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fter a five-month political deadlock, Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi’s election comes amidst a time of social and economic hardship for the Iraqi people. Despite regional and domestic turmoil, the Prime Minister’s greatest challenge lies in the country’s burgeoning water crisis.

As Mr. Al-Kadhimi navigates a difficult first term, his political strategy should adopt a hydro-political approach that draws upon water diplomacy, an integrative approach built upon the belief that there can exist no peace without water. In this approach, water, or a lack thereof, has the innate ability to influence domestic and regional politics. At the intersection of science and policy, water diplomacy urges stakeholders to re-evaluate their joint contributions to water management. In the past, hydro-politics has been an effective tool to stimulate cooperation between countries, prompting the development of sustainable and peaceful water management solutions. This is an approach that would surely benefit Iraq.

By the year 2030, Iraq’s population will grow to over 50 Million. At that rate, demands for potable water will become increasingly difficult to meet. For Iraq, the threats of water scarcity are not imminent. They are already occurring, due to both environmental and man-made conditions. Compounded with continued political violence and a resurgence of ISIL-driven terrorism, hydro-politics is Al-Kadhimi’s best chance at keeping the country afloat.

The Water Crisis

With more than a third of Iraq’s 38 million citizens dependent on the agricultural sector, the livelihood of local communities is inextricably linked to the water flowing downstream from Turkey, Iran, and Syria. Close to 70% of Iraq’s waterways are under the control of Ankara, Tehran and Damascus. Despite the detrimental effects to both the agricultural sector and ordinary Iraqi citizens, Turkey’s decision to begin operating the Ilisu Dam in May signals distress for an Iraqi government already reeling from war and internal conflict as the operation of the first turbine of the Ilisu dam is expected to drain up to 90 miles of the Tigris river and 150 miles of its tributaries. Besides the outbreak of COVID-19, Iraq confronts several economic problems fueled by historically low oil prices and its fight against terrorism (notably ISIL), while trying to balance relations between both Tehran and Washington as the country prepares for its early national elections.

Exacerbating the situation, rising temperatures and reduced rainfall are accelerating the evaporation of freshwater across northern, western and southern Iraq. Local environmentalist Jassim al-Assadi, added that by 2035 Iraq “will have lost 11bn cubic meters of water.” Although fifteen years away, many Iraqis are already feeing the impacts of freshwater loss.

The rapid disappearance of freshwater in Southern Iraq remains a domestic flashpoint. The southern city of Basra, historically known to be blessed with too much water, was often referred to as the “Venice of the Middle East” and the silk route of Iraq. However, since 2003 protestors have taken to the streets fighting for basic water and power rights.

Although political officials deem these protests as merely a “political dispute,” their nonchalant responses neglect the environmental and health issues plaguing local communities. Furthermore, a UN report recounted that 4,000 residents in Basra left their homes in 2018 as local hospitals recorded 118,000 cases of waterborne illnesses. The outbreak of viruses, parasites, bacteria and toxic metals have not stopped the protestors in demanding reform of the water management system. This chronic deterioration, mismanagement, and neglect of water security in the southern governorate paints a dark reality and even darker future for Iraq.

Water, Peace and Security: The way forward for Iraq

While Al-Kadhimi’s government is working under irreversible environmental changes, leadership must treat this as a modern security threat. His cabinet should shift away from the traditional oil-guided, sectarian-laden policy approach and adopt a hydro-political strategy that would place the country’s water needs at the core of its regional engagement.

A hydro-political approach would assume policies that would put pressure on Iran, Turkey and Syria to transfer water management access to Baghdad. The former water minister, Mr. Hassan Janabi proposed a $184 billion 20-year project that would reform outdated practices and implement a drip-irrigation system, enabling farmers to produce new crops instead of those that are water-intensive such as wheat. Mr. Janabi has cited Iraq’s $71 billion of debt and years of low oil prices as the factors hindering the implementation of this project.

