.

What Putin is doing is not new in the geo political world.  There is a word for it: “revanche.”   A policy of revanche is designed to recover lost territory and reverse territorial losses incurred by a country.  It is an age-old attempt to grab land under the hubris of patriotism.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, in defiance of international norms and Russia’s own commitments, has been simultaneously justified and concealed by a propaganda effort on a scale that we have not seen for decades. Kremlin apologists have dismissed the integrity of Ukraine, a sovereign state in Europe, casually. Gullible news commentators on both the Left and the Right have conceded support for Moscow’s entirely fictitious narrative of its expansionist policy.

The fact is that NATO, and the European Union, are voluntary alliances of states, which have chosen their own destiny. There can be no talk of spheres of influence—we should recognize only spheres of freedom. It is hardly surprising that some of Russia’s neighbors wish to resist its embrace; they deserve wider and fuller support for making that courageous choice than they have received.

The Russian propaganda challenge has been far more successful than we realize in Europe and America. Across Asia and the Middle East, Moscow’s narrative is accepted and not contested. Unfortunately it is assumed that all native speakers of Russian in other former Soviet states are automatically supporters of Russian interests, and that they appreciate the Kremlin's efforts on their behalf.

Nothing could be further from the truth. Outside the areas where Russia has engaged its military forces, the Russian speakers of Ukraine have experienced a new surge of identification with their country, precisely in reaction to Putinism. In Moldova, Russian and Romanian speakers alike are vulnerable to the whims of Russian economic policy.

Even authoritarian Belarus, where three quarters of the population speak Russian day by day, has distanced itself from Moscow. It should not surprise us that native Russian speakers are not always loyal to Russia - how many native English speakers, after all, are loyal to England?

In this environment, Western states need to do more to counter the Moscow narrative of oppressed minorities beyond their borders.

Western states must develop without delay a narrative that counters these negative Russian messages.

On the other hand, those same Western states must also take care not to launch unjust accusations at ethnic Russians living in their midst and help them integrate into the political and social societies in their countries. For example in Latvia, over 400,000 ethnic Russians are so-called “non-citizens”. As a hold-over from the Soviet Unions’ policies of forcibly moving ethnic Russians to over Soviet Republics, these non-citizens are not only not given their fundamental right to vote, but they are also bared from joining professional services and working for the government. In Lithuania concerns have been raised about what appears to be the politically prosecution of the most prominent ethnic Russian in the country's politics, Viktor Uspaskich.

Countries in Eastern Europe should work to strengthen their own anti-corruption measures, civil society and rule of law. It is only through fully integrating ethnic Russian and abiding by the strengthening their own democracy, can we show Russians that this is the better choice for their own lives and country.

The Baltic States have been rightly vociferous in their demands for a firmer line from the EU and NATO. Their experience of relations with Russia in the twentieth century was not a happy one, and has left many scars. A challenge to the integrity of Ukraine, Georgia or Moldova is equally a potential challenge to the integrity of Latvia, Lithuania or Estonia. This integrity must be protected and the West must demonstrate how important it is in dealing fairly with all citizens, whatever their ethnic background. The West must stand up to Putin’s propaganda program and challenge his revanchist narrative under the hubris of Russian patriotism.

Paul Hamill is the Director of Strategy at the American Security Project, a non-partisan think tank in Washington DC, he recently returned from a visit to Latvia.

The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.

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Putin’s Winning Propaganda Program

March 24, 2015

What Putin is doing is not new in the geo political world.  There is a word for it: “revanche.”   A policy of revanche is designed to recover lost territory and reverse territorial losses incurred by a country.  It is an age-old attempt to grab land under the hubris of patriotism.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, in defiance of international norms and Russia’s own commitments, has been simultaneously justified and concealed by a propaganda effort on a scale that we have not seen for decades. Kremlin apologists have dismissed the integrity of Ukraine, a sovereign state in Europe, casually. Gullible news commentators on both the Left and the Right have conceded support for Moscow’s entirely fictitious narrative of its expansionist policy.

The fact is that NATO, and the European Union, are voluntary alliances of states, which have chosen their own destiny. There can be no talk of spheres of influence—we should recognize only spheres of freedom. It is hardly surprising that some of Russia’s neighbors wish to resist its embrace; they deserve wider and fuller support for making that courageous choice than they have received.

The Russian propaganda challenge has been far more successful than we realize in Europe and America. Across Asia and the Middle East, Moscow’s narrative is accepted and not contested. Unfortunately it is assumed that all native speakers of Russian in other former Soviet states are automatically supporters of Russian interests, and that they appreciate the Kremlin's efforts on their behalf.

Nothing could be further from the truth. Outside the areas where Russia has engaged its military forces, the Russian speakers of Ukraine have experienced a new surge of identification with their country, precisely in reaction to Putinism. In Moldova, Russian and Romanian speakers alike are vulnerable to the whims of Russian economic policy.

Even authoritarian Belarus, where three quarters of the population speak Russian day by day, has distanced itself from Moscow. It should not surprise us that native Russian speakers are not always loyal to Russia - how many native English speakers, after all, are loyal to England?

In this environment, Western states need to do more to counter the Moscow narrative of oppressed minorities beyond their borders.

Western states must develop without delay a narrative that counters these negative Russian messages.

On the other hand, those same Western states must also take care not to launch unjust accusations at ethnic Russians living in their midst and help them integrate into the political and social societies in their countries. For example in Latvia, over 400,000 ethnic Russians are so-called “non-citizens”. As a hold-over from the Soviet Unions’ policies of forcibly moving ethnic Russians to over Soviet Republics, these non-citizens are not only not given their fundamental right to vote, but they are also bared from joining professional services and working for the government. In Lithuania concerns have been raised about what appears to be the politically prosecution of the most prominent ethnic Russian in the country's politics, Viktor Uspaskich.

Countries in Eastern Europe should work to strengthen their own anti-corruption measures, civil society and rule of law. It is only through fully integrating ethnic Russian and abiding by the strengthening their own democracy, can we show Russians that this is the better choice for their own lives and country.

The Baltic States have been rightly vociferous in their demands for a firmer line from the EU and NATO. Their experience of relations with Russia in the twentieth century was not a happy one, and has left many scars. A challenge to the integrity of Ukraine, Georgia or Moldova is equally a potential challenge to the integrity of Latvia, Lithuania or Estonia. This integrity must be protected and the West must demonstrate how important it is in dealing fairly with all citizens, whatever their ethnic background. The West must stand up to Putin’s propaganda program and challenge his revanchist narrative under the hubris of Russian patriotism.

Paul Hamill is the Director of Strategy at the American Security Project, a non-partisan think tank in Washington DC, he recently returned from a visit to Latvia.

The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.