hen the virus first emerged, global business and travel slammed to a screeching halt. Within just a few weeks, the disease had spread from one country to thirty-five, prompting a global shutdown, which warranted economic backlash. Researchers quickly sequenced the virus’s genome to begin developing a vaccine. Countries scrambled to plan a disaster response in an effort researchers would later say laid the foundation for future fights against infectious disease. In the meantime, what became known as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) spread to thousands.
Many of the experiences the world had with the initial outbreak of SARS in 2002 mirror the early experiences the world had with COVID-19 in early 2020. Almost 20 years later, these experiences can still help researchers and policymakers as the world continues to work to end this crisis. Perhaps most important, it is likely that just like SARS, COVID-19 will inspire a new era of global cooperation needed to tackle future global health challenges.
So far, however, the global cooperation needed to manage the coronavirus crisis has been lacking. When the virus first became known in Wuhan, China, officials were slow to report the crisis to the WHO. In the U.S., President Trump suspended air travel from Europe without consulting American allies. In France and Germany, governments banned or placed limits on the exportation of protective medical supplies. Rather than collaborating to mitigate the global impact of the pandemic, many countries took a nationalist approach to dealing with coronavirus.
This lack of global solidarity was perhaps most visible in convenings of the G7, the G20, and UN Security Council this year. Both the G7 and the G20 failed to meet until early March. Further, when the G20 did manage to meet, it initially rejected requests from the IMF to suspend debt obligations for poor nations during the crisis. And from the UN Security Council, Secretary General António Guterres called for a ceasefire to all global conflict and stressed the need for countries to work together rather than taking a national approach. However, since Guterres’ calls were not backed by the 15-member UN Security Council, his demands went unheeded. Further, in March, China (which held the rotating presidency seat at the time) blocked the Security Council from considering any “public health” resolutions on the pandemic, even though the body had released a resolution on Ebola in 2014.
In the aftermath of the pandemic, it will make sense to develop global “circuit breakers” that can help isolate systemic health risks before they spread.
In the aftermath of the pandemic, it will make sense to develop global “circuit breakers” that can help isolate systemic health risks before they spread.
The difficulty mounting an international response to the coronavirus crisis speaks to the need for coordination within the global public health sphere. In the aftermath of the pandemic, it will make sense to develop global “circuit breakers” that can help isolate systemic health risks before they spread. One example of a global circuit breaker might include updated temporary travel and trade restrictions in the event of another illness with pandemic potential. Additionally, states can agree to protect vital health supplies such as masks or disposable gloves from tariffs before the next pandemic. Further, states can work together to create more modern international immunization records. The original WHO International Certification of Vaccination cards for diseases like smallpox or yellow fever are terribly outdated and should be replaced with chip-enabled and machine-readable records. Such an update will help prevent additional COVID-19 outbreaks after vaccines are widely available.
However, if history is any indication, the global experience fighting this pandemic might pay off when states face additional viral threats in the future. Taiwan, which was impacted by SARS in 2002, mounted an excellent defense to COVID-19. It was first to try and stop the spread of the coronavirus after hearing about a mysterious pneumonia-like illness emerging from Wuhan in December. One year later, only seven people within the country had died of the disease. South Korea, which was severely impacted by Middle Eastern Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) in 2015, also presented an impressive response to the COVID-19 pandemic, with under 800 people dying in a country of over 51 million. Most importantly, in the aftermath of the SARS epidemic, countries met to update the International Health Regulations for the first time since 1969, and several states established new public health institutes.
Clearly, this early coronavirus pandemic did much to stimulate international public health efforts. Hopefully, history repeats itself in the aftermath of COVID-19 and states can do much to prevent a crisis of this scale from happening in the future.
a global affairs media network
What COVID-19 Might Mean for Future International Health Efforts
January 1, 2021
W
hen the virus first emerged, global business and travel slammed to a screeching halt. Within just a few weeks, the disease had spread from one country to thirty-five, prompting a global shutdown, which warranted economic backlash. Researchers quickly sequenced the virus’s genome to begin developing a vaccine. Countries scrambled to plan a disaster response in an effort researchers would later say laid the foundation for future fights against infectious disease. In the meantime, what became known as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) spread to thousands.
Many of the experiences the world had with the initial outbreak of SARS in 2002 mirror the early experiences the world had with COVID-19 in early 2020. Almost 20 years later, these experiences can still help researchers and policymakers as the world continues to work to end this crisis. Perhaps most important, it is likely that just like SARS, COVID-19 will inspire a new era of global cooperation needed to tackle future global health challenges.
So far, however, the global cooperation needed to manage the coronavirus crisis has been lacking. When the virus first became known in Wuhan, China, officials were slow to report the crisis to the WHO. In the U.S., President Trump suspended air travel from Europe without consulting American allies. In France and Germany, governments banned or placed limits on the exportation of protective medical supplies. Rather than collaborating to mitigate the global impact of the pandemic, many countries took a nationalist approach to dealing with coronavirus.
This lack of global solidarity was perhaps most visible in convenings of the G7, the G20, and UN Security Council this year. Both the G7 and the G20 failed to meet until early March. Further, when the G20 did manage to meet, it initially rejected requests from the IMF to suspend debt obligations for poor nations during the crisis. And from the UN Security Council, Secretary General António Guterres called for a ceasefire to all global conflict and stressed the need for countries to work together rather than taking a national approach. However, since Guterres’ calls were not backed by the 15-member UN Security Council, his demands went unheeded. Further, in March, China (which held the rotating presidency seat at the time) blocked the Security Council from considering any “public health” resolutions on the pandemic, even though the body had released a resolution on Ebola in 2014.
In the aftermath of the pandemic, it will make sense to develop global “circuit breakers” that can help isolate systemic health risks before they spread.
In the aftermath of the pandemic, it will make sense to develop global “circuit breakers” that can help isolate systemic health risks before they spread.
The difficulty mounting an international response to the coronavirus crisis speaks to the need for coordination within the global public health sphere. In the aftermath of the pandemic, it will make sense to develop global “circuit breakers” that can help isolate systemic health risks before they spread. One example of a global circuit breaker might include updated temporary travel and trade restrictions in the event of another illness with pandemic potential. Additionally, states can agree to protect vital health supplies such as masks or disposable gloves from tariffs before the next pandemic. Further, states can work together to create more modern international immunization records. The original WHO International Certification of Vaccination cards for diseases like smallpox or yellow fever are terribly outdated and should be replaced with chip-enabled and machine-readable records. Such an update will help prevent additional COVID-19 outbreaks after vaccines are widely available.
However, if history is any indication, the global experience fighting this pandemic might pay off when states face additional viral threats in the future. Taiwan, which was impacted by SARS in 2002, mounted an excellent defense to COVID-19. It was first to try and stop the spread of the coronavirus after hearing about a mysterious pneumonia-like illness emerging from Wuhan in December. One year later, only seven people within the country had died of the disease. South Korea, which was severely impacted by Middle Eastern Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) in 2015, also presented an impressive response to the COVID-19 pandemic, with under 800 people dying in a country of over 51 million. Most importantly, in the aftermath of the SARS epidemic, countries met to update the International Health Regulations for the first time since 1969, and several states established new public health institutes.
Clearly, this early coronavirus pandemic did much to stimulate international public health efforts. Hopefully, history repeats itself in the aftermath of COVID-19 and states can do much to prevent a crisis of this scale from happening in the future.
