To his enemies is known as Viktator, a prickly autocrat with little tolerance for dissent or independent institutions. To his allies, the savior of a nation brought to its knees by years of corruption and misrule.
But for most, Viktor Orban, Hungary’s prime minister, is an enigma. An idealistic liberal turned populist, an unswerving democrat who helped topple an oppressive communist regime now accused by detractors of behaving like a despot himself, Orban does not easily fit the mold of a traditional European politician.
Yet, he is now arguably the most powerful leader in all of Europe. Elections last spring swept Orban and his right-wing Fidesz party into power with a crushing two-thirds majority. It is, as Orban is quick to point out, perhaps the only time a European leader has enjoyed such a wide majority since Charles de Gaulle’s march to power in France.
“Hungary has to come to terms with the fact that we are in a situation completely unknown to the West,” Orban said in a recent interview. In a separate discussion with Israel’s Yedioth Ahronoth daily, he continued, “I feel that I am facing a historic challenge. We have a majority in parliament. Such a majority has not existed in Europe since Charles de Gaulle, who built a new France. Our task is to build a new Hungary, clean the house and instill order.”
With his country in charge of the European Union’s rotating presidency, the spotlight is now shining brightly on Hungary’s inscrutable leader. Can he save Hungary—a country suffering from economic hardship and political disillusionment—as de Gaulle did for France?
An anti-communist agitator and one of the leading lights of Hungary’s transition to democracy in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Viktor Orban built a reputation as a committed democrat and a loyal European. He co-founded the fiercely anti-communist Fidesz—an acronym meaning Alliance of Young Democrats—a libertarian, student-led party with views considered progressive at the time: “liberal,” “radical” and “alternative,” in the party’s own words.
Fidesz had high hopes in Hungary’s first post-communist elections in the early 1990s. But a series of disappointing defeats led to a revaluation of the party’s ideological direction. With each passing year, the party lost more of its liberal character and adopted policies more often associated with the nationalist right. By the end of the decade, Orban had scrapped Fidesz’s membership in the Liberal International.
In 1998, Viktor Orban came to power. He followed a populist economic path and gained a reputation as an ill-tempered leader with little time for the concerns of the opposition. In 2002, he narrowly lost re-election to a coalition led by the Socialist party—reformed communists who challenged Orban, paradoxically, from the free-market right.
The Socialists, in coalition with the market-oriented Liberal Democrats, implemented a series of tough austerity measures aimed at getting Hungary’s economy back into balance. But they also gained a reputation for corruption and sleaze. While they managed to win a close rematch with Orban in 2006, it was a pyrrhic victory. A leaked tape caught the Socialist prime minister admitting to lying “morning, evening and night” about the state of the economy in order to win the poll, boasting that the country had been kept afloat due to “divine providence, the abundance of cash in the world economy and hundreds of tricks.”
The Socialist vote collapsed, and the economic tricks did not work for much longer. The government was forced to seek IMF assistance—humiliation for most Hungarians—leaving no doubt that Orban would soon be back in power.
Indeed, Fidesz’s victory in last June’s general election was a foregone conclusion. The Socialists lost 131 of their 190 seats, barely edging out the ultra-nationalist Jobbik party for second place. Their Liberal Democrat allies failed to win a single seat. Fidesz easily captured 263 mandates.
Returned to power, Viktor Orban now faces an unenviable task. He has been left to pick up the pieces of Hungary’s shattered economy and the legacy of the outgoing government—chaotic public finances, soaring unemployment, and near-bankruptcy.
His solution, thus far, has been a series of self-styled “patriotic” policies. An economic official in the administration, speaking on condition of anonymity, says one of the main ideas of Orban’s economic policy is that “multinational corporates are not useful as engines of a long-term economic development.” Rather “they came here mostly because of [Hungary’s] low wages, and they'll go away if they find an area with lower wages,”
Accordingly, Orban has slapped companies with swinging “crisis” taxes and raided—effectively nationalized—the private pension system in order to shore up public finances. Shockingly leftist thinking for a former libertarian, perhaps. Foreign corporations and liberal economists have howled in protest.
