.
T

he difference is striking. Two recruiting advertisements, one for the U.S. Army and the other for the Russian military, offered contrasting self-images from Washington and Moscow. The American ad, mostly animated, featured a young woman, Emma, a serving corporal, and her two mothers. It showed her marching for equality and finding her own adventure and purpose in the Army. The Russian advertisement offered a hyper-masculine, dark, and menacing vision of service, with call backs to World War II. Some on social media were aghast. Critics saw the American ad as “woke” and suggested that somehow embracing diversity would undermine the country’s military might. Senator Ted Cruz of Texas tweeted, “Holy crap. Perhaps a woke, emasculated military is not the best idea....” 

There is no small irony that less than a year after the Russian propaganda video was released, Russian military strength was violently exposed as hollow, nothing more than smoke and mirrors. America’s “Emma” (or certainly those like her) was training Ukrainians how to defeat those idealized Russians soldiers embarked on the country’s “special military operation.” Yet the tone and style of Russia’s advertisement reflects an increasingly authoritarian, hyper-aggressive, ultra-nationalist strain of propaganda emerging from the Kremlin. 

Z Generation: Into the Heart of Russia’s Fascist Youth | Ian Garner | Hurst

While elements of this iconography have roots in the country’s history and self-image, it is one that has, in Dr. Ian Garner’s accounting, taken on new and alarming purpose and influence among Russia’s youth. His book “Z Generation” (a copy of which was kindly provided by the publisher) is a deeply disturbing, anecdotal exploration of the rise of fascism in Russia, particularly since the country’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. Garner explores how the Kremlin has sought to co-opt the youth of the country, redefining what it means to be “Russian,” and close pathways to alternative interpretations of Russian-ness and identity. 

Fascism is a deeply emotive term and concept, one that must be used with caution especially when viewing Russia under President Vladimir Putin. Literal interpretations are risky and can obfuscate complexity, overpower nuance, and lead to poor policy. One can certainly see elements reminiscent of fascism: a type of cult of personality surrounding a strongman leader, a militant ideology that harkens back to an idealized past, and the propaganda of constant struggle against internal and external adversaries. Most notably and alarming, in Garner’s accounting, is the process of “othering”—the creation of an enemy that is the target for defeat; the struggle over which will lead to renewed identity and purpose. 

Garner states at the outset that “Z Generation” is not an academic study. It is based neither on surveys nor polling but is more akin to a deeply informed journalistic exploration of his disturbing thesis and its consequences. This is an important fact to keep in mind when reading his book. There is a risk that readers take Garner’s message at face value and believe it to reflect Russian society as a whole, rather than one element of complex and turbulent forces within the country. 

A literal reading of Garner would seem to suggest that Putin and the Kremlin have managed mass mobilization of identity, transforming all of Russia into its vision of a militarized society in support of the authoritarian state. This is not strictly true. While there is widespread support for the war as Dr. Jade McGlynn demonstrated in “Russia’s War,” it is not universal—true believers are always the most vocal and most vociferous. Individuals interviewed by Garner almost certainly sought to portray themselves in the best light, as the most ardent believers and vocal supporters. This is especially in the performative world of social media. To Garner’s credit, he does include a few vignettes of individuals who have found themselves on the receiving end of the “othering” that this propaganda environment has created—an artist who discovers his gay identity, and a member of Russia’s ethnic Korean minority. 

It is true that the Russian state is transforming from a “personalist autocracy,” in the words of Dr. Timothy Frye, to something decidedly more authoritarian. The economy is more militarized, and what little room for opposition that existed prior to the war is now all but closed as the “special military operation” continues. Yet, assuming the last 18 months is reflective of all of Russia’s recent history is, however, misguided. Putin’s regime and his leadership relied on the tacit support and passive apathy of the people. He was deeply concerned about what they thought and sought to appear as though he cared. There was opposition (both loyal and otherwise) and some (sharply limited) room for criticism. 

The Kremlin also sought to paper over ethnic differences, focusing on a Russian identity that was far more inclusive than sectarian. In Garner’s telling, this identity has, however, shifted from a pseudo-inclusive “Russianness” to one that is ethnically Russian, Orthodox Christian, straight, and deeply patriotic. Anyone outside of these categories is, implicitly, the other and therefore an enemy. It is an aspirational identity, one to which all true Russians should strive. 

Much of what Garner uncovers through his interviews could be seen as performative politics at best. Activity on social media doesn’t always translate into real-world action. Posting on VK or Telegram, publishing nationalist art, and re-sharing pro-Putin/anti-Ukraine memes is not the same as picking up arms and going to the front in Donbas. Very few of those profiled by Garner joined Russia’s military or took part in pro-government protests. By way of comparison, of the countless people that put Ukraine’s flag (replacing the previous issue du jour) in their profiles on Twitter or Facebook, how many donated to Ukrainian charities? Participation in this performative politics makes one feel good and part of  something greater, but without the requirement of doing something. Action could, however, be a lagging indicator. If Putin and the Kremlin sought to co-opt the youth, Russia’s Gen Z, the results may only truly be seen in the years ahead. 

