his month, NATO celebrates its 75th anniversary. It is an impressive achievement for the defensive treaty group, having lasted as long as it has and in so doing, becoming, arguably, the most successful alliance of all time. It is certainly the longest lasting alliance, surpassing the Delian League of fifth century Greece. In its 75 years, the alliance has not lost any territory—an impressive feat. Quite the contrary. It has steadily added new members (growing from the initial 12 to 32 members, with the most recent addition—Sweden—participating (formally) in the Washington summit in July 2024.
In “Deterring Armageddon,” author Peter Apps tells the story of the alliance’s formation, its struggles and turmoil, and its sense of renewed purpose after Russia’s expanded invasion of Ukraine. Apps enlivens NATO’s history with rich anecdotes and a journalist’s eye for storytelling. He makes readers feel as though they are present at the creation, capturing the emotions, fears, and considerable diplomacy that led to the alliance’s foundation. Apps retells the recent history of NATO’s response to Russian provocations and the efforts of member–states to support Ukraine after February 2022. He offers wonderful snapshots of the innumerable personalities that have shaped and challenged the alliance from within and from without—from Ernest Bevin to Slobodan Milošević, and from Bernard Law Montgomery to Vladimir Putin.
Telling NATO’s story in such a vivid and vibrant fashion is decidedly welcome. The machinations of NATO headquarters, internecine political battles, and byzantine bureaucratic processes do not necessarily lend themselves to racy pacing or engrossing plots. Indeed, for a lengthy period (which coincided with the reviewer’s time in graduate school) much of the coverage of NATO was relegated to deeply researched and well–argued articles in policy journals that induced a melatonin–like effect.
Apps’ contribution is a vitally necessary interjection at a critical time. NATO’s post–Ukraine renewed sense of purpose and mission reintroduced policymakers and the public alike to the challenges of alliance politics and the necessity of defense and deterrence. The end of the Cold War thrust NATO into uncharted territory. The alliance’s raison d'etre disappeared with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Efforts to bring Moscow closer to, if not into the fold, were halting at best and unrequited at worst, and ultimately came to naught with President Putin’s revanchism. Within the alliance and across Europe, defense and deterrence fell down the priority list. NATO struggled to find a clear purpose and its focus expanded with engagements in the Balkans, Libya, and Afghanistan, counter–piracy off the Horn of Africa, and training missions in Iraq.
The events of February 2022 violently refocused the collective consciousness. War was indeed possible; defense and deterrence still mattered; and NATO was the guarantor of continued stability and security.
Alliances are messy, especially ones with as many diverse member–states as NATO, a point well–made by Apps. International squabbles would find themselves mirrored within NATO, such as France’s objections to America’s 2003 invasion of Iraq. Yet, even in the heady days of the Cold War when there was a clear and present danger from the Soviet Union, unanimity was never guaranteed and fights were inevitable. America’s preponderance of power loomed over every debate and every discussion, and still does to this day. Consensus remained then, as now, the order of the day. Turkey’s opposition to the entry of Sweden and Finland into the alliance is just the latest illustration of the challenges of alliance consensus, but also indicative of how workarounds are found. Even the pacification of Hungary’s recent objections is in keeping with past NATO efforts to mollify recalcitrant members.
Not all is well on the horizon. Apps recounts the impact that President Donald Trump had on the alliance, with his open questioning of its usefulness, America’s allegiance to NATO’s Article Five commitment to collective self-defense, and suggestions that Washington would only defend those who met the 2% of GDP spending target. What would a second Trump administration mean for NATO? It is an open question—where Trump stands on any issue is decidedly unclear. NATO member–states are working against a policy assumption that America’s interest in European security will wane, and the continent will be responsible for its own security to a greater degree than at any point since the alliance’s creation.
There is a cruel, twisted irony that it took Trump’s Nixonian madman approach to NATO to kickstart the alliance’s renewed focus on defense and deterrence. Successive American presidents have pushed for the alliance to spend more on defense and to invest more in their own militaries. The difference was most of this prodding was polite and diplomatic, done out of the public eye. Trump said the quiet part out loud for all to hear. If there were some Machiavellian genius behind it, it would be remarkable, but sadly this is decidedly not the case.
The question remains for how long this renewed interest and investment can continue. For all the focused messaging and statements of unity, underlying challenges remain. Within NATO member–states it is not a guarantee that political support for aid to Ukraine and increased defense spending is sustainable. The inevitable question of guns versus butter will emerge. The rise of far–right and populist parties in France and elsewhere in Europe, and the continued obstinance of Hungary and Turkey, could imperil the consensus efforts of the next secretary general, the outgoing prime minister of the Netherlands, Mark Rutte.
