.
V

ictory Day, usually celebrated on May 5th, marks the Union of Soviet Social Republics’ defeat of Nazi Germany and holds a high place in Russian culture. For the past 74 years, the day has been a socio-military blend mixing modern military hardware, veterans of the war itself, and foreign dignitaries in parades around Russia and other states of the former USSR.

On April 16, President Putin shocked the world with the announcement that the Victory Day parade in Moscow would be canceled due to the coronavirus pandemic. President Putin, currently in his third term of office, has consistently used this annual event as a key fixture of national narrative that builds on the rising nostalgia for great power status that the USSR was conferred following the allied victory during World War II . This longing for recognition as a great power is in part what Stephen Kotkin regards as “characterized by soaring ambitions that have exceeded the country’s capabilities.”

As has been the case throughout the globe, COVID-19 has tested almost every country. Russia has also faced severe challenges and has now overtaken China with confirmed coronavirus cases totaling as of May 1 over 114,000. Russia’s recently installed prime minister, Mikhail Mishustin, is himself among COVID-19’s victims. As coronavirus ravages Russia, it’s worth recalling how President Putin returned to power, how he has retained it, and what challenges coronavirus poses to the stability of the Kremlin.

Putin’s Rise to Power

The slow collapse of the USSR threw Russia into chaos during the 1990s, characterized by political incompetence of the opportunistic Yeltsin administration and the economic turmoil of “shock therapy.” During the mayhem of the 1990s, Vladimir Putin managed to transition from his relatively unknown stature as mayor of St. Petersburg to beat out key Russian political figures such as former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov and former mayor of Moscow Yury Luzhkov.

Putin’s first administration saw the Russian economy rebound on the back of rising oil prices while his court consolidated power from various oligarchs that had challenged United Russia as the dominant political party. Dmitri Medvedev’s brief ascendance to the Presidency, viewed as an opportunity for a “recharge” in U.S.-Russia relations by the Obama administration, came to a swift end when Putin pushed Medvedev out of power as a result of the decision to abstain from the United Nation Security Council vote to allow a NATO-backed coalition to intervene in the Libyan Civil War that ultimately led to the fall of dictator Muammar Gaddafi. Putin was ushered back into the presidency by United Russia’s party apparatus, sparking huge protests like the one the day prior to Putin’s inauguration which drew 20,000 people to Bolotnaya Square. These protests led to the repression that Putin has utilized in the eight years since his return to presidency.  

Putin’s second administration has brought sweeping changes to the current authoritarian character of the Russian state. By leveraging identity politics that divide the Russian public, Putin has been able to maintain a high degree of popularity, while undertaking xenophobic and discriminatory initiatives that advance United Russia’s vision of national conservatism. Whereas Putin’s first administration saw a brief flirtation with the Russian Orthodox Church, since 2012 he has brought the church to a key role in Russian politics. This nexus runs deep into the Russian state to the point where it is now a key tenet that influences the strategy and ideology behind Russia’s nuclear triad.

The nexus of state and church has remained steadfast in the midst of the ongoing pandemic as the Orthodox church opens up a new cathedral complete with mosaics depicting scenes from the age of Stalin to figures currently in the court of Putin as well as a motorcade of the Patriarch Kirill deployed to parade a holy icon around Moscow to ward off COVID-19.  However, as many protests have demonstrated, the combined appeals of the Kremlin’s collaboration with the Orthodox Church and calls to remember how Putin “brought Russia up from its knees.” may not be as stable as one might presume at first glance.

COVID-19 in Russia

The insecurities laid bare by the austerity politics of two decades of Putinism have generated a crisis in Russia. Critical care is being denied as hospitals and providers are overwhelmed by victims. The stark medical disparities around the country, from affluent areas in urban centers, such as Moscow and St. Petersburg, to rural provinces, have contributed to the spread of COVID-19 throughout Russia. Oblasts far from Moscow have been hit particularly hard as the political responses to the pandemic are mixed—varying widely across regions and highlighting the overall ineffectiveness and corruption of the Russian state.

Russians exposed to COVID-19 now have to contend with their information being posted on social media sites, where they are subsequently harassed with little possibility of legal recourse. The Levada center reports that 48% of Russians are dissatisfied with their government’s response, and unpopularity levels are even higher among lower ranking politicians. Unpopularity and discontent is compounded not only by the response from the central Russian government, but also by Putin’s gamble with OPEC+ in attempting to deal a blow to the shale industry in the United States. This gamble has backfired and ended up alienating potential partners, predominantly throughout the Middle East.

Putin’s move to cut oil production without coordination with Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman led the two petro-states into a game of brinksmanship that turned oil’s futures prices negative for the first time in history and a retreat to the bargaining table. A testament to the power of those in the inner circle of Putin’s court, Rosneft CEO Igor Sechin was the primary advocate for this price war that ended up with an agreement put forth by President Trump in an attempt to allay economic concerns on behalf all three of the major oil producers.

