Robert Kagan is one of the world’s leading experts on U.S. foreign policy, having written such landmark works as Dangerous Nation, The Return of History and the End of Dreams, and Of Paradise and Power. Kagan is currently the Director of the Foreign Policy Initiative, an organization that seeks to promote continued U.S. engagement in the world, along with military might, human rights, and democracy promotion. He is also a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, a monthly columnist for the Washington Post, and contributing editor to The Weekly Standard and The New Republic. Having held numerous foreign policy positions in government and authored works that still garner considerable attention to this day, Kagan’s worldview has no doubt shaped the debate in Washington on matters pertaining to global affairs, U.S. defense, and democratization. The Diplomatic Courier had the chance to sit down with Kagan for an interview on the current state of U.S. foreign policy under the Obama Administration.
[DIPLOMATIC COURIER]: Do you think the U.S.-led war in Iraq has had an impact in any way on the popular revolts currently sweeping the Arab world?
[ROBERT KAGAN]: Kagan: I’m inclined to say that what’s happening in the Arab world is independent, mostly, from what happens in Iraq. One can surmise that perhaps the fact that Iraq was holding democratic elections raised the issue in other parts of the region, with people asking, “if Iraq is holding elections, why aren’t we holding elections?” But, I would say that the case of Egypt was easily predictable in the sense that Mubarak’s rule had created a tremendous amount of dissatisfaction. Egyptians grew tired of 3 decades of military rule by an increasingly rigid dictator like Mubarak. So, it’s a long way of saying that Iraq had some positive effect, but my guess is that it was fairly marginal.
[DC]: What role do you think the U.S. should be playing in the revolts in the Arab world?
[RK]: I think that when you look at the Middle East, there’s a big false dichotomy that’s being set up between a supposed “idealistic” approach and a supposedly “realistic” approach. My view is that it is highly unrealistic to imagine that we’re going to be able to support these dictators in the region against the will of their people indefinitely. That kind of policy led to the Shah of Iran falling not to moderate forces, but to radical forces. I think anyone who thinks we could have clung to Mubarak longer than we did doesn’t understand the dynamic in Egypt. And I think that as far as the administration is pressing for reforms in all these countries, they’re right to do so, and in some cases they should be pressing harder. I think that at the end of the day, every single one of the dictators in the Middle East is going to be overthrown. And I think it’s very foolish on our part to be clinging to this dying model in the Arab world.
[DC]: What about the dynamic in a country like Yemen, which we rely on so heavily for counter terrorism and when the alternative to Saleh’s rule doesn’t present many moderate alternatives upfront?
[RK]: I’m not sure we know exactly what the alternatives are. There are certainly going to be risks to losing Saleh’s support, although you can overstate the degree to which Saleh was very committed to finding Al Qaeda. In fact, it’s clear the U.S. has had to take up a certain portion of that effort itself. In any case, people talk about the downside risks of losing these dictators, as if we have an option of supporting them indefinitely. If our policy is to support Saleh for as long as it takes, no matter how brutal his actions, I think that’s a loser.
[DC]: One of your most prominent books was “Of Paradise and Power,” which described the growing rift between the U.S. government and its European allies on issues pertaining to foreign policy. Several developments have changed with regards to the EU/NATO since you published the work, namely, the rise in nationalist and anti-Islamist political parties throughout Europe, as well as the NATO-led operation in Libya. Do you feel that these developments are affecting your basic arguments in “Of Paradise and Power” in any way?
[RK]: I don’t see a lot of signs that Europe is anymore inclined to maintain itself as a military power in the world. I’m very heartened to see France and Britain taking a leadership role in Libya, but I can’t help but note that their capacity to do so is clearly limited and their willingness to spend money to give themselves that capacity is even more limited. I think that there are many wonderful successes of the EU, but I wish it were much more powerful. I wish that it had an independent military capability, but for the most part Europeans are not interested in spending that money. And I think it’s additionally troubling to see the role Germany is now playing. Germany abstained from the Libyan operation, which I think reflects the general German view that they just don’t want to be involved in the world, except economically. It’s very hard to envision a potent European actor on the world stage if Germany is sitting it out. It’s the largest country in Europe, and I think without Germany, Europe is not going to be a strong force.
