.

As tensions continue to rise in the East and South China Seas, the Obama administration’s attempts to redefine the balance of power in the Asia is undergoing a rebalancing of its own.

Obama’s signature foreign policy “pivot” toward the Asia-Pacific, initiated in 2011 as large troop deployments in the Middle East were ending, aims to bring about a renewed American engagement in the region to curb Beijing’s territorial ambitions. It calls for an increase in U.S. naval and air force assets in the Pacific theater to 60 percent by 2020, a significant a departure from the longstanding 50/50 split with the Atlantic theater. But skeptics say the scheme has floundered since former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and National Security Advisor Thomas Donilon left office.

Syria, Iran, and Middle East peace talks have distracted their successors, John Kerry and Susan E. Rice. More recently, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its threat to eastern Ukraine have caused growing unease among the United States’ Asian allies, including Japan and the Philippines, who worry that Washington may be unable or unwilling to protect them against any aggression from China. The State Department has given assurances that it stands by the defense treaty obligations it has with them—obligations it never had with Ukraine.

The Asia pivot was believed possible because post-Cold War security in Europe was thought largely accomplished after the disintegration of the Soviet bloc. Since the early 1990s, China has emerged as a regional hegemon with expanding military capabilities for long-range power projection in the East and South China Seas, where U.S. naval power has dominated since the end of World War II. In recent years, even NATO allies began to see the need for the Pentagon to shift resources from the Atlantic to the Asia-Pacific, where various disputes over islands and zones of influence could easily escalate into armed conflicts threatening global trade routes to Europe.

Obama’s eight-day tour of Asia in April was intended to restore credibility to the pivot by reaffirming ties with Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, and the Philippines. While the trip sought to deepen security agreements, a new emphasis on commercial alliances became apparent. Obama made it clear that the U.S. wants to build and sustain a regional economic integration favorable to Washington’s foreign policy objectives.

Secretary of Commerce Penny Pritzker said that commercial diplomacy would form one of three pillars in an overarching strategic framework. It would involve shoring up regional mechanisms to allow emerging Asian economies to enter into the global trade and investment system, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Association for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).

The new emphasis on commerce also aims to demonstrate to Beijing and opponents at home that the pivot is more comprehensive than simply another large-scale military undertaking. With the U.S. economy recovering at slower pace than anticipated, there is growing reluctance to antagonize China, the world’s second-largest economy and one of the biggest permanent markets for U.S. products and services.

Pritzker noted that the Asia-Pacific contains “nearly 60 percent of global GDP, the world’s fastest-growing economies, half of the world’s population, and an emerging middle class hungry for American products and services.” The “largest footprint of the [U.S.] foreign commercial service is in Asia,” she said, “with 75 officers and nearly 300 locally engaged staff,” more than in any other part of the world.

Rice remarked that she and other administration officials “increasingly see our top priorities as tied to Asia, whether it’s accessing new markets or promoting exports or protecting our security interests and promoting our core values.”

Beijing contends that the U.S. pivot is designed to contain China and prevent its emergence as a world power. Obama, however, repeatedly stated that the U.S. takes no position on the merits of the sovereignty disputes in the East or South China Seas, though it is opposed to the use of force or coercion to resolve them.

In November, China unilaterally declared an air defense identification zone in the East China Sea over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, which are administered by Japan but claimed by Beijing. The zone overlaps also with South Korean and Taiwanese airspace. Malaysia and the Philippines, meanwhile, are locked in their own maritime disputes concerning boundaries in the South China Sea.

Obama’s trip to Asia was intended to strategically manage the U.S. deterrent in a way that leads to a cooperative and constructive relationship with China, one that avoids regional instability or open conflict. “Our goal is not to counter China,” Obama said. “Our goal is not to contain China. Our goal is to make sure that international rules and norms are respected, and that includes in the area of maritime disputes.”

