.
O

n May 18, Sweden and Finland jointly submitted their formal application to join the Western military alliance at North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) headquarters in Brussels. However, Turkey, which has been a NATO member since 1952, is opposed. Ankara’s stance is problematic because membership in the Western Military Alliance requires unanimous approval from all 30 members. So why is Turkey opposed? And how should other members respond?

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan accuses both northern countries, which had previously remained neutral in international conflicts until Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, of being "guesthouses for terrorist organizations." Erdogan was unwavering in his speech to lawmakers from his ruling AK Party on May 18—if Finland and Sweden want to join NATO, "terrorists" must be extradited. This call highlights Erdogan’s displeasure with Sweden and Finland hosting members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which has waged an insurgency against the Turkish state since 1984 and is on the EU’s list of terrorist organizations. However, Erdogan’s opposition to the northern Scandinavian countries joining NATO could be due to a number of other factors as well.

First, Turkey’s main concern is a possible shift in NATO’s balance of power. Turkey, a key NATO member in the eastern Mediterranean region, understandably wants guarantees in exchange for its vote. Even though the European Union is no longer referred to as a "Christian club," Ankara is concerned that the emergence of a new NATO ‘hub’ in the north will outstrip the southern ‘hub.’

A second Turkish concern may be the fact that Finland and Sweden are two of the world’s most important democratic models. The addition of these two highly democratic states strengthens the desire to transform NATO into more than an incoherent military patchwork and towards a force for democratization. This has implications for Turkey as well. Despite government repression of the Turkish opposition and the decline of democratic institutions in Turkey, NATO has always been able to justify Turkey’s membership. NATO’s democratic profile is becoming a necessary component for membership in the organization and the survival of NATO.

Third, Erdogan’s move is intended to counteract his dwindling domestic popularity. According to opinion polls in Turkey, his popularity has reached an all-time low. In April, Turkey’s inflation rate reached a staggering 70%, owing largely to Erdogan’s long-standing refusal to raise interest rates while reducing currency reserves. The country of 84 million people has been hard hit by the rise in global energy costs and basic goods, with fuel and agricultural commodities prices skyrocketing, owing in part to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In Turkey, two things unite the country: opposition to the PKK and perceived Western hypocrisy—creating the perfect cocktail to oppose NATO expansion among domestic audiences.

Meanwhile, political leaders in Finland and Sweden appear unconcerned about Turkish opposition. They believe there is plenty of room to persuade Turkey to support their membership. In the end, this conflict may have to be resolved in the same way as the debate over who would lead NATO in 2009. After some give and take, Turkey agreed to Anders Fogh Rasmussen's becoming Secretary General at the time. This happened following then-U.S. President Barack Obama’s promise that Fogh Rasmussen’s deputy would be Turkish. Perhaps current U.S. President Joe Biden could strike a similar deal.

Another option would be to simply ignore Turkey’s obstruction—as well as Hungary’s. Other NATO members can simply refuse to be accommodating. Comparing Erdogan’s opposition to Finland and Sweden joining NATO and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s impending veto of the proposed EU boycott of Russian oil approved by the other 26 member states highlight an alternative strategy. What should be done about Hungary’s and Turkey’s toxic delays? Unfortunately, the answer is simple: keep playing the same game Putin has been playing for years. If you can’t win by following the traditional rules, disregard them. NATO and EU members should make Orbán and Erdogan irrelevant. The oil boycott should be implemented by all 26 EU members. Likewise, NATO should simply pave the way for Sweden and Finland to join. What would be the worst thing that Hungary or Turkey could do? Indict? Disengage?

In any case, there has already been considerable debate about barring Turkey from NATO, particularly after Erdogan purchased Russian S-400 missile defense systems from Russia three years ago. Perhaps now is the time to simply stand up to these lone strongmen who have managed to embed themselves deeply within democratic international institutions.

About
Richard Rousseau
:
Richard Rousseau, Ph.D. is an international relations expert. He was formerly a professor and head of political science departments at universities in Canada, France, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and the United Arab Emirates.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.

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Erdogan’s Opposition to NATO Expansion

Photo via Pixabay.

