.
I

t is the more unusual or indecorous moments in UN General Assembly history that are best remembered. Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chavez once whiffed that the podium “smells of sulfur,” comparing George W. Bush to the devil. More recently, former U.S. President Donald Trump drew chuckles when boasting of "accomplishing more than almost any administration" in U.S. history.

While we do not know yet whether similarly memorable pronouncements will take place this year, the forum’s role to advance and attract support for global policy remains unique. Persuasive leadership is needed to catalyze collective action on issues that are impossible for any state, or small collection of states, to confront on their own.

Unfortunately, on the most critical near- and long-term challenges—overcoming the pandemic, strengthening the state of democratic governance across the world, and curbing climate change—robust global leadership remains in short supply.

With good reason, the campaign against COVID-19 will dominate the plenary. With most rich countries having vaccinated large segments of their populations, the focus must shift to ensuring developing states are able to begin en masse inoculations. This is made difficult given that advanced countries have already reserved large portions of the current supply and future production, significantly hindering vaccine distribution efforts such as COVAX. Today, fewer than 3% of Africans have received their first dose of vaccine while tremendous supplies sit in reserve for vaccine skeptic Westerners.

To date, the U.S. has pledged to donate more than 580 million doses—a considerable amount, though short of the 11 billion doses needed to eradicate the pandemic. While the U.S. commitment is more than China or Russia have offered, those countries' state-developed jabs—while less effective than Western variants—have reached countries unable to procure the gold-standard shots. In an instance of diplomatic one-upmanship, China announced a two million dose pledge to Vietnam hours before Vice President Kamala Harris was set to announce a one million contribution. Vaccines have become not only vehicles for public health, but instruments of strategic aid.

Vaccine pledges will not be the only topic of discussion. Pharma companies are facing pressure to transfer vaccine know-how to manufacturers in poorer countries. There will also be debate on global vaccine certifications to replace the current country-by-country patchwork. Ultimately, more robust universal frameworks and distribution mechanisms are needed. Concrete action is not merely good diplomacy or charity but calculated self-interest; new strains will continue to eclipse vaccine immunity until tackled on a global scale. That goal, at this juncture, still remains largely theoretical.

The pandemic has magnified the discontent many feel about their country’s governance. Polling suggests that citizens across the world continue to lose trust in their governments. Early rally-around-the-flag effects buoyed national leadership at the earliest stages of the pandemic, but has given way to lingering dissatisfactions that predate the current crisis. Regions as varied as Central America, Southeast Asia, and Eastern Europe have suffered democratic backsliding. Freedom House announced that in 2021 “nearly 75% of the world's population lived in a country that faced [political rights] deterioration.” It seems that Jair Bolsonaro’s notion that “only God will get me out” of the president’s chair is a general fear likely felt not only by Brazilians.

While this overall trend is negative, there are few indications that the U.S. or the European bloc will make governance and democracy reform a central pillar of foreign engagement in the near-term. On the heels of withdrawal from Afghanistan, U.S. leaders are focused domestically; Gallup polling suggests Americans view foreign affairs as far less important relative to the economy, immigration, and race relations. Meanwhile, Europe is navigating the delicate challenge of illiberal governments and rising political parties among the Union’s own member states, as well as diverse risks in its near-abroad—tempering focus to a narrower set of interests.

China will also be taking a standoff approach to reform—though for different reasons. Advocating non-interference, China will continue to foster relations disconnected from any governance or human rights measures. Worryingly, Chinese companies also continue to export cutting-edge surveillance technology. This makes it easier for countries with poor civic protections to mete out repressive control.

Buffeted by so many issues on the home front, Western leaders' willingness to expend scarce political capital to pressure reforms abroad will remain depleted. While the sentiment may not be laid bare in speeches, a retrenchment in the scale of foreign commitments is inevitable—and regrettable.

Finally, with climate change, this summer’s landmark UN study makes evident that the science is clear and further inaction is unconscionable. Unfortunately, even as natural disasters become ever more calamitous and routine, international consensus to tackle the root causes remains fluid and uncertain ahead of a major UN climate change conference in Glasgow, Scotland this November.

In the U.S. the path ahead for a $3.5 trillion spending bill advanced by the White House—which will aim to promote green industries, as well as improve the resilience of the nation’s infrastructure—remains anything but certain. With the slimmest of majorities in Congress, any number of defections among Democratic legislators will imperil the entire effort. Across the Atlantic, with German federal elections later this month, the Green party is polling competitively, with potential to influence the country’s future direction.

Perhaps the biggest question mark ahead of Glasgow remains China. While the world’s largest carbon emitter, Beijing argues that the country should not be held to the same standard as more developed nations. The country has pledged to peak its emissions by 2030 before becoming carbon neutral by 2060—but has not shared how it will execute this ambitious plan. China has rejected calls to commit more clearly ahead of the Glasgow conference, having already “its own plans and road map for achieving its climate goals.”

Clearly, on climate and other affairs, this go-it-alone approach may suit Beijing’s preferences. The nature of the problems at stake, however, will require concerted collaboration. How vigorously this retreat of multilateralism is rebuffed by the global community should merit more attention than any dignitary's unglued commentary.

Editor's Note: This feature was originally published in Diplomatic Courier's UNGA 2021 special print edition.

About
Lulio Vargas-Cohen
:
Lulio Vargas-Cohen is a public and private sector strategist, focusing on the intersection of emerging technology, business, and security. He is a graduate of the Harvard Kennedy School (MPP), the University of Michigan (MBA), and was a Fulbright scholar to Spain.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.

a global affairs media network

www.diplomaticourier.com

For the Biggest Multilateral Challenges Global Leadership Is in Short Supply

Secretary-General António Guterres addresses the opening of the general debate of the General Assembly’s seventy-sixth session. UN Photo/Manuel Elías.

