.

As the Syrian civil war enters its 36th month, it is becoming clearer that the conflict is spilling into neighboring states. In Syria, Bashar al-Assad has been waging a bloody war with Sunni insurgents. Assad is an Alawite Muslim, which is an offshoot of Shiite Islam. The Syrian Government has become dependent on religious allies for support, and Sunni fundamentalist groups have become the strongest opposition. Iran and Hezbollah have actively backed their long-term ally in the Assad government, while Saudi Arabia and Qatar have supported the Sunni rebels. The war has morphed into a larger fight between Sunnis and Shiites that has spread into neighboring countries, and has the potential to ignite a wider conflict across the entire region.

The rivalry between Sunnis and Shiites is closely tied to the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, who both seek to be the dominant power in the region. The two states distrust one another, and both view themselves as the regional leader with ideology rooted in their respective Islamic faiths. Iran is a Shiite majority country, and the revolutionary government that replaced the Shah has actively supported its religious brethren throughout the Middle East. Sunni Islam is a central component of Saudi identity as is the custodianship of the two Islamic holy sites in Mecca and Medina. Saudi Arabia is the birthplace of Islam and most Saudis are Salafi, which is a conservative practice of Islam that does not recognize Shiites as Muslims.

Saudi-Iranian competition pre-dates the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Prior to Iran’s revolution, the disputes were minor and centered on religious practices. The Shah was secular and sought to Westernize Iran, whereas Saudi Arabia maintained strict Islamic tradition. Now the rivalry is a zero sum game for influence. Tensions exploded after revolutionary Iran sought to export its revolution and empower Shiites across the Middle East.

The war in Syria has worsened the enmity. Iran views outside support for anti-Assad rebels as undermining their primary ally in the Middle East. A loss in Syria would make the Iranians even more isolated. For their part, the Saudis are concerned by the sectarian battle in Syria because they view the Iranians as being on the offensive, potentially weakening the Saudi’s security situation. Saudi authorities have blamed Iran for instigating previous protests in the oil rich Eastern Province, where the majority of Saudi Shiites live. Also, Saudi authorities believe Shiite employees of Aramco working on behalf of Iran were responsible for the large cyber attack in 2012 that damaged thousands of computers at the oil giant. These events are viewed in Riyadh as national security and ideological threats due to fears that the Shiite population is loyal to Tehran.

Iran has also supported Shiite opposition groups in Yemen and Bahrain in recent years, which challenge Saudi Arabia’s Sunni allies. The Saudis have backed their co-religionists governing both countries with military force. Saudi troops have been deployed to Bahrain to support the Sunni monarchy and Saudi forces launched air strikes against Shiite rebels in Yemen. The Saudis are concerned by the Shiite-dominated government in Iraq’s close ties to Tehran. The loss of Iraq is particularly concerning since Saddam Hussein was viewed as a Sunni bulwark against Iran. Syria has been Iran’s beachhead in the western Middle East, and the Saudis are working to reverse what they see as Shiite ascendency from the Gulf to the Mediterranean.

One of the primary places where the Syrian civil war has increased sectarian tension is in Lebanon. Hezbollah forces have been fighting in Syria since 2012 and played a key role in the capture of the strategic town of Qusayr on the border with Lebanon. The role of Hezbollah has inflamed religious tensions in Lebanon, where many Sunnis have family ties and sympathize with the Sunni rebels in Syria. Since 2012 hundreds have been killed in sectarian fighting between Hezbollah and Sunni opposition forces. The clashes have sidelined moderate Sunni voices and radical clerics have gained influence, which will only perpetuate the conflict. In 2013, the violence culminated in an attack on the Iranian Embassy, and the assassinations of a Hezbollah commander and a former Sunni Lebanese Ambassador to the U.S. that was blamed on Hezbollah. Car bombs have exploded in Hezbollah and Sunni neighborhoods, and the bloodshed shows no signs of slowing.