June 2, 2022

Turkey is opposed to Sweden and Finland joining NATO, calling them "guesthouses" for terrorist organizations. But the deeper reasons for this opposition reflect Turkey’s own domestic politics and Erdogan’s ideational concerns, explains Richard Rousseau.

O

n May 18, Sweden and Finland jointly submitted their formal application to join the Western military alliance at North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) headquarters in Brussels. However, Turkey, which has been a NATO member since 1952, is opposed. Ankara’s stance is problematic because membership in the Western Military Alliance requires unanimous approval from all 30 members. So why is Turkey opposed? And how should other members respond?

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan accuses both northern countries, which had previously remained neutral in international conflicts until Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, of being "guesthouses for terrorist organizations." Erdogan was unwavering in his speech to lawmakers from his ruling AK Party on May 18—if Finland and Sweden want to join NATO, "terrorists" must be extradited. This call highlights Erdogan’s displeasure with Sweden and Finland hosting members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which has waged an insurgency against the Turkish state since 1984 and is on the EU’s list of terrorist organizations. However, Erdogan’s opposition to the northern Scandinavian countries joining NATO could be due to a number of other factors as well.

First, Turkey’s main concern is a possible shift in NATO’s balance of power. Turkey, a key NATO member in the eastern Mediterranean region, understandably wants guarantees in exchange for its vote. Even though the European Union is no longer referred to as a "Christian club," Ankara is concerned that the emergence of a new NATO ‘hub’ in the north will outstrip the southern ‘hub.’

A second Turkish concern may be the fact that Finland and Sweden are two of the world’s most important democratic models. The addition of these two highly democratic states strengthens the desire to transform NATO into more than an incoherent military patchwork and towards a force for democratization. This has implications for Turkey as well. Despite government repression of the Turkish opposition and the decline of democratic institutions in Turkey, NATO has always been able to justify Turkey’s membership. NATO’s democratic profile is becoming a necessary component for membership in the organization and the survival of NATO.

Third, Erdogan’s move is intended to counteract his dwindling domestic popularity. According to opinion polls in Turkey, his popularity has reached an all-time low. In April, Turkey’s inflation rate reached a staggering 70%, owing largely to Erdogan’s long-standing refusal to raise interest rates while reducing currency reserves. The country of 84 million people has been hard hit by the rise in global energy costs and basic goods, with fuel and agricultural commodities prices skyrocketing, owing in part to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In Turkey, two things unite the country: opposition to the PKK and perceived Western hypocrisy—creating the perfect cocktail to oppose NATO expansion among domestic audiences.

Meanwhile, political leaders in Finland and Sweden appear unconcerned about Turkish opposition. They believe there is plenty of room to persuade Turkey to support their membership. In the end, this conflict may have to be resolved in the same way as the debate over who would lead NATO in 2009. After some give and take, Turkey agreed to Anders Fogh Rasmussen's becoming Secretary General at the time. This happened following then-U.S. President Barack Obama’s promise that Fogh Rasmussen’s deputy would be Turkish. Perhaps current U.S. President Joe Biden could strike a similar deal.

Another option would be to simply ignore Turkey’s obstruction—as well as Hungary’s. Other NATO members can simply refuse to be accommodating. Comparing Erdogan’s opposition to Finland and Sweden joining NATO and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s impending veto of the proposed EU boycott of Russian oil approved by the other 26 member states highlight an alternative strategy. What should be done about Hungary’s and Turkey’s toxic delays? Unfortunately, the answer is simple: keep playing the same game Putin has been playing for years. If you can’t win by following the traditional rules, disregard them. NATO and EU members should make Orbán and Erdogan irrelevant. The oil boycott should be implemented by all 26 EU members. Likewise, NATO should simply pave the way for Sweden and Finland to join. What would be the worst thing that Hungary or Turkey could do? Indict? Disengage?

In any case, there has already been considerable debate about barring Turkey from NATO, particularly after Erdogan purchased Russian S-400 missile defense systems from Russia three years ago. Perhaps now is the time to simply stand up to these lone strongmen who have managed to embed themselves deeply within democratic international institutions.

About
Richard Rousseau
:
Richard Rousseau, Ph.D. is an international relations expert. He was formerly a professor and head of political science departments at universities in Canada, France, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and the United Arab Emirates.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.