A consistent and eerily familiar tone throughout Garner’s interviews is the sense of disenfranchisement with the system and government—how Millennials bought into a system that promised (however tenuously) progress and success, only to fundamentally fail them as they were on the verge of maturity. The illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 started a process of economic and political isolation culminated by February 2022’s expanded invasion. The hopes and dreams of young professionals stalled as the West sought to punish the Kremlin for its geopolitical aggression. For the Millennial generation, Putin sought greater apathy as opposed to outright mobilization, which Garner finds is Putin’s objective for the next generational cohort, Gen Z. 

By creating an external cast of enemies—such as the United States, United Kingdom, NATO, etc.—and by crafting domestic villains, the Kremlin shifted blame away from its own failures. At the same time, it has embellished and weaponized the narrative of Russian greatness and exceptionalism. In this telling, the country was the last great hope for conservative, Christian values, standing against the decadent and debauched West—a message that, ironically, many on the right in the “debauched” West latched onto and accepted as a gospel of sorts. It is as populist as it is fascist. 

The long-term effects of this propaganda and Garner’s “fascism” are the most concerning aspect of the book. Within Russia, even if the narrative is not universally supported, the Kremlin’s saturation of the domestic information space with alleged foreign threats and homegrown traitors assuredly means it can take actions it is already inclined to take but do so with greater ease. It becomes much easier for Russia to continue waging this or the next “special military operation” if its populace believes it is already under attack. Personal and domestic self-sacrifice is much more palatable if you believe it is in support of the quasi-religious mission of Russian greatness, no different than the sacrifices of their grandparents in World War II.  

Leveraging the institutions of the state, the Orthodox Church, and the Young Army—a quasi-Boy Scout/ROTC program—for the Kremlin’s interests does presage longer-term risks for Western policymakers. The Kremlin has sought to leverage social media to mobilize support for its policies and its unique brand of “Russianness.” While this message has elements of Putin, it is not wholly tied to Vladimir Vladimirovich. This mass mobilization is about a greater Russia that is under threat from both within and from the outside; it is a narrative into which any Russian leader could tap. Putin’s successor could well be a “turbo patriot” or, less likely, a moderate reformer, either of which could tap into this narrative. It’s not about the man, it’s about the message. 

In the near-term, there is a risk that the movement outpaces the man and the message itself. What happens if the forces the Kremlin unleashed and mobilized with its fascist narrative no longer believe that those in power are prosecuting the campaigns of the state with sufficient verve and vigor? These are forces that are, for now, controllable by the state, even in the wake of the recent mutiny by Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Wagner Group. There is no guarantee this will remain the case, especially as cracks within the regime’s façade of control start to appear.

Garner closes his book by asking “what is to be done” about this fascist strain within Russian society. He explores de-programming and de-radicalization efforts, some of which were done one-on-one over the phone. His question is, however, based on the belief that the West can do something at all. If, as Garner suggests, the fascists propaganda is so wide and so deep, so all pervasive within Russian society, there is arguably very little the West can do.

Counter-propaganda efforts within Russia will simply be labeled as “foreign agent” activity. Efforts to support domestic opposition will almost certainly work against those they are intended to help. The United States and others have enough difficulty countering Russian propaganda at home, let alone possess the expertise to undermine it within Russia. The best Washington, London, or Brussels could do is possess a measure of both strategic empathy—understanding, though not accepting, how Russia sees the world—and strategic humility, recognizing the limits of their power, and crafting policy accordingly. Their end goal should be crisis management and containment, not altering Russian behavior.

“Z Generation” is a disturbing read about the present and future of Russia. The rise of fascism Garner explores is concerning now, but is deeply alarming when gauging the country’s long-term trajectory, and what it means for Moscow’s relations with the West. Garner demonstrates how substantially the Kremlin has shifted the window of public discourse. Not all Russians may accept Putin’s narrative, but it is less about them. It is more about the true believers, the “dreamers of the day” about whom T. E. Lawrence wrote, and who could well shape the future course of the country. 

About
Joshua Huminski
:
Joshua C. Huminski is the Senior Vice President for National Security & Intelligence Programs and the Director of the Mike Rogers Center at the Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.

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www.diplomaticourier.com

The Unique Fascism of Russia’s Radicalized Youth

The onion domes of Moscow, Russia. Image by Eliane Meyer from Pixabay.

