Terrorism and related criminal activities, in the form of organized crime, are among the most pressing and complicated issues of our age. These twin threats flourish in environments characterized by weak state institutions, communal grievances, socio-economic inequities, and excessive greed. They also tend to reinforce one another and cross-fertilize in environments where certain states utilize terrorism as a strategic means of advancing their foreign policy objectives.
Moreover, new types of synergetic relations between terrorism and organized crime make both phenomena more lethal and dangerous than ever before. After the end of the Cold War, as state sponsorship of terrorist acts declined, organized criminal activities, slowly but steadily, became a major source of revenue for terrorist groups worldwide. While some terrorist groups have simply adopted criminal means and methods to earn revenue for the purpose of committing terrorist acts, others have moved towards merging or forging alliances, as well as developing symbiotic relationships with organized criminal groups.
Due to growing complementarities between organized crime and terrorism, in many cases, the distinction between the two phenomena has either become blurred or non-existent. And faster and cheaper transportation and communication have made synergies between terrorists and organized criminal groups more lucrative and hard to detect and punish.
Afghanistan is a prime example of demonstrating how terrorism and organized crime are mutually reinforcing, as terrorists and criminals exploit our social and economic vulnerabilities to destabilize Afghanistan. This precarious situation is compounded by the fact that the leaders and logistical infrastructure of terrorist and criminal groups are located beyond Afghanistan’s borders. And this externality has made it even more difficult to combat and defeat terrorism and organized crime in Afghanistan.
In spite of these challenges, the Afghan government, in partnership with the international community, has taken serious steps to fight and eliminate terrorism and organized crime. We have achieved considerable success in eradication of narcotic crops, as well as interdiction and prosecution of drug traffickers. Through increased law enforcement and alternative assistance to poor farmers, drug production has declined by 50 percent and cultivation by 46 percent in Afghanistan. Consequently, 20 of our 34 provinces are poppy-free and five more provinces will be poppy-free soon.
Moreover, the Afghan government has successfully prosecuted close to 500 drug dealers and traffickers in the last 10 months. Parallel to this effort, we have established the High Office of Oversight and Anti-corruption, which is mandated to fight corruption as a systemic problem so that opportunities for illicit activities are significantly reduced during 2011-2013. Furthermore, Afghanistan is the only country to become a member of the Egmont Group, at the regional level, to combat money laundering and terrorism financing more effectively.
The achievements of Afghanistan and the international community notwithstanding, the unintended consequences of counter-terrorism and counter-crime are many and widespread that must be addressed. Human rights, including sanctity of life, right to privacy, and protection of private and public property have come under tremendous pressure. Privatization of security, in many cases, has led to illegal, excessive and unwarranted use of force by private security companies, causing alienation and resentment among populations.
Moreover, the inability of security forces to draw a line between international terrorists and locally driven insurgencies and grievance-based opposition has made it more difficult for the states to engage in reconciliation. As a result, winning the hearts and minds of the affected populations has become more difficult.
Indeed, fighting terrorism and fighting organized crime are one and the same war. This war is a war of necessity, particularly in Afghanistan. Yet, the length of the war, its spillover effects, and its human and monetary costs are making it impossible for this war to go on forever. An endless war of this nature will create an endless stream of innocent victims and collateral damage, depriving the war of the very legitimacy it began with.
Hence, for the war against terrorism and organized crime to have a successful end in Afghanistan, our nation-partners need to develop better ways to distinguish between the guilty and the innocent. We need to be more conscious of the war’s long-term implications than its immediate, tactical security gains; we need to show more sensitivity and respect toward peoples’ honor and dignity; and last but not least, we need to address the systemic and more subtle causes that serve as drivers of terrorism and organized crime at local, national, regional, and international levels.
Shaida M. Abdali is the Deputy National Security Adviser of Afghanistan and serves as Special Assistant to President Hamid Karzai.
