.
A

lthough Serbs and Jews might have stood together throughout history, political relations between Serbia and Israel significantly deteriorated in 2020 after the Jewish state recognized Kosovo, the Serbian breakaway province that unilaterally declared independence in 2008. But in spite of that, Belgrade openly sided with Israel in its war against Hamas, even though there are no indications that the United States’ major non-NATO ally plans to change its policy regarding Kosovo.

Following Hamas attack on Israel on 07 October 2023, the southeastern European country took concrete measures to demonstrate its support for Israel. Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic was one of the first world leaders to condemn the Palestinian militants’ actions.

“The Jewish people have endured a history of suffering and Israel deserves to live in peace and with security. Now, more than ever, the world needs Israelis and Palestinians to come together and put a stop to the violence,” Vucic wrote on X.

On 25 October 2023, it was announced that Israeli basketball club Maccabi Playtika Tel Aviv will play its EuroLeague home games in Serbia. Moreover, Serbia will also host Israeli soccer teams Maccabi Haifa and Maccabi Tel Aviv who will play their remaining home games in the group stage of European competitions in the Balkan country’s cities. Ironically enough, Maccabi Tel Aviv will first take on Ukraine's Zorya Luhansk—a club that cannot play in its hometown either, given that Luhansk has been under Russian control since 2014.

But why is Serbia taking such a pro-Israeli stance? According to recent polls, only 11% of the Serbian population supports Israeli actions in Gaza. On 02 November 2021, in the Serbian city of Novi Pazar, where Bosniak Muslims make up the majority of the population, thousands of people took part in a rally in support of Palestine. Previously, on 15 October, dozens of activists in Belgrade showed solidarity with the Jewish State. 

For most Serbs, however, the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine has a far greater importance than developments in the Middle East. Around 68% of Serbs believe that NATO, rather than Russian President Vladimir Putin, started the war in Ukraine, while 82% of them oppose any sanctions on Russia. Still, despite a strong pro-Russian sentiment among the Serbian population, Belgrade took a neutral stance regarding the war in Ukraine, while in the Middle East it sided with the Israel.  

“The friendship between the Jewish and Serbian peoples goes back to thousands of years. In the modern world our two peoples were united in struggle and in suffering,” said Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on 01 December 2014, following a meeting with then-Serbian Prime Minister Vucic. Previously, in 2011, Israel “strongly supported” Serbia’s position on Kosovo, but in 2020 it fundamentally changed its position.

In September that year, leaders of Serbia and Kosovo—under the auspices of then-U.S. President Donald Trump—signed a “historic deal” on normalization of relations. As a result of the agreement (that looked like a list of American demands addressed to its Balkan client states), both Belgrade and Pristina recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. The Jewish state, in exchange, recognized Kosovo as an independent state, a move that represented a humiliating defeat for Serbian diplomacy.

To this day, the Balkan nation has not relocated its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, while the ambassador of Israel to Serbia, Yahel Vilan, said in May 2021 that his country’s decision to recognize Kosovo was made “under U.S. pressure.” But if the United States really pressured Israeli officials to recognize Kosovo, could it be that Belgrade was under U.S. pressure to condemn Hamas’ actions and side with Israel? 

Following Israel’s 2020 move, Serbia started expanding economic and political relations with Iran, despite the fact that the Jewish state has significant economic investments in the southeastern European nation. In 2021, during the 11-day war between Israel and Hamas, Belgrade acted rather ambivalent, unlike Republika Srpska—Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Serb-dominated entity—that openly took a pro-Israel stance. This time, however, Republika Srpska’s leadership seems to avoid taking sides, while Belgrade acts as one of Israel’s best friends in the Balkans.

But in spite of that, the state of Israel made some moves that drew criticism in Serbia. Israel's ambassador to Croatia, Garry Koren, recently reportedly stated that “Croatia understands what Israel is going through due to the Homeland War” and that Serb refugees, who were forced to leave Croatia in 1995, were “lucky Serbia wanted them, while nobody wants the Palestinians.” Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen reacted on X, pointing out that his country “unequivocally distances itself from the statements attributed to the Israeli ambassador in Croatia.”

But that was not the end of Israeli “problematic” statements regarding Serbia. On 11 November 2023, the Israeli national soccer coach Alon Hazan compared the struggle of Kosovo with that of his country. The following day, Israeli Ambassador to Serbia Yahel Vilan “vehemently disavowed” Hazan’s words, and thanked the southeastern European nation for being a home for Israeli sport teams. 

Still, it remains rather unclear if Israel really appreciates Serbia’s actions, and if Belgrade’s position vis-à-vis the Israel-Hamas war represents the country’s sincere support for the Jewish people, or if it is just a result of the Western pressure on the Serbian leadership.

About
Nikola Mikovic
:
Nikola Mikovic is a correspondent for Diplomatic Courier. He is a freelance journalist, researcher and analyst based in Serbia covering foreign policy in Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.

a global affairs media network

www.diplomaticourier.com

Inside Serbia’s Complicated Relationship with Israel

Tel Aviv, Israel, where Serbia continues to base its embassy, despite recognizing Jerusalem as the new capital of Israel. Image by Volker Glätsch from Pixabay

November 29, 2023

Serbia’s solidly pro-Israel stance in the current conflict may feel unexpected, given Serbia’s population largely disapproves of Israeli actions in Gaza. Examining Serbia’s broader geopolitical situation may provide some explanation, writes Nikola Mikovic.

