Is China moving towards democracy? Seemingly capitalist, seemingly communist, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) frequently engages in half-hearted reforms that never quite reach their full potential. Laws passed in the last few years have well-intentioned goals such as strengthening the judicial system, increasing the rights of small town farmers to the proceeds of selling the land they work on, and reducing corruption. These reforms all seem to indicate the Chinese leadership’s intent to address the issues which lead to hundreds of thousands of protests every year, especially in the rural countryside. With such well-intentioned reforms, it would seem as though the march towards a democratic China is all but assured.
Yet with a closer look, many of these democratic reforms only address the symptoms rather than the root causes of the problems that motivate rural residents to protest in such overwhelming numbers. Central policy directives are rarely implemented on the local level and there are few checks and balances on the power of local officials. Officials in rural areas still have strong incentives, such as promotion within the party, to increase their jurisdiction’s GDP without regard to environmental damage, fair compensation to residents whose land is confiscated, or community involvement in the decision-making process. In high profile incidents where protests against land seizures gain media attention, central government officials will often play the role of good cop, punishing corrupt local officials. This tactic allows them to appease protesters and create good publicity but does nothing to eliminate the incentives for corruption that remain.
Nowhere was this more apparent than in the small town of Wukan, a fishing community in Guangdong province. In September 2011, town officials sold a local pig farm to a Hong Kong developer without the community’s input and vastly below the market value of the land. Outraged, the people of Wukan began a town-wide protest that lasted several months and managed to garner extensive international media coverage. Protesters brought signs to their sit-ins and rallies in the town square calling for a redistribution of confiscated land and the accountability of government officials too accustomed to profiting from shady backroom agreements. The protesters wanted more input in the town’s economic decisions and for town representatives to pay attention to residents rather than business interests. While the protesters consistently proclaimed their support for the central CCP, they demanded the accountability of local government officials who had maintained power for almost forty years.
In the late 1980s, democratic elections were implemented in rural areas across China, but in Wukan and many other towns officials in power were easily able to manipulate the system to ensure their reelection. Wukan residents tried for years to petition the regional government to address this undemocratic behavior, but had largely been ignored.
Protests in rural China are most often suppressed through force and intimidation, yet in Wukan the regional governor, Wang Yang, stepped in and peaceably negotiated a settlement with the protesters. The regional government paid for new elections, deemed free and fair by the ever-watchful Hong Kong press, and promised a redistribution of confiscated public land.
One influential current of Western thought on political reform in China holds that local-level reforms such as those implemented in Wukan constitute new seeds of democracy. This argument assumes small advances in the fairness of local elections and the accountability of local government officials are enough to push China on the path towards democracy. The government’s willingness to negotiate with protesters and settle conflict in a non-violent manner must be the beginning of a local policy with greater national implications for China. Such a taste of democracy in towns like Wukan could then push the central government towards democratic reform as well.
The implications of the Wukan incident, however, bear further reflection. The Wukan model could easily be used in the next ten years as a national political tool to placate grassroots political protests, but not in the way the ‘seed of democracy’ idea might predict. Because the solutions used to address Wukan’s problems did not address the structural problems of implementing democratic elections in a one-party state with a non-independent judiciary, there were effectively no changes made to prevent the next generation of leaders from committing the same abuses of power. And without structural reform of semi-democratic rural governments, how can this seed impact China on the national level?
The placation strategy used in Wukan is instead a model which Chinese leaders could use to address the growing anger in rural areas at government corruption and land grabs and further strengthen the CCP’s legitimacy as a party responsive to rural residents’ needs. After protesters left the streets the central propaganda apparatus unblocked “Wukan” as a search term on Chinese microblogs, which indicates the government wanted to use the peaceful solution to the Wukan protest as positive publicity across China. Indeed, the solution to the Wukan protest functioned as positive publicity for the CCP worldwide.
The most significant indicator the Wukan model of addressing grassroots political protest could be used nationwide is the direct involvement of Governor Wang Yang in the negotiations and his impending promotion to the national government. At the upcoming 18th Party Conference, Wang Yang is expected to take one of seven free positions on the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Communist Party Central Committee, the most powerful body in the CCP. After the downfall of Wang Yang’s policy rival, Bo Xilai, it seems Wang’s liberal “Guangdong model” has widespread support within the central CCP.
Due to the secretive and factional nature of inter-party dialogue, it is hard to predict future government policy. The public disavowal of Bo Xilai and his Chongqing model of political and economic reform make it more likely Wang Yang’s method of dealing with grassroots political protest will be influential. After Wang successfully negotiated a settlement in Wukan, powerful establishment figures such as Premier Wen Jiabao voiced their support for his actions. Bo Xilai’s political downfall, which could only have happened so publicly if his faction was weakened within the party, indicates Wang Yang will have much more room to implement the Wukan model across China if he is appointed to a ten-year term on the politburo. With so much popular public support for Wang Yang’s handling of the Wukan incident, it will be politically unpopular for the establishment to endorse any other model.
The policy implications of the Wukan incident are enormous. The Chinese government has publicly endorsed a tactic of both negotiating with protesters and conceding to their demands without the use of violence. Such a change in policy could positively affect the lives of thousands of Chinese who engage in political protest in the upcoming years. Yet this policy change is not the seed of Chinese democracy. The Wukan model will more likely be an effective tool to increase the legitimacy of the CCP without seriously addressing the structural problems inherent in the Chinese political system. More than political reform, the CCP is focused on remaining the sole governing entity in China. It remains to be seen how long this band-aid solution can prevent a wound from becoming infected.
This article was originally published in the Diplomatic Courier's November/December 2012 print edition.
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The Wukan Model: Democratic Reform or Political Maneuver?
