Recent negotiations in Geneva between Iran and Western leaders over Iran’s nuclear program ended as both sides agreed to an interim deal. The leaders agreed to a six-month freeze in Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for a temporary lifting of some of the international economic sanctions that have plagued Iran.
Initial disagreements over the scope and severity of concessions prevented the two sides from reaching an agreement in the first phases of negotiations. The deal that the Iranian delegation had initially aimed for would have included eased sanctions in return for promises of transparency from Iran. Transparency, as the Iranians would have conceded, would have included minimal changes, such as providing 24-hour surveillance at the Arak facility, when Western leaders instead desired a complete cessation of nuclear development activities at the facility. If this aspirational deal had been reached, it would have marked an irrefutable political victory for the Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, and a magnificent defeat for the West.
Instead, the interim deal reached on November 24th circumvented this lopsided victory. These negotiations on nuclear activity were set against a background of past hostilities and estrangement. The U.S and its allies approached these negotiations fully aware that Iran had lied to and betrayed the trust of the international community on number of previous occasions. To the Western leaders it was evident that, despite the enforcement of strong sanctions over the past seven years, Iran was closer than ever to producing weapon-grade uranium given their large stockpile of partially enriched uranium, as this stockpile could be used to produce weapon-grade uranium,. The minatory threshold of twenty percent uranium enrichment had long been passed and, as some analysts estimated, close to ninety percent of the enrichment necessary to produce weapons grade uranium had been completed.
In addition to temporarily halting nuclear development programs, the Geneva deal also calls for enhanced monitoring and surveillance of Iranian nuclear facilities. This includes the discontinuation of construction of the Arak facility, a heavy water reactor capable of producing weapon-grade plutonium. Iran must also convert half of its partially enriched uranium stockpile to oxide; this process will stop Iran from using the method of batch recycling to produce weapon-grade uranium in the future. In exchange for these concessions, Iran was promised a rollback in sanctions, which is estimated to amount to a $7 billion value.
It can be contended that the renewed interest among Western leaders to engage in negotiations with Iran is in large part a product of the relative normalcy and equanimity that the new Iranian president Hassan Rouhani exudes–characteristics that are in stark comparison to his predecessor Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. However, it is important for Western leaders to remember that, despite his inclinations towards cooperation, President Rouhani’s powers in shaping Iran’s foreign policy agenda are limited at best. According to the Iranian constitution, it is the Supreme Leader that has the final say on all matters of state.
Hardliners in Iran who are actively blocking President Rouhani’s domestic reform efforts are even more serious about protecting Iran’s nuclear ambitions. This was addressed through discouraging pronouncements from Western leaders with regards to future negotiations. Iranian leaders have also showed hesitance in signaling a willingness to accept a comprehensive final deal permanently including the concessions made in the interim deal. Knowing these obstacles, what would a good final deal entail?
Regarding sanctions, Western leaders must remain mindful of the feasibility of any significant overhaul. Iran has allocated money to install 3,830 centrifuges in just the last ten months. Money has also been allocated to establish a new cyber warfare command, and there are no signs in the decrease of the regime’s objectionable expenditures in support of Assad in Syria, or a weakening of Iran’s close ties to Hezbollah.
The international community must give the Iranian regime the opportunity to demonstrate the authenticity of the “change narrative” that dominated Mr. Rouhani’s media tour in the U.S. The Iranian regime should also be pressed to sign the Geneva Communique, which calls for an immediate cessation of violence and the establishment of a transitional government in Syria. Another issue requiring attention is Iranian internet reform that was promised, but never delivered. Furthermore, the process of releasing political prisoners needs to be expedited, as the latest UN report stated that “no signs of fundamental improvement” in Iran’s human rights situation has been seen. Finally, the enforcement of low enrichments caps and 24/7 surveillance in Arak are commitments that need to be honored. Iran, by agreeing to these concessions, can prove to the international community that its new regime will stay true to its narrative of change and cooperation.
Iran has already shown interest and willingness in cooperating with the Western Leaders on some of these issues, and the flexibility shown in reaching the interim deal is another indicative of current administration’s relative openness. The opportunity to reach agreements over the aforementioned deals shows that the pot odds are still favorable for the Western allies, and there is quite a lot to win if the hand is played right.
Kia Rahnama is a student of political science at Texas Tech University. He is currently the Government Affairs Programs Assistant at the International Stability Operations Association.
