.
Foreign Policy recently revealed the United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) proposed new organizational chart. The subject of extensive discussion in Washington’s development circles, the new structure would consolidate several bureaus and create new senior positions in the agency. While significant, these administrative changes are unlikely to achieve the ambitions of USAID Administrator Mark Green, who aims for more transformational change.
Though publicly available information is limited, reports indicate that Green’s goals include developing flexible new partnership models, finding ways to better leverage in-house talent, and empowering USAID’s field offices. To achieve these goals, Green’s reform efforts must not only reshuffle the organization’s structure but change how decisions are made and who makes them.
Prior to the release of the proposed organizational chart, various reports indicated Green’s reform campaign aimed to devolve power away from Washington out to USAID’s field offices, which exist in nearly every country that receives USAID support. In April, Devex reported the coordinator of USAID’s Transformation Task Force, Jim Richardson, aims to push “decisions and resources to the field” and use “Washington more as a consultative body to provide technical assistance.”
Of course, devolving power to the field is only useful if it results in concrete improvements to USAID policies and programs. Research in this area suggests there are times when empowering field agents can be useful and times when control from headquarters is more effective. Administrator Green and his team will be successful if they recognize the important lessons this research shares, particularly the recent work of Dan Honig.
In his book on development management, Honig introduces the term “Navigation by Judgment,” which describes a devolved, hands-off approach, in which field agents use their discretion to guide development projects. The inverse of this is a top-down, authoritative organizational structure in which headquarters calls the shots and field agents work to achieve narrowly defined outcomes.
Honig argues that “Navigation by Judgment” is most useful when development project outcomes and the local environment are unpredictable. “[A]s contexts become harder to navigate using top-down controls and measurement,” empowering field agents to use their discretion while guiding programs may contribute to the likelihood that the program is successful. For example, managing a democracy promotion program in Venezuela from headquarters in Washington may decrease the likelihood of success, given the array of local complexities. On the other hand, “Navigation by Judgment” may not be required to successfully build a bridge in Uruguay, a stable, predictable environment and an initiative with an easily verifiable outcome.
Honig’s book studies the differences between USAID and the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID). His findings suggest that DFID is more likely to empower field agents to use their judgement, while USAID tends to exert control over programs from headquarters. While USAID’s traditional management style is well suited for development projects in predictable environments with easily verified outcomes, DFID’s “Navigation by Judgment” style may be better suited for complex, unpredictable types of programs. As the development sector increasingly moves towards integrated, complex approaches to programming, field agent autonomy may only become more important.
Whether or not Green’s devolution efforts are successful relies on recognizing when doing so is helpful. USAID leadership would be wise to review the research of Honig and others in the development space to ensure their efforts are fruitful.
USAID’s field staff, however, are not the only actors to which decision-making authority can devolve. Given the amount of USAID’s programming implemented by contractors and grantees, any effective strategy of devolving power will inevitably include procurement reform. Fortunately, Green’s first few months at the helm of USAID demonstrated his willingness to tackle this tricky issue. Published in February, the State Department and USAID Joint Strategic Plan indicated USAID is interested in pursuing “co-creation” opportunities and other flexible partnership models. Often on the frontline of USAID programming, giving contractors and grantees greater flexibility to design and adjust programming as circumstances on the ground change would be an essential component of Green’s efforts to build a more nimble, responsive, agency.
USAID’s reform efforts are taking place in a Washington that is increasingly centralized, secretive, and disdainful of participation and cooperation. At odds with this trend, Green and USAID leadership have, by many accounts, led an inclusive, participatory reform process. They should be commended for this approach. To be successful, though, they must think beyond the new organizational structure and consider how decision-making processes can be changed for the better.
About the author: Greg Brown is the International Development Fellow at Young Professionals in Foreign Policy (YPFP). He is currently pursuing a Master’s degree in international economics and development at The Johns Hopkins University—Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).
Photo Source: By Cpl. Hernan Vidana, Defense.gov.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.