The South Korean and Malaysian presidents took the visit as a symbol of U.S. solidarity and a commitment to their security. In the Philippines, a former U.S. colony, Obama signed a controversial 10-year defense accord that allows for more frequent rotation of U.S. troops, ships, and warplanes through the islands and more joint military training exercises.

China has warned that the Philippines may leverage this security pact against its presence in the disputed Spratly Islands. A commentary in Xinhua, China’s state-run news agency, said that “given that the Philippines is at a bitter territorial row with China, the move is particularly disturbing as it may embolden Manila in dealing with Beijing.” Many analysts agree that if Manila were to become more assertive, it would aggravate regional tensions and further complicate the pivot.

Evan Medeiros, senior director for Asian affairs on the National Security Council, said the U.S. wants “a constructive relationship with China” but is also committed to advancing its strategic objectives and safeguarding its allies from regional threats. “And as those threats evolve,” he added, “the nature of our alliances and security partnerships will evolve as well, whether its Japan or South Korea.”

China has called on Washington to abandon its bipolar “Cold War mentality.” With countries in the region increasingly tied to China’s economic weight, there is a growing sense that the United States will be unable to sustain a long-term geo-strategic presence, which, in any event, China says would do little to change its own strategic interests.

Katrina McFarland, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, said in March that the agency is rethinking the strategy in light of budgetary pressures. “The pivot is being looked at again,” she said, “because candidly it can’t happen [due to cuts in the defense budget].”

Meanwhile, Beijing seems to interpret Washington’s efforts to step up soft power and commercial diplomacy as an indication that the pivot has so far been chiefly rhetorical. “If you come or do not come, we will be here,” said Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Qin Gang.

This article was originally published in the Diplomatic Courier's special edition G7 ebook. The full ebook can be purchased here.

Official White House Photo by Pete Souza.

About
Paul Nash
:
Toronto-based Correspondent Paul Nash is a frequent China commentator.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.

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A Delicate Rebalancing Act: Obama’s Asia Pivot in Troubled Waters

June 18, 2014

As tensions continue to rise in the East and South China Seas, the Obama administration’s attempts to redefine the balance of power in the Asia is undergoing a rebalancing of its own.

Obama’s signature foreign policy “pivot” toward the Asia-Pacific, initiated in 2011 as large troop deployments in the Middle East were ending, aims to bring about a renewed American engagement in the region to curb Beijing’s territorial ambitions. It calls for an increase in U.S. naval and air force assets in the Pacific theater to 60 percent by 2020, a significant a departure from the longstanding 50/50 split with the Atlantic theater. But skeptics say the scheme has floundered since former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and National Security Advisor Thomas Donilon left office.

Syria, Iran, and Middle East peace talks have distracted their successors, John Kerry and Susan E. Rice. More recently, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its threat to eastern Ukraine have caused growing unease among the United States’ Asian allies, including Japan and the Philippines, who worry that Washington may be unable or unwilling to protect them against any aggression from China. The State Department has given assurances that it stands by the defense treaty obligations it has with them—obligations it never had with Ukraine.

The Asia pivot was believed possible because post-Cold War security in Europe was thought largely accomplished after the disintegration of the Soviet bloc. Since the early 1990s, China has emerged as a regional hegemon with expanding military capabilities for long-range power projection in the East and South China Seas, where U.S. naval power has dominated since the end of World War II. In recent years, even NATO allies began to see the need for the Pentagon to shift resources from the Atlantic to the Asia-Pacific, where various disputes over islands and zones of influence could easily escalate into armed conflicts threatening global trade routes to Europe.

Obama’s eight-day tour of Asia in April was intended to restore credibility to the pivot by reaffirming ties with Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, and the Philippines. While the trip sought to deepen security agreements, a new emphasis on commercial alliances became apparent. Obama made it clear that the U.S. wants to build and sustain a regional economic integration favorable to Washington’s foreign policy objectives.

