s an organization the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is remobilizing for the renewed threat of Russian aggression. From suffering from ‘brain death’ in recent years to agreeing to spend five percent of GDP on defense (3.5% on core defense and 1.5% on defense–related expenditures) at the Hague Summit this summer, NATO’s transformation since Russia’s full–scale invasion of Ukraine has been commendable, though incomplete. Driven partially by the perceived threat from Russia and partially in response to President Donald Trump’s rhetoric, member states of the Alliance are stepping up and taking on greater responsibility for European defense and security.
This process is by no means complete and significant obstacles remain, not the least of which is mobilizing the spending in the face of competing spending priorities and uncertain future economic performance. Past precedence does not fill one with confidence—even after the full–scale invasion and after President Trump’s early demands only 23 of 32 member states met the previous two percent spending floor. Spain has already opted out of the 2025 commitment, indicating it would provide value to the Alliance in kind through other, unspecified means.
Member states are also working to meet the new capability targets that NATO’s Regional Defense Plans set. This shift from NATO planning around what capabilities member states could provide, to Brussels actively setting targets for what capabilities member-states should provide will, over time, see NATO in a much stronger position and able to deliver greater effects across its areas of operation.
The unknown, at least of this piece’s drafting, is what the United States’ commitment to NATO will look like. The National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the Global Posture Review all remain unpublished—despite reports that they are all finished. If the leaks are anything to go from, Washington will prioritize the southern border and northern hemisphere first, the Indo–Pacific second, and Europe a distant third. This could well lead to a reduction or reallocation of American troops, but more importantly, the repositioning of enabling capabilities on the continent. This could result in near-term gaps in the Alliance’s command and control, air defense, air–to–air refueling, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets. NATO member states are aware of the looming shift and are now taking steps to increase their own capabilities in these areas, but this is a longer–term and expensive undertaking.
Relative to Russia’s conventional ground forces, NATO is arguably at its strongest point since the end of the Cold War. This is due in no small part to Ukraine’s resilience and resistance which has steadily degraded, though not defeated Russia’s military. Member states, through various initiatives, continue to provide aid and arms to Kyiv, but this will not fundamentally shift the tide of battle. The war looks set to grind on along the line of control, while Ukraine’s long–term position in European security architecture remains an open question. It may be on an ‘irreversible path’ towards NATO membership, but that is only an indication of direction, not time. How the war terminates and under what conditions will also drive continental considerations on spending.
Despite these challenges, NATO nonetheless shows signs of reinvigoration and renewed energy, both of which are vital for the continent’s defense and security in a challenging geostrategic environment.
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Despite uncertainty, NATO shows signs of reinvigoration
Image by NATO on Flickr. CC BY-NC-ND 2.0
December 10, 2025
NATO is undergoing a transformation with European members of the Alliance taking on higher defense spending commitments and greater responsibility. While not complete, and despite uncertainty about U.S. commitment to NATO, these are welcome signs of invigoration, writes Joshua Huminski.
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s an organization the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is remobilizing for the renewed threat of Russian aggression. From suffering from ‘brain death’ in recent years to agreeing to spend five percent of GDP on defense (3.5% on core defense and 1.5% on defense–related expenditures) at the Hague Summit this summer, NATO’s transformation since Russia’s full–scale invasion of Ukraine has been commendable, though incomplete. Driven partially by the perceived threat from Russia and partially in response to President Donald Trump’s rhetoric, member states of the Alliance are stepping up and taking on greater responsibility for European defense and security.
This process is by no means complete and significant obstacles remain, not the least of which is mobilizing the spending in the face of competing spending priorities and uncertain future economic performance. Past precedence does not fill one with confidence—even after the full–scale invasion and after President Trump’s early demands only 23 of 32 member states met the previous two percent spending floor. Spain has already opted out of the 2025 commitment, indicating it would provide value to the Alliance in kind through other, unspecified means.
Member states are also working to meet the new capability targets that NATO’s Regional Defense Plans set. This shift from NATO planning around what capabilities member states could provide, to Brussels actively setting targets for what capabilities member-states should provide will, over time, see NATO in a much stronger position and able to deliver greater effects across its areas of operation.
The unknown, at least of this piece’s drafting, is what the United States’ commitment to NATO will look like. The National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the Global Posture Review all remain unpublished—despite reports that they are all finished. If the leaks are anything to go from, Washington will prioritize the southern border and northern hemisphere first, the Indo–Pacific second, and Europe a distant third. This could well lead to a reduction or reallocation of American troops, but more importantly, the repositioning of enabling capabilities on the continent. This could result in near-term gaps in the Alliance’s command and control, air defense, air–to–air refueling, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets. NATO member states are aware of the looming shift and are now taking steps to increase their own capabilities in these areas, but this is a longer–term and expensive undertaking.
Relative to Russia’s conventional ground forces, NATO is arguably at its strongest point since the end of the Cold War. This is due in no small part to Ukraine’s resilience and resistance which has steadily degraded, though not defeated Russia’s military. Member states, through various initiatives, continue to provide aid and arms to Kyiv, but this will not fundamentally shift the tide of battle. The war looks set to grind on along the line of control, while Ukraine’s long–term position in European security architecture remains an open question. It may be on an ‘irreversible path’ towards NATO membership, but that is only an indication of direction, not time. How the war terminates and under what conditions will also drive continental considerations on spending.
Despite these challenges, NATO nonetheless shows signs of reinvigoration and renewed energy, both of which are vital for the continent’s defense and security in a challenging geostrategic environment.
