he Republic of Moldova will hold presidential elections on 20 October 2024, with President Maia Sandu seeking re–election, and a referendum regarding the country’s European Union (EU) aspirations. While European geopolitics nowadays are very complex, understanding Moldovan politics and voting preferences is equally challenging.
The presidential elections in Moldova are highly relevant to the future of Europe. The country is located on the western border of Ukraine; hence, having a pro-Moscow government in Chisinau would be a concern for Kyiv and its allies. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has met with Sandu several times and has expressed his gratitude for Moldova’s support for Ukraine against Russia during her presidency. Moreover, at a domestic level, given the ambition of the Moldovan government and most of the population to join the European Union by the end of the decade, having a pro-Europe president is critical to carry out much-needed reforms to fulfill Brussels’ requirements for membership.
Running against Sandu is former president Igor Dodon (2016–2020), known for his pro–Russia views and ideology. According to an April 2024 poll, Sandu has around 31.5% of the vote, while Dodon has around 15.8%. If necessary, there will be a second round on 3 November 2024.
Sandu’s strategy to secure voters is to talk directly to her citizens about the European Union. In April 2024, she visited Comrat University in Gagauzia to discuss “the advantages of European integration” with university students and staff. Gagauzia, an autonomous region in Southern Moldova, is generally viewed as having a pro–Moscow population. The label is not entirely undeserved: Dodon received around 84% of the vote in the 2020 elections.
On the other hand, Dodon continues to preach a pro–Moscow ideology. In late May 2024, he argued that Moldova should not forget its other allies, such as Russia and China, and asked Chisinau to “return to a normal dialogue” with said governments.
Moreover, Gagauzia’s governor (locally known as Başkan), Yevgenia Gutsul, elected in 2023, has criticized Sandu’s pro–EU aspirations while praising Russia. In March 2024, several pro–Moscow Moldovan politicians visited Moscow, where Gutsul met with President Vladimir Putin. Gutsul has reportedly requested Moscow to “protect Gagauzia” from Chisinau and signed agreements with Moscow to provide Gagauzian with allowances via Russia’s Mir payment system.
One curiosity of Moldovan politics since achieving independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 is that foreign policy and domestic politics tend to flip–flop between pro–European or pro–Russian ideologies. While Sandu is pro–EU, her predecessor Dodon was pro–Russia and Moscow–led blocs like the Eurasian Economic Union. This lack of cohesion affects foreign policy and long–term strategic planning.
After the Russian invasion of Ukraine commenced, Moldova applied for European Union membership. In June 2022, Brussels awarded Moldova candidate status, and in December 2023, Brussels decided to open accession negotiations with the country. Moldovan authorities aim to join the bloc by 2030.
Sandu has to be re–elected to achieve Moldova’s EU aspirations. Should Moldovans elect Dodon, at best, the EU application process will slow down until 2028 and, at worst, completely stall. Moreover, it is important to note that Sandu’s Party of Action and Solidarity (Partidul Acțiune și Solidaritate, PAS) has a 61–seat majority in the 101–seat Parliament, and the parliamentary elections are scheduled for Spring 2025. While Sandu is popular enough to be re–elected, the PAS may have a bigger problem holding a parliamentary majority.
Moldova has improved since Sandu was elected, though challenges remain, including energy security, justice sector reform, the economy, and the country’s brain drain. Hence, even if Sandu and her PAS colleagues in Parliament are re–elected, being ready for the EU in 2030 is an extremely optimistic scenario.
The identity issue must also be considered. Moldova is a complex country, with a pro–Russia separatist region in Transnistria, the autonomous Gagauzia, and many citizens who still have positive views of Russia. Sandu’s election and overall pro–EU sentiments suggest that most Moldovans, particularly the younger generations, prefer a pro–West policy. Language complicates the situation further, as many Moldovans (and most Gagauzians) speak Russian. The country’s state language is Romanian, which was called Moldovan during Soviet times, and until 2023—changing the name of the state language was a highly debated issue and has been weaponized to spread misinformation.
President Sandu (like many Moldovans) has dual citizenship, Moldovan and Romanian, a fact that Moscow and pro–Moscow Moldovan politicians use to criticize her pro–Europe attitude. One popular conspiracy theory is that Sandu seeks to reunify Moldova with Romania. On 30 May 2024, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova argued that Sandu and her administration “believe that there are no such things as the Moldovan language or nation. They are all Romanian.” While this statement is untrue, it will nevertheless be used by Dodon and Gutsul to create a divide among Moldovans, linking the elections with the future of Moldova as an independent state.
Moldova’s EU membership will ideally end the Moldovan identity and reunification debate. It is illogical to believe that Moldova will want to reunify with Romania after achieving EU membership, as Chisinau’s goal is to enjoy the benefits of joining the bloc. While friendly attitudes towards Romania certainly exist, and Bucharest has supported Moldova’s EU application and energy security, the priority for Chisinau and many Moldovans is to join the bloc.
Discussions about Moldovan identity, language, and the future of the country as an independent state have been highly politicized and weaponized since even the war in Ukraine commenced. Hopefully, on 20 October 2024, the voice of the Moldovan people will be heard.
a global affairs media network
Moldova’s EU ambitions rest on Sandu’s shoulders
Chisinau protest following 2009 elections. Image by VargaA, CC BY-SA 4.0 from Wikimedia Commons.