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USAID’s “Transformation” Will Only Be Realized If Decision Making Power Is Shared
July 13, 2018
Foreign Policy recently revealed the United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) proposed new organizational chart. The subject of extensive discussion in Washington’s development circles, the new structure would consolidate several bureaus and create new senior positions in the agency. While significant, these administrative changes are unlikely to achieve the ambitions of USAID Administrator Mark Green, who aims for more transformational change.
Though publicly available information is limited, reports indicate that Green’s goals include developing flexible new partnership models, finding ways to better leverage in-house talent, and empowering USAID’s field offices. To achieve these goals, Green’s reform efforts must not only reshuffle the organization’s structure but change how decisions are made and who makes them.
Prior to the release of the proposed organizational chart, various reports indicated Green’s reform campaign aimed to devolve power away from Washington out to USAID’s field offices, which exist in nearly every country that receives USAID support. In April, Devex reported the coordinator of USAID’s Transformation Task Force, Jim Richardson, aims to push “decisions and resources to the field” and use “Washington more as a consultative body to provide technical assistance.”
Of course, devolving power to the field is only useful if it results in concrete improvements to USAID policies and programs. Research in this area suggests there are times when empowering field agents can be useful and times when control from headquarters is more effective. Administrator Green and his team will be successful if they recognize the important lessons this research shares, particularly the recent work of Dan Honig.
In his book on development management, Honig introduces the term “Navigation by Judgment,” which describes a devolved, hands-off approach, in which field agents use their discretion to guide development projects. The inverse of this is a top-down, authoritative organizational structure in which headquarters calls the shots and field agents work to achieve narrowly defined outcomes.
Honig argues that “Navigation by Judgment” is most useful when development project outcomes and the local environment are unpredictable. “[A]s contexts become harder to navigate using top-down controls and measurement,” empowering field agents to use their discretion while guiding programs may contribute to the likelihood that the program is successful. For example, managing a democracy promotion program in Venezuela from headquarters in Washington may decrease the likelihood of success, given the array of local complexities. On the other hand, “Navigation by Judgment” may not be required to successfully build a bridge in Uruguay, a stable, predictable environment and an initiative with an easily verifiable outcome.
Honig’s book studies the differences between USAID and the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID). His findings suggest that DFID is more likely to empower field agents to use their judgement, while USAID tends to exert control over programs from headquarters. While USAID’s traditional management style is well suited for development projects in predictable environments with easily verified outcomes, DFID’s “Navigation by Judgment” style may be better suited for complex, unpredictable types of programs. As the development sector increasingly moves towards integrated, complex approaches to programming, field agent autonomy may only become more important.
Whether or not Green’s devolution efforts are successful relies on recognizing when doing so is helpful. USAID leadership would be wise to review the research of Honig and others in the development space to ensure their efforts are fruitful.
USAID’s field staff, however, are not the only actors to which decision-making authority can devolve. Given the amount of USAID’s programming implemented by contractors and grantees, any effective strategy of devolving power will inevitably include procurement reform. Fortunately, Green’s first few months at the helm of USAID demonstrated his willingness to tackle this tricky issue. Published in February, the State Department and USAID Joint Strategic Plan indicated USAID is interested in pursuing “co-creation” opportunities and other flexible partnership models. Often on the frontline of USAID programming, giving contractors and grantees greater flexibility to design and adjust programming as circumstances on the ground change would be an essential component of Green’s efforts to build a more nimble, responsive, agency.
USAID’s reform efforts are taking place in a Washington that is increasingly centralized, secretive, and disdainful of participation and cooperation. At odds with this trend, Green and USAID leadership have, by many accounts, led an inclusive, participatory reform process. They should be commended for this approach. To be successful, though, they must think beyond the new organizational structure and consider how decision-making processes can be changed for the better.
About the author: Greg Brown is the International Development Fellow at Young Professionals in Foreign Policy (YPFP). He is currently pursuing a Master’s degree in international economics and development at The Johns Hopkins University—Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).
Photo Source: By Cpl. Hernan Vidana, Defense.gov.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.
