fter more than two decades of authoritarian rule, negotiations between the Venezuelan regime and the opposition have resulted in the Barbados agreement, a political roadmap for elections. But the path to the 28 July 2024 elections is not easy.
Venezuela's Supreme Court has disqualified the leading opposition candidate, and the electoral authority has banned an alternative candidate. More recently, the opposition opted to unite behind Edmundo Gonzalez as a strategy to achieve a transition toward democracy. Yet, widespread corruption and an alarming rise in regime–backed criminality are further undermining Venezuelans' hopes for a better future. Transnational criminal networks even threaten stability in the larger region, drawing in paramilitary outfits like Russia's Wagner Group. This suggests that successful elections based on agreement between the government and opposition must be paired with concerted international help in restoring the rule of law.
In 1998, the Venezuelan people elected Hugo Chavez, a military officer and populist, as president. Chavez wanted to create a new political and social order to eradicate poverty and rid the country of corrupt elites. But democratic institutions were systematically weakened under his rule. When Chavez died in 2013, the situation worsened, as the oil–dependent economy descended into hyperinflationary chaos. In the face of growing social unrest, Chavez's successor, President Nicolas Maduro, and the political movement behind him, known as Chavismo, violently repressed dissent and persecuted opposition politicians.
Today, Maduro's authoritarian regime remains in the saddle, backed by the military. State institutions and the rule of law have eroded. The regime stands internationally accused of systematic human rights violations and is responsible for a humanitarian crisis that has forced more than seven million Venezuelans to flee the country, marking it as one of the largest migration crises in the world and the largest in Latin American history. These factors combined have helped create an environment in which illicit economies and organized crime thrive.
Lawlessness has turned Venezuela into a virtual mafia state, where state actors and criminals overlap, operating with total impunity. These include armed insurgent groups (Colombian ELN and an offshoot of the FARC), gangs (Tren de Aragua and colectivos), transnational criminal organizations, and criminal networks embedded in the state.
The regime has also forged relationships with foreign criminal and political groups, such as the Iran–backed Lebanese Hezbollah, which is engaged in money laundering, illegal mining, and drug trafficking in Venezuela. Similarly, Russia's Wagner Group reportedly took over Maduro's personal security in 2019. Venezuelan authorities and the military have allegedly also facilitated illicit economies and perpetrated corruption schemes in the state–owned oil company, PDVSA. In the process, the regime has lost control over parts of its territory.
The proliferation of criminal gangs is not only an obstacle to restoring democratic governance, but also poses a transnational threat. In fighting to ensure their ability to maintain control over the illicit economies with impunity, these groups have further hollowed out the state. Venezuela's transition to a democratic future must therefore take into account this fragile security environment and devise ways to restore the rule of law.
So far, the international response to the Venezuelan crisis has oscillated between U.S. sanctions and engaging with Maduro to encourage him to hold free and fair elections. But given the fragile state of Venezuela's institutions, a long–term solution cannot rely solely on negotiations to facilitate these. The country will need a comprehensive strategy for the "day after," including critical reforms to tackle organized crime and corruption.
One option is to establish an internationally backed body that draws on the experience of anti–impunity commissions in Central America. The first was in Guatemala, which in 2007 was wracked by criminal violence and corruption. Partnering with the UN, the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) took a unique approach, bolstering rather than supplanting national institutions. CICIG operated for 12 years, helping the Attorney's Office identify and bring to justice state–entrenched criminal networks with ties to drug trafficking, security forces, and political elites. Its initial success inspired similar initiatives in Honduras and El Salvador. Yet, the commission's two–year renewable mandate depended on the willingness of local authorities to join in the fight against impunity. Full autonomy facilitated the commissions’ work, but it also made them vulnerable to accusations of politicization and undermining state sovereignty. Eventually, corrupt actors found ways to attack and ultimately expel all three commissions, undoing whatever progress they had made in upholding and strengthening the rule of law.
Any Venezuelan attempt to replicate this model should therefore consider the difficulties experienced by its predecessors. A similar commission partnering with the UN in Venezuela would need to enjoy the acceptance and commitment of all local stakeholders, as well as strong international support. It must have a multiyear mandate to maximize its freedom from political interference, and its investigative goals and tools must be clearly defined. Even then, an anti–impunity commission will not be a panacea, unless it is embedded in a strong and independent judiciary. This is one of the main challenges that Venezuela and international supporters of its democratic transition face.
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How to rebuild the rule of law in Venezuela
Sunset over Caracas, Venezuela. Image by Maria Rodriguez from Pixabay
May 9, 2024
The country will need a comprehensive strategy for the "day after," including critical reforms to tackle organized crime and corruption. The international community can help. writes Ronald Trenchi.