[DC]: Do you think that the United States should have done more in the Libya operation?
[RK]: Well you know these operations are never done the way you might want to draw them up. We’ve lived through several of these kinds of interventions. The Kosovo operation in 1999 was ultimately successful but not before several months of failure. I am thus not too critical of the administration’s current approach. I do think however that if they had been willing to do more upfront, at a time when the Libyan rebels were really advancing and Qaddafi looked like he was on his last legs, we might have managed to topple Qaddafi without all the difficulty that we’ve had since. I attribute the reluctance in the administration primarily to Bob Gates, who has decided as his parting shot as Secretary of Defense that he is going to oppose military action no matter if the President wants to or not. It was very hard for the President to overrule him. Despite the fact that I think they could have done a great deal more and more effectively if they had acted sooner, I’m not prepared to say that they haven’t succeeded. And they may well succeed. I recall in Kosovo and in the Balkans in general, you know, many months of pulling our hair out because things weren’t working, but ultimately prevailing. And I think that we can still prevail in Libya.
[DC]: How do you respond to today’s calls for defense cuts, from liberal Democrats to Tea Party members, in the name of restoring our fiscal sanity?
[RK]: The fiscal sanity thing is pretty absurd. Unfortunately, President Obama is calling for defense cuts of $400 billion over 10 years. To say that that is a drop in the bucket of the overall fiscal crisis is an insult to drops in buckets. It’s a trivial amount. Our budget crisis is being driven by entitlements and tax policies, not defense. These have been the same people calling for retrenchment in American foreign policy for decades, and now they are using the budget deficit as a means of strengthening their hand. The question we have to ask is, “How much is the world order that the US plays such a big role in upholding worth to us?” I think it’s worth an incalculable amount because, since World War 2, the US-led world order has produced among other things the greatest period of prosperity in human history.
[DC]: You have been an advocate of the war with Iraq since its early days. How would you grade the Obama Administration’s policy towards Iraq since taking over the reins from the Bush Administration?
[RK]: I did support the war, as did Hilary Clinton, and Joe Biden. I would like to make that point because unfortunate wars, or are at least wars that people feel haven’t gone very well, turn out to have very few supporters. I feel the Administration has done pretty well until now. I think that Vice President Biden has taken the issue in Iraq very seriously, has visited frequently, and has attempted to work through the very complicated political situation in Iraq. And up until now the Administration has not been rushing US forces out of Iraq prematurely. One of the good things that President Obama did was maintain a continuing commitment to Iraq. The issue now is whether the Iraqi government can be persuaded to invite American forces to stay longer to make up for what are pretty dramatic deficiencies in Iraqi capabilities. I’m not sure they have yet the capacity to deal with certain kinds of terrorist attacks and movements within the country that are still lurking about. I think it would be an advantage both to Iraq and American interests to maintain some level of forces beyond this year but as of now that hasn’t happened. Gates has been trying to convince the Iraqis to make this move. On the whole I do grade the administration positively on Iraq.
[DC]: For our international & diplomatic audience, can you grade the Obama Administration’s foreign policy record to date? Is there an Obama Doctrine, and if so, what are your thoughts on it? Explain.
[RK]: I don’t think there’s an Obama doctrine. Usually doctrines are created in responses to events rather than out of the mind of some National Security Advisor or President. People don’t just invent a doctrine. The Truman doctrine came in response to concerns about encroachments in Turkey and Greece, the Reagan doctrine was in response to Soviet positions in the Middle East etc. Obama has yet to have that situation. I think to some extent he has missed an opportunity to outline for the American people what our stakes are in the Arab Spring, and what a revolutionary moment this is and why it’s an opportunity for the U.S. I think he was uniquely suited to do that because he’s not part of the generation of Snowcrofts and Brzezinskis who are responsible for supporting these dictators so lovingly over the years. He was from a different generation. And he had an opportunity to make a break with that path, but he hasn’t brought himself to do that. On the other hand, I don’t think people should be scrambling for a doctrine. The key issue is what the successes of the policy are. I’m not very negative on the administration - I think they’ve done some good things.
Publisher’s Note: This interview was originally published in the summer print edition of the Diplomatic Courier.