Russia as a Global Power

The Kremlin, like most global powers, learned major lessons from 2008’s financial crisis—especially with regards to maintaining reserve currency to ward off the collapse of the ruble and its ripple effect on the Russian economy. To this day, the shock of the Russian Central Bank’s move to let the ruble float, coupled with the effects of sanctions imposed by the West following the annexation of Crimea in 2014 have had negative repercussions in key economic indicators such as wealth inequality, foreign investment, and GDP growth. Economic stagnation, fused with moves by the Kremlin to cut the safety net of everyday Russians ever lower with a proposal to cut pensions in 2018, has drawn massive protests against Putin’s policies from the public at large. As a part of China’s global, revisionist, and structural trend under Xi Jinping, Beijing has used shoring up gaps in sovereign credit as a means to propel both the Russian economy and China’s vision for the future.

For Russia, which has found itself internationally isolated in the wake of its 2014 intervention in Ukraine, China’s rise has been beneficial to maintaining its status quo. Although Russians fear the status of junior partner to China’s rising power, Moscow’s concerns ring hollow in the face of Chinese purchasing power. Between 2000-2014, Russia was the largest recipient of Chinese economic aid at around $36.6 worth of agreements. While Russia has banned Chinese citizens from crossing into the country in light of the pandemic, China has responded by offering economic and medical aid. Amidst the global backlash to the COVID-19 pandemic, it's possible that China and Russia may grow closer as China’s partnerships recede. Simultaneously, as Russia struggles amid its inability to deal with the pandemic, Moscow’s foreign policy agenda in the region, including in Syria and Ukraine, remains uncertain.

Stability has long been a key argument and selling point by United Russia as it retains power. However, as the pandemic and the subsequent economic losses in Russia have shown, especially with younger generations who have no memory of the tumultuous 1990s, this isn’t as stable as the Russian Silovik may hope. Especially in the wake of pandemics, when the economic pie shrinks, resources that might have otherwise gone to sociopolitical patrons of authoritarians are moved to other areas to shore up stability. It has become evident that President Putin’s moves to shake up the Kremlin within the past year indicate he does not feel as in-control as he has felt during the previous decades he’s already spent in power. The COVID-19 pandemic may bring more of these challenges yet to Russia in general and the Kremlin in particular.

About
Joel Blankenship
:
Joel Blankenship is a U.S. Army officer and a graduate of Kansas State University, where he received a BA in Political Science. While attending Kansas State, he was selected as a 2015 NSEP Boren scholar to Kyrgyzstan, where he studied Russian and Eurasian Studies.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.

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Putin and his Third Term Troubles

June 3, 2020

V

ictory Day, usually celebrated on May 5th, marks the Union of Soviet Social Republics’ defeat of Nazi Germany and holds a high place in Russian culture. For the past 74 years, the day has been a socio-military blend mixing modern military hardware, veterans of the war itself, and foreign dignitaries in parades around Russia and other states of the former USSR.

On April 16, President Putin shocked the world with the announcement that the Victory Day parade in Moscow would be canceled due to the coronavirus pandemic. President Putin, currently in his third term of office, has consistently used this annual event as a key fixture of national narrative that builds on the rising nostalgia for great power status that the USSR was conferred following the allied victory during World War II . This longing for recognition as a great power is in part what Stephen Kotkin regards as “characterized by soaring ambitions that have exceeded the country’s capabilities.”

As has been the case throughout the globe, COVID-19 has tested almost every country. Russia has also faced severe challenges and has now overtaken China with confirmed coronavirus cases totaling as of May 1 over 114,000. Russia’s recently installed prime minister, Mikhail Mishustin, is himself among COVID-19’s victims. As coronavirus ravages Russia, it’s worth recalling how President Putin returned to power, how he has retained it, and what challenges coronavirus poses to the stability of the Kremlin.

Putin’s Rise to Power

The slow collapse of the USSR threw Russia into chaos during the 1990s, characterized by political incompetence of the opportunistic Yeltsin administration and the economic turmoil of “shock therapy.” During the mayhem of the 1990s, Vladimir Putin managed to transition from his relatively unknown stature as mayor of St. Petersburg to beat out key Russian political figures such as former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov and former mayor of Moscow Yury Luzhkov.

Putin’s first administration saw the Russian economy rebound on the back of rising oil prices while his court consolidated power from various oligarchs that had challenged United Russia as the dominant political party. Dmitri Medvedev’s brief ascendance to the Presidency, viewed as an opportunity for a “recharge” in U.S.-Russia relations by the Obama administration, came to a swift end when Putin pushed Medvedev out of power as a result of the decision to abstain from the United Nation Security Council vote to allow a NATO-backed coalition to intervene in the Libyan Civil War that ultimately led to the fall of dictator Muammar Gaddafi. Putin was ushered back into the presidency by United Russia’s party apparatus, sparking huge protests like the one the day prior to Putin’s inauguration which drew 20,000 people to Bolotnaya Square. These protests led to the repression that Putin has utilized in the eight years since his return to presidency.  