Secretary of Commerce Penny Pritzker said that commercial diplomacy would form one of three pillars in an overarching strategic framework. It would involve shoring up regional mechanisms to allow emerging Asian economies to enter into the global trade and investment system, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Association for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).

The new emphasis on commerce also aims to demonstrate to Beijing and opponents at home that the pivot is more comprehensive than simply another large-scale military undertaking. With the U.S. economy recovering at slower pace than anticipated, there is growing reluctance to antagonize China, the world’s second-largest economy and one of the biggest permanent markets for U.S. products and services.

Pritzker noted that the Asia-Pacific contains “nearly 60 percent of global GDP, the world’s fastest-growing economies, half of the world’s population, and an emerging middle class hungry for American products and services.” The “largest footprint of the [U.S.] foreign commercial service is in Asia,” she said, “with 75 officers and nearly 300 locally engaged staff,” more than in any other part of the world.

Rice remarked that she and other administration officials “increasingly see our top priorities as tied to Asia, whether it’s accessing new markets or promoting exports or protecting our security interests and promoting our core values.”

Beijing contends that the U.S. pivot is designed to contain China and prevent its emergence as a world power. Obama, however, repeatedly stated that the U.S. takes no position on the merits of the sovereignty disputes in the East or South China Seas, though it is opposed to the use of force or coercion to resolve them.

In November, China unilaterally declared an air defense identification zone in the East China Sea over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, which are administered by Japan but claimed by Beijing. The zone overlaps also with South Korean and Taiwanese airspace. Malaysia and the Philippines, meanwhile, are locked in their own maritime disputes concerning boundaries in the South China Sea.

Obama’s trip to Asia was intended to strategically manage the U.S. deterrent in a way that leads to a cooperative and constructive relationship with China, one that avoids regional instability or open conflict. “Our goal is not to counter China,” Obama said. “Our goal is not to contain China. Our goal is to make sure that international rules and norms are respected, and that includes in the area of maritime disputes.”

The South Korean and Malaysian presidents took the visit as a symbol of U.S. solidarity and a commitment to their security. In the Philippines, a former U.S. colony, Obama signed a controversial 10-year defense accord that allows for more frequent rotation of U.S. troops, ships, and warplanes through the islands and more joint military training exercises.

China has warned that the Philippines may leverage this security pact against its presence in the disputed Spratly Islands. A commentary in Xinhua, China’s state-run news agency, said that “given that the Philippines is at a bitter territorial row with China, the move is particularly disturbing as it may embolden Manila in dealing with Beijing.” Many analysts agree that if Manila were to become more assertive, it would aggravate regional tensions and further complicate the pivot.

Evan Medeiros, senior director for Asian affairs on the National Security Council, said the U.S. wants “a constructive relationship with China” but is also committed to advancing its strategic objectives and safeguarding its allies from regional threats. “And as those threats evolve,” he added, “the nature of our alliances and security partnerships will evolve as well, whether its Japan or South Korea.”

China has called on Washington to abandon its bipolar “Cold War mentality.” With countries in the region increasingly tied to China’s economic weight, there is a growing sense that the United States will be unable to sustain a long-term geo-strategic presence, which, in any event, China says would do little to change its own strategic interests.

Katrina McFarland, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, said in March that the agency is rethinking the strategy in light of budgetary pressures. “The pivot is being looked at again,” she said, “because candidly it can’t happen [due to cuts in the defense budget].”

Meanwhile, Beijing seems to interpret Washington’s efforts to step up soft power and commercial diplomacy as an indication that the pivot has so far been chiefly rhetorical. “If you come or do not come, we will be here,” said Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Qin Gang.

This article was originally published in the Diplomatic Courier's special edition G7 ebook. The full ebook can be purchased here.

Official White House Photo by Pete Souza.

About
Paul Nash
:
Toronto-based Correspondent Paul Nash is a frequent China commentator.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.