September 22, 2021

Global powers are adopting a path of international retrenchment in the face of public health, political rights, and climate disasters.

I

t is the more unusual or indecorous moments in UN General Assembly history that are best remembered. Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chavez once whiffed that the podium “smells of sulfur,” comparing George W. Bush to the devil. More recently, former U.S. President Donald Trump drew chuckles when boasting of "accomplishing more than almost any administration" in U.S. history.

While we do not know yet whether similarly memorable pronouncements will take place this year, the forum’s role to advance and attract support for global policy remains unique. Persuasive leadership is needed to catalyze collective action on issues that are impossible for any state, or small collection of states, to confront on their own.

Unfortunately, on the most critical near- and long-term challenges—overcoming the pandemic, strengthening the state of democratic governance across the world, and curbing climate change—robust global leadership remains in short supply.

With good reason, the campaign against COVID-19 will dominate the plenary. With most rich countries having vaccinated large segments of their populations, the focus must shift to ensuring developing states are able to begin en masse inoculations. This is made difficult given that advanced countries have already reserved large portions of the current supply and future production, significantly hindering vaccine distribution efforts such as COVAX. Today, fewer than 3% of Africans have received their first dose of vaccine while tremendous supplies sit in reserve for vaccine skeptic Westerners.

To date, the U.S. has pledged to donate more than 580 million doses—a considerable amount, though short of the 11 billion doses needed to eradicate the pandemic. While the U.S. commitment is more than China or Russia have offered, those countries' state-developed jabs—while less effective than Western variants—have reached countries unable to procure the gold-standard shots. In an instance of diplomatic one-upmanship, China announced a two million dose pledge to Vietnam hours before Vice President Kamala Harris was set to announce a one million contribution. Vaccines have become not only vehicles for public health, but instruments of strategic aid.

Vaccine pledges will not be the only topic of discussion. Pharma companies are facing pressure to transfer vaccine know-how to manufacturers in poorer countries. There will also be debate on global vaccine certifications to replace the current country-by-country patchwork. Ultimately, more robust universal frameworks and distribution mechanisms are needed. Concrete action is not merely good diplomacy or charity but calculated self-interest; new strains will continue to eclipse vaccine immunity until tackled on a global scale. That goal, at this juncture, still remains largely theoretical.

The pandemic has magnified the discontent many feel about their country’s governance. Polling suggests that citizens across the world continue to lose trust in their governments. Early rally-around-the-flag effects buoyed national leadership at the earliest stages of the pandemic, but has given way to lingering dissatisfactions that predate the current crisis. Regions as varied as Central America, Southeast Asia, and Eastern Europe have suffered democratic backsliding. Freedom House announced that in 2021 “nearly 75% of the world's population lived in a country that faced [political rights] deterioration.” It seems that Jair Bolsonaro’s notion that “only God will get me out” of the president’s chair is a general fear likely felt not only by Brazilians.

While this overall trend is negative, there are few indications that the U.S. or the European bloc will make governance and democracy reform a central pillar of foreign engagement in the near-term. On the heels of withdrawal from Afghanistan, U.S. leaders are focused domestically; Gallup polling suggests Americans view foreign affairs as far less important relative to the economy, immigration, and race relations. Meanwhile, Europe is navigating the delicate challenge of illiberal governments and rising political parties among the Union’s own member states, as well as diverse risks in its near-abroad—tempering focus to a narrower set of interests.

China will also be taking a standoff approach to reform—though for different reasons. Advocating non-interference, China will continue to foster relations disconnected from any governance or human rights measures. Worryingly, Chinese companies also continue to export cutting-edge surveillance technology. This makes it easier for countries with poor civic protections to mete out repressive control.

Buffeted by so many issues on the home front, Western leaders' willingness to expend scarce political capital to pressure reforms abroad will remain depleted. While the sentiment may not be laid bare in speeches, a retrenchment in the scale of foreign commitments is inevitable—and regrettable.

Finally, with climate change, this summer’s landmark UN study makes evident that the science is clear and further inaction is unconscionable. Unfortunately, even as natural disasters become ever more calamitous and routine, international consensus to tackle the root causes remains fluid and uncertain ahead of a major UN climate change conference in Glasgow, Scotland this November.

In the U.S. the path ahead for a $3.5 trillion spending bill advanced by the White House—which will aim to promote green industries, as well as improve the resilience of the nation’s infrastructure—remains anything but certain. With the slimmest of majorities in Congress, any number of defections among Democratic legislators will imperil the entire effort. Across the Atlantic, with German federal elections later this month, the Green party is polling competitively, with potential to influence the country’s future direction.

Perhaps the biggest question mark ahead of Glasgow remains China. While the world’s largest carbon emitter, Beijing argues that the country should not be held to the same standard as more developed nations. The country has pledged to peak its emissions by 2030 before becoming carbon neutral by 2060—but has not shared how it will execute this ambitious plan. China has rejected calls to commit more clearly ahead of the Glasgow conference, having already “its own plans and road map for achieving its climate goals.”

Clearly, on climate and other affairs, this go-it-alone approach may suit Beijing’s preferences. The nature of the problems at stake, however, will require concerted collaboration. How vigorously this retreat of multilateralism is rebuffed by the global community should merit more attention than any dignitary's unglued commentary.

Editor's Note: This feature was originally published in Diplomatic Courier's UNGA 2021 special print edition.

About
Lulio Vargas-Cohen
:
Lulio Vargas-Cohen is a public and private sector strategist, focusing on the intersection of emerging technology, business, and security. He is a graduate of the Harvard Kennedy School (MPP), the University of Michigan (MBA), and was a Fulbright scholar to Spain.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.