The rise of Sunni fundamentalist groups in Syria has also impacted the security situation in Iraq. Sectarian tensions in Iraq came to a boil after the U.S. invasion. In 2006 there was fierce fighting between Sunni and Shiite militias that left thousands dead and millions displaced. Recently, the situation has again taken a turn for the worse. In January 2014, militants aligned with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have seized Ramadi and Fallujah in Anbar province. The origins of ISIS can be traced to Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) that began fighting in Iraq in 2003. AQI sought to create Sunni Islamic state in Iraq and waged a bloody war against US forces and Iraqi Shiites. Their violent attacks against civilians led to a backlash and their decline. By 2007 many Sunni insurgents turned against AQI, and in 2008 US military operations had rendered the group largely ineffective. In April, 2013 the group reestablished itself in Syria and changed its name to ISIS to reflect its expansion beyond Iraq. It has established a presence in northern Syria and ruthlessly crushed rival groups and enforced Sharia law in cities it has captured. The Iraqi-Syria border is porous, and men, weapons, and money flow freely between the two countries. While Sunni-Shiite discord in Iraq predates the war in Syria, the rise of ISIS directly stems from the civil war where it created a base of operations for radical groups that can now spread into neighboring states.

The war in Syria shows no sign of slowing down. The rise of radical Sunni groups and the decline of the secular opposition will only intensify the religious dynamic of the conflict. The Middle East has seen extensive turmoil with the Arab Spring and uncertainty about the future of the U.S.’s role in the region. Saudis and the Sunni Gulf states re concerned that the nuclear deal with Iran and the U.S. backing away from launching a strike on Syria have weakened their position. Under these circumstances the Sunni order, led by Saudi Arabia, is deeply concerned about their security needs and will do everything to support their interests. This means providing further support to Sunni allies, including governments and non-state players. The deepening sectarian conflict will only worsen as both sides become more radicalized, and are further convinced that they are in a life or death struggle with mortal enemies.

Vineet Daga is an independent foreign policy writer. He has a BA and MA in international affairs from The George Washington University.

This article was originally published in the Diplomatic Courier's March/April 2014 print edition.

The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.

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Syrian Spillover

March 13, 2014

As the Syrian civil war enters its 36th month, it is becoming clearer that the conflict is spilling into neighboring states. In Syria, Bashar al-Assad has been waging a bloody war with Sunni insurgents. Assad is an Alawite Muslim, which is an offshoot of Shiite Islam. The Syrian Government has become dependent on religious allies for support, and Sunni fundamentalist groups have become the strongest opposition. Iran and Hezbollah have actively backed their long-term ally in the Assad government, while Saudi Arabia and Qatar have supported the Sunni rebels. The war has morphed into a larger fight between Sunnis and Shiites that has spread into neighboring countries, and has the potential to ignite a wider conflict across the entire region.

The rivalry between Sunnis and Shiites is closely tied to the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, who both seek to be the dominant power in the region. The two states distrust one another, and both view themselves as the regional leader with ideology rooted in their respective Islamic faiths. Iran is a Shiite majority country, and the revolutionary government that replaced the Shah has actively supported its religious brethren throughout the Middle East. Sunni Islam is a central component of Saudi identity as is the custodianship of the two Islamic holy sites in Mecca and Medina. Saudi Arabia is the birthplace of Islam and most Saudis are Salafi, which is a conservative practice of Islam that does not recognize Shiites as Muslims.

Saudi-Iranian competition pre-dates the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Prior to Iran’s revolution, the disputes were minor and centered on religious practices. The Shah was secular and sought to Westernize Iran, whereas Saudi Arabia maintained strict Islamic tradition. Now the rivalry is a zero sum game for influence. Tensions exploded after revolutionary Iran sought to export its revolution and empower Shiites across the Middle East.

The war in Syria has worsened the enmity. Iran views outside support for anti-Assad rebels as undermining their primary ally in the Middle East. A loss in Syria would make the Iranians even more isolated. For their part, the Saudis are concerned by the sectarian battle in Syria because they view the Iranians as being on the offensive, potentially weakening the Saudi’s security situation. Saudi authorities have blamed Iran for instigating previous protests in the oil rich Eastern Province, where the majority of Saudi Shiites live. Also, Saudi authorities believe Shiite employees of Aramco working on behalf of Iran were responsible for the large cyber attack in 2012 that damaged thousands of computers at the oil giant. These events are viewed in Riyadh as national security and ideological threats due to fears that the Shiite population is loyal to Tehran.

