or decades, Kazakhstan’s “multivector foreign policy” allowed the Central Asian nation to balance between Russia, China, and the Western powers. But the Russian invasion of Ukraine has created a new geopolitical reality in which Astana seeks to position itself as an important regional actor.
On 19 March 2023, Kazakhstan will hold elections for the lower chamber of the parliament (Majilis) and local assemblies (Maslikhat). The main difference with the previous elections is that independent candidates are back, although most seats in the Majilis are expected to be captured by the ruling Amanat party, as well as by other parties close to the government. It is believed the vote will allow the country to continue gradually replacing the old elite, which means that the younger generation could soon start playing a more important role in Kazakhstan’s political life. But given that the former Soviet republic is a unitary state with a presidential system of government, the upcoming elections are unlikely to have a significant impact on the nation’s foreign policy course.
The political elite in Kazakhstan seem to have a program that they have been strictly following since the breakup of the Soviet Union. In the 1990s, the then-Kazakh leader Nursultan Nazarbayev introduced the concept of a “multivector foreign policy” aiming to establish “friendly and predictable relations with all states that play a significant role in world affairs and are of practical interest to Kazakhstan." Such a model of diplomacy has passed the test of time, given that the current Kazakh president, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, has repeatedly stressed that a balanced foreign policy is in the country’s strategic interest.
Kazakhstan’s foreign ministry recently launched the Astana International Forum, an event that will address some key global issues, foreign policy, security and sustainability, energy and economy. This is telling, showing that current dynamics have strengthened the country’s importance worldwide. That is why Russia—Kazakhstan’s ally in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)—will undoubtedly seek to preserve the Central Asian nation as its ally. But whether it succeeds will largely depend on the outcome of the Ukraine war.
Despite occasional disagreements with the Kremlin, Astana seeks to maintain a healthy relationship with Moscow. At the same time, Kazakhstan aims to upgrade relations with the United States and the European Union to balance the influence of Russia and the massive gravitational pull of China.
In June 2022, the European Union and Kazakhstan pledged to forge "ever closer" relations, which is not surprising since the EU is one of Kazakhstan’s biggest trade partners and foreign investors, despite Astana’s membership in the Russian-dominated Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). In 2021, the trade balance between Kazakhstan and the EU was $12,7 billion in favor of the former Soviet republic, while the total volume of bilateral trade between the Central Asian nation and Russia reached $24.2 billion. These economic parameters clearly show why Astana is not willing to openly choose a side in the Russian-Ukrainian war, and why it seeks to preserve good ties with both Moscow and the West.
Some political forces in Kazakhstan argue that the country should join the European Union. But given Kazakhstan’s geographical position, such an idea is unlikely to ever be implemented, although Astana’s priority, for the foreseeable future, will undoubtedly be to deepen its energy cooperation with the EU since over 70% of its oil exports goes to Europe.
From the Kazakh perspective, a diversification of its seaborne crude oil export routes away from Russian territory is an existential question for the former Soviet republic. The Kazakh government plans to develop a marine terminal at the Caspian port of Kuryk, a facility that could eventually become an alternative to Kazakhstan’s main seaborne crude oil export route, which currently transports volumes across Russian territory via the 1,511-kilometer (939-mile) Caspian Pipeline Corporation’s pipeline. In the meantime, Astana and Europe will have to continue doing energy trade via Russia.
In Late February 2023, Kazakhstan shipped the first batch of crude to Germany through the Druzhba pipeline, which is one of the largest oil pipeline systems in the world, with the capacity to carry 2 million barrels per day. Even though Germany may have stopped purchasing oil directly from Russia, the fact the Kazakh state-run pipeline operator KazTransOil received approval from its Russian counterpart Transneft to deliver oil through the Druzhba pipeline indicates that both Berlin and Astana will remain, at least to a certain extent, dependent on the Russian Federation’s goodwill.
Thus, under the current geopolitical circumstances, Astana likely has no choice but to continue balancing between the West and Russia. Such a policy seems to suit the United States’ interests in Central Asia. On 28 February 2023, during the visit to Astana, US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken voiced support for the “independence and sovereignty of Kazakhstan,” noting the importance of deepening and strengthening the partnership between the two countries. In other words, at this stage of what some see as a new Cold War, Washington expects Astana to prevent Russia's efforts to evade sanctions via Kazakhstan, and to preserve its neutral stance regarding the Ukraine war.
For the time being, Kazakhstan is expected to remain part of the Russian-led organizations such as the CSTO and the EAEU, although Astana will undoubtedly continue increasing its economic cooperation with Europe, and at the same time develop strong bilateral relations with the United States. This appears to be the Kazakh strategy to overcome turbulent times in the global arena.
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Kazakhstan: Balancing Russia and the Rest
Astana, Kazakhstan. Image by Людмила Помазанова from Pixabay
March 19, 2023
Kazakhstan's foreign policy for years struck a balance in its relationship with Russia, China, and the West has been disrupted by recent geopolitical events. Even as the government realigns its foreign policy, this year's elections could mean even bigger changes, writes Nikola Mikovic.