But these policies do not mean Hungary is closed for business to foreign investors, urges Hungary’s new ambassador to the U.S., Gyorgy Szapáry. “It is said that Orbán’s policies are against foreign companies, but this is not true,” said Szapáry in an interview with the Diplomatic Courier. “In several sectors—such as banking and energy—it is not foreign companies paying the largest share of the new taxes, but Hungarian companies. People also forget that Hungary has also had one of the lowest levels of corporate tax in Europe, and still does.” Yet, concerns over economic policy have not been the only criticism leveled at Orban in recent months. More troubling for the opposition are the Prime Minister’s moves to centralize power and chip away at the authority of independent institutions. Critics point to his decision to appoint a party loyalist as Hungary’s President, for instance, or his seemingly endless battles with the governor of the independent central bank.
Speaking to the Diplomatic Courier, David Dorosz, an opposition Member of Parliament for the liberal Politics Can Be Different (LMP) party, accused the government of introducing “a great amount of new laws which undermine the system of checks and balances in [Hungary].” He cited attempts to restrict the jurisdiction of the constitutional court and alter electoral rules in Fidesz’s favor. Yet what is “most scandalous,” according to Dorosz, is the government’s media law “which contains serious restrictions aimed at the press.”
Indeed, of all Orban’s perceived transgressions, none has attracted more criticism than the creation of a supervisory commission with the power to mete out hefty fines to a wide spectrum of media outlets, including newspapers, television, and even blogs. The body, packed with Fidesz loyalists, can mandate punishment for violations as nebulous as insulting “public morality.”
The Council of Europe’s commissioner for human rights blasted the commission as a “politically unbalanced regulatory [machine] with disproportionate powers and lack of full judicial supervision.” Neelie Kroes, Europe’s digital affairs commissioner, demanded the government revisit several aspects of the law to make it compliant with EU standards.
Orban received a particularly rough ride on the issue when addressing the European Parliament in January. Several parliamentarians showed up gagged to protest the new law. The leader of the European Greens warned Orban he was “on the road to becoming a European Chavez, a national-populist who doesn’t understand the essence of democracy.”
But is it all that simple? To Orban and his followers, it is the outside world that has it wrong, not the Hungarian government. Foreigners do not understand, they insist, that Hungary has not fully completed its transition from communism to democracy.
“People forget that Hungary was the country that started its democratization process by sitting down with the communists and negotiating a path forward leading to free elections,” cautions Ambassador Szapáry. “As a result, many compromises were made and we ended up having many laws that require two-thirds majorities, much more than in any other country. Initially it was envisaged that even the government budget would require a super-majority, but that was changed before it could actually go into effect.
But 20 years have passed since then, he argues, and the changed circumstances require changes in many of these laws. “Now there is a government with a two-thirds majority, and its making those changes. It is true that those changes are happening very rapidly, but the government is saying that if we drag on, the debate will not cease and then it cannot concentrate on the economy.”
Many Fidesz supporters concede Viktor Orban may have some authoritarian tendencies. But order is important, and the government must use this rare moment to ram through a complete rewrite of the political playbook before the dead hand of the communists—and their heirs, the Socialists—can rise again to stifle Hungary’s democratic path. Nothing less than a complete refounding of the republic will do, they claim.
Indeed, public buildings are now required to display propaganda claiming the Hungarian people founded a new regime by embracing Fidesz so convincingly in last year’s election.
Charles de Gaulle swept in to save France in 1958. He achieved a wide parliamentary majority and used it, knowing that nothing less than a complete refounding of his country would do. He is remembered for saying, “Once upon a time there was an old country, wrapped up in habit and caution. We have to transform our old France into a new country and marry it to its time.”
He did change France. As Ambassador Szapáry points out, there are now roads, boulevards, and airports named after the General all across the French Republic. But it took a heavy hand to move his country forward, a monarchical manner, and an unwavering confidence that put little stock in the opinions of opposing voices.
Viktor Orban now stands at the crossroads of his own country’s history. Will he, can he—should he—embark on the same path? Is Gaullism and its Hungarian equivalent appropriate in modern, democratic Europe—and can it work? Regardless of the consequences or the criticism, Viktor Orban seems determined to push forward.
a global affairs media network
Viktor Orban: Viktator or Visionary?