Iran has also supported Shiite opposition groups in Yemen and Bahrain in recent years, which challenge Saudi Arabia’s Sunni allies. The Saudis have backed their co-religionists governing both countries with military force. Saudi troops have been deployed to Bahrain to support the Sunni monarchy and Saudi forces launched air strikes against Shiite rebels in Yemen. The Saudis are concerned by the Shiite-dominated government in Iraq’s close ties to Tehran. The loss of Iraq is particularly concerning since Saddam Hussein was viewed as a Sunni bulwark against Iran. Syria has been Iran’s beachhead in the western Middle East, and the Saudis are working to reverse what they see as Shiite ascendency from the Gulf to the Mediterranean.

One of the primary places where the Syrian civil war has increased sectarian tension is in Lebanon. Hezbollah forces have been fighting in Syria since 2012 and played a key role in the capture of the strategic town of Qusayr on the border with Lebanon. The role of Hezbollah has inflamed religious tensions in Lebanon, where many Sunnis have family ties and sympathize with the Sunni rebels in Syria. Since 2012 hundreds have been killed in sectarian fighting between Hezbollah and Sunni opposition forces. The clashes have sidelined moderate Sunni voices and radical clerics have gained influence, which will only perpetuate the conflict. In 2013, the violence culminated in an attack on the Iranian Embassy, and the assassinations of a Hezbollah commander and a former Sunni Lebanese Ambassador to the U.S. that was blamed on Hezbollah. Car bombs have exploded in Hezbollah and Sunni neighborhoods, and the bloodshed shows no signs of slowing.

The rise of Sunni fundamentalist groups in Syria has also impacted the security situation in Iraq. Sectarian tensions in Iraq came to a boil after the U.S. invasion. In 2006 there was fierce fighting between Sunni and Shiite militias that left thousands dead and millions displaced. Recently, the situation has again taken a turn for the worse. In January 2014, militants aligned with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have seized Ramadi and Fallujah in Anbar province. The origins of ISIS can be traced to Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) that began fighting in Iraq in 2003. AQI sought to create Sunni Islamic state in Iraq and waged a bloody war against US forces and Iraqi Shiites. Their violent attacks against civilians led to a backlash and their decline. By 2007 many Sunni insurgents turned against AQI, and in 2008 US military operations had rendered the group largely ineffective. In April, 2013 the group reestablished itself in Syria and changed its name to ISIS to reflect its expansion beyond Iraq. It has established a presence in northern Syria and ruthlessly crushed rival groups and enforced Sharia law in cities it has captured. The Iraqi-Syria border is porous, and men, weapons, and money flow freely between the two countries. While Sunni-Shiite discord in Iraq predates the war in Syria, the rise of ISIS directly stems from the civil war where it created a base of operations for radical groups that can now spread into neighboring states.

The war in Syria shows no sign of slowing down. The rise of radical Sunni groups and the decline of the secular opposition will only intensify the religious dynamic of the conflict. The Middle East has seen extensive turmoil with the Arab Spring and uncertainty about the future of the U.S.’s role in the region. Saudis and the Sunni Gulf states re concerned that the nuclear deal with Iran and the U.S. backing away from launching a strike on Syria have weakened their position. Under these circumstances the Sunni order, led by Saudi Arabia, is deeply concerned about their security needs and will do everything to support their interests. This means providing further support to Sunni allies, including governments and non-state players. The deepening sectarian conflict will only worsen as both sides become more radicalized, and are further convinced that they are in a life or death struggle with mortal enemies.

Vineet Daga is an independent foreign policy writer. He has a BA and MA in international affairs from The George Washington University.

This article was originally published in the Diplomatic Courier's March/April 2014 print edition.

The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.