f the catastrophe happens between now and May of 2021, this is how it is likely to play out.
The SAFER, a 45-year-old tanker converted to a floating storage and offloading facility (FSO) and permanently moored less than five miles off the Ras Isa on the Red Sea coast of Yemen, holds an estimated 1.14 million barrels of crude oil. It is also falling apart. In the five years since Houthi forces gained control of access to the SAFER, the vessel has gone without essential maintenance. Pieces have fallen off. A pipe has burst in the engine room. Critical safety systems have stopped working. Despite the often-ingenious efforts of a small, under equipped technical crew, the SAFER will fail. The resulting spill will be four times larger than that of the EXXON VALDEZ.
It will not take long for the spilled oil to reach the turbulence closer to shore, where it will be entrained down the water column and send a curtain of toxins through vital marine and coastal ecosystems. Some of the oil will go eastward, constricting and perhaps closing port operations at Hodeidah, the main gateway for aid to millions of Yemenis suffering from war, famine, and disease. Most of the oil will meet the winter coastal boundary current and be carried westward along the shore, to where two new desalination plants have just been inaugurated in Hajjah Governorate. Beyond, the spill will continue to Jizan, Saudi Arabia, where desalination provides drinking water, enabling other sources of fresh water to be used for agriculture. The drinking water supply in these areas will last about three days. Millions of lives will be put at immediate risk. Yemen, already fragile, will be dealt a blow from which it will take generations to recover.
The SAFER is, indisputably, a disaster waiting to happen. It is beyond repair. One way or another, sooner rather than later, it is going to spill its cargo. The technicians on the small team still managing to hold the vessel together have made it clear that technical skills are no longer enough. Despite these warnings and despite protracted negotiations, no outside team of inspectors or salvage operators has yet been allowed aboard. Complicating matters, the SAFER is afloat in an area controlled by the Houthis, while the vessel and the pipeline to which it is connected are owned and operated by a state company of the Hadi government. The Houthis have had their reasons for not wanting the United Nations or other international actors to “solve” this situation. Chief among these is concern that the oil onboard the SAFER, and the revenues it represents, will be taken away. Progress has at times seemed tantalizingly close, only to have negotiations break down. Many looking on, within the Red Sea region and without, oscillate between a sense of urgency and feelings of futility and impending doom.
The SAFER crisis initially posed a classic collective action dilemma. It has major implications for various coastal areas in the Red Sea basin, including Djibouti, Eritrea, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and even Egypt, Jordan, and Israel. Yet despite the huge costs and devastating fallout of a spill that would impact numerous countries, any moves toward intervention and international action have gone slowly and lacked urgency. United Nations Security Council members have all issued stern warnings. Members of the African Union (AU), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Arab League have issued statements. Yet none of these organizations have pushed hard enough for a speedy resolution—despite the reality that some of their member states stand to experience severe fallout from a spill, to say nothing of potential disruptions to international shipping.
But recent events, including the incident in the engine room in May, have highlighted the urgency of the situation. All the key stakeholders in negotiations now know the scope of the danger, and how disastrous a turn the crisis will take if a solution is not found.
The Situation is Dire, but There is a Solution.
And there is a solution—a simple, straightforward way to avert disaster. A seaworthy supertanker could be brought in to replace the SAFER, and a salvage operation could then transfer the FSO’s cargo to the new vessel, which would remain off Ras Isa until disputes over ownership and revenues can be resolved.
The technical challenges of this project are complicated but not excessively difficult. There is no need to conduct, as has been suggested, a global search for a team of experts; major salvage and oilfield services firms exist that could undertake this operation. Reliable Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs)—capable of holding over two million barrels of oil—can be sourced and outfitted appropriately. The salvage operation would take time, perhaps over a month to complete safely, but it is highly doable. There are, however, significant safety risks, some of which are literally floating through this conflict zone.
Accordingly, guarantees of safety are crucial to any operation on the SAFER. The Houthi leadership would need to honor any such guarantees during a potential salvage project. The area must be cleared, as much as possible, of threats to the SAFER, its replacement, and all support activities. Adversaries will need to move beyond immediate enmities for the sake of the common good and push quickly for a solution. The danger is deepening, and pressure to move beyond past trajectories is growing.
In that regard, preventing a catastrophic spill should be the priority, but working to do so is not mutually exclusive with establishing an effective response. There is no reason why, with proper safety and security measures, the area around the SAFER should not be boomed now. While a booming operation may not be able to contain all the oil, as some may spread beyond the surface barriers, most of the oil would likely be contained. Furthermore, the cost of installing such a system is negligible compared to even the immediate cost of an unmitigated spill, not to mention the long-term human, environmental and economic harm. Even if the SAFER does not spill before a transfer to a seaworthy replacement is possible, a booming system would help mitigate a smaller spill that could occur during the transfer process.
Amid all the negotiations, calls for action, news stories and global developments, the SAFER continues to deteriorate. The window for a solution is short. But the chance is here to build and sustain confidence through an effective process that accomplishes the shared need of all stakeholders: to prevent a catastrophic spill. Among the crises facing the world at this moment, the SAFER is one that can be resolved.
a global affairs media network
A Stalemate in Yemen Jeopardizes the Future of the Red Sea
Photo via Unsplash.
