.
I

n a historic move in March 2023, Iran and Saudi Arabia agreed to normalize their bilateral relations after more than a decade of hostility. The deal, brokered by China, arranged to reopen the embassies in Tehran and Riyadh, facilitate travel visas, and promote visits from government and private company delegations.

The conflict started during the Arab Spring of 2011 when Iran incited protests against the royal family of Bahrain. Since then, the Arab Gulf countries have confronted the Islamic Republic in different crisis areas, such as Yemen and Syria. Tensions grew further during the Trump presidency when the U.S. withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) and adopted a firm pro-Israel, anti-Iran foreign policy.

Strategic factors explain this breakthrough. Saudi Arabia is acting according to its new foreign policy path based on prioritizing domestic socio-economic development. After the rise of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the Saudi government focused on investment in and expansion of new economic sectors. Tensions with its neighbors could slow down this process.

On the other side, Iran is experiencing a severe economic crisis because of sanctions imposed by the United States and the isolation from regional actors, especially in the Gulf. Seeking re-engagement with Saudi Arabia and stopping its own nuclear program development could reduce Iran’s dire situation.

In June 2023, Iran Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, paid a three-day state visit to several Gulf states, traveling to Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). According to some analysts, these talks may anticipate a "U.S.-Iran nuclear understanding," facilitating the release of a part of Tehran's frozen economic assets.

The first leg was in Doha, where Amir-Abdollahian met with Qatar's emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani. They discussed regional and international events, particularly reviving the JCPOA. Then, Iran’s foreign minister traveled to Oman, where he reportedly discussed a possible prisoner swap with the United States.

Concerning this possibility, the Omani foreign minister commented, "I can say they [the U.S.and Iran] are close. This is probably a question of technicalities." Also, there has been a meeting between Iran’s foreign minister and Omani minister of the Royal Office, Sultan bin Mohammed al Numani, to discuss joint efforts to restore stability in Yemen.

After discussing regional issues in Kuwait, Amir-Abdollahian used triumphant tones when he  declareding Iran has "no limit" for strengthening its bilateral ties with this country. Lastly, he flew to Abu Dhabi, the capital of the UAE, to have a strategic conversation with a crucial U.S. military ally and financial center in the Middle East. The meeting concluded with a formal invitation to the UAE president to visit Tehran.

Returning home, Amir-Abdollahian underlined the state visit's success: "In the framework of economic and commercial cooperation, we will have very good news for our beloved nation and the nations of these four countries in the future." He also stressed Iran's willingness to establish “‘a forum of dialog and cooperation’ with the presence of all the countries in the north and south of the Gulf.”

Iran previously proposed a similar organization in 2019 to discuss regional issues. This updated version would help establish a joint mechanism for cooperation and dialogue with the Gulf Arab countries and maintain an open diplomatic channel. So far, those other governments have made no statements regarding this proposal.

Iran's rising integration with the East, the Gulf, and Central Asia will significantly affect its foreign and domestic policies. Prioritizing socio-economic development and lifting sanctions have become a priority for the Islamic Republic leadership—a goal only achievable by decreasing regional tensions.

This objective does not only encompass the Arab world but also other actors in the greater Middle East. For example, on June 2023, Beijing announced a trilateral security dialogue with Iran and Pakistan to discuss terrorism issues, particularly in the southwestern Baluchistan province, where China has invested billion of dollars in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

In addition, Iran and Iraq recently signed a deal to establish joint security hotspots after, earlier this year, both countries pledged to exert more control over their shared border and disarm the Iraqi separatists based in Iraqi Kurdistan.

The role of Iran is pivotal in China's Middle Eastern strategy and the larger-scale confrontation with the U.S. After brokering the Saudi-Iran deal in March, Beijing recently welcomed Iran into its multilateral forum, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). This is the first time the Islamic Republic has joined a regional pact since the 1979 Revolution.

The U.S. closely monitors this new Middle Eastern axis between China, Iran, and Gulf states. Historically, the Arab countries have been more pro-Washington than pro-Beijing, but this attitude is rapidly changing as global competition intensifies.

From this perspective, the normalization agreement signed by Iran and Saudi Arabia in March is a failure for U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East. As reported by The New York Times, "the Americans, who have been the central actors in the Middle East for the past three-quarters of a century, [...], now find themselves on the sidelines during a moment of significant change. The Chinese [...] have suddenly transformed themselves into the new power player.”

About
Elia Preto Martini
:
Elia Preto Martini is a correspondent for Diplomatic Courier, covering European and Middle Eastern affairs. On Twitter: @epretomartini.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.

a global affairs media network

www.diplomaticourier.com

Iran Talks with Saudi Arabia and the Birth of a New Middle East

Tehran in the evening. Photo by Mohammad Amirahmadi on Unsplash


July 28, 2023

The China-brokered talks between Iran and Saudi Arabia illustrate how both Iran's and China's strategic goals in the region have shifted. The warming of relations between China and the Middle East, and Iran and the Middle East, could prove challenging for the U.S., writes Elia Preto Martini.