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Afghanistan: The Unjust Consequences of a Just War
March 23, 2011
Terrorism and related criminal activities, in the form of organized crime, are among the most pressing and complicated issues of our age. These twin threats flourish in environments characterized by weak state institutions, communal grievances, socio-economic inequities, and excessive greed. They also tend to reinforce one another and cross-fertilize in environments where certain states utilize terrorism as a strategic means of advancing their foreign policy objectives.
Moreover, new types of synergetic relations between terrorism and organized crime make both phenomena more lethal and dangerous than ever before. After the end of the Cold War, as state sponsorship of terrorist acts declined, organized criminal activities, slowly but steadily, became a major source of revenue for terrorist groups worldwide. While some terrorist groups have simply adopted criminal means and methods to earn revenue for the purpose of committing terrorist acts, others have moved towards merging or forging alliances, as well as developing symbiotic relationships with organized criminal groups.
Due to growing complementarities between organized crime and terrorism, in many cases, the distinction between the two phenomena has either become blurred or non-existent. And faster and cheaper transportation and communication have made synergies between terrorists and organized criminal groups more lucrative and hard to detect and punish.
Afghanistan is a prime example of demonstrating how terrorism and organized crime are mutually reinforcing, as terrorists and criminals exploit our social and economic vulnerabilities to destabilize Afghanistan. This precarious situation is compounded by the fact that the leaders and logistical infrastructure of terrorist and criminal groups are located beyond Afghanistan’s borders. And this externality has made it even more difficult to combat and defeat terrorism and organized crime in Afghanistan.
In spite of these challenges, the Afghan government, in partnership with the international community, has taken serious steps to fight and eliminate terrorism and organized crime. We have achieved considerable success in eradication of narcotic crops, as well as interdiction and prosecution of drug traffickers. Through increased law enforcement and alternative assistance to poor farmers, drug production has declined by 50 percent and cultivation by 46 percent in Afghanistan. Consequently, 20 of our 34 provinces are poppy-free and five more provinces will be poppy-free soon.
Moreover, the Afghan government has successfully prosecuted close to 500 drug dealers and traffickers in the last 10 months. Parallel to this effort, we have established the High Office of Oversight and Anti-corruption, which is mandated to fight corruption as a systemic problem so that opportunities for illicit activities are significantly reduced during 2011-2013. Furthermore, Afghanistan is the only country to become a member of the Egmont Group, at the regional level, to combat money laundering and terrorism financing more effectively.
The achievements of Afghanistan and the international community notwithstanding, the unintended consequences of counter-terrorism and counter-crime are many and widespread that must be addressed. Human rights, including sanctity of life, right to privacy, and protection of private and public property have come under tremendous pressure. Privatization of security, in many cases, has led to illegal, excessive and unwarranted use of force by private security companies, causing alienation and resentment among populations.
Moreover, the inability of security forces to draw a line between international terrorists and locally driven insurgencies and grievance-based opposition has made it more difficult for the states to engage in reconciliation. As a result, winning the hearts and minds of the affected populations has become more difficult.
Indeed, fighting terrorism and fighting organized crime are one and the same war. This war is a war of necessity, particularly in Afghanistan. Yet, the length of the war, its spillover effects, and its human and monetary costs are making it impossible for this war to go on forever. An endless war of this nature will create an endless stream of innocent victims and collateral damage, depriving the war of the very legitimacy it began with.
Hence, for the war against terrorism and organized crime to have a successful end in Afghanistan, our nation-partners need to develop better ways to distinguish between the guilty and the innocent. We need to be more conscious of the war’s long-term implications than its immediate, tactical security gains; we need to show more sensitivity and respect toward peoples’ honor and dignity; and last but not least, we need to address the systemic and more subtle causes that serve as drivers of terrorism and organized crime at local, national, regional, and international levels.
Shaida M. Abdali is the Deputy National Security Adviser of Afghanistan and serves as Special Assistant to President Hamid Karzai.
