.
The attack in Burkina Faso’s capital of Ouagadougou, orchestrated by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its affiliate al-Murabitoun on January 16th, signals the start of a new, deadly phase in West Africa’s struggle against jihadism. Up until now, Burkina Faso had mostly been spared the worst of terrorist activity in the region. While the entire north of neighboring Mali risked being taken over by jihadist forces (hiding behind Tuareg separatists) just three years ago, Burkina Faso had only seen one foreign mine employee kidnapped and a safe house for bomb-makers raided before this month. By assaulting the Splendid Hotel and the Cappuccino Café in Ouagadougou, which they referred to as “dens of global espionage,” the two groups struck out not only at foreigners and elites in the capital but at all Westerners and “non-believers” in the country.
Coming less than two months after their hotel attack at the Radisson Blu in Bamako, Mali last November, the weapons and tactics used by the Ouagadougou assailants show rapid advances in how and where these two groups carry out their plots. Both attacks followed similar modus operandi, with a small number of gunmen going after undefended civilian targets. In Bamako, two terrorists stormed the hotel with AK-47 assault rifles and held 170 hostages during a nine-hour standoff, with twenty people dying by the time security forces retook the building. In Ouagadougou, there were at least three attackers and 22 victims, but the perpetrators added a new layer of complexity to their assault by using car bombs. With their latest attack, AQIM and al-Murabitoun proved themselves capable of expanding their operations to a new country and bringing more firepower into play, even after the French-led intervention reversed AQIM’s gains in northern Mali. How have the groups managed to persevere, in spite of what appeared to be such a resounding defeat? How are they able to operate across borders with such regularity? The answer may lie with AQIM’s on again off again ally, the “uncatchable” Algerian Mokhtar Belmokhtar.
Belmokhtar, in many ways, is something of a wildcard for AQIM. After fighting with the mujahedeen in Afghanistan and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in Algeria in the 1990s, he joined a splinter group that eventually swore allegiance to AQIM.
Belmokhtar served as a commander for AQIM, operating between Algeria and Mali and drawing on his intimate knowledge of the region to maneuver along the vast, desolate border between the two countries. In 2012, he lost his title within AQIM and left to start his own group, the al-Mulathameen or “Masked Men Brigade.” His “Masked Men” later merged with another group to form al-Murabitoun. It is as leader of that group that Belmokhtar was officially brought back into AQIM’s fold in the days after the Radisson Blu attack.
Belmokhtar and his groups have been responsible for a great deal of bloodshed across the Sahara, especially the 2013 In Amenas attack in Algeria. The shadowy jihadist and smuggler straddles a tenuous middle ground, however, between Islamist radical and pragmatic businessman. He financed his own rise to the top of terrorist circles by building a trans-Saharan smuggling network and kidnapping foreigners for ransom. By entering into strategic marriages with local tribal leaders and taking advantage of his knowledge of the Sahara, Belmokhtar set himself up as one of North Africa’s biggest traders in contraband. So many cigarettes moved through Belmokhtar’s underground desert trade network that he earned the nickname “Mr. Marlboro” and has kept it since. That knowledge of the Sahara’s ancient trade routes, and those close ties with local elites in various parts of the region, have helped him and his fighters slip between countries and avoid numerous attempts by international forces to kill him.
These business interests have been lucrative for Belmokhtar, but they have also attracted suspicions that the one-eyed Algerian be more focused on lining his own pockets than he is on waging holy war. According to the Guardian newspaper, illegal tobacco is a $1 billion USD business in Saharan Africa and provides most of AQIM’s funding. Of course, Belmokhtar is not the only terrorist to take advantage of smuggling goods like cigarettes to finance his operations (including the latest Burkina Faso attack). The U.S. State Department released a report in December that highlights how both international criminal groups and terrorist networks use smuggled tobacco to earn millions of dollars in income. The report shows that, while borders in the Sahara may be porous, neither the United States nor Europe are immune from smuggling networks.
As shocking as the two hotel attacks were, even more sobering is that Burkina Faso’s forces may not have been enough to defeat the terrorists and rescue the hostages if French troops (and at least one American) were not there to help. The African militaries who are fighting this war, whether against AQIM in Mali and Burkina Faso or Boko Haram in Nigeria, need greater manpower, more training, and better equipment to effectively prosecute West Africa’s “War on Terror.”
The multinational African forces successfully assembled to fight in northern Mali and northeastern Nigeria are very encouraging, above all because they show that leaders and governments on the continent recognize they will not be able to keep groups like AQIM, al-Murabitoun, and Boko Haram from permeating their borders alone. Even so, it will take more support from France, the United States, and the other major powers to build up African militaries to the point where they are capable of taking on this task fully.
Photo: Reuters/Joe Penney
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.