A

lthough Serbs and Jews might have stood together throughout history, political relations between Serbia and Israel significantly deteriorated in 2020 after the Jewish state recognized Kosovo, the Serbian breakaway province that unilaterally declared independence in 2008. But in spite of that, Belgrade openly sided with Israel in its war against Hamas, even though there are no indications that the United States’ major non-NATO ally plans to change its policy regarding Kosovo.

Following Hamas attack on Israel on 07 October 2023, the southeastern European country took concrete measures to demonstrate its support for Israel. Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic was one of the first world leaders to condemn the Palestinian militants’ actions.

“The Jewish people have endured a history of suffering and Israel deserves to live in peace and with security. Now, more than ever, the world needs Israelis and Palestinians to come together and put a stop to the violence,” Vucic wrote on X.

On 25 October 2023, it was announced that Israeli basketball club Maccabi Playtika Tel Aviv will play its EuroLeague home games in Serbia. Moreover, Serbia will also host Israeli soccer teams Maccabi Haifa and Maccabi Tel Aviv who will play their remaining home games in the group stage of European competitions in the Balkan country’s cities. Ironically enough, Maccabi Tel Aviv will first take on Ukraine's Zorya Luhansk—a club that cannot play in its hometown either, given that Luhansk has been under Russian control since 2014.

But why is Serbia taking such a pro-Israeli stance? According to recent polls, only 11% of the Serbian population supports Israeli actions in Gaza. On 02 November 2021, in the Serbian city of Novi Pazar, where Bosniak Muslims make up the majority of the population, thousands of people took part in a rally in support of Palestine. Previously, on 15 October, dozens of activists in Belgrade showed solidarity with the Jewish State. 

For most Serbs, however, the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine has a far greater importance than developments in the Middle East. Around 68% of Serbs believe that NATO, rather than Russian President Vladimir Putin, started the war in Ukraine, while 82% of them oppose any sanctions on Russia. Still, despite a strong pro-Russian sentiment among the Serbian population, Belgrade took a neutral stance regarding the war in Ukraine, while in the Middle East it sided with the Israel.  

“The friendship between the Jewish and Serbian peoples goes back to thousands of years. In the modern world our two peoples were united in struggle and in suffering,” said Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on 01 December 2014, following a meeting with then-Serbian Prime Minister Vucic. Previously, in 2011, Israel “strongly supported” Serbia’s position on Kosovo, but in 2020 it fundamentally changed its position.

In September that year, leaders of Serbia and Kosovo—under the auspices of then-U.S. President Donald Trump—signed a “historic deal” on normalization of relations. As a result of the agreement (that looked like a list of American demands addressed to its Balkan client states), both Belgrade and Pristina recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. The Jewish state, in exchange, recognized Kosovo as an independent state, a move that represented a humiliating defeat for Serbian diplomacy.

To this day, the Balkan nation has not relocated its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, while the ambassador of Israel to Serbia, Yahel Vilan, said in May 2021 that his country’s decision to recognize Kosovo was made “under U.S. pressure.” But if the United States really pressured Israeli officials to recognize Kosovo, could it be that Belgrade was under U.S. pressure to condemn Hamas’ actions and side with Israel? 

Following Israel’s 2020 move, Serbia started expanding economic and political relations with Iran, despite the fact that the Jewish state has significant economic investments in the southeastern European nation. In 2021, during the 11-day war between Israel and Hamas, Belgrade acted rather ambivalent, unlike Republika Srpska—Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Serb-dominated entity—that openly took a pro-Israel stance. This time, however, Republika Srpska’s leadership seems to avoid taking sides, while Belgrade acts as one of Israel’s best friends in the Balkans.

But in spite of that, the state of Israel made some moves that drew criticism in Serbia. Israel's ambassador to Croatia, Garry Koren, recently reportedly stated that “Croatia understands what Israel is going through due to the Homeland War” and that Serb refugees, who were forced to leave Croatia in 1995, were “lucky Serbia wanted them, while nobody wants the Palestinians.” Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen reacted on X, pointing out that his country “unequivocally distances itself from the statements attributed to the Israeli ambassador in Croatia.”

But that was not the end of Israeli “problematic” statements regarding Serbia. On 11 November 2023, the Israeli national soccer coach Alon Hazan compared the struggle of Kosovo with that of his country. The following day, Israeli Ambassador to Serbia Yahel Vilan “vehemently disavowed” Hazan’s words, and thanked the southeastern European nation for being a home for Israeli sport teams. 

Still, it remains rather unclear if Israel really appreciates Serbia’s actions, and if Belgrade’s position vis-à-vis the Israel-Hamas war represents the country’s sincere support for the Jewish people, or if it is just a result of the Western pressure on the Serbian leadership.

About
Nikola Mikovic
:
Nikola Mikovic is a correspondent for Diplomatic Courier. He is a freelance journalist, researcher and analyst based in Serbia covering foreign policy in Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.