Perhaps most ironically, NATO deterrence continues to hold. For all the Kremlin’s belligerence and threats to strike member–state supply lines into Ukraine, Russia has done very little. Article Five appears to be the one thing that President Putin remains genuinely wary of and keen to avoid provoking.
Scratching the surface of the vocal commitments to increase defense spending, one finds that not all is what it seems. The 2% of GDP spending commitment is a political signal, not a useful measure of combat power. It is the Arthur Andersen of defense spending, using creative accounting to make the books look better than they are, often including pensions and other spending entries that stretch the definition of ‘defense.’ Even the recently announced spending increases in the United Kingdom and France mask an awkward truth—much of that new investment is going towards nuclear modernization. Necessary for deterrence to be sure, but not exactly practical for conventional operations.
Trump aside, America’s long–term strategic interest is in the Indo–Pacific and strategic competition with China. Russia’s expanded invasion forced the White House to hastily rewrite its National Security Strategy to give greater prominence to Moscow. Speaking privately, with European defense and security officials, the only sure–fire way to get a meeting with Pentagon officials prior to the war was making the meeting about China.
Europe must confront the awkward truth that even under a second Biden administration, the United States will shift its strategic focus to the Indo–Pacific. What role NATO will have in the region, if any at all, is an open question. The United Kingdom and France are Indo–Pacific powers with interests in the region but lack the force projection capabilities of the United States. Paris quashed the idea of opening a representative office in Tokyo, but other member–states want the alliance to remain focused on Europe and not go tilting at Chinese windmills.
“Deterring Armageddon” captures NATO’s strengths and its weaknesses and shows that what the alliance faces today is not terribly different from that which it has confronted and overcome in the past. Apps does not shy away from highlighting the risks the alliance faces or the obstacles it will encounter, but also illustrates that it has endured, perhaps above all else, because of that shared mission of collective defense and deterrence. Allies will squabble; disputes will erupt; missions will morph and change. Yet, at the end of the day, the strength of the alliance is the willingness of each member to support every other member, ensuring a measure of stability and security unprecedented in human history.
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NATO’s story, from foundation to reinvigoration
Photo by Marek Studzinski on Unsplash.
July 6, 2024
In “Deterring Armageddon,” author Peter Apps has written a rich and engaging portrait of NATO, its history, and where it stands in its 75th year, writes Joshua Huminski.
T
his month, NATO celebrates its 75th anniversary. It is an impressive achievement for the defensive treaty group, having lasted as long as it has and in so doing, becoming, arguably, the most successful alliance of all time. It is certainly the longest lasting alliance, surpassing the Delian League of fifth century Greece. In its 75 years, the alliance has not lost any territory—an impressive feat. Quite the contrary. It has steadily added new members (growing from the initial 12 to 32 members, with the most recent addition—Sweden—participating (formally) in the Washington summit in July 2024.
In “Deterring Armageddon,” author Peter Apps tells the story of the alliance’s formation, its struggles and turmoil, and its sense of renewed purpose after Russia’s expanded invasion of Ukraine. Apps enlivens NATO’s history with rich anecdotes and a journalist’s eye for storytelling. He makes readers feel as though they are present at the creation, capturing the emotions, fears, and considerable diplomacy that led to the alliance’s foundation. Apps retells the recent history of NATO’s response to Russian provocations and the efforts of member–states to support Ukraine after February 2022. He offers wonderful snapshots of the innumerable personalities that have shaped and challenged the alliance from within and from without—from Ernest Bevin to Slobodan Milošević, and from Bernard Law Montgomery to Vladimir Putin.
Telling NATO’s story in such a vivid and vibrant fashion is decidedly welcome. The machinations of NATO headquarters, internecine political battles, and byzantine bureaucratic processes do not necessarily lend themselves to racy pacing or engrossing plots. Indeed, for a lengthy period (which coincided with the reviewer’s time in graduate school) much of the coverage of NATO was relegated to deeply researched and well–argued articles in policy journals that induced a melatonin–like effect.
Apps’ contribution is a vitally necessary interjection at a critical time. NATO’s post–Ukraine renewed sense of purpose and mission reintroduced policymakers and the public alike to the challenges of alliance politics and the necessity of defense and deterrence. The end of the Cold War thrust NATO into uncharted territory. The alliance’s raison d'etre disappeared with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Efforts to bring Moscow closer to, if not into the fold, were halting at best and unrequited at worst, and ultimately came to naught with President Putin’s revanchism. Within the alliance and across Europe, defense and deterrence fell down the priority list. NATO struggled to find a clear purpose and its focus expanded with engagements in the Balkans, Libya, and Afghanistan, counter–piracy off the Horn of Africa, and training missions in Iraq.