December 5, 2012
Is China moving towards democracy? Seemingly capitalist, seemingly communist, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) frequently engages in half-hearted reforms that never quite reach their full potential. Laws passed in the last few years have well-intentioned goals such as strengthening the judicial system, increasing the rights of small town farmers to the proceeds of selling the land they work on, and reducing corruption. These reforms all seem to indicate the Chinese leadership’s intent to address the issues which lead to hundreds of thousands of protests every year, especially in the rural countryside. With such well-intentioned reforms, it would seem as though the march towards a democratic China is all but assured.
Yet with a closer look, many of these democratic reforms only address the symptoms rather than the root causes of the problems that motivate rural residents to protest in such overwhelming numbers. Central policy directives are rarely implemented on the local level and there are few checks and balances on the power of local officials. Officials in rural areas still have strong incentives, such as promotion within the party, to increase their jurisdiction’s GDP without regard to environmental damage, fair compensation to residents whose land is confiscated, or community involvement in the decision-making process. In high profile incidents where protests against land seizures gain media attention, central government officials will often play the role of good cop, punishing corrupt local officials. This tactic allows them to appease protesters and create good publicity but does nothing to eliminate the incentives for corruption that remain.
Nowhere was this more apparent than in the small town of Wukan, a fishing community in Guangdong province. In September 2011, town officials sold a local pig farm to a Hong Kong developer without the community’s input and vastly below the market value of the land. Outraged, the people of Wukan began a town-wide protest that lasted several months and managed to garner extensive international media coverage. Protesters brought signs to their sit-ins and rallies in the town square calling for a redistribution of confiscated land and the accountability of government officials too accustomed to profiting from shady backroom agreements. The protesters wanted more input in the town’s economic decisions and for town representatives to pay attention to residents rather than business interests. While the protesters consistently proclaimed their support for the central CCP, they demanded the accountability of local government officials who had maintained power for almost forty years.
In the late 1980s, democratic elections were implemented in rural areas across China, but in Wukan and many other towns officials in power were easily able to manipulate the system to ensure their reelection. Wukan residents tried for years to petition the regional government to address this undemocratic behavior, but had largely been ignored.
Protests in rural China are most often suppressed through force and intimidation, yet in Wukan the regional governor, Wang Yang, stepped in and peaceably negotiated a settlement with the protesters. The regional government paid for new elections, deemed free and fair by the ever-watchful Hong Kong press, and promised a redistribution of confiscated public land.
One influential current of Western thought on political reform in China holds that local-level reforms such as those implemented in Wukan constitute new seeds of democracy. This argument assumes small advances in the fairness of local elections and the accountability of local government officials are enough to push China on the path towards democracy. The government’s willingness to negotiate with protesters and settle conflict in a non-violent manner must be the beginning of a local policy with greater national implications for China. Such a taste of democracy in towns like Wukan could then push the central government towards democratic reform as well.
The implications of the Wukan incident, however, bear further reflection. The Wukan model could easily be used in the next ten years as a national political tool to placate grassroots political protests, but not in the way the ‘seed of democracy’ idea might predict. Because the solutions used to address Wukan’s problems did not address the structural problems of implementing democratic elections in a one-party state with a non-independent judiciary, there were effectively no changes made to prevent the next generation of leaders from committing the same abuses of power. And without structural reform of semi-democratic rural governments, how can this seed impact China on the national level?
The placation strategy used in Wukan is instead a model which Chinese leaders could use to address the growing anger in rural areas at government corruption and land grabs and further strengthen the CCP’s legitimacy as a party responsive to rural residents’ needs. After protesters left the streets the central propaganda apparatus unblocked “Wukan” as a search term on Chinese microblogs, which indicates the government wanted to use the peaceful solution to the Wukan protest as positive publicity across China. Indeed, the solution to the Wukan protest functioned as positive publicity for the CCP worldwide.
The most significant indicator the Wukan model of addressing grassroots political protest could be used nationwide is the direct involvement of Governor Wang Yang in the negotiations and his impending promotion to the national government. At the upcoming 18th Party Conference, Wang Yang is expected to take one of seven free positions on the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Communist Party Central Committee, the most powerful body in the CCP. After the downfall of Wang Yang’s policy rival, Bo Xilai, it seems Wang’s liberal “Guangdong model” has widespread support within the central CCP.
Due to the secretive and factional nature of inter-party dialogue, it is hard to predict future government policy. The public disavowal of Bo Xilai and his Chongqing model of political and economic reform make it more likely Wang Yang’s method of dealing with grassroots political protest will be influential. After Wang successfully negotiated a settlement in Wukan, powerful establishment figures such as Premier Wen Jiabao voiced their support for his actions. Bo Xilai’s political downfall, which could only have happened so publicly if his faction was weakened within the party, indicates Wang Yang will have much more room to implement the Wukan model across China if he is appointed to a ten-year term on the politburo. With so much popular public support for Wang Yang’s handling of the Wukan incident, it will be politically unpopular for the establishment to endorse any other model.
The policy implications of the Wukan incident are enormous. The Chinese government has publicly endorsed a tactic of both negotiating with protesters and conceding to their demands without the use of violence. Such a change in policy could positively affect the lives of thousands of Chinese who engage in political protest in the upcoming years. Yet this policy change is not the seed of Chinese democracy. The Wukan model will more likely be an effective tool to increase the legitimacy of the CCP without seriously addressing the structural problems inherent in the Chinese political system. More than political reform, the CCP is focused on remaining the sole governing entity in China. It remains to be seen how long this band-aid solution can prevent a wound from becoming infected.
This article was originally published in the Diplomatic Courier's November/December 2012 print edition.