A
fter more than two decades of authoritarian rule, negotiations between the Venezuelan regime and the opposition have resulted in the Barbados agreement, a political roadmap for elections. But the path to the 28 July 2024 elections is not easy.
Venezuela's Supreme Court has disqualified the leading opposition candidate, and the electoral authority has banned an alternative candidate. More recently, the opposition opted to unite behind Edmundo Gonzalez as a strategy to achieve a transition toward democracy. Yet, widespread corruption and an alarming rise in regime–backed criminality are further undermining Venezuelans' hopes for a better future. Transnational criminal networks even threaten stability in the larger region, drawing in paramilitary outfits like Russia's Wagner Group. This suggests that successful elections based on agreement between the government and opposition must be paired with concerted international help in restoring the rule of law.
In 1998, the Venezuelan people elected Hugo Chavez, a military officer and populist, as president. Chavez wanted to create a new political and social order to eradicate poverty and rid the country of corrupt elites. But democratic institutions were systematically weakened under his rule. When Chavez died in 2013, the situation worsened, as the oil–dependent economy descended into hyperinflationary chaos. In the face of growing social unrest, Chavez's successor, President Nicolas Maduro, and the political movement behind him, known as Chavismo, violently repressed dissent and persecuted opposition politicians.
Today, Maduro's authoritarian regime remains in the saddle, backed by the military. State institutions and the rule of law have eroded. The regime stands internationally accused of systematic human rights violations and is responsible for a humanitarian crisis that has forced more than seven million Venezuelans to flee the country, marking it as one of the largest migration crises in the world and the largest in Latin American history. These factors combined have helped create an environment in which illicit economies and organized crime thrive.
Lawlessness has turned Venezuela into a virtual mafia state, where state actors and criminals overlap, operating with total impunity. These include armed insurgent groups (Colombian ELN and an offshoot of the FARC), gangs (Tren de Aragua and colectivos), transnational criminal organizations, and criminal networks embedded in the state.
The regime has also forged relationships with foreign criminal and political groups, such as the Iran–backed Lebanese Hezbollah, which is engaged in money laundering, illegal mining, and drug trafficking in Venezuela. Similarly, Russia's Wagner Group reportedly took over Maduro's personal security in 2019. Venezuelan authorities and the military have allegedly also facilitated illicit economies and perpetrated corruption schemes in the state–owned oil company, PDVSA. In the process, the regime has lost control over parts of its territory.
The proliferation of criminal gangs is not only an obstacle to restoring democratic governance, but also poses a transnational threat. In fighting to ensure their ability to maintain control over the illicit economies with impunity, these groups have further hollowed out the state. Venezuela's transition to a democratic future must therefore take into account this fragile security environment and devise ways to restore the rule of law.
So far, the international response to the Venezuelan crisis has oscillated between U.S. sanctions and engaging with Maduro to encourage him to hold free and fair elections. But given the fragile state of Venezuela's institutions, a long–term solution cannot rely solely on negotiations to facilitate these. The country will need a comprehensive strategy for the "day after," including critical reforms to tackle organized crime and corruption.
One option is to establish an internationally backed body that draws on the experience of anti–impunity commissions in Central America. The first was in Guatemala, which in 2007 was wracked by criminal violence and corruption. Partnering with the UN, the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) took a unique approach, bolstering rather than supplanting national institutions. CICIG operated for 12 years, helping the Attorney's Office identify and bring to justice state–entrenched criminal networks with ties to drug trafficking, security forces, and political elites. Its initial success inspired similar initiatives in Honduras and El Salvador. Yet, the commission's two–year renewable mandate depended on the willingness of local authorities to join in the fight against impunity. Full autonomy facilitated the commissions’ work, but it also made them vulnerable to accusations of politicization and undermining state sovereignty. Eventually, corrupt actors found ways to attack and ultimately expel all three commissions, undoing whatever progress they had made in upholding and strengthening the rule of law.
Any Venezuelan attempt to replicate this model should therefore consider the difficulties experienced by its predecessors. A similar commission partnering with the UN in Venezuela would need to enjoy the acceptance and commitment of all local stakeholders, as well as strong international support. It must have a multiyear mandate to maximize its freedom from political interference, and its investigative goals and tools must be clearly defined. Even then, an anti–impunity commission will not be a panacea, unless it is embedded in a strong and independent judiciary. This is one of the main challenges that Venezuela and international supporters of its democratic transition face.
