.
Historically the United States has been developing, almost by default, a tactic of indirect engagement. However, from 1990 to 2008, the U.S. has been using military power as the default for dealing with foreign issues, leading as the single superpower. From Panama to Somalia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, U.S. followed a policy of direct and early military involvement. This was not the case over the period 1914-1989, when the strategy was to provide political support to allies, followed by economic and military aid, which have included advisers and limited forces. The U.S. kept its main force in reserve for circumstances in which (WWI, WWII, Korea, Vietnam) allies could not contain a new potential hegemon. Back then military force was perceived as the last resort. This was primarily a tactic of maintaining a global balance of power. The containment of the Soviet Union involved creating an alliance system, which incorporated countries at risk of Soviet attack. In this framework, containment was a balance of power strategy that did not seek the capitulation of the Soviet Union as much as increasing the risks of offensive action using allied countries as the first barrier. The threat of full U.S. intervention and the potential of using nuclear weapons, put together with NATO’s alliance structure, constrained Soviet risk-taking. A review of the policies undertaken by the current U.S. administration suggests the return of the balance of forces strategy and its adjustment in the modern global context. As the U.S. continues suffering from high external debt, leading to restrictive policies for years to come, the need for increased policy coordination between the power centers of a multipolar world has become more than evident. In this respect, with the dynamics of change taking precedence over the ones of continuity, the role of the U.S. for managing global security and matching shifting regional power relationships in a liberal economic order is increasingly linked to the Asia-Pacific region. The need for establishing a closer, more favorable and enduring geopolitical understanding with China over regional security settings with global implications has been firmly recognized in Washington. By reducing its military presence in Europe and the Middle East, the U.S. administration continues to pave the way for pivoting its strategic gaze to Asia with the aim of becoming the central broker in China’s external relations. Through this strategy, Washington seeks to maintain its network of key alliances in the region, project its capacity for military intervention and above all avoid facing unfavorable trends in the Asian balance of power including a less favorable geopolitical arrangement with China. Rebalancing the Middle East As a result of the gradual process which has been described, America’s foreign and defense policy priorities are shifting and the Middle East region progressively scores lower—compared to the past—as a valuable but still peripheral piece in the security puzzle of shaping Washington’s grand new equilibrium strategy in Eurasia. However, pulling of resources for unfolding a solid and durable U.S. strategic rebalancing to Asia is inextricably linked to successfully manage Middle East messy relations in a far from straightforward deteriorating security environment. All in all, in an effort to achieve and maintain a functional balance of power by managing and stabilizing fragile relationships; a development allowing over time the U.S. military presence there be kept to a minimum while the administration will continue leading from behind to defend its strategic interests in the region, which include: a) securing the free flow of oil to global markets, b) ensuring nuclear proliferation, c) sustaining counter-terrorism efforts and reducing extremist violence. In order to avoid a dangerous escalation of the region’s security dilemmas due to intensified competition, America’s gradual disengagement from the Middle East goes hand in hand with the establishment of geopolitical arrangements between contrasting interests which the U.S.—via coordination of alliances—succeeds to neutralize, establishing the so-called neutral balancing. Thereby, creating a balance among competing interests that serves as a necessary prerequisite to provide room for neutralization of forces and space for allowing Washington’s pull back from the region. Above all, it serves the interests of a medium term U.S. strategy for establishing a well-ordered and resource-effective Greater Middle East balance of power that leaves the region more secure. Needless to say that, the aforementioned strategy will progressively evolve rather than just happen. The role of Iran and Turkey Washington’s regrouping and game-changing for managing regional rivalries, including the more than alarming situation in Iraq followed by the spillover effects of the Syrian civil war, have indicated a necessity for rebalancing Middle East’s security system. In an effort to secure its Greater Middle East geopolitical strategy, the U.S. administration has been revisiting long-lasting polarized misperceptions next to the pragmatic recognition of aligning interests. By reviewing ‘special relationships’ (i.e. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel) and restoring channels of cooperation along with providing security guarantees and setting action limits (i.e. Iran, Turkey, and member-states of Gulf Cooperation Council), the Americans have been testing working patterns so as to better serve the interests of their medium term grand strategy for the region. What’s more, during Obama's second term of office, U.S. geopolitical planning has introduced the active engagement of two non-Arab Muslim countries which are listed—along with Israel—as the most influential powers in the region to represent the leading strategic schism between Shia and Sunnis, namely Shiite Iran and Sunni Turkey. Engaging Iran in a constructive and mutually beneficial process of rapprochement would result, if successful, in American recognition of fundamental security concerns in the region and vice versa. This is the core challenge facing all the parties and its resolution will transform relations not only between Iran and the West, but also among antagonists throughout the region, which have been searching for a delicate balance among strategic objectives and tacti­cal commands. The battlefields in Syria and Iraq are actually being portrayed as the ultimate test case for paving the way towards progressively establishing the new balance of forces. In light of the above, by choosing two historical and strategic rivals as the principal agents for assuming elevated roles in the region, the U.S. has been setting forward a dual strategy of both empowerment and containment that does not entail Washington’s direct engagement and allows itself to decrease its regional footprint. Taking into account competing interests and geopolitical rivalries among Ankara and Tehran for expanding their regional influence, the stiff arenas in Iraq and Syria serve as an example of growing competition on multiple fronts which allows the Americans to both elevate and limit their diverging strategies (with special emphasis placed on the sectarian conflict between the Shi’a and Sunni, the prominent role of energy resources-energy security, vulnerabilities of the Kurdish issue and the interplay between all three). More importantly, from a U.S. perspective, such a strategy handles provisions for both Turkey and Iran to regularly check and balance over each other while preventing both from becoming too powerful and challenge the regional balance of power. Among the pitfalls involved, one has to note that parallel to the conclusion of negotiations between Washington and Tehran for recognizing security concerns on either side and finalize respective spheres of influence, it remains uncertain how and through the use of which policy instruments Iran will exercise its leverage in the region. As the risk of an accident always lurks, one should bear in mind that the U.S. unfolds its policy in a remote context. On top of that, as far as Turkey weak link of leading Sunni Islam is concerned, closing the capability-expectations gap reveals a major risk factor and a central strategic hurdle for American security-establishment. After all, implementation of the new Turkish statecraft requires efficient adjustment of Davutoğlu’s ‘rhythmic diplomacy’ to the needs of the region’s new geopolitical choreography provided by the US. A reality reaffirming both Turkey’s rising anxiety over the process of unlocking Iran’s reintegration in the international community which sheds light of pragmatism on its foreign policy behavior alongside Ankara’s strategic inexperience to dig its heels in the region’s ‘deep waters’. Soon enough, the Americans will be in a position to evaluate Turkish performance and perhaps acknowledge that Ankara was in need for a few years of previous work experience, before meeting the strategic demands of the job description drafted by Washington’s foreign policy establishment. At present, the stakes are high for the U.S. and the risks are even higher, especially during a period where the sense of urgency can dominate mindsets and cloud judgments. In an environment dynamic in character and subject to constant change, the art of geopolitics involves obeying the rules of a medium-term game strategy. The risk is that the urgent would drive out the important. Responding to Middle East challenges consists of a core element and a main reason for modifying America’s foreign policy approach and establishment’s perceptions. There is a close link between, on the one hand, the US’s global role, its capacity to deliver on concrete policies, and, on the other hand, its inner strength and ability to take swift decisions in areas that matter. Reforms and new starts are not an end in themselves. The way the United States adapts to the regional realities and the practical geopolitics in the Middle East, will determine how much influence it can exert in the greater region to effectively shape its security order.   About the author: Dr. Sotiris Serbos is Assistant Professor in International Politics at Democritus University of Thrace and former Fulbright Fellow in transatlantic relations. He has served as special adviser in the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.