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After Geneva: A Look at What’s Ahead for Iran
December 26, 2013
Recent negotiations in Geneva between Iran and Western leaders over Iran’s nuclear program ended as both sides agreed to an interim deal. The leaders agreed to a six-month freeze in Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for a temporary lifting of some of the international economic sanctions that have plagued Iran.
Initial disagreements over the scope and severity of concessions prevented the two sides from reaching an agreement in the first phases of negotiations. The deal that the Iranian delegation had initially aimed for would have included eased sanctions in return for promises of transparency from Iran. Transparency, as the Iranians would have conceded, would have included minimal changes, such as providing 24-hour surveillance at the Arak facility, when Western leaders instead desired a complete cessation of nuclear development activities at the facility. If this aspirational deal had been reached, it would have marked an irrefutable political victory for the Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, and a magnificent defeat for the West.
Instead, the interim deal reached on November 24th circumvented this lopsided victory. These negotiations on nuclear activity were set against a background of past hostilities and estrangement. The U.S and its allies approached these negotiations fully aware that Iran had lied to and betrayed the trust of the international community on number of previous occasions. To the Western leaders it was evident that, despite the enforcement of strong sanctions over the past seven years, Iran was closer than ever to producing weapon-grade uranium given their large stockpile of partially enriched uranium, as this stockpile could be used to produce weapon-grade uranium,. The minatory threshold of twenty percent uranium enrichment had long been passed and, as some analysts estimated, close to ninety percent of the enrichment necessary to produce weapons grade uranium had been completed.
In addition to temporarily halting nuclear development programs, the Geneva deal also calls for enhanced monitoring and surveillance of Iranian nuclear facilities. This includes the discontinuation of construction of the Arak facility, a heavy water reactor capable of producing weapon-grade plutonium. Iran must also convert half of its partially enriched uranium stockpile to oxide; this process will stop Iran from using the method of batch recycling to produce weapon-grade uranium in the future. In exchange for these concessions, Iran was promised a rollback in sanctions, which is estimated to amount to a $7 billion value.
It can be contended that the renewed interest among Western leaders to engage in negotiations with Iran is in large part a product of the relative normalcy and equanimity that the new Iranian president Hassan Rouhani exudes–characteristics that are in stark comparison to his predecessor Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. However, it is important for Western leaders to remember that, despite his inclinations towards cooperation, President Rouhani’s powers in shaping Iran’s foreign policy agenda are limited at best. According to the Iranian constitution, it is the Supreme Leader that has the final say on all matters of state.
Hardliners in Iran who are actively blocking President Rouhani’s domestic reform efforts are even more serious about protecting Iran’s nuclear ambitions. This was addressed through discouraging pronouncements from Western leaders with regards to future negotiations. Iranian leaders have also showed hesitance in signaling a willingness to accept a comprehensive final deal permanently including the concessions made in the interim deal. Knowing these obstacles, what would a good final deal entail?
Regarding sanctions, Western leaders must remain mindful of the feasibility of any significant overhaul. Iran has allocated money to install 3,830 centrifuges in just the last ten months. Money has also been allocated to establish a new cyber warfare command, and there are no signs in the decrease of the regime’s objectionable expenditures in support of Assad in Syria, or a weakening of Iran’s close ties to Hezbollah.
The international community must give the Iranian regime the opportunity to demonstrate the authenticity of the “change narrative” that dominated Mr. Rouhani’s media tour in the U.S. The Iranian regime should also be pressed to sign the Geneva Communique, which calls for an immediate cessation of violence and the establishment of a transitional government in Syria. Another issue requiring attention is Iranian internet reform that was promised, but never delivered. Furthermore, the process of releasing political prisoners needs to be expedited, as the latest UN report stated that “no signs of fundamental improvement” in Iran’s human rights situation has been seen. Finally, the enforcement of low enrichments caps and 24/7 surveillance in Arak are commitments that need to be honored. Iran, by agreeing to these concessions, can prove to the international community that its new regime will stay true to its narrative of change and cooperation.
Iran has already shown interest and willingness in cooperating with the Western Leaders on some of these issues, and the flexibility shown in reaching the interim deal is another indicative of current administration’s relative openness. The opportunity to reach agreements over the aforementioned deals shows that the pot odds are still favorable for the Western allies, and there is quite a lot to win if the hand is played right.
Kia Rahnama is a student of political science at Texas Tech University. He is currently the Government Affairs Programs Assistant at the International Stability Operations Association.
