.
A

fter the Hamas attack against Israel on 7 October 2023, there has been a rapid escalation in the Middle East—particularly between Israel and the so-called "axis of resistance”—which includes Iran and other militias like Hamas and Hezbollah. The reactions from Middle Eastern governments, particularly in the Gulf, have varied significantly depending on their particular relationship with Israel. Still, popular sentiments of Muslim communities have undoubtedly been on the side of the Palestinians, as shown by demonstrations in the streets of Istanbul, Cairo, and Amman. While there haven't been pro-Palestine mass demonstrations in Saudi Arabia or Qatar, due to the limited space of their civil societies, these countries will play a significant role in Middle Eastern diplomatic peace efforts in the next few months.

Soon after the conflict outbreak, the United Arab Emirates, which established political and economic ties with Israel in 2020, criticized Hamas' aggression—despite the pro-Palestine sentiments of the Emirati peoples. Many members of the Emirati economic elite were eager to promote greater integration with Israel, a country now perceived as a trustworthy partner in trade and investments. If the crisis intensifies, they will exert political pressure on their government to avoid harming their interests. 

The UAE’s government is walking a thin line by attempting to balance its views with its public commitment to Israel. UAE political leadership is reportedly highly critical of Hamas activities and loathes them in private. Thus, UAE officials must ensure that the pro-Palestine demonstrations in its cities are consistent with its public image, which has improved in recent years in part due to the Abraham Accords presenting the UAE as a reliable, peaceful country in the Middle East. 

The same mismatch between government goals and popular sentiment emerged in Bahrain, another signatory to the Accords. Its government released a statement condemning the casualties of Israeli civilians. Still, widespread resentment is growing rapidly in Bahraini streets as Israel reorganized its counter-offensive. Both the UAE and Bahrain have invested political capital in rapprochement with Israel. Thus, they are unlikely to break ties if the war extends to other countries in the region. As argued by Natalie Ecanow, an analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, the Israel-Hamas conflict is testing the soundness of the Abraham Accords, so far with good results.

On the other side of the Gulf, Saudi Arabia and Qatar aim to mediate the conflict while maintaining a more neutral posture than the UAE. The former, particularly since the rise to power of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, has prioritized economic and social development over involvement in further conflicts. Accordingly, its officials recently held diplomatic dialogues with Israel aiming to reach a historical peace deal for the Middle East. In September, Mohammed bin Salman told Fox News, “Every day we get closer [to an agreement].” After the conflict outbreak, he reiterated that the Saudi-Israel rapprochement could resume after the war.

Such a lukewarm reaction from the Saudis following a crisis over the Gaza Strip would have been unthinkable some years ago. For example, during the so-called Second Intifada, a prolonged period of Palestinian revolts against Israel between 2000 and 2005, Saudi Arabia was Hamas's largest funder and advocate. Saudi Arabia is also discussing the conflict with Iran, a country with which the Kingdom resumed dialogues only a few months ago. Moḥammed bin Salman and Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi talked by phone, with the former allegedly affirming he is making all possible efforts to stop the escalation.

Conversely, Qatar has a more pro-Palestine position than Saudi Arabia. Its leadership publicly blamed Israel for the bombardments on the Gaza Strip, and they maintained close ties with Hamas. However, Qatar's foreign policy aims to establish relations with every actor in the Middle East, hosting exiled members from Hamas and Hezbollah and maintaining open channels of communication with Iran and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Some months ago, the Qatari Sheik said he was eager to normalize ties with Israel.

Additionally, Saudi Arabia and Qatar's strategies for their relationship with political Islam groups differ. The former wants to distance itself from Islamist organizations like Hamas or ISIS to strengthen its image as a reliable country open to tourism and investments. Qatar's attitude towards terrorist groups is more ambiguous and exploitative.

Many analysts and journalists are debating who could be the best long-term regional mediator in the conflict. Assuming that a joint effort among various regional and international players will be needed, Saudi Arabia is the most accredited country—given its unique role within the Muslim world, advanced military capabilities, and enormous leverage in the oil market. The Kingdom is currently keeping a lower profile than Qatar, which has played a major role in mediating to free the two U.S. hostages kidnapped by Hamas. The Kingdom's primary obstacle to relaunching its role is to regain the trust of the Palestinians that was lost after it pushed for normalization with Israel.

About
Elia Preto Martini
:
Elia Preto Martini is a correspondent for Diplomatic Courier, covering European and Middle Eastern affairs. On Twitter: @epretomartini.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.