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From Single Superpower to Balance of Forces

Pennsylvania Avenue, #1600
December 11, 2015

Historically the United States has been developing, almost by default, a tactic of indirect engagement. However, from 1990 to 2008, the U.S. has been using military power as the default for dealing with foreign issues, leading as the single superpower. From Panama to Somalia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, U.S. followed a policy of direct and early military involvement. This was not the case over the period 1914-1989, when the strategy was to provide political support to allies, followed by economic and military aid, which have included advisers and limited forces. The U.S. kept its main force in reserve for circumstances in which (WWI, WWII, Korea, Vietnam) allies could not contain a new potential hegemon. Back then military force was perceived as the last resort. This was primarily a tactic of maintaining a global balance of power. The containment of the Soviet Union involved creating an alliance system, which incorporated countries at risk of Soviet attack. In this framework, containment was a balance of power strategy that did not seek the capitulation of the Soviet Union as much as increasing the risks of offensive action using allied countries as the first barrier. The threat of full U.S. intervention and the potential of using nuclear weapons, put together with NATO’s alliance structure, constrained Soviet risk-taking. A review of the policies undertaken by the current U.S. administration suggests the return of the balance of forces strategy and its adjustment in the modern global context. As the U.S. continues suffering from high external debt, leading to restrictive policies for years to come, the need for increased policy coordination between the power centers of a multipolar world has become more than evident. In this respect, with the dynamics of change taking precedence over the ones of continuity, the role of the U.S. for managing global security and matching shifting regional power relationships in a liberal economic order is increasingly linked to the Asia-Pacific region. The need for establishing a closer, more favorable and enduring geopolitical understanding with China over regional security settings with global implications has been firmly recognized in Washington. By reducing its military presence in Europe and the Middle East, the U.S. administration continues to pave the way for pivoting its strategic gaze to Asia with the aim of becoming the central broker in China’s external relations. Through this strategy, Washington seeks to maintain its network of key alliances in the region, project its capacity for military intervention and above all avoid facing unfavorable trends in the Asian balance of power including a less favorable geopolitical arrangement with China. Rebalancing the Middle East As a result of the gradual process which has been described, America’s foreign and defense policy priorities are shifting and the Middle East region progressively scores lower—compared to the past—as a valuable but still peripheral piece in the security puzzle of shaping Washington’s grand new equilibrium strategy in Eurasia. However, pulling of resources for unfolding a solid and durable U.S. strategic rebalancing to Asia is inextricably linked to successfully manage Middle East messy relations in a far from straightforward deteriorating security environment. All in all, in an effort to achieve and maintain a functional balance of power by managing and stabilizing fragile relationships; a development allowing over time the U.S. military presence there be kept to a minimum while the administration will continue leading from behind to defend its strategic interests in the region, which include: a) securing the free flow of oil to global markets, b) ensuring nuclear proliferation, c) sustaining counter-terrorism efforts and reducing extremist violence. In order to avoid a dangerous escalation of the region’s security dilemmas due to intensified competition, America’s gradual disengagement from the Middle East goes hand in hand with the establishment of geopolitical arrangements between contrasting interests which the U.S.—via coordination of alliances—succeeds to neutralize, establishing the so-called neutral balancing. Thereby, creating a balance among competing interests that serves as a necessary prerequisite to provide room for neutralization of forces and space for allowing Washington’s pull back from the region. Above all, it serves the interests of a medium term U.S. strategy for establishing a well-ordered and resource-effective Greater Middle East balance of power that leaves the region more secure. Needless to say that, the aforementioned strategy will progressively evolve rather than just happen. The role of Iran and Turkey Washington’s regrouping and game-changing for managing regional rivalries, including the more than alarming situation in Iraq followed by the spillover effects of the Syrian civil war, have indicated a necessity for rebalancing Middle East’s security system. In an effort to secure its Greater Middle East geopolitical strategy, the U.S. administration has been revisiting long-lasting polarized misperceptions next to the pragmatic recognition of aligning interests. By reviewing ‘special relationships’ (i.e. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel) and restoring channels of cooperation along with providing security guarantees and setting action limits (i.e. Iran, Turkey, and member-states of Gulf Cooperation Council), the Americans have been testing working patterns so as to better serve the interests of their medium term grand strategy for the region. What’s more, during Obama's second term of office, U.S. geopolitical planning has introduced the active engagement of two non-Arab Muslim countries which are listed—along with Israel—as the most influential powers in the region to represent the leading strategic schism between Shia and Sunnis, namely Shiite Iran and Sunni Turkey. Engaging Iran in a constructive and mutually beneficial process of rapprochement would result, if successful, in American recognition of fundamental security concerns in the region and vice versa. This is the core challenge facing all the parties and its resolution will transform relations not only between Iran and the West, but also among antagonists throughout the region, which have been searching for a delicate balance among strategic objectives and tacti­cal commands. The battlefields in Syria and Iraq are actually being portrayed as the ultimate test case for paving the way towards progressively establishing the new balance of forces. In light of the above, by choosing two historical and strategic rivals as the principal agents for assuming elevated roles in the region, the U.S. has been setting forward a dual strategy of both empowerment and containment that does not entail Washington’s direct engagement and allows itself to decrease its regional footprint. Taking into account competing interests and geopolitical rivalries among Ankara and Tehran for expanding their regional influence, the stiff arenas in Iraq and Syria serve as an example of growing competition on multiple fronts which allows the Americans to both elevate and limit their diverging strategies (with special emphasis placed on the sectarian conflict between the Shi’a and Sunni, the prominent role of energy resources-energy security, vulnerabilities of the Kurdish issue and the interplay between all three). More importantly, from a U.S. perspective, such a strategy handles provisions for both Turkey and Iran to regularly check and balance over each other while preventing both from becoming too powerful and challenge the regional balance of power. Among the pitfalls involved, one has to note that parallel to the conclusion of negotiations between Washington and Tehran for recognizing security concerns on either side and finalize respective spheres of influence, it remains uncertain how and through the use of which policy instruments Iran will exercise its leverage in the region. As the risk of an accident always lurks, one should bear in mind that the U.S. unfolds its policy in a remote context. On top of that, as far as Turkey weak link of leading Sunni Islam is concerned, closing the capability-expectations gap reveals a major risk factor and a central strategic hurdle for American security-establishment. After all, implementation of the new Turkish statecraft requires efficient adjustment of Davutoğlu’s ‘rhythmic diplomacy’ to the needs of the region’s new geopolitical choreography provided by the US. A reality reaffirming both Turkey’s rising anxiety over the process of unlocking Iran’s reintegration in the international community which sheds light of pragmatism on its foreign policy behavior alongside Ankara’s strategic inexperience to dig its heels in the region’s ‘deep waters’. Soon enough, the Americans will be in a position to evaluate Turkish performance and perhaps acknowledge that Ankara was in need for a few years of previous work experience, before meeting the strategic demands of the job description drafted by Washington’s foreign policy establishment. At present, the stakes are high for the U.S. and the risks are even higher, especially during a period where the sense of urgency can dominate mindsets and cloud judgments. In an environment dynamic in character and subject to constant change, the art of geopolitics involves obeying the rules of a medium-term game strategy. The risk is that the urgent would drive out the important. Responding to Middle East challenges consists of a core element and a main reason for modifying America’s foreign policy approach and establishment’s perceptions. There is a close link between, on the one hand, the US’s global role, its capacity to deliver on concrete policies, and, on the other hand, its inner strength and ability to take swift decisions in areas that matter. Reforms and new starts are not an end in themselves. The way the United States adapts to the regional realities and the practical geopolitics in the Middle East, will determine how much influence it can exert in the greater region to effectively shape its security order.   About the author: Dr. Sotiris Serbos is Assistant Professor in International Politics at Democritus University of Thrace and former Fulbright Fellow in transatlantic relations. He has served as special adviser in the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.