July 15, 2023

Much of the iconography in recent Russian propaganda have root in the country's history and self-image. But Ian Garner's new book "Z Generation" illustrates a new and alarming purpose and influence of Russian propaganda on the country's youth, writes Joshua Huminski.

T

he difference is striking. Two recruiting advertisements, one for the U.S. Army and the other for the Russian military, offered contrasting self-images from Washington and Moscow. The American ad, mostly animated, featured a young woman, Emma, a serving corporal, and her two mothers. It showed her marching for equality and finding her own adventure and purpose in the Army. The Russian advertisement offered a hyper-masculine, dark, and menacing vision of service, with call backs to World War II. Some on social media were aghast. Critics saw the American ad as “woke” and suggested that somehow embracing diversity would undermine the country’s military might. Senator Ted Cruz of Texas tweeted, “Holy crap. Perhaps a woke, emasculated military is not the best idea....” 

There is no small irony that less than a year after the Russian propaganda video was released, Russian military strength was violently exposed as hollow, nothing more than smoke and mirrors. America’s “Emma” (or certainly those like her) was training Ukrainians how to defeat those idealized Russians soldiers embarked on the country’s “special military operation.” Yet the tone and style of Russia’s advertisement reflects an increasingly authoritarian, hyper-aggressive, ultra-nationalist strain of propaganda emerging from the Kremlin. 

Z Generation: Into the Heart of Russia’s Fascist Youth | Ian Garner | Hurst

While elements of this iconography have roots in the country’s history and self-image, it is one that has, in Dr. Ian Garner’s accounting, taken on new and alarming purpose and influence among Russia’s youth. His book “Z Generation” (a copy of which was kindly provided by the publisher) is a deeply disturbing, anecdotal exploration of the rise of fascism in Russia, particularly since the country’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. Garner explores how the Kremlin has sought to co-opt the youth of the country, redefining what it means to be “Russian,” and close pathways to alternative interpretations of Russian-ness and identity. 

Fascism is a deeply emotive term and concept, one that must be used with caution especially when viewing Russia under President Vladimir Putin. Literal interpretations are risky and can obfuscate complexity, overpower nuance, and lead to poor policy. One can certainly see elements reminiscent of fascism: a type of cult of personality surrounding a strongman leader, a militant ideology that harkens back to an idealized past, and the propaganda of constant struggle against internal and external adversaries. Most notably and alarming, in Garner’s accounting, is the process of “othering”—the creation of an enemy that is the target for defeat; the struggle over which will lead to renewed identity and purpose. 

Garner states at the outset that “Z Generation” is not an academic study. It is based neither on surveys nor polling but is more akin to a deeply informed journalistic exploration of his disturbing thesis and its consequences. This is an important fact to keep in mind when reading his book. There is a risk that readers take Garner’s message at face value and believe it to reflect Russian society as a whole, rather than one element of complex and turbulent forces within the country. 

A literal reading of Garner would seem to suggest that Putin and the Kremlin have managed mass mobilization of identity, transforming all of Russia into its vision of a militarized society in support of the authoritarian state. This is not strictly true. While there is widespread support for the war as Dr. Jade McGlynn demonstrated in “Russia’s War,” it is not universal—true believers are always the most vocal and most vociferous. Individuals interviewed by Garner almost certainly sought to portray themselves in the best light, as the most ardent believers and vocal supporters. This is especially in the performative world of social media. To Garner’s credit, he does include a few vignettes of individuals who have found themselves on the receiving end of the “othering” that this propaganda environment has created—an artist who discovers his gay identity, and a member of Russia’s ethnic Korean minority. 

It is true that the Russian state is transforming from a “personalist autocracy,” in the words of Dr. Timothy Frye, to something decidedly more authoritarian. The economy is more militarized, and what little room for opposition that existed prior to the war is now all but closed as the “special military operation” continues. Yet, assuming the last 18 months is reflective of all of Russia’s recent history is, however, misguided. Putin’s regime and his leadership relied on the tacit support and passive apathy of the people. He was deeply concerned about what they thought and sought to appear as though he cared. There was opposition (both loyal and otherwise) and some (sharply limited) room for criticism. 

The Kremlin also sought to paper over ethnic differences, focusing on a Russian identity that was far more inclusive than sectarian. In Garner’s telling, this identity has, however, shifted from a pseudo-inclusive “Russianness” to one that is ethnically Russian, Orthodox Christian, straight, and deeply patriotic. Anyone outside of these categories is, implicitly, the other and therefore an enemy. It is an aspirational identity, one to which all true Russians should strive. 