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Summer Issue: Interview with Robert Kagan
June 5, 2011
Robert Kagan is one of the world’s leading experts on U.S. foreign policy, having written such landmark works as Dangerous Nation, The Return of History and the End of Dreams, and Of Paradise and Power. Kagan is currently the Director of the Foreign Policy Initiative, an organization that seeks to promote continued U.S. engagement in the world, along with military might, human rights, and democracy promotion. He is also a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, a monthly columnist for the Washington Post, and contributing editor to The Weekly Standard and The New Republic. Having held numerous foreign policy positions in government and authored works that still garner considerable attention to this day, Kagan’s worldview has no doubt shaped the debate in Washington on matters pertaining to global affairs, U.S. defense, and democratization. The Diplomatic Courier had the chance to sit down with Kagan for an interview on the current state of U.S. foreign policy under the Obama Administration.
[DIPLOMATIC COURIER]: Do you think the U.S.-led war in Iraq has had an impact in any way on the popular revolts currently sweeping the Arab world?
[ROBERT KAGAN]: Kagan: I’m inclined to say that what’s happening in the Arab world is independent, mostly, from what happens in Iraq. One can surmise that perhaps the fact that Iraq was holding democratic elections raised the issue in other parts of the region, with people asking, “if Iraq is holding elections, why aren’t we holding elections?” But, I would say that the case of Egypt was easily predictable in the sense that Mubarak’s rule had created a tremendous amount of dissatisfaction. Egyptians grew tired of 3 decades of military rule by an increasingly rigid dictator like Mubarak. So, it’s a long way of saying that Iraq had some positive effect, but my guess is that it was fairly marginal.
[DC]: What role do you think the U.S. should be playing in the revolts in the Arab world?
[RK]: I think that when you look at the Middle East, there’s a big false dichotomy that’s being set up between a supposed “idealistic” approach and a supposedly “realistic” approach. My view is that it is highly unrealistic to imagine that we’re going to be able to support these dictators in the region against the will of their people indefinitely. That kind of policy led to the Shah of Iran falling not to moderate forces, but to radical forces. I think anyone who thinks we could have clung to Mubarak longer than we did doesn’t understand the dynamic in Egypt. And I think that as far as the administration is pressing for reforms in all these countries, they’re right to do so, and in some cases they should be pressing harder. I think that at the end of the day, every single one of the dictators in the Middle East is going to be overthrown. And I think it’s very foolish on our part to be clinging to this dying model in the Arab world.
[DC]: What about the dynamic in a country like Yemen, which we rely on so heavily for counter terrorism and when the alternative to Saleh’s rule doesn’t present many moderate alternatives upfront?
[RK]: I’m not sure we know exactly what the alternatives are. There are certainly going to be risks to losing Saleh’s support, although you can overstate the degree to which Saleh was very committed to finding Al Qaeda. In fact, it’s clear the U.S. has had to take up a certain portion of that effort itself. In any case, people talk about the downside risks of losing these dictators, as if we have an option of supporting them indefinitely. If our policy is to support Saleh for as long as it takes, no matter how brutal his actions, I think that’s a loser.
[DC]: One of your most prominent books was “Of Paradise and Power,” which described the growing rift between the U.S. government and its European allies on issues pertaining to foreign policy. Several developments have changed with regards to the EU/NATO since you published the work, namely, the rise in nationalist and anti-Islamist political parties throughout Europe, as well as the NATO-led operation in Libya. Do you feel that these developments are affecting your basic arguments in “Of Paradise and Power” in any way?
[RK]: I don’t see a lot of signs that Europe is anymore inclined to maintain itself as a military power in the world. I’m very heartened to see France and Britain taking a leadership role in Libya, but I can’t help but note that their capacity to do so is clearly limited and their willingness to spend money to give themselves that capacity is even more limited. I think that there are many wonderful successes of the EU, but I wish it were much more powerful. I wish that it had an independent military capability, but for the most part Europeans are not interested in spending that money. And I think it’s additionally troubling to see the role Germany is now playing. Germany abstained from the Libyan operation, which I think reflects the general German view that they just don’t want to be involved in the world, except economically. It’s very hard to envision a potent European actor on the world stage if Germany is sitting it out. It’s the largest country in Europe, and I think without Germany, Europe is not going to be a strong force.