The events of February 2022 violently refocused the collective consciousness. War was indeed possible; defense and deterrence still mattered; and NATO was the guarantor of continued stability and security.
Alliances are messy, especially ones with as many diverse member–states as NATO, a point well–made by Apps. International squabbles would find themselves mirrored within NATO, such as France’s objections to America’s 2003 invasion of Iraq. Yet, even in the heady days of the Cold War when there was a clear and present danger from the Soviet Union, unanimity was never guaranteed and fights were inevitable. America’s preponderance of power loomed over every debate and every discussion, and still does to this day. Consensus remained then, as now, the order of the day. Turkey’s opposition to the entry of Sweden and Finland into the alliance is just the latest illustration of the challenges of alliance consensus, but also indicative of how workarounds are found. Even the pacification of Hungary’s recent objections is in keeping with past NATO efforts to mollify recalcitrant members.
Not all is well on the horizon. Apps recounts the impact that President Donald Trump had on the alliance, with his open questioning of its usefulness, America’s allegiance to NATO’s Article Five commitment to collective self-defense, and suggestions that Washington would only defend those who met the 2% of GDP spending target. What would a second Trump administration mean for NATO? It is an open question—where Trump stands on any issue is decidedly unclear. NATO member–states are working against a policy assumption that America’s interest in European security will wane, and the continent will be responsible for its own security to a greater degree than at any point since the alliance’s creation.
There is a cruel, twisted irony that it took Trump’s Nixonian madman approach to NATO to kickstart the alliance’s renewed focus on defense and deterrence. Successive American presidents have pushed for the alliance to spend more on defense and to invest more in their own militaries. The difference was most of this prodding was polite and diplomatic, done out of the public eye. Trump said the quiet part out loud for all to hear. If there were some Machiavellian genius behind it, it would be remarkable, but sadly this is decidedly not the case.
The question remains for how long this renewed interest and investment can continue. For all the focused messaging and statements of unity, underlying challenges remain. Within NATO member–states it is not a guarantee that political support for aid to Ukraine and increased defense spending is sustainable. The inevitable question of guns versus butter will emerge. The rise of far–right and populist parties in France and elsewhere in Europe, and the continued obstinance of Hungary and Turkey, could imperil the consensus efforts of the next secretary general, the outgoing prime minister of the Netherlands, Mark Rutte.
Perhaps most ironically, NATO deterrence continues to hold. For all the Kremlin’s belligerence and threats to strike member–state supply lines into Ukraine, Russia has done very little. Article Five appears to be the one thing that President Putin remains genuinely wary of and keen to avoid provoking.
Scratching the surface of the vocal commitments to increase defense spending, one finds that not all is what it seems. The 2% of GDP spending commitment is a political signal, not a useful measure of combat power. It is the Arthur Andersen of defense spending, using creative accounting to make the books look better than they are, often including pensions and other spending entries that stretch the definition of ‘defense.’ Even the recently announced spending increases in the United Kingdom and France mask an awkward truth—much of that new investment is going towards nuclear modernization. Necessary for deterrence to be sure, but not exactly practical for conventional operations.
Trump aside, America’s long–term strategic interest is in the Indo–Pacific and strategic competition with China. Russia’s expanded invasion forced the White House to hastily rewrite its National Security Strategy to give greater prominence to Moscow. Speaking privately, with European defense and security officials, the only sure–fire way to get a meeting with Pentagon officials prior to the war was making the meeting about China.
Europe must confront the awkward truth that even under a second Biden administration, the United States will shift its strategic focus to the Indo–Pacific. What role NATO will have in the region, if any at all, is an open question. The United Kingdom and France are Indo–Pacific powers with interests in the region but lack the force projection capabilities of the United States. Paris quashed the idea of opening a representative office in Tokyo, but other member–states want the alliance to remain focused on Europe and not go tilting at Chinese windmills.
“Deterring Armageddon” captures NATO’s strengths and its weaknesses and shows that what the alliance faces today is not terribly different from that which it has confronted and overcome in the past. Apps does not shy away from highlighting the risks the alliance faces or the obstacles it will encounter, but also illustrates that it has endured, perhaps above all else, because of that shared mission of collective defense and deterrence. Allies will squabble; disputes will erupt; missions will morph and change. Yet, at the end of the day, the strength of the alliance is the willingness of each member to support every other member, ensuring a measure of stability and security unprecedented in human history.
