“New era for Georgia as nation moves closer to Russia” (CNN), “A Russian Victory in Georgia's Parliamentary Election” (WSJ), “Putin Profits as U.S. Ally Saakashvili Loses Georgian Vote” (Businessweek), “Georgia: Expect Storms Ahead” (The Guardian) – those and the number of other similar headlines permeated the mainstream international media echoing the Georgian parliamentary elections, that took place on October 1.
Following the results, the party “United National Movement” (UNM), that is headed by the incumbent president Mikheil Saakashvili and had ruled the country since January 2004, lost with only 40 percent electorate support versus the 55 percent of the victorious opposition coalition “Georgian Dream” led by the billionaire businessman Bidzina Ivanishvili.
This legislative election in the tiny ex-Soviet country located in the South Caucasus has large geopolitical implications, and far exceeds its domestic significance.
To begin with, as Georgia under Mikheil Saakashvili sought membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions--first and foremost in NATO--it challenged Russia’s interests in the region that gradually devolved into the fierce antagonism between the neighbors. Moreover, the two countries fought a five-day war in August 2008 over South Ossetia resulting in occupation of 20 percent of Georgian territory by Russian militaries and deadlocking the official diplomatic relationship between Moscow and Tbilisi ever since.
Hence, after being challenged by security vulnerabilities exposed by unresolved conflicts on its borders, there has always been a consensus among the Georgian ruling elite and the population that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is the only counterweight against the Russian hegemony in the region.
NATO or Russia: will Georgia rethink its course?
During the campaign, the UNM tried to ostracize Bidzina Ivanishvili in Georgian political life by discrediting him as “a Kremilin’s stooge” whose aim was to return Georgia to Russian influence. International media contributed to this idea's spread by reiterating unchecked the same conviction, which is basically grounded on the fact that the billionaire made his fortune in Russia (according to the Forbes his wealth is estimated to be US $6.4 billion, ranking him the world’s 153rd richest man). This argument gains more credibility against the backdrop of the harsh business environment in Russia, which requires a loyalty to the government from the wealthiest businessmen unless they want to share Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s fate. That said, the media fell short on highlighting other facets of Ivanishvil’s biography that contradict his allegedly “treacherous plan” and give little indication that he intended to succumb Georgia to the Russian influence.
First, he left Russia in 2004 and immediately offered massive philanthropic support to the young retinue of Saakashvili who swept to power after the “Rose Revolution”. Several millions (U.S. dollars) from his private funds were injected into the reforms of various state institutions of Georgia, including the police and the army, and made a significant contribution to the eradication of corruption that led Georgia to be advertised as a leading reformist country in the West.
Second, in his campaign Ivanishvili continuously assuaged the Georgian population and partner countries that once selected his government would not change Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations, and he staffed his coalition with explicitly pro-Western politicians. Whether Georgia maintains its chosen path towards NATO and concomitantly restores friendly relations with Russia still remains to be seen, but the prospect poses opportunities as well challenges for all stakeholders, requiring shrewd and scrupulous diplomacy.
Meanwhile, it has been precisely NATO officials who encouraged the Georgian leadership to mend ties with Moscow in order to change the current unstable status quo in the region. NATO, while supporting Georgia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, is hesitant to favor membership of a country that can bring internal instability and unresolved conflicts into the organization and exacerbate otherwise traditionally strenuous NATO–Russia relations.
Last but not least, despite the defeat, Mikheil Saakashvili will remain at the helm of the country with strong constitutional power one more year, entitling him to appoint local governors in all cities and regions of Georgia. This power combined with his strong opposition party in the parliament will provide him with a strong leverage and sufficient maneuvering space on the Georgian political landscape to counterbalance the new government until October 2013.
Shalva Dzidziguri is a member of the Young Atlanticist NATO Working Group. He holds a Masters in International relations and European studies from Central European University in Budapest, Hungary.
Photo: Embassy of the U.S. to Georgia.