Putin’s second administration has brought sweeping changes to the current authoritarian character of the Russian state. By leveraging identity politics that divide the Russian public, Putin has been able to maintain a high degree of popularity, while undertaking xenophobic and discriminatory initiatives that advance United Russia’s vision of national conservatism. Whereas Putin’s first administration saw a brief flirtation with the Russian Orthodox Church, since 2012 he has brought the church to a key role in Russian politics. This nexus runs deep into the Russian state to the point where it is now a key tenet that influences the strategy and ideology behind Russia’s nuclear triad.

The nexus of state and church has remained steadfast in the midst of the ongoing pandemic as the Orthodox church opens up a new cathedral complete with mosaics depicting scenes from the age of Stalin to figures currently in the court of Putin as well as a motorcade of the Patriarch Kirill deployed to parade a holy icon around Moscow to ward off COVID-19.  However, as many protests have demonstrated, the combined appeals of the Kremlin’s collaboration with the Orthodox Church and calls to remember how Putin “brought Russia up from its knees.” may not be as stable as one might presume at first glance.

COVID-19 in Russia

The insecurities laid bare by the austerity politics of two decades of Putinism have generated a crisis in Russia. Critical care is being denied as hospitals and providers are overwhelmed by victims. The stark medical disparities around the country, from affluent areas in urban centers, such as Moscow and St. Petersburg, to rural provinces, have contributed to the spread of COVID-19 throughout Russia. Oblasts far from Moscow have been hit particularly hard as the political responses to the pandemic are mixed—varying widely across regions and highlighting the overall ineffectiveness and corruption of the Russian state.

Russians exposed to COVID-19 now have to contend with their information being posted on social media sites, where they are subsequently harassed with little possibility of legal recourse. The Levada center reports that 48% of Russians are dissatisfied with their government’s response, and unpopularity levels are even higher among lower ranking politicians. Unpopularity and discontent is compounded not only by the response from the central Russian government, but also by Putin’s gamble with OPEC+ in attempting to deal a blow to the shale industry in the United States. This gamble has backfired and ended up alienating potential partners, predominantly throughout the Middle East.

Putin’s move to cut oil production without coordination with Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman led the two petro-states into a game of brinksmanship that turned oil’s futures prices negative for the first time in history and a retreat to the bargaining table. A testament to the power of those in the inner circle of Putin’s court, Rosneft CEO Igor Sechin was the primary advocate for this price war that ended up with an agreement put forth by President Trump in an attempt to allay economic concerns on behalf all three of the major oil producers.

Russia as a Global Power

The Kremlin, like most global powers, learned major lessons from 2008’s financial crisis—especially with regards to maintaining reserve currency to ward off the collapse of the ruble and its ripple effect on the Russian economy. To this day, the shock of the Russian Central Bank’s move to let the ruble float, coupled with the effects of sanctions imposed by the West following the annexation of Crimea in 2014 have had negative repercussions in key economic indicators such as wealth inequality, foreign investment, and GDP growth. Economic stagnation, fused with moves by the Kremlin to cut the safety net of everyday Russians ever lower with a proposal to cut pensions in 2018, has drawn massive protests against Putin’s policies from the public at large. As a part of China’s global, revisionist, and structural trend under Xi Jinping, Beijing has used shoring up gaps in sovereign credit as a means to propel both the Russian economy and China’s vision for the future.

For Russia, which has found itself internationally isolated in the wake of its 2014 intervention in Ukraine, China’s rise has been beneficial to maintaining its status quo. Although Russians fear the status of junior partner to China’s rising power, Moscow’s concerns ring hollow in the face of Chinese purchasing power. Between 2000-2014, Russia was the largest recipient of Chinese economic aid at around $36.6 worth of agreements. While Russia has banned Chinese citizens from crossing into the country in light of the pandemic, China has responded by offering economic and medical aid. Amidst the global backlash to the COVID-19 pandemic, it's possible that China and Russia may grow closer as China’s partnerships recede. Simultaneously, as Russia struggles amid its inability to deal with the pandemic, Moscow’s foreign policy agenda in the region, including in Syria and Ukraine, remains uncertain.

Stability has long been a key argument and selling point by United Russia as it retains power. However, as the pandemic and the subsequent economic losses in Russia have shown, especially with younger generations who have no memory of the tumultuous 1990s, this isn’t as stable as the Russian Silovik may hope. Especially in the wake of pandemics, when the economic pie shrinks, resources that might have otherwise gone to sociopolitical patrons of authoritarians are moved to other areas to shore up stability. It has become evident that President Putin’s moves to shake up the Kremlin within the past year indicate he does not feel as in-control as he has felt during the previous decades he’s already spent in power. The COVID-19 pandemic may bring more of these challenges yet to Russia in general and the Kremlin in particular.

About
Joel Blankenship
:
Joel Blankenship is a U.S. Army officer and a graduate of Kansas State University, where he received a BA in Political Science. While attending Kansas State, he was selected as a 2015 NSEP Boren scholar to Kyrgyzstan, where he studied Russian and Eurasian Studies.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.