March 6, 2011
To his enemies is known as Viktator, a prickly autocrat with little tolerance for dissent or independent institutions. To his allies, the savior of a nation brought to its knees by years of corruption and misrule.
But for most, Viktor Orban, Hungary’s prime minister, is an enigma. An idealistic liberal turned populist, an unswerving democrat who helped topple an oppressive communist regime now accused by detractors of behaving like a despot himself, Orban does not easily fit the mold of a traditional European politician.
Yet, he is now arguably the most powerful leader in all of Europe. Elections last spring swept Orban and his right-wing Fidesz party into power with a crushing two-thirds majority. It is, as Orban is quick to point out, perhaps the only time a European leader has enjoyed such a wide majority since Charles de Gaulle’s march to power in France.
“Hungary has to come to terms with the fact that we are in a situation completely unknown to the West,” Orban said in a recent interview. In a separate discussion with Israel’s Yedioth Ahronoth daily, he continued, “I feel that I am facing a historic challenge. We have a majority in parliament. Such a majority has not existed in Europe since Charles de Gaulle, who built a new France. Our task is to build a new Hungary, clean the house and instill order.”
With his country in charge of the European Union’s rotating presidency, the spotlight is now shining brightly on Hungary’s inscrutable leader. Can he save Hungary—a country suffering from economic hardship and political disillusionment—as de Gaulle did for France?
An anti-communist agitator and one of the leading lights of Hungary’s transition to democracy in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Viktor Orban built a reputation as a committed democrat and a loyal European. He co-founded the fiercely anti-communist Fidesz—an acronym meaning Alliance of Young Democrats—a libertarian, student-led party with views considered progressive at the time: “liberal,” “radical” and “alternative,” in the party’s own words.
Fidesz had high hopes in Hungary’s first post-communist elections in the early 1990s. But a series of disappointing defeats led to a revaluation of the party’s ideological direction. With each passing year, the party lost more of its liberal character and adopted policies more often associated with the nationalist right. By the end of the decade, Orban had scrapped Fidesz’s membership in the Liberal International.
In 1998, Viktor Orban came to power. He followed a populist economic path and gained a reputation as an ill-tempered leader with little time for the concerns of the opposition. In 2002, he narrowly lost re-election to a coalition led by the Socialist party—reformed communists who challenged Orban, paradoxically, from the free-market right.
The Socialists, in coalition with the market-oriented Liberal Democrats, implemented a series of tough austerity measures aimed at getting Hungary’s economy back into balance. But they also gained a reputation for corruption and sleaze. While they managed to win a close rematch with Orban in 2006, it was a pyrrhic victory. A leaked tape caught the Socialist prime minister admitting to lying “morning, evening and night” about the state of the economy in order to win the poll, boasting that the country had been kept afloat due to “divine providence, the abundance of cash in the world economy and hundreds of tricks.”
The Socialist vote collapsed, and the economic tricks did not work for much longer. The government was forced to seek IMF assistance—humiliation for most Hungarians—leaving no doubt that Orban would soon be back in power.
Indeed, Fidesz’s victory in last June’s general election was a foregone conclusion. The Socialists lost 131 of their 190 seats, barely edging out the ultra-nationalist Jobbik party for second place. Their Liberal Democrat allies failed to win a single seat. Fidesz easily captured 263 mandates.
Returned to power, Viktor Orban now faces an unenviable task. He has been left to pick up the pieces of Hungary’s shattered economy and the legacy of the outgoing government—chaotic public finances, soaring unemployment, and near-bankruptcy.
His solution, thus far, has been a series of self-styled “patriotic” policies. An economic official in the administration, speaking on condition of anonymity, says one of the main ideas of Orban’s economic policy is that “multinational corporates are not useful as engines of a long-term economic development.” Rather “they came here mostly because of [Hungary’s] low wages, and they'll go away if they find an area with lower wages,”
Accordingly, Orban has slapped companies with swinging “crisis” taxes and raided—effectively nationalized—the private pension system in order to shore up public finances. Shockingly leftist thinking for a former libertarian, perhaps. Foreign corporations and liberal economists have howled in protest.