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The Israel-Hamas Conflict and the Future of Middle Eastern Relations

Riyadh at night. Image by apriltan18 from Pixabay

November 6, 2023

As the conflict between Israel and Hamas heats up, Middle Eastern governments have responded in significantly different ways depending largely on their evolving relationships with Israel. These varied reactions will impact the future of diplomacy in the Middle East, writes Elia Preto Martini.

A

fter the Hamas attack against Israel on 7 October 2023, there has been a rapid escalation in the Middle East—particularly between Israel and the so-called "axis of resistance”—which includes Iran and other militias like Hamas and Hezbollah. The reactions from Middle Eastern governments, particularly in the Gulf, have varied significantly depending on their particular relationship with Israel. Still, popular sentiments of Muslim communities have undoubtedly been on the side of the Palestinians, as shown by demonstrations in the streets of Istanbul, Cairo, and Amman. While there haven't been pro-Palestine mass demonstrations in Saudi Arabia or Qatar, due to the limited space of their civil societies, these countries will play a significant role in Middle Eastern diplomatic peace efforts in the next few months.

Soon after the conflict outbreak, the United Arab Emirates, which established political and economic ties with Israel in 2020, criticized Hamas' aggression—despite the pro-Palestine sentiments of the Emirati peoples. Many members of the Emirati economic elite were eager to promote greater integration with Israel, a country now perceived as a trustworthy partner in trade and investments. If the crisis intensifies, they will exert political pressure on their government to avoid harming their interests. 

The UAE’s government is walking a thin line by attempting to balance its views with its public commitment to Israel. UAE political leadership is reportedly highly critical of Hamas activities and loathes them in private. Thus, UAE officials must ensure that the pro-Palestine demonstrations in its cities are consistent with its public image, which has improved in recent years in part due to the Abraham Accords presenting the UAE as a reliable, peaceful country in the Middle East. 

The same mismatch between government goals and popular sentiment emerged in Bahrain, another signatory to the Accords. Its government released a statement condemning the casualties of Israeli civilians. Still, widespread resentment is growing rapidly in Bahraini streets as Israel reorganized its counter-offensive. Both the UAE and Bahrain have invested political capital in rapprochement with Israel. Thus, they are unlikely to break ties if the war extends to other countries in the region. As argued by Natalie Ecanow, an analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, the Israel-Hamas conflict is testing the soundness of the Abraham Accords, so far with good results.

On the other side of the Gulf, Saudi Arabia and Qatar aim to mediate the conflict while maintaining a more neutral posture than the UAE. The former, particularly since the rise to power of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, has prioritized economic and social development over involvement in further conflicts. Accordingly, its officials recently held diplomatic dialogues with Israel aiming to reach a historical peace deal for the Middle East. In September, Mohammed bin Salman told Fox News, “Every day we get closer [to an agreement].” After the conflict outbreak, he reiterated that the Saudi-Israel rapprochement could resume after the war.

Such a lukewarm reaction from the Saudis following a crisis over the Gaza Strip would have been unthinkable some years ago. For example, during the so-called Second Intifada, a prolonged period of Palestinian revolts against Israel between 2000 and 2005, Saudi Arabia was Hamas's largest funder and advocate. Saudi Arabia is also discussing the conflict with Iran, a country with which the Kingdom resumed dialogues only a few months ago. Moḥammed bin Salman and Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi talked by phone, with the former allegedly affirming he is making all possible efforts to stop the escalation.

Conversely, Qatar has a more pro-Palestine position than Saudi Arabia. Its leadership publicly blamed Israel for the bombardments on the Gaza Strip, and they maintained close ties with Hamas. However, Qatar's foreign policy aims to establish relations with every actor in the Middle East, hosting exiled members from Hamas and Hezbollah and maintaining open channels of communication with Iran and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Some months ago, the Qatari Sheik said he was eager to normalize ties with Israel.

Additionally, Saudi Arabia and Qatar's strategies for their relationship with political Islam groups differ. The former wants to distance itself from Islamist organizations like Hamas or ISIS to strengthen its image as a reliable country open to tourism and investments. Qatar's attitude towards terrorist groups is more ambiguous and exploitative.

Many analysts and journalists are debating who could be the best long-term regional mediator in the conflict. Assuming that a joint effort among various regional and international players will be needed, Saudi Arabia is the most accredited country—given its unique role within the Muslim world, advanced military capabilities, and enormous leverage in the oil market. The Kingdom is currently keeping a lower profile than Qatar, which has played a major role in mediating to free the two U.S. hostages kidnapped by Hamas. The Kingdom's primary obstacle to relaunching its role is to regain the trust of the Palestinians that was lost after it pushed for normalization with Israel.

About
Elia Preto Martini
:
Elia Preto Martini is a correspondent for Diplomatic Courier, covering European and Middle Eastern affairs. On Twitter: @epretomartini.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.