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Russia-NATO Relations: High Stakes in Georgia
October 30, 2012
“New era for Georgia as nation moves closer to Russia” (CNN), “A Russian Victory in Georgia's Parliamentary Election” (WSJ), “Putin Profits as U.S. Ally Saakashvili Loses Georgian Vote” (Businessweek), “Georgia: Expect Storms Ahead” (The Guardian) – those and the number of other similar headlines permeated the mainstream international media echoing the Georgian parliamentary elections, that took place on October 1.
Following the results, the party “United National Movement” (UNM), that is headed by the incumbent president Mikheil Saakashvili and had ruled the country since January 2004, lost with only 40 percent electorate support versus the 55 percent of the victorious opposition coalition “Georgian Dream” led by the billionaire businessman Bidzina Ivanishvili.
This legislative election in the tiny ex-Soviet country located in the South Caucasus has large geopolitical implications, and far exceeds its domestic significance.
To begin with, as Georgia under Mikheil Saakashvili sought membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions--first and foremost in NATO--it challenged Russia’s interests in the region that gradually devolved into the fierce antagonism between the neighbors. Moreover, the two countries fought a five-day war in August 2008 over South Ossetia resulting in occupation of 20 percent of Georgian territory by Russian militaries and deadlocking the official diplomatic relationship between Moscow and Tbilisi ever since.
Hence, after being challenged by security vulnerabilities exposed by unresolved conflicts on its borders, there has always been a consensus among the Georgian ruling elite and the population that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is the only counterweight against the Russian hegemony in the region.
NATO or Russia: will Georgia rethink its course?
During the campaign, the UNM tried to ostracize Bidzina Ivanishvili in Georgian political life by discrediting him as “a Kremilin’s stooge” whose aim was to return Georgia to Russian influence. International media contributed to this idea's spread by reiterating unchecked the same conviction, which is basically grounded on the fact that the billionaire made his fortune in Russia (according to the Forbes his wealth is estimated to be US $6.4 billion, ranking him the world’s 153rd richest man). This argument gains more credibility against the backdrop of the harsh business environment in Russia, which requires a loyalty to the government from the wealthiest businessmen unless they want to share Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s fate. That said, the media fell short on highlighting other facets of Ivanishvil’s biography that contradict his allegedly “treacherous plan” and give little indication that he intended to succumb Georgia to the Russian influence.
First, he left Russia in 2004 and immediately offered massive philanthropic support to the young retinue of Saakashvili who swept to power after the “Rose Revolution”. Several millions (U.S. dollars) from his private funds were injected into the reforms of various state institutions of Georgia, including the police and the army, and made a significant contribution to the eradication of corruption that led Georgia to be advertised as a leading reformist country in the West.
Second, in his campaign Ivanishvili continuously assuaged the Georgian population and partner countries that once selected his government would not change Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations, and he staffed his coalition with explicitly pro-Western politicians. Whether Georgia maintains its chosen path towards NATO and concomitantly restores friendly relations with Russia still remains to be seen, but the prospect poses opportunities as well challenges for all stakeholders, requiring shrewd and scrupulous diplomacy.
Meanwhile, it has been precisely NATO officials who encouraged the Georgian leadership to mend ties with Moscow in order to change the current unstable status quo in the region. NATO, while supporting Georgia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, is hesitant to favor membership of a country that can bring internal instability and unresolved conflicts into the organization and exacerbate otherwise traditionally strenuous NATO–Russia relations.
Last but not least, despite the defeat, Mikheil Saakashvili will remain at the helm of the country with strong constitutional power one more year, entitling him to appoint local governors in all cities and regions of Georgia. This power combined with his strong opposition party in the parliament will provide him with a strong leverage and sufficient maneuvering space on the Georgian political landscape to counterbalance the new government until October 2013.
Shalva Dzidziguri is a member of the Young Atlanticist NATO Working Group. He holds a Masters in International relations and European studies from Central European University in Budapest, Hungary.
Photo: Embassy of the U.S. to Georgia.