However, years of civil unrest and war have greatly undermined Iraq’s position to negotiate with regional adversaries, leaving it unable to attract the foreign investment it needs. As the hegemonic riparian state of the Tigris-Euphrates river basin, Turkey’s control over downstream water and hydropower projects have exacerbated regional disparities and inequalities in Iraq, specifically between the Iraqi government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Turkey’s unilateral manipulation of downstream water supplies, through its various dam projects, has further retarded the post-war reconstruction of Iraq.

Therefore, Iraq must place water at the center of its regional diplomacy if it hopes to elevate its standing diplomatically and from a business perspective. Iraq should gain support for water sharing agreements and implement trust building initiatives with the KRG, Turkey, Syria and Iran. Joint fact-finding missions and geological surveys would make for accurate hydrological data, garnering trust and easing transboundary resource sharing. These initiatives would address the popular unrest at home and reduce hostile tensions between the three riparian states. Turning Iraq into an attractive investment opportunity will be crucial, and it starts with water diplomacy.

Based on the assumption that water cooperation can be a catalyst for internal peace and regional stability, peacebuilding through hydro-politics presents Al-Kadhimi with an unconventional approach towards fixing many of Iraq’s current and future problems. Equitable distribution of water resources and modernization of infrastructure would reduce domestic tensions while water diplomacy and hydro-political initiatives would strengthen Iraq’s economy and international position. Through a combination of water diplomacy and hydro-political initiatives, Al-Kadhimi would enable Iraqi communities to secure their common future while preventing future water related conflicts. Not only does the Prime Minister’s political future depend on it, but so may the future of Iraq.

About
Shivani Tanil Somaiya
:
Shivani Tanil Somaiya has previously worked at the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), UK Houses of Parliament, and Anti-Slavery International. She is currently pursuing an MA in International Relations at New York University.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.

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Hydro-Politics Is Key to Iraq’s Survival

Qadisiyah, Baghdad, Iraq. Snaking Rivers. Photo by NASA via Unsplash.

August 4, 2020

A

fter a five-month political deadlock, Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi’s election comes amidst a time of social and economic hardship for the Iraqi people. Despite regional and domestic turmoil, the Prime Minister’s greatest challenge lies in the country’s burgeoning water crisis.

As Mr. Al-Kadhimi navigates a difficult first term, his political strategy should adopt a hydro-political approach that draws upon water diplomacy, an integrative approach built upon the belief that there can exist no peace without water. In this approach, water, or a lack thereof, has the innate ability to influence domestic and regional politics. At the intersection of science and policy, water diplomacy urges stakeholders to re-evaluate their joint contributions to water management. In the past, hydro-politics has been an effective tool to stimulate cooperation between countries, prompting the development of sustainable and peaceful water management solutions. This is an approach that would surely benefit Iraq.

By the year 2030, Iraq’s population will grow to over 50 Million. At that rate, demands for potable water will become increasingly difficult to meet. For Iraq, the threats of water scarcity are not imminent. They are already occurring, due to both environmental and man-made conditions. Compounded with continued political violence and a resurgence of ISIL-driven terrorism, hydro-politics is Al-Kadhimi’s best chance at keeping the country afloat.

The Water Crisis

With more than a third of Iraq’s 38 million citizens dependent on the agricultural sector, the livelihood of local communities is inextricably linked to the water flowing downstream from Turkey, Iran, and Syria. Close to 70% of Iraq’s waterways are under the control of Ankara, Tehran and Damascus. Despite the detrimental effects to both the agricultural sector and ordinary Iraqi citizens, Turkey’s decision to begin operating the Ilisu Dam in May signals distress for an Iraqi government already reeling from war and internal conflict as the operation of the first turbine of the Ilisu dam is expected to drain up to 90 miles of the Tigris river and 150 miles of its tributaries. Besides the outbreak of COVID-19, Iraq confronts several economic problems fueled by historically low oil prices and its fight against terrorism (notably ISIL), while trying to balance relations between both Tehran and Washington as the country prepares for its early national elections.