But these policies do not mean Hungary is closed for business to foreign investors, urges Hungary’s new ambassador to the U.S., Gyorgy Szapáry. “It is said that Orbán’s policies are against foreign companies, but this is not true,” said Szapáry in an interview with the Diplomatic Courier. “In several sectors—such as banking and energy—it is not foreign companies paying the largest share of the new taxes, but Hungarian companies. People also forget that Hungary has also had one of the lowest levels of corporate tax in Europe, and still does.” Yet, concerns over economic policy have not been the only criticism leveled at Orban in recent months. More troubling for the opposition are the Prime Minister’s moves to centralize power and chip away at the authority of independent institutions. Critics point to his decision to appoint a party loyalist as Hungary’s President, for instance, or his seemingly endless battles with the governor of the independent central bank.
Speaking to the Diplomatic Courier, David Dorosz, an opposition Member of Parliament for the liberal Politics Can Be Different (LMP) party, accused the government of introducing “a great amount of new laws which undermine the system of checks and balances in [Hungary].” He cited attempts to restrict the jurisdiction of the constitutional court and alter electoral rules in Fidesz’s favor. Yet what is “most scandalous,” according to Dorosz, is the government’s media law “which contains serious restrictions aimed at the press.”
Indeed, of all Orban’s perceived transgressions, none has attracted more criticism than the creation of a supervisory commission with the power to mete out hefty fines to a wide spectrum of media outlets, including newspapers, television, and even blogs. The body, packed with Fidesz loyalists, can mandate punishment for violations as nebulous as insulting “public morality.”
The Council of Europe’s commissioner for human rights blasted the commission as a “politically unbalanced regulatory [machine] with disproportionate powers and lack of full judicial supervision.” Neelie Kroes, Europe’s digital affairs commissioner, demanded the government revisit several aspects of the law to make it compliant with EU standards.
Orban received a particularly rough ride on the issue when addressing the European Parliament in January. Several parliamentarians showed up gagged to protest the new law. The leader of the European Greens warned Orban he was “on the road to becoming a European Chavez, a national-populist who doesn’t understand the essence of democracy.”
But is it all that simple? To Orban and his followers, it is the outside world that has it wrong, not the Hungarian government. Foreigners do not understand, they insist, that Hungary has not fully completed its transition from communism to democracy.
“People forget that Hungary was the country that started its democratization process by sitting down with the communists and negotiating a path forward leading to free elections,” cautions Ambassador Szapáry. “As a result, many compromises were made and we ended up having many laws that require two-thirds majorities, much more than in any other country. Initially it was envisaged that even the government budget would require a super-majority, but that was changed before it could actually go into effect.
But 20 years have passed since then, he argues, and the changed circumstances require changes in many of these laws. “Now there is a government with a two-thirds majority, and its making those changes. It is true that those changes are happening very rapidly, but the government is saying that if we drag on, the debate will not cease and then it cannot concentrate on the economy.”
Many Fidesz supporters concede Viktor Orban may have some authoritarian tendencies. But order is important, and the government must use this rare moment to ram through a complete rewrite of the political playbook before the dead hand of the communists—and their heirs, the Socialists—can rise again to stifle Hungary’s democratic path. Nothing less than a complete refounding of the republic will do, they claim.
Indeed, public buildings are now required to display propaganda claiming the Hungarian people founded a new regime by embracing Fidesz so convincingly in last year’s election.
Charles de Gaulle swept in to save France in 1958. He achieved a wide parliamentary majority and used it, knowing that nothing less than a complete refounding of his country would do. He is remembered for saying, “Once upon a time there was an old country, wrapped up in habit and caution. We have to transform our old France into a new country and marry it to its time.”
He did change France. As Ambassador Szapáry points out, there are now roads, boulevards, and airports named after the General all across the French Republic. But it took a heavy hand to move his country forward, a monarchical manner, and an unwavering confidence that put little stock in the opinions of opposing voices.
Viktor Orban now stands at the crossroads of his own country’s history. Will he, can he—should he—embark on the same path? Is Gaullism and its Hungarian equivalent appropriate in modern, democratic Europe—and can it work? Regardless of the consequences or the criticism, Viktor Orban seems determined to push forward.
