The Future of U.S.-Turkey Relations

The Trump Administration has inherited a challenging relationship with Turkey—a country feeling under siege from internal and external threats. When President Obama took office he had high hopes for building what he described a “model partnership” with a secular democracy that could serve as a bridge to the Muslim world. Seeking to mend relations frayed by disagreements during the Bush Administration over Iraq, Obama made Turkey his first bilateral visit in April 2009 following several European stops for multi-lateral meetings. However, U.S.-Turkey relations soured amidst foreign policy differences (especially over Syria), the deterioration of democracy and rights, and the aftermath of the July 15, 2016 coup attempt. The extradition of Islamic cleric Fetullah Gulen will be at the top of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s to-do list with his new American counterpart. Erdogan has accused Gulen, a Turkish national who has lived in self-imposed exile in Pennsylvania since 1999, of masterminding the attempted coup. While the Turks view Gulen’s extradition in political terms, the U.S. government has taken a strictly legal approach: in accordance with extradition treaty requirements, the Department of Justice must review evidence and determine whether it can persuade a federal judge of probable cause. The Turkish government has submitted numerous dossiers, and U.S. government lawyers visited Ankara last fall to aid the investigation. Yet absent a compelling case, the U.S. will be unable to extradite him and the issue will remain a bilateral irritant. President Erdogan will also be keen to discuss the Trump Administration’s handling of the war in Syria—particularly any continued reliance on Kurdish fighters, the YPG. Erdogan’s priority shifted in recent months from supporting the defeat of the Assad regime to preventing the creation of an autonomous Kurdish region within Syria along the Turkish border. The Obama Administration walked a fine line in providing measured military support to the YPG in the fight against ISIS and assuaging the security concerns of its NATO ally. Ankara views the YPG’s effort to connect several cantons into a contiguous Kurdish-controlled region as an existential security threat, which it has already taken military action to prevent. Turkey believes the YPG is synonymous with the PKK. Designated by the U.S. as a foreign terrorist organization, the PKK has been engaged in a decades-long armed struggle against the Turkish government in pursuit of Kurdish rights, with violence resuming in July 2015 following the collapse of a two-year ceasefire. The Kurdish question will need to be addressed in both Syria and Turkey. There could be disagreements on Middle East policy more broadly, as some of President Trump’s campaign pledges run contrary to Erdogan’s desire to serve as a leader in the Islamic world. If Trump works more closely with Russia to focus on ISIS in Syria, it could affect relations with Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar who have partnered against the Assad regime. (The dynamic relationship between Turkey and Russia—marked by support for opposing sides in Syria, heightened tension after Turkey downed a Russian fighter jet, recent cooperation in northern Syria, and the tragic assassination of the Russian Ambassador in Ankara—will remain a complicating factor.) A decision to strengthen U.S. ties with Egyptian President Sisi and designate the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization would be anathema to Erdogan. While Turkey has recently patched up relations with Israel, relocating the American embassy to Jerusalem could create new tensions. Any move to scrap the Iran deal would leave Turkey feeling cornered given the economic ties and regional rivalry between them. The deteriorating political situation in Turkey will remain a backdrop to these foreign policy discussions. While the Turkish government understandably wishes to bring to justice those responsible for the coup attempt, its approach has appeared heavy-handed and non-transparent. Furthermore, the pursuit of journalists, civic activists, and Kurdish politicians in the name of security remains troubling. Hopefully the Trump Administration will urge Ankara to uphold its democratic obligations. For the foreseeable future, Turkey will remain an important partner of the United States given its strategic location, NATO membership, economic ties to Europe, and key role in resolving shared regional problems. Yet Ankara is frequently a challenging partner with its own—sometimes divergent—interests. The bilateral relationship will require sustained, high-level engagement to mitigate mistrust, address differences, and forge solutions.   About the author: Dr. Amanda Sloat is a Turkey and Europe geopolitical expert at Dūcō and recently served in the State Department as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Southern Europe and Eastern Mediterranean Affairs. Amanda has nearly two decades of foreign policy experience, including service in the U.S. Administration and Congress as well as the non-profit sector and academia.