of critical aspects of the treaty that must be addressed are the code's investigation and consultative mechanisms - in the case of a politically binding treaty without proper enforcement mechanisms, the provisions of investigation and consultation must be made stronger.
Not all is lost with the ICoC. As Frank A. Rose US Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance explained in the multilateral negotiations: "We must look closely at the proposed Code and appreciate the effort that the European Union and others in the international community have put into crafting a document that provide us with an opportunity to reach agreement in the near term on a series of voluntary, non-legally binding, pragmatic, and timely measures that are essential to the long-term sustainability, safety, stability, and security of the outer space environment. And I would urge colleagues to recognize that many of these cooperative mechanisms do not exist anywhere else. That is why the Code is such an important step forward in increasing our shared efforts to preserve the outer space environment for all nations."
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.