October 28, 2020
I
f the catastrophe happens between now and May of 2021, this is how it is likely to play out.
The SAFER, a 45-year-old tanker converted to a floating storage and offloading facility (FSO) and permanently moored less than five miles off the Ras Isa on the Red Sea coast of Yemen, holds an estimated 1.14 million barrels of crude oil. It is also falling apart. In the five years since Houthi forces gained control of access to the SAFER, the vessel has gone without essential maintenance. Pieces have fallen off. A pipe has burst in the engine room. Critical safety systems have stopped working. Despite the often-ingenious efforts of a small, under equipped technical crew, the SAFER will fail. The resulting spill will be four times larger than that of the EXXON VALDEZ.
It will not take long for the spilled oil to reach the turbulence closer to shore, where it will be entrained down the water column and send a curtain of toxins through vital marine and coastal ecosystems. Some of the oil will go eastward, constricting and perhaps closing port operations at Hodeidah, the main gateway for aid to millions of Yemenis suffering from war, famine, and disease. Most of the oil will meet the winter coastal boundary current and be carried westward along the shore, to where two new desalination plants have just been inaugurated in Hajjah Governorate. Beyond, the spill will continue to Jizan, Saudi Arabia, where desalination provides drinking water, enabling other sources of fresh water to be used for agriculture. The drinking water supply in these areas will last about three days. Millions of lives will be put at immediate risk. Yemen, already fragile, will be dealt a blow from which it will take generations to recover.
The SAFER is, indisputably, a disaster waiting to happen. It is beyond repair. One way or another, sooner rather than later, it is going to spill its cargo. The technicians on the small team still managing to hold the vessel together have made it clear that technical skills are no longer enough. Despite these warnings and despite protracted negotiations, no outside team of inspectors or salvage operators has yet been allowed aboard. Complicating matters, the SAFER is afloat in an area controlled by the Houthis, while the vessel and the pipeline to which it is connected are owned and operated by a state company of the Hadi government. The Houthis have had their reasons for not wanting the United Nations or other international actors to “solve” this situation. Chief among these is concern that the oil onboard the SAFER, and the revenues it represents, will be taken away. Progress has at times seemed tantalizingly close, only to have negotiations break down. Many looking on, within the Red Sea region and without, oscillate between a sense of urgency and feelings of futility and impending doom.
The SAFER crisis initially posed a classic collective action dilemma. It has major implications for various coastal areas in the Red Sea basin, including Djibouti, Eritrea, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and even Egypt, Jordan, and Israel. Yet despite the huge costs and devastating fallout of a spill that would impact numerous countries, any moves toward intervention and international action have gone slowly and lacked urgency. United Nations Security Council members have all issued stern warnings. Members of the African Union (AU), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Arab League have issued statements. Yet none of these organizations have pushed hard enough for a speedy resolution—despite the reality that some of their member states stand to experience severe fallout from a spill, to say nothing of potential disruptions to international shipping.
But recent events, including the incident in the engine room in May, have highlighted the urgency of the situation. All the key stakeholders in negotiations now know the scope of the danger, and how disastrous a turn the crisis will take if a solution is not found.
The Situation is Dire, but There is a Solution.
And there is a solution—a simple, straightforward way to avert disaster. A seaworthy supertanker could be brought in to replace the SAFER, and a salvage operation could then transfer the FSO’s cargo to the new vessel, which would remain off Ras Isa until disputes over ownership and revenues can be resolved.
The technical challenges of this project are complicated but not excessively difficult. There is no need to conduct, as has been suggested, a global search for a team of experts; major salvage and oilfield services firms exist that could undertake this operation. Reliable Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs)—capable of holding over two million barrels of oil—can be sourced and outfitted appropriately. The salvage operation would take time, perhaps over a month to complete safely, but it is highly doable. There are, however, significant safety risks, some of which are literally floating through this conflict zone.
Accordingly, guarantees of safety are crucial to any operation on the SAFER. The Houthi leadership would need to honor any such guarantees during a potential salvage project. The area must be cleared, as much as possible, of threats to the SAFER, its replacement, and all support activities. Adversaries will need to move beyond immediate enmities for the sake of the common good and push quickly for a solution. The danger is deepening, and pressure to move beyond past trajectories is growing.
In that regard, preventing a catastrophic spill should be the priority, but working to do so is not mutually exclusive with establishing an effective response. There is no reason why, with proper safety and security measures, the area around the SAFER should not be boomed now. While a booming operation may not be able to contain all the oil, as some may spread beyond the surface barriers, most of the oil would likely be contained. Furthermore, the cost of installing such a system is negligible compared to even the immediate cost of an unmitigated spill, not to mention the long-term human, environmental and economic harm. Even if the SAFER does not spill before a transfer to a seaworthy replacement is possible, a booming system would help mitigate a smaller spill that could occur during the transfer process.
Amid all the negotiations, calls for action, news stories and global developments, the SAFER continues to deteriorate. The window for a solution is short. But the chance is here to build and sustain confidence through an effective process that accomplishes the shared need of all stakeholders: to prevent a catastrophic spill. Among the crises facing the world at this moment, the SAFER is one that can be resolved.