Exacerbating the situation, rising temperatures and reduced rainfall are accelerating the evaporation of freshwater across northern, western and southern Iraq. Local environmentalist Jassim al-Assadi, added that by 2035 Iraq “will have lost 11bn cubic meters of water.” Although fifteen years away, many Iraqis are already feeing the impacts of freshwater loss.

The rapid disappearance of freshwater in Southern Iraq remains a domestic flashpoint. The southern city of Basra, historically known to be blessed with too much water, was often referred to as the “Venice of the Middle East” and the silk route of Iraq. However, since 2003 protestors have taken to the streets fighting for basic water and power rights.

Although political officials deem these protests as merely a “political dispute,” their nonchalant responses neglect the environmental and health issues plaguing local communities. Furthermore, a UN report recounted that 4,000 residents in Basra left their homes in 2018 as local hospitals recorded 118,000 cases of waterborne illnesses. The outbreak of viruses, parasites, bacteria and toxic metals have not stopped the protestors in demanding reform of the water management system. This chronic deterioration, mismanagement, and neglect of water security in the southern governorate paints a dark reality and even darker future for Iraq.

Water, Peace and Security: The way forward for Iraq

While Al-Kadhimi’s government is working under irreversible environmental changes, leadership must treat this as a modern security threat. His cabinet should shift away from the traditional oil-guided, sectarian-laden policy approach and adopt a hydro-political strategy that would place the country’s water needs at the core of its regional engagement.

A hydro-political approach would assume policies that would put pressure on Iran, Turkey and Syria to transfer water management access to Baghdad. The former water minister, Mr. Hassan Janabi proposed a $184 billion 20-year project that would reform outdated practices and implement a drip-irrigation system, enabling farmers to produce new crops instead of those that are water-intensive such as wheat. Mr. Janabi has cited Iraq’s $71 billion of debt and years of low oil prices as the factors hindering the implementation of this project.

However, years of civil unrest and war have greatly undermined Iraq’s position to negotiate with regional adversaries, leaving it unable to attract the foreign investment it needs. As the hegemonic riparian state of the Tigris-Euphrates river basin, Turkey’s control over downstream water and hydropower projects have exacerbated regional disparities and inequalities in Iraq, specifically between the Iraqi government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Turkey’s unilateral manipulation of downstream water supplies, through its various dam projects, has further retarded the post-war reconstruction of Iraq.

Therefore, Iraq must place water at the center of its regional diplomacy if it hopes to elevate its standing diplomatically and from a business perspective. Iraq should gain support for water sharing agreements and implement trust building initiatives with the KRG, Turkey, Syria and Iran. Joint fact-finding missions and geological surveys would make for accurate hydrological data, garnering trust and easing transboundary resource sharing. These initiatives would address the popular unrest at home and reduce hostile tensions between the three riparian states. Turning Iraq into an attractive investment opportunity will be crucial, and it starts with water diplomacy.

Based on the assumption that water cooperation can be a catalyst for internal peace and regional stability, peacebuilding through hydro-politics presents Al-Kadhimi with an unconventional approach towards fixing many of Iraq’s current and future problems. Equitable distribution of water resources and modernization of infrastructure would reduce domestic tensions while water diplomacy and hydro-political initiatives would strengthen Iraq’s economy and international position. Through a combination of water diplomacy and hydro-political initiatives, Al-Kadhimi would enable Iraqi communities to secure their common future while preventing future water related conflicts. Not only does the Prime Minister’s political future depend on it, but so may the future of Iraq.

About
Shivani Tanil Somaiya
:
Shivani Tanil Somaiya has previously worked at the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), UK Houses of Parliament, and Anti-Slavery International. She is currently pursuing an MA in International Relations at New York University.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.