June 17, 2024
Moldova’s EU membership will ideally end the Moldovan identity and reunification debate. But the road to get there is a complicated one, writes Wilder Alejandro Sanchez.
T
he Republic of Moldova will hold presidential elections on 20 October 2024, with President Maia Sandu seeking re–election, and a referendum regarding the country’s European Union (EU) aspirations. While European geopolitics nowadays are very complex, understanding Moldovan politics and voting preferences is equally challenging.
The presidential elections in Moldova are highly relevant to the future of Europe. The country is located on the western border of Ukraine; hence, having a pro-Moscow government in Chisinau would be a concern for Kyiv and its allies. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has met with Sandu several times and has expressed his gratitude for Moldova’s support for Ukraine against Russia during her presidency. Moreover, at a domestic level, given the ambition of the Moldovan government and most of the population to join the European Union by the end of the decade, having a pro-Europe president is critical to carry out much-needed reforms to fulfill Brussels’ requirements for membership.
Running against Sandu is former president Igor Dodon (2016–2020), known for his pro–Russia views and ideology. According to an April 2024 poll, Sandu has around 31.5% of the vote, while Dodon has around 15.8%. If necessary, there will be a second round on 3 November 2024.
Sandu’s strategy to secure voters is to talk directly to her citizens about the European Union. In April 2024, she visited Comrat University in Gagauzia to discuss “the advantages of European integration” with university students and staff. Gagauzia, an autonomous region in Southern Moldova, is generally viewed as having a pro–Moscow population. The label is not entirely undeserved: Dodon received around 84% of the vote in the 2020 elections.
On the other hand, Dodon continues to preach a pro–Moscow ideology. In late May 2024, he argued that Moldova should not forget its other allies, such as Russia and China, and asked Chisinau to “return to a normal dialogue” with said governments.
Moreover, Gagauzia’s governor (locally known as Başkan), Yevgenia Gutsul, elected in 2023, has criticized Sandu’s pro–EU aspirations while praising Russia. In March 2024, several pro–Moscow Moldovan politicians visited Moscow, where Gutsul met with President Vladimir Putin. Gutsul has reportedly requested Moscow to “protect Gagauzia” from Chisinau and signed agreements with Moscow to provide Gagauzian with allowances via Russia’s Mir payment system.
One curiosity of Moldovan politics since achieving independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 is that foreign policy and domestic politics tend to flip–flop between pro–European or pro–Russian ideologies. While Sandu is pro–EU, her predecessor Dodon was pro–Russia and Moscow–led blocs like the Eurasian Economic Union. This lack of cohesion affects foreign policy and long–term strategic planning.
After the Russian invasion of Ukraine commenced, Moldova applied for European Union membership. In June 2022, Brussels awarded Moldova candidate status, and in December 2023, Brussels decided to open accession negotiations with the country. Moldovan authorities aim to join the bloc by 2030.
Sandu has to be re–elected to achieve Moldova’s EU aspirations. Should Moldovans elect Dodon, at best, the EU application process will slow down until 2028 and, at worst, completely stall. Moreover, it is important to note that Sandu’s Party of Action and Solidarity (Partidul Acțiune și Solidaritate, PAS) has a 61–seat majority in the 101–seat Parliament, and the parliamentary elections are scheduled for Spring 2025. While Sandu is popular enough to be re–elected, the PAS may have a bigger problem holding a parliamentary majority.
Moldova has improved since Sandu was elected, though challenges remain, including energy security, justice sector reform, the economy, and the country’s brain drain. Hence, even if Sandu and her PAS colleagues in Parliament are re–elected, being ready for the EU in 2030 is an extremely optimistic scenario.
The identity issue must also be considered. Moldova is a complex country, with a pro–Russia separatist region in Transnistria, the autonomous Gagauzia, and many citizens who still have positive views of Russia. Sandu’s election and overall pro–EU sentiments suggest that most Moldovans, particularly the younger generations, prefer a pro–West policy. Language complicates the situation further, as many Moldovans (and most Gagauzians) speak Russian. The country’s state language is Romanian, which was called Moldovan during Soviet times, and until 2023—changing the name of the state language was a highly debated issue and has been weaponized to spread misinformation.
President Sandu (like many Moldovans) has dual citizenship, Moldovan and Romanian, a fact that Moscow and pro–Moscow Moldovan politicians use to criticize her pro–Europe attitude. One popular conspiracy theory is that Sandu seeks to reunify Moldova with Romania. On 30 May 2024, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova argued that Sandu and her administration “believe that there are no such things as the Moldovan language or nation. They are all Romanian.” While this statement is untrue, it will nevertheless be used by Dodon and Gutsul to create a divide among Moldovans, linking the elections with the future of Moldova as an independent state.
Moldova’s EU membership will ideally end the Moldovan identity and reunification debate. It is illogical to believe that Moldova will want to reunify with Romania after achieving EU membership, as Chisinau’s goal is to enjoy the benefits of joining the bloc. While friendly attitudes towards Romania certainly exist, and Bucharest has supported Moldova’s EU application and energy security, the priority for Chisinau and many Moldovans is to join the bloc.
Discussions about Moldovan identity, language, and the future of the country as an independent state have been highly politicized and weaponized since even the war in Ukraine commenced. Hopefully, on 20 October 2024, the voice of the Moldovan people will be heard.