Much of what Garner uncovers through his interviews could be seen as performative politics at best. Activity on social media doesn’t always translate into real-world action. Posting on VK or Telegram, publishing nationalist art, and re-sharing pro-Putin/anti-Ukraine memes is not the same as picking up arms and going to the front in Donbas. Very few of those profiled by Garner joined Russia’s military or took part in pro-government protests. By way of comparison, of the countless people that put Ukraine’s flag (replacing the previous issue du jour) in their profiles on Twitter or Facebook, how many donated to Ukrainian charities? Participation in this performative politics makes one feel good and part of  something greater, but without the requirement of doing something. Action could, however, be a lagging indicator. If Putin and the Kremlin sought to co-opt the youth, Russia’s Gen Z, the results may only truly be seen in the years ahead. 

A consistent and eerily familiar tone throughout Garner’s interviews is the sense of disenfranchisement with the system and government—how Millennials bought into a system that promised (however tenuously) progress and success, only to fundamentally fail them as they were on the verge of maturity. The illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 started a process of economic and political isolation culminated by February 2022’s expanded invasion. The hopes and dreams of young professionals stalled as the West sought to punish the Kremlin for its geopolitical aggression. For the Millennial generation, Putin sought greater apathy as opposed to outright mobilization, which Garner finds is Putin’s objective for the next generational cohort, Gen Z. 

By creating an external cast of enemies—such as the United States, United Kingdom, NATO, etc.—and by crafting domestic villains, the Kremlin shifted blame away from its own failures. At the same time, it has embellished and weaponized the narrative of Russian greatness and exceptionalism. In this telling, the country was the last great hope for conservative, Christian values, standing against the decadent and debauched West—a message that, ironically, many on the right in the “debauched” West latched onto and accepted as a gospel of sorts. It is as populist as it is fascist. 

The long-term effects of this propaganda and Garner’s “fascism” are the most concerning aspect of the book. Within Russia, even if the narrative is not universally supported, the Kremlin’s saturation of the domestic information space with alleged foreign threats and homegrown traitors assuredly means it can take actions it is already inclined to take but do so with greater ease. It becomes much easier for Russia to continue waging this or the next “special military operation” if its populace believes it is already under attack. Personal and domestic self-sacrifice is much more palatable if you believe it is in support of the quasi-religious mission of Russian greatness, no different than the sacrifices of their grandparents in World War II.  

Leveraging the institutions of the state, the Orthodox Church, and the Young Army—a quasi-Boy Scout/ROTC program—for the Kremlin’s interests does presage longer-term risks for Western policymakers. The Kremlin has sought to leverage social media to mobilize support for its policies and its unique brand of “Russianness.” While this message has elements of Putin, it is not wholly tied to Vladimir Vladimirovich. This mass mobilization is about a greater Russia that is under threat from both within and from the outside; it is a narrative into which any Russian leader could tap. Putin’s successor could well be a “turbo patriot” or, less likely, a moderate reformer, either of which could tap into this narrative. It’s not about the man, it’s about the message. 

In the near-term, there is a risk that the movement outpaces the man and the message itself. What happens if the forces the Kremlin unleashed and mobilized with its fascist narrative no longer believe that those in power are prosecuting the campaigns of the state with sufficient verve and vigor? These are forces that are, for now, controllable by the state, even in the wake of the recent mutiny by Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Wagner Group. There is no guarantee this will remain the case, especially as cracks within the regime’s façade of control start to appear.

Garner closes his book by asking “what is to be done” about this fascist strain within Russian society. He explores de-programming and de-radicalization efforts, some of which were done one-on-one over the phone. His question is, however, based on the belief that the West can do something at all. If, as Garner suggests, the fascists propaganda is so wide and so deep, so all pervasive within Russian society, there is arguably very little the West can do.

Counter-propaganda efforts within Russia will simply be labeled as “foreign agent” activity. Efforts to support domestic opposition will almost certainly work against those they are intended to help. The United States and others have enough difficulty countering Russian propaganda at home, let alone possess the expertise to undermine it within Russia. The best Washington, London, or Brussels could do is possess a measure of both strategic empathy—understanding, though not accepting, how Russia sees the world—and strategic humility, recognizing the limits of their power, and crafting policy accordingly. Their end goal should be crisis management and containment, not altering Russian behavior.

“Z Generation” is a disturbing read about the present and future of Russia. The rise of fascism Garner explores is concerning now, but is deeply alarming when gauging the country’s long-term trajectory, and what it means for Moscow’s relations with the West. Garner demonstrates how substantially the Kremlin has shifted the window of public discourse. Not all Russians may accept Putin’s narrative, but it is less about them. It is more about the true believers, the “dreamers of the day” about whom T. E. Lawrence wrote, and who could well shape the future course of the country. 

About
Joshua Huminski
:
Joshua C. Huminski is the Senior Vice President for National Security & Intelligence Programs and the Director of the Mike Rogers Center at the Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.