F
or decades, Kazakhstan’s “multivector foreign policy” allowed the Central Asian nation to balance between Russia, China, and the Western powers. But the Russian invasion of Ukraine has created a new geopolitical reality in which Astana seeks to position itself as an important regional actor.
On 19 March 2023, Kazakhstan will hold elections for the lower chamber of the parliament (Majilis) and local assemblies (Maslikhat). The main difference with the previous elections is that independent candidates are back, although most seats in the Majilis are expected to be captured by the ruling Amanat party, as well as by other parties close to the government. It is believed the vote will allow the country to continue gradually replacing the old elite, which means that the younger generation could soon start playing a more important role in Kazakhstan’s political life. But given that the former Soviet republic is a unitary state with a presidential system of government, the upcoming elections are unlikely to have a significant impact on the nation’s foreign policy course.
The political elite in Kazakhstan seem to have a program that they have been strictly following since the breakup of the Soviet Union. In the 1990s, the then-Kazakh leader Nursultan Nazarbayev introduced the concept of a “multivector foreign policy” aiming to establish “friendly and predictable relations with all states that play a significant role in world affairs and are of practical interest to Kazakhstan." Such a model of diplomacy has passed the test of time, given that the current Kazakh president, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, has repeatedly stressed that a balanced foreign policy is in the country’s strategic interest.
Kazakhstan’s foreign ministry recently launched the Astana International Forum, an event that will address some key global issues, foreign policy, security and sustainability, energy and economy. This is telling, showing that current dynamics have strengthened the country’s importance worldwide. That is why Russia—Kazakhstan’s ally in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)—will undoubtedly seek to preserve the Central Asian nation as its ally. But whether it succeeds will largely depend on the outcome of the Ukraine war.
Despite occasional disagreements with the Kremlin, Astana seeks to maintain a healthy relationship with Moscow. At the same time, Kazakhstan aims to upgrade relations with the United States and the European Union to balance the influence of Russia and the massive gravitational pull of China.
In June 2022, the European Union and Kazakhstan pledged to forge "ever closer" relations, which is not surprising since the EU is one of Kazakhstan’s biggest trade partners and foreign investors, despite Astana’s membership in the Russian-dominated Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). In 2021, the trade balance between Kazakhstan and the EU was $12,7 billion in favor of the former Soviet republic, while the total volume of bilateral trade between the Central Asian nation and Russia reached $24.2 billion. These economic parameters clearly show why Astana is not willing to openly choose a side in the Russian-Ukrainian war, and why it seeks to preserve good ties with both Moscow and the West.
Some political forces in Kazakhstan argue that the country should join the European Union. But given Kazakhstan’s geographical position, such an idea is unlikely to ever be implemented, although Astana’s priority, for the foreseeable future, will undoubtedly be to deepen its energy cooperation with the EU since over 70% of its oil exports goes to Europe.
From the Kazakh perspective, a diversification of its seaborne crude oil export routes away from Russian territory is an existential question for the former Soviet republic. The Kazakh government plans to develop a marine terminal at the Caspian port of Kuryk, a facility that could eventually become an alternative to Kazakhstan’s main seaborne crude oil export route, which currently transports volumes across Russian territory via the 1,511-kilometer (939-mile) Caspian Pipeline Corporation’s pipeline. In the meantime, Astana and Europe will have to continue doing energy trade via Russia.
In Late February 2023, Kazakhstan shipped the first batch of crude to Germany through the Druzhba pipeline, which is one of the largest oil pipeline systems in the world, with the capacity to carry 2 million barrels per day. Even though Germany may have stopped purchasing oil directly from Russia, the fact the Kazakh state-run pipeline operator KazTransOil received approval from its Russian counterpart Transneft to deliver oil through the Druzhba pipeline indicates that both Berlin and Astana will remain, at least to a certain extent, dependent on the Russian Federation’s goodwill.
Thus, under the current geopolitical circumstances, Astana likely has no choice but to continue balancing between the West and Russia. Such a policy seems to suit the United States’ interests in Central Asia. On 28 February 2023, during the visit to Astana, US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken voiced support for the “independence and sovereignty of Kazakhstan,” noting the importance of deepening and strengthening the partnership between the two countries. In other words, at this stage of what some see as a new Cold War, Washington expects Astana to prevent Russia's efforts to evade sanctions via Kazakhstan, and to preserve its neutral stance regarding the Ukraine war.
For the time being, Kazakhstan is expected to remain part of the Russian-led organizations such as the CSTO and the EAEU, although Astana will undoubtedly continue increasing its economic cooperation with Europe, and at the same time develop strong bilateral relations with the United States. This appears to be the Kazakh strategy to overcome turbulent times in the global arena.