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Burkina Faso: The Newest Front for Trans-Saharan Jihad
January 25, 2016
The attack in Burkina Faso’s capital of Ouagadougou, orchestrated by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its affiliate al-Murabitoun on January 16th, signals the start of a new, deadly phase in West Africa’s struggle against jihadism. Up until now, Burkina Faso had mostly been spared the worst of terrorist activity in the region. While the entire north of neighboring Mali risked being taken over by jihadist forces (hiding behind Tuareg separatists) just three years ago, Burkina Faso had only seen one foreign mine employee kidnapped and a safe house for bomb-makers raided before this month. By assaulting the Splendid Hotel and the Cappuccino Café in Ouagadougou, which they referred to as “dens of global espionage,” the two groups struck out not only at foreigners and elites in the capital but at all Westerners and “non-believers” in the country.
Coming less than two months after their hotel attack at the Radisson Blu in Bamako, Mali last November, the weapons and tactics used by the Ouagadougou assailants show rapid advances in how and where these two groups carry out their plots. Both attacks followed similar modus operandi, with a small number of gunmen going after undefended civilian targets. In Bamako, two terrorists stormed the hotel with AK-47 assault rifles and held 170 hostages during a nine-hour standoff, with twenty people dying by the time security forces retook the building. In Ouagadougou, there were at least three attackers and 22 victims, but the perpetrators added a new layer of complexity to their assault by using car bombs. With their latest attack, AQIM and al-Murabitoun proved themselves capable of expanding their operations to a new country and bringing more firepower into play, even after the French-led intervention reversed AQIM’s gains in northern Mali. How have the groups managed to persevere, in spite of what appeared to be such a resounding defeat? How are they able to operate across borders with such regularity? The answer may lie with AQIM’s on again off again ally, the “uncatchable” Algerian Mokhtar Belmokhtar.
Belmokhtar, in many ways, is something of a wildcard for AQIM. After fighting with the mujahedeen in Afghanistan and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in Algeria in the 1990s, he joined a splinter group that eventually swore allegiance to AQIM.
Belmokhtar served as a commander for AQIM, operating between Algeria and Mali and drawing on his intimate knowledge of the region to maneuver along the vast, desolate border between the two countries. In 2012, he lost his title within AQIM and left to start his own group, the al-Mulathameen or “Masked Men Brigade.” His “Masked Men” later merged with another group to form al-Murabitoun. It is as leader of that group that Belmokhtar was officially brought back into AQIM’s fold in the days after the Radisson Blu attack.
Belmokhtar and his groups have been responsible for a great deal of bloodshed across the Sahara, especially the 2013 In Amenas attack in Algeria. The shadowy jihadist and smuggler straddles a tenuous middle ground, however, between Islamist radical and pragmatic businessman. He financed his own rise to the top of terrorist circles by building a trans-Saharan smuggling network and kidnapping foreigners for ransom. By entering into strategic marriages with local tribal leaders and taking advantage of his knowledge of the Sahara, Belmokhtar set himself up as one of North Africa’s biggest traders in contraband. So many cigarettes moved through Belmokhtar’s underground desert trade network that he earned the nickname “Mr. Marlboro” and has kept it since. That knowledge of the Sahara’s ancient trade routes, and those close ties with local elites in various parts of the region, have helped him and his fighters slip between countries and avoid numerous attempts by international forces to kill him.
These business interests have been lucrative for Belmokhtar, but they have also attracted suspicions that the one-eyed Algerian be more focused on lining his own pockets than he is on waging holy war. According to the Guardian newspaper, illegal tobacco is a $1 billion USD business in Saharan Africa and provides most of AQIM’s funding. Of course, Belmokhtar is not the only terrorist to take advantage of smuggling goods like cigarettes to finance his operations (including the latest Burkina Faso attack). The U.S. State Department released a report in December that highlights how both international criminal groups and terrorist networks use smuggled tobacco to earn millions of dollars in income. The report shows that, while borders in the Sahara may be porous, neither the United States nor Europe are immune from smuggling networks.
As shocking as the two hotel attacks were, even more sobering is that Burkina Faso’s forces may not have been enough to defeat the terrorists and rescue the hostages if French troops (and at least one American) were not there to help. The African militaries who are fighting this war, whether against AQIM in Mali and Burkina Faso or Boko Haram in Nigeria, need greater manpower, more training, and better equipment to effectively prosecute West Africa’s “War on Terror.”
The multinational African forces successfully assembled to fight in northern Mali and northeastern Nigeria are very encouraging, above all because they show that leaders and governments on the continent recognize they will not be able to keep groups like AQIM, al-Murabitoun, and Boko Haram from permeating their borders alone. Even so, it will take more support from France, the United States, and the other major powers to build up African militaries to the point where they are capable of taking on this task fully.
Photo: Reuters/Joe Penney
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.