[DC]: Do you think that the United States should have done more in the Libya operation?
[RK]: Well you know these operations are never done the way you might want to draw them up. We’ve lived through several of these kinds of interventions. The Kosovo operation in 1999 was ultimately successful but not before several months of failure. I am thus not too critical of the administration’s current approach. I do think however that if they had been willing to do more upfront, at a time when the Libyan rebels were really advancing and Qaddafi looked like he was on his last legs, we might have managed to topple Qaddafi without all the difficulty that we’ve had since. I attribute the reluctance in the administration primarily to Bob Gates, who has decided as his parting shot as Secretary of Defense that he is going to oppose military action no matter if the President wants to or not. It was very hard for the President to overrule him. Despite the fact that I think they could have done a great deal more and more effectively if they had acted sooner, I’m not prepared to say that they haven’t succeeded. And they may well succeed. I recall in Kosovo and in the Balkans in general, you know, many months of pulling our hair out because things weren’t working, but ultimately prevailing. And I think that we can still prevail in Libya.
[DC]: How do you respond to today’s calls for defense cuts, from liberal Democrats to Tea Party members, in the name of restoring our fiscal sanity?
[RK]: The fiscal sanity thing is pretty absurd. Unfortunately, President Obama is calling for defense cuts of $400 billion over 10 years. To say that that is a drop in the bucket of the overall fiscal crisis is an insult to drops in buckets. It’s a trivial amount. Our budget crisis is being driven by entitlements and tax policies, not defense. These have been the same people calling for retrenchment in American foreign policy for decades, and now they are using the budget deficit as a means of strengthening their hand. The question we have to ask is, “How much is the world order that the US plays such a big role in upholding worth to us?” I think it’s worth an incalculable amount because, since World War 2, the US-led world order has produced among other things the greatest period of prosperity in human history.
[DC]: You have been an advocate of the war with Iraq since its early days. How would you grade the Obama Administration’s policy towards Iraq since taking over the reins from the Bush Administration?
[RK]: I did support the war, as did Hilary Clinton, and Joe Biden. I would like to make that point because unfortunate wars, or are at least wars that people feel haven’t gone very well, turn out to have very few supporters. I feel the Administration has done pretty well until now. I think that Vice President Biden has taken the issue in Iraq very seriously, has visited frequently, and has attempted to work through the very complicated political situation in Iraq. And up until now the Administration has not been rushing US forces out of Iraq prematurely. One of the good things that President Obama did was maintain a continuing commitment to Iraq. The issue now is whether the Iraqi government can be persuaded to invite American forces to stay longer to make up for what are pretty dramatic deficiencies in Iraqi capabilities. I’m not sure they have yet the capacity to deal with certain kinds of terrorist attacks and movements within the country that are still lurking about. I think it would be an advantage both to Iraq and American interests to maintain some level of forces beyond this year but as of now that hasn’t happened. Gates has been trying to convince the Iraqis to make this move. On the whole I do grade the administration positively on Iraq.
[DC]: For our international & diplomatic audience, can you grade the Obama Administration’s foreign policy record to date? Is there an Obama Doctrine, and if so, what are your thoughts on it? Explain.
[RK]: I don’t think there’s an Obama doctrine. Usually doctrines are created in responses to events rather than out of the mind of some National Security Advisor or President. People don’t just invent a doctrine. The Truman doctrine came in response to concerns about encroachments in Turkey and Greece, the Reagan doctrine was in response to Soviet positions in the Middle East etc. Obama has yet to have that situation. I think to some extent he has missed an opportunity to outline for the American people what our stakes are in the Arab Spring, and what a revolutionary moment this is and why it’s an opportunity for the U.S. I think he was uniquely suited to do that because he’s not part of the generation of Snowcrofts and Brzezinskis who are responsible for supporting these dictators so lovingly over the years. He was from a different generation. And he had an opportunity to make a break with that path, but he hasn’t brought himself to do that. On the other hand, I don’t think people should be scrambling for a doctrine. The key issue is what the successes of the policy are. I’m not very negative on the administration - I think they’ve done some good things.
Publisher’s Note: This interview was originally published in the summer print edition of the Diplomatic Courier.