I

n a historic move in March 2023, Iran and Saudi Arabia agreed to normalize their bilateral relations after more than a decade of hostility. The deal, brokered by China, arranged to reopen the embassies in Tehran and Riyadh, facilitate travel visas, and promote visits from government and private company delegations.

The conflict started during the Arab Spring of 2011 when Iran incited protests against the royal family of Bahrain. Since then, the Arab Gulf countries have confronted the Islamic Republic in different crisis areas, such as Yemen and Syria. Tensions grew further during the Trump presidency when the U.S. withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) and adopted a firm pro-Israel, anti-Iran foreign policy.

Strategic factors explain this breakthrough. Saudi Arabia is acting according to its new foreign policy path based on prioritizing domestic socio-economic development. After the rise of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the Saudi government focused on investment in and expansion of new economic sectors. Tensions with its neighbors could slow down this process.

On the other side, Iran is experiencing a severe economic crisis because of sanctions imposed by the United States and the isolation from regional actors, especially in the Gulf. Seeking re-engagement with Saudi Arabia and stopping its own nuclear program development could reduce Iran’s dire situation.

In June 2023, Iran Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, paid a three-day state visit to several Gulf states, traveling to Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). According to some analysts, these talks may anticipate a "U.S.-Iran nuclear understanding," facilitating the release of a part of Tehran's frozen economic assets.

The first leg was in Doha, where Amir-Abdollahian met with Qatar's emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani. They discussed regional and international events, particularly reviving the JCPOA. Then, Iran’s foreign minister traveled to Oman, where he reportedly discussed a possible prisoner swap with the United States.

Concerning this possibility, the Omani foreign minister commented, "I can say they [the U.S.and Iran] are close. This is probably a question of technicalities." Also, there has been a meeting between Iran’s foreign minister and Omani minister of the Royal Office, Sultan bin Mohammed al Numani, to discuss joint efforts to restore stability in Yemen.

After discussing regional issues in Kuwait, Amir-Abdollahian used triumphant tones when he  declareding Iran has "no limit" for strengthening its bilateral ties with this country. Lastly, he flew to Abu Dhabi, the capital of the UAE, to have a strategic conversation with a crucial U.S. military ally and financial center in the Middle East. The meeting concluded with a formal invitation to the UAE president to visit Tehran.

Returning home, Amir-Abdollahian underlined the state visit's success: "In the framework of economic and commercial cooperation, we will have very good news for our beloved nation and the nations of these four countries in the future." He also stressed Iran's willingness to establish “‘a forum of dialog and cooperation’ with the presence of all the countries in the north and south of the Gulf.”

Iran previously proposed a similar organization in 2019 to discuss regional issues. This updated version would help establish a joint mechanism for cooperation and dialogue with the Gulf Arab countries and maintain an open diplomatic channel. So far, those other governments have made no statements regarding this proposal.

Iran's rising integration with the East, the Gulf, and Central Asia will significantly affect its foreign and domestic policies. Prioritizing socio-economic development and lifting sanctions have become a priority for the Islamic Republic leadership—a goal only achievable by decreasing regional tensions.

This objective does not only encompass the Arab world but also other actors in the greater Middle East. For example, on June 2023, Beijing announced a trilateral security dialogue with Iran and Pakistan to discuss terrorism issues, particularly in the southwestern Baluchistan province, where China has invested billion of dollars in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

In addition, Iran and Iraq recently signed a deal to establish joint security hotspots after, earlier this year, both countries pledged to exert more control over their shared border and disarm the Iraqi separatists based in Iraqi Kurdistan.

The role of Iran is pivotal in China's Middle Eastern strategy and the larger-scale confrontation with the U.S. After brokering the Saudi-Iran deal in March, Beijing recently welcomed Iran into its multilateral forum, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). This is the first time the Islamic Republic has joined a regional pact since the 1979 Revolution.

The U.S. closely monitors this new Middle Eastern axis between China, Iran, and Gulf states. Historically, the Arab countries have been more pro-Washington than pro-Beijing, but this attitude is rapidly changing as global competition intensifies.

From this perspective, the normalization agreement signed by Iran and Saudi Arabia in March is a failure for U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East. As reported by The New York Times, "the Americans, who have been the central actors in the Middle East for the past three-quarters of a century, [...], now find themselves on the sidelines during a moment of significant change. The Chinese [...] have suddenly transformed themselves into the new power player.”

About
Elia Preto Martini
:
Elia Preto Martini is a correspondent for Diplomatic Courier, covering European and Middle Eastern affairs. On Twitter: